Threat, Competition, and Mobilizing Structures: Motivational and Organizational Contingencies of the Civil Rights-Era Ku Klux Klan

Peter B. Owens,1 David Cunningham,2 and Geoff Ward3

1Washington University, St. Louis, 2Washington University, St. Louis, and 3University of California, Irvine

ABSTRACT

While previous studies of ethnic contention and conflict identify important structural and meso-level indicators of threat and competition, analysis of variation in the mechanisms linking these sources of potential grievance formation with mobilization remains unclear. To address this issue, this study explores the social organization of Ku Klux Klan mobilization in 1960s North Carolina. While regarded as a progressive state in the civil rights era, North Carolina exhibited a greater level of Klan mobilization than the rest of the South combined. We build on models of “mediated competition,” where ethnic competition and group threat are held as necessary, and propinquity, authority work, and legacies of previous racial violence link threat and competition with mobilization. Extending prior formulations centered on the discrete impact of individual components of competition, we employ fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to precisely specify the conjunctural conditions governing two modes of Klan mobilization: public rally events and the establishment of local organizational units. Our findings indicate that the mobilizing effects of threat and competition varied between rural and urban areas, and that threat/competition and organization/leadership play a dual role in translating collective grievances into mobilization.

KEYWORDS: vigilantism; social movements; racism; power relations; minority groups.

Theories of ethnic competition and conflict emphasize the motivating role of threat in producing collective action intended to preserve in-group resources and status-quo power relations (Blalock 1957, 1967). Such approaches have broad purchase, and have been compellingly applied to a gamut of contentious outcomes, including ethnic identification and the hardening of divisive attitudes (Coenders and Scheepers 2008; Ono 2002; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002), exclusionary criminal justice policies (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 2003), bloc voting behavior (Medrano 1994), riots and other forms of violent unrest (Bergeson and Herman 1998; Olzak 1989, 1990), and sustained social
movement activity (Cunningham and Phillips 2007; Luders 2010; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). While this broad applicability is typically viewed as a strength of the theoretical approach, its often generic adaptation to divergent contexts and outcomes also signals a lack of analytical precision.

Indeed, though competitive contexts regularly predict a variety of contentious outcomes, the ways in which these overarching contexts produce mobilization through interaction with mesolevel resources and processes are accounted for only indirectly. It thus remains unclear how analyses of reactive ethnic mobilization, defined here as collective attempts by nominal power-holding groups to reassert claims to political and/or economic resources that they perceive as being challenged or lost (Tilly 1978; Van Dyke and Soule 2002:499), should properly weigh the presence of broadly competitive contexts against the material, social, and strategic capacities of the organizations and institutions that mobilize around such grievances. Mediated competition models (Cunningham 2012, 2013) point to the importance of interactions between structural determinants of competition and threat, organizational infrastructures, and other mobilizing structures and dynamics, but studies have yet to test the degree to which this interplay varies across distinct forms of reactive mobilization or holds across diverse social contexts.

Additionally, predominant methodologies for demonstrating relationships between competitive contexts and contentious mobilizations operationalize dimensions of threat and competition as discrete variables that—when additively combined—predict outcomes. Such regression-based approaches are limited in their ability to specify the necessity or sufficiency of specific conditions to produce mobilization (Goertz and Mahoney 2012), or how some conditions may only become sufficient in the presence of other facilitating factors (Mackie 1965, 1980). Recent developments in comparative configurational methods (Ragin 2000, 2008) encourage a turn toward a more fluid sense of the combinatorial logics of ethnic mobilization. In addition, recent advances in mixed methods research provide useful avenues for combining cross-case analyses with in-depth comparisons between theoretically relevant cases (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013).

This study engages both of these critiques, applying fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) and detailed case comparisons to two distinct modes of reactive ethnic mobilization associated with the Ku Klux Klan in civil rights movement-era North Carolina. The 1960s rise of the “Carolina Klan” constituted the largest instantiation of the post-war Klan, with an estimated 12,000 members spread over nearly 200 local chapters, or “klaverns,” across the Tar Heel State (Cunningham 2013; U.S. House of Representatives 1967). The group’s success in mobilizing chapter memberships in North Carolina stemmed in part from its leaders’ pioneering organizing efforts, featuring an aggressive schedule of public rallies that helped to solicit financial support and build membership. These multi-faceted organizing efforts provide a dual analytic opportunity, allowing us to extend previous analyses of reactive ethnic mobilization (Blee 2003; Cunningham and Phillips 2007; Simi and Futrell 2010; Van Dyke and Soule 2002) through identification of the constitutive structures of two related but distinct forms of mobilization: the development of movement organizational capacity through the establishment of “klaverns,” and mobilization of popular support through public rally events.

Mediated competition approaches to reactive ethnic mobilization argue that individual sources of threat and competition are necessary but insufficient preconditions for actual mobilization (Cunningham 2012). In order to specify the mechanisms linking broadly competitive or threatening social contexts with reactive ethnic mobilization, we combine standard structural indicators with recent insights from social movement theory. In addition to assessing structural sources of demographic, economic, and political threat and competition, our mediated competition model of Klan mobilization incorporates four mediating factors: (1) the organizational capacity of ethnic challengers to mobilize around shared grievances (Andrews 2002; Edwards and McCarthy 2004); (2) propinquity between organizational units, facilitating the spread of networking and information across spatial contexts (Cunningham and Philips 2007); (3) authority work, or actions taken by movement leaders to demonstrate the unity and viability of a movement to potential followers (Einwohner 2007); and (4) legacies of previous racial violence, which enhance the appeal of vigilantism and
reduce the salience of mainstream political participation (McVeigh and Cunningham 2012; Messner, Baller, and Zevenbergen 2005).

In sum, the Carolina Klan case provides an opportunity to explain the constitutive structures of two distinct forms of reactive ethnic mobilization that emerged within the same state but occurred variably within different local contexts. We exploit the dual presence of these modes of mobilization to comparatively examine how a mediated competition model relates to each, and in particular to adjudicate across competition and threat versus organizing and leadership explanations for anti-civil rights activism in the state. We conclude by reflecting on how the mediated competition model and conjunctural analytical approach used here confirm and extend existing understandings of threat- and competition-based reactive ethnic mobilization.

**MOBILIZING THE CAROLINA KLAN: BACKGROUND**

The United Klans of America (UKA) was formed in 1961, and quickly consolidated the scattered memberships of various self-styled KKK outfits1 across the South to become the civil rights-era’s pre-eminent Klan organization. The Tar Heel State was widely viewed as perhaps the most progressive of the civil rights battleground states, showing greater signs of restraint and accommodation than Mississippi, Alabama, and others (Cunningham 2013; Key [1949] 1984; Walker 2009). However, the KKK thrived in North Carolina, drawing a membership that dwarfed that of Klan organizations elsewhere in the South, and becoming an important fount of anti-civil rights activity in the state. In part, the UKA’s success in North Carolina was due precisely to the state government’s accommodationist stance, which—combined with a population for whom civil rights posed a significant threat—meant that the KKK had broader appeal as the central institution willing to militantly speak out against civil rights reforms (Cunningham 2013). By 1965, the realm counted over ten thousand dues-paying members, surpassing its membership in all the rest of the South combined, and garrisoning these anti-civil rights activists with nearly 200 klaverns spread across the state.2

In terms of organization, the UKA was relatively diffuse, with several hundred local chapters, or klaverns, spread out across ten southern states. In North Carolina, it possessed a membership characterized by two “layers” (Cunningham 2013:69-71). The smaller layer was a militant core of organizers and leaders, many of whom had been active with the Klan since the 1950s or earlier, and were drawn into the UKA from previous Klan organizations such as Eldon Edwards’s U.S. Klans and James “Catfish” Cole’s North Carolina Knights. The UKA was able to recruit this militant core as a roughly intact bloc, creating a durable network able to “maintain . . . commitment to the Klan even in the absence of mass support” (Cunningham 2013:70). In North Carolina, where this core was also located in a particular region of the state and associated with specific local klaverns, we argue below that it provided a basis upon which to build organizational capacity and perform and deploy authority work. The larger layer was a diffuse groundswell of popular supporters “who tended to lack a deep connection to the Klan in general, and instead viewed the UKA as a vehicle to address race-based anxieties” (Cunningham 2013:70). Because of North Carolina’s relatively accommodationist stance regarding civil rights reforms, the UKA was able to position itself as an alternative institution of social control able and willing to resist challenges to the Jim Crow status quo. The militant core was crucial to this positioning, but popular support was also critical to maintaining the reputation and organizational infrastructure of the UKA through the collection of donations, the promotion of public visibility, and the mounting of social events that masked the KKK’s more nefarious political ends. As a result, the

---

1 In particular, the UKA drew much of its initial membership from organizations such as U.S. Klans (USK), founded by Eldon Edwards in Atlanta in 1954 (Cunningham 2013:38-42). Bob Jones, the future grand dragon of North Carolina for the UKA, was formerly an assistant to the USK North Carolina Grand Dragon Thurman Miller.

2 Formally a regional organization with national aspirations, the UKA adopted a federated structure, with the group’s national leader, “Imperial Wizard” Robert Shelton, presiding over a set of “realms,” or statewide outfits, each headed by a “grand dragon.” Within each realm, state officers oversaw local chapters (dubbed “klaverns”) that, in turn, were each run by an “exalted cyclops” and other officers charged with responsibility over finances, recruitment, rally organization, and so on.
two layers of membership and involvement in the North Carolina UKA represented a “symbiotic
dual structure” (Cunningham 2013:70).

This structure was also reflected in two overlapping but distinct modes of reactive ethnic mobilization
by the UKA. The first mode focused on the development of local klaverns, which served as a
dedicated organizational infrastructure and resource for the movement that could aid in further mobi-
lization. Klaverns functioned as meeting spaces for county-level UKA activity, and housed the admin-
istrative and financial apparatus for each county. In contrast, public Klan rallies were organized by
local klaverns, and were intended primarily for a public audience of sympathizers and curious on-
lookers rather than for members themselves. While rallies functioned primarily as popular recruit-
ment mechanisms and terroristic spectacles within the communities where they occurred, they also
served an important financial function through gathering donations and other forms of revenue3 used
to support existing organizational capacity. Thus, rallies both reflected local organizational capacities
and served as a means to build klavern capacity.

Although North Carolina in general exhibited levels of UKA mobilization that dwarfed the rest of
the South, this mobilization did not occur evenly across all areas of the state. In addition, because of the
layered membership profile of the UKA, the development of strong organizational capacity in a county
did not always guarantee mass popular mobilization in rally attendance. These variations in the two
modes of mobilization, displayed in Figures 1 and 2, demonstrate that the development of organiza-
tional capacity and the mobilization of mass public support through rallying were connected but distinct
collective phenomena that may have drawn on different bases for mobilization during this period.

GRIEVANCES, REACTIVE ETHNIC MOBILIZATION, AND THE MEDIATED
COMPETITION PERSPECTIVE

Ethnic competition theory seeks to explain how the presence of inter-group competition relates to
the emergence of racial and ethnic conflict, reactionary lawmaking, bloc voting behaviors, and other
collective efforts to preserve accumulated in-group privileges and resources against perceived out-
group challenges. Typically associated with collectives bound by a shared ethnic identity, such expla-
nations posit that the salience of group bonds generally increases in the presence of competition for
scarce resources (Barth 1969), especially in contexts where ethnic identification and mobilization are
more likely to occur (Medrano 1994). As ethnic group boundaries harden in an effort to “close
ranks,” possibilities for ethnic mobilization increase (Hannan 1979; Olzak 1992), but this outcome
remains contingent on other contextual factors, including organizational and other resource bases of
mobilization capacity (Edwards and McCarthy 2004; McCarthy and Zald 1977). This theoretical ap-
proach overlaps with theories that examine the mobilizing influence of perceived threat to status quo
arrangements, especially as these relate to racial or ethnic stratification (Blalock 1967; Einwohner and
Maher 2011; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Maher 2010; Reese, Giedraitis, and Vega 2005; Van Dyke
and Soule 2002). Blalock’s power-threat thesis holds that as minority groups grow and accumulate re-
sources, they threaten majority control, creating “a fear of political power [shifting to] the minority,”
and thus encouraging the majority to intensify efforts to maintain dominance (Blalock 1967:147).
This ability to reassert dominance is contextual and possibly fleeting in that it depends on power im-
balance, a contingency similarly based on mobilization capacity.

Empirical studies in these areas have long demonstrated that various structural indicators of ethnic
competition and racial group threat relate to a wide range of contentious outcomes, including but not
limited to reactive ethnic mobilization. These structural bases are commonly located within three dis-
crete sets of factors. Demographic threat indicators focus on increasing levels of ethnic overlap within

3 By 1965, the FBI estimated that the Carolina Klan was taking in an average of $229 per rally in donations. Those interested in
joining could pay a $10 initiation fee, plus $10-$15 for Klan robes and $2 per month in dues. Monthly financial reports on these
various revenue streams were submitted by each klavern to the UKA’s central state office in Granite Quarry, the Rowan County
home of state leader Bob Jones (Cunningham 2013:45-46).
Figure 1. Klaverns in North Carolina Counties, 1966
Figure 2. Average Rally Attendance, North Carolina Counties, 1964-67
geographic units, which increase the potential for contentious social interactions between conflicting groups as well as the likelihood that majority groups perceive status threats from visible minorities (Bergeson and Herman 1998; Blalock 1967; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Economic competition indicators center on the presence of significant racial/ethnic overlap in certain labor niches, often exacerbated by declining economic purchasing power for majority group members (Beck and Tolnay 1990; Bonacich 1972; McVeigh 1999; Olzak 1992; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Political threat indicators focus on active mobilization by minority group interests or changes in political institutions that shift political power and entitlements away from dominant ethnic groups (Cunningham and Philips 2007; McVeigh 1999; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Social movement research suggests that minority political mobilization, and the rearrangements of political power and resources it may cause, are powerful incentives for reactive countermovement mobilization (Andrews 2002; Zald and Useem 1987).

Social movement scholars have repeatedly emphasized ways in which collective processes and outcomes are mediated by characteristics of proximate institutional, social, and political environments. Mediating factors include organizational capacity and the presence of elite allies (Soule and Olzak 2004), the interaction of movement strategy with political context and public opinion (Agnone 2007; Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005), and exposure to salient collective action frames (McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink 2004). The primacy of mediation processes in social movement studies begs consideration of how similar processes may be at work within episodes of ethnic and racial contention. Thus, while structural findings noted above illustrate the robustness of the ethnic competition and threat perspective, they also reflect the limited development of its analytic apparatus. Though traditional competition and threat analyses identify factors that enable or disenable perceived competition or threat to translate into inter-group conflict and reactionary social control efforts, they tend not to directly analyze how variation in these factors conditions positive or negative mobilization outcomes. Consequently, we still possess what Charles Tilly (1991) called “a shaky grip on the negative question: of the thousands of possible bases for ethnic mobilization, why do only a certain few materialize” (p. 572)?

Recent research has sought to tighten this grip by directing theoretical attention to mediating structures and processes. Here, we draw on associated work on how organizational capacities enable the activation of ethnic identities (Nielson 1985) and translate threats into action (Andrews 2002; Cunningham 2013), as well as Rory McVeigh’s (2009) sense of how organizational frames and infrastructures provide resources to marshal extant ethnically driven grievances. Our analysis examines whether threat and competition motivates distinct forms of reactive ethnic mobilization in similar or divergent ways, as well as explicitly weighing the impact of local organizational capacity, authority work, and other mediating factors. To do so, we utilize a mediated competition model (Cunningham 2012, 2013), which seeks to extend traditional ethnic competition frameworks by emphasizing the relational bases of interethnic contention that tend to vary across mesolevel social contexts. Variation in these bases should therefore differentially influence how ethnic actors in those environments come to perceive certain social arrangements as inimitable to their group-based interests, and form strategies of action around these concerns (Cunningham 2013:7-10). The approach provides an adaptable framework for analysis that focuses on interactions between structural and mesolevel mechanisms of competition and conflict, and their effects on mobilization processes in different social environments. If valid, this flexible framework should be applicable to the same broad range of social control efforts as traditional competition models. Here we also aim to refine previous qualitative analyses of mediated ethnic competition (Cunningham 2012, 2013) by utilizing a multi-method comparative approach that enables us to identify the complex and conjunctural pathways to reactive ethnic mobilization. In doing so we draw from cross-state tendencies in UKA mobilization identified in previous regression analyses (Cunningham and Philips 2007) in order to develop a highly nuanced regional portrait of the mechanisms driving the UKA’s explosive growth.
Mediating Factors Linking Threat, Competition, and Mobilization

In its initial applications, the mediated competition approach yielded causal insights into specific relational mechanisms that link conducive political environments with reactive mobilization outcomes. Most notably, political moderation towards minority rights-based challenges, the lack of effective countermovement policing by authorities, tangible neighborhood-level political and occupational gains by minority groups, and the tactical choices of local supremacist leaders, together linked sources of potential political and economic grievances with the UKA’s mobilization efforts (Cunningham 2012, 2013). Here we conceptualize the state’s generally moderate political climate and lack of effective klan policing as context-setting conditions that, while generally necessary for the UKA to mobilize across the state, cannot explain regional variation in mobilization outcomes. In order to account for this variation, we extend previous qualitative attention to the role of tangible minority occupational gains and leadership strategies by operationalizing these factors as regionally varying collective mechanisms in our model, as discussed below.

Insights from recent social movement studies inform our theoretical predictions of how demographic, economic, and political bases for ethnic grievance formation become mobilized into reactive ethnic contention. Our mediated competition model thus focuses on four sets of mediating factors that link threatening and competitive contexts with Klan mobilization. First, as a rich tradition of resource mobilization scholarship has indicated, the basic availability of resources for collective action makes its occurrence much more likely (Cress and Snow 1996; Edwards and McCarthy 2004; McCarthy and Zald 1977). While there are a variety of resource types available to movements (McCarthy and Zald 2001), here we focus on organizational resources that determine the capacity of a movement to mobilize around shared perceptions of threat (Andrews 2002; McVeigh 1999, 2009).

In the case of the North Carolina Klan, the key initial step in local mobilization was the formation of a “klavern,” the county-level organizational unit of the UKA (Cunningham 2013). Klavern formation reflected two key aspects of organizational capacity. First, their emergence in particular locales was enabled by the activation of Klan networks, as the UKA’s leadership core featured a set of organizers who traveled throughout the state to recruit like-minded adherents to formalize their KKK sympathies. Second, following initial formation these local chapters served as dedicated movement infrastructure (Andrews 1997), housing county-level administrative apparatus, providing venues for meetings and events, as well as a publicly accessible venue for recruitment. It is therefore unlikely that popular mobilization by the Klan, such as its regular hosting of large rallies, would be possible in a given locale without the initial development of such basic organizational capacities. We expect that organizational resources were a necessary precondition for popular mobilization by the North Carolina Klan.

Second, spatially proximate anti-civil rights organizational infrastructures, such as the presence of klaverns in neighboring counties, may provide various normative impulses and organizational networks and resources to draw upon, directly or indirectly, in later mobilizing efforts. Mobilizing capacities related to propinquity effects (the probability of forming relationships with those frequently encountered) should be greatest where communities are broadly and deeply connected to surrounding areas of Klan activity, as such connectedness increases the density, practicality, and salience of recruiting appeals (Cunningham and Phillips 2007; Strang and Soule 1998). It is therefore likely that areas nearest to densely clustered Klan-active counties exhibit higher levels of klavern development and public rally attendance. While we do not possess systematic county-level data on preexisting Klan networks from earlier cycles of klan activity in the 1950s, we use available historical evidence to address the roles these networks played in statewide organizing efforts in our discussion section below.

Third, we focus on the important role of leadership in the emergence of collective action (Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry 2001; Morris and Staggenborg 2004). As public representatives, leaders are often the primary communicative agents for movement claims and strategies (Morris and Staggenborg 2004:183; Robnett 1996). Apart from these communicative tasks, leaders must also demonstrate the movement’s unity and viability in the eyes of potential members,
as well as maintain internal movement cohesion throughout the mobilization process, through a process Rachel Einwohner (2007) terms “authority work.” In North Carolina, national Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton, state Grand Dragon Bob Jones, and other UKA officials were tireless in their efforts to make appearances at hundreds of Klan rallies across the state (Cunningham 2013:39, 46), in order to keep their finger on the pulse of membership. These appearances served partly as rally attendance boosters, since Shelton and Jones enjoyed something of a celebrity status (Kurzman et al. 2007) within the Klan world, and their appearances were featured prominently in rally advertisements. Beyond boosting attendance, appearances also served important organizational functions similar to those highlighted by Einwohner (2007). As a highly diffuse organization comprised of hundreds of klaverns, the UKA needed to pursue leadership strategies that would ensure organizational solidarity and commitment, and minimize the likelihood of local corruption and graft. The visibility of national and state leaders in local Klan events, in particular rallies and other public gatherings, thus served dual bureaucratic and charismatic functions (Andreas 2007) in popular Klan recruitment and mobilization.

Fourth, in addition to these organizational and leadership dimensions, a particularly strong legacy of racial violence (e.g., prior lynching), signaling extreme racial socialization and a culture of violence that may endure over many decades (Messner et al. 2005; Petersen and Ward 2015; Tolnay and Beck 1995), may further define the “character” of a locale, enhancing the cultural resonance of race-based vigilantism and loosening the hold of established authorities to control violence (McVeigh and Cunningham 2012). Especially in the case of the Ku Klux Klan, an organization principally committed to violence and intimidation, such contexts are likely to provide a powerful symbolic resource for reactive anti-civil rights mobilization. While lynching was less common in “border South” states (Tolnay and Beck 1995), several North Carolina counties exhibited high levels of white on black lynching in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Local environments marked by an unusually strong legacy of racial violence may provide facilitative cultural and institutional contexts (McVeigh and Cunningham 2012; Williams 2004) within which the militant and vigilantist claims of the UKA would be more likely to resonate. We thus expect levels of Klan organizational development and rally attendance to be most pronounced in areas with stronger legacies of previous racial violence.

Complex Causation and Comparative Analysis

Beyond testing the impact of these mediating factors in linking structural arrangements to reactive ethnic mobilization, we also wish to specify the combinatorial logics through which these various factors interact and combine together. To do so, we use configurational and comparative analysis to identify the combinations of factors that shaped mobilization patterns across diverse contexts. As Cress and Snow (2000:1070) note, the explanatory strength of individual factors does not always “reside solely in the strength of their association with a particular outcome, but in the more complex ways they interact with each other.”

This insight is especially important for mediated competition approaches to ethnic collective action, since previous studies of ethnic contention have identified important cross-case tendencies, but tend to overlook differences between the causal processes at work within specific cases. Comparative configurational methods direct attention towards the complex ways in which threat, competition, and mobilization are constitutively linked within specific contexts. This approach facilitates identification of necessary, sufficient, and INUS conditions, which traditional regression-based approaches are generally unable to assess, but are nevertheless key to social scientific explanation (Goertz and Mahoney 2012).

---

4 For instance, it is unlikely that demographics alone would be sufficient to yield ethnic mobilization without the addition of either economic competition or political threats that would locate such ethnic overlap within the locus of perceived threat or competition (e.g., Blalock 1967; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). It is thus plausible that demographic threat would operate as an “INUS” condition: a condition that is an individually necessary (IN) component of a larger causal combination that is unnecessary but sufficient (US) for an outcome (Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Mackie 1965, 1980).
DATA AND METHODS

Our data focus on two distinct modes of anti-civil rights mobilization in North Carolina. First, we utilize historical data on the establishment of UKA klaverns. These data are compiled from the House Un-American Activities Committee’s (HUAC) congressional hearings in 1965 and 1966, FBI intelligence reports, and subpoenaed klavern bank records (see Cunningham and Philips 2007). Second, we merge these klavern data with additional information on county-level rallying by the UKA. Drawn from FBI, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, and North Carolina State Highway Patrol field reports, these rallies compile attendance, location, and other characteristics of 205 rallies that occurred between May 1964 and December 1967. While this is not a complete population of rallies, as particular months’ reports are absent from the policing records included in the North Carolina State Archives, these missing records appear to reflect random bureaucratic omission associated with the scattershot archiving process. Thus, we find no reason to believe that obvious biases are associated with which rallies were included or excluded in this count. For additional county characteristics, we utilize federal census data for 1960. For data on the incidence of previous racial violence, we make use of Stewart Tolnay and E. M. Beck’s (1995) database of known lynchings occurring in North Carolina counties between 1882 and 1930.

Our analysis employs two models: one for counties that exhibited organizational (i.e., klavern) development by the UKA, and another for counties that exhibited high average attendance for UKA public rallies. Each analysis uses the full population of viable North Carolina counties as the unit of analysis, giving each model an N of 76.5

For both analyses, we utilize fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin 2000, 2008; Ragin, Drass, and Darey 2006). In fsQCA, variables become reconfigured as qualitatively defined sets that display continuous levels of membership between 0 and 1, with 0 being the absolute absence of a condition, 1 being the absolute presence of a condition, and .5 being the point of “maximum ambiguity.” Cases possess differing levels of membership across various sets. For example, if one were to use American universities as their cases of interest, Harvard’s membership in the set of “highly prestigious universities” would likely be quite high. Conversely, Harvard would likely have very low membership in the set “universities that admit undergraduates with low SAT scores.” This example shows that any case’s membership levels in both explanatory and outcome sets depend on how these sets are qualitatively defined and quantitatively calibrated by the analyst (see below for calibration discussion and procedures). This definition and calibration, in turn, relies on the analyst’s knowledge of relevant causal processes working within the cases under investigation.

Once set membership levels have been defined and calibrated, fuzzy-set analysis proceeds by comparing the levels of set membership that cases possess for all explanatory factors, and empirically linking these combinations to the presence (> .5 set membership) of an outcome. After identifying these combinations, fsQCA next logically reduces them using its “truth table” algorithm (Ragin et al. 2006), which eliminates redundancy between identified causal combinations. For instance, if one case exhibiting an outcome has explanatory factors A and B present (i.e., both A and B are > .5), and a second case that is linked to the same outcome has only factor A present (i.e., A is > .5 and B is < .5), then factor B would be dropped from the identified solution since it is, logically speaking, superfluous to the outcome (it may still be a relevant, albeit secondary, explanatory factor within this second case). For our purposes, fsQCA offers unique analytic advantages because of its ability to assess causal complexity, the necessity and sufficiency of

5 While North Carolina has 100 counties, we exclude the 24 counties comprising the western mountain region given their near-total absence of sustained UKA activity and, relatedly, the region’s relative lack of African American residents, removing the primary demographic basis for racial tension. For this analysis we are primarily interested in cases that exhibited the presence of either basic predictors or outcomes of interest. While the exclusion of cases that do not exhibit theoretically relevant variation is anathema in conventional quantitative research, it does not affect the results of qualitative comparative analysis since the integrity of analytic results are not tied to model standard errors (for further discussion, see Ragin 1987:10-16)
different factors for an outcome, and its attention to outlying cases as opportunities for the refinement of theory (Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Ragin 2008).

There are two measures of set-theoretic connection in fuzzy-set QCA: consistency and coverage. As proportions, both scores fall between 0 and 1. Consistency is associated with set-theoretic sufficiency, and assesses the degree to which values in single or INUS (i.e., $A \cap B$) conditions comprise a subset of the outcome. The formula for consistency is:

$$\frac{\sum \min(x_i, y_i)}{\sum x_i}.$$  

Generally, scores above .8 demonstrate a strong set-theoretic connection between a causal solution and an outcome (Ragin 2008). A similar consistency calculation tests set-theoretic necessity, assessing the degree to which singular or unified sets of causal conditions comprise a superset out the outcome. Here all $Y_i$ values are substituted for $X_i$ values in the denominator:

$$\frac{\sum \min(x_i, y_i)}{\sum y_i}.$$  

Coverage is also associated with set-theoretic necessity, and assesses the degree to which singular or INUS sufficient conditions are present relative to the total presence of an outcome. Coverage is calculated using the formula:

$$\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \min(x_i, y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} y_i}.$$  

This formula expresses the relation of the sum of those $x$-values that are consistent with the statement that $x$ is sufficient for $y$ and the sum of $y$ values. Coverage demonstrates the empirical triviality or importance of a sufficient solution (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009:122). High coverage is not required to establish a set-theoretic connection, but is an important consideration in overall explanation. In fsQCA (Ragin et al. 2006), once a group of causal solutions (combinations of conditions) that are all at least .8 consistent with a relationship of set-theoretic sufficiency for an outcome is identified, the set is logically reduced into more parsimonious solutions where redundancy between similar solutions is eliminated.6

In order to permit transformation of our initial interval-ratio data into fuzzy sets, we utilize the “direct” method of fuzzy-set calibration (Ragin 2008:89-94). This method requires the researcher to specify values on an interval-ratio scale that correspond to three qualitative anchors of set membership: the threshold for full membership (.95), the threshold for full non-membership (.05), and the crossover point (.5, neither in nor out of the set). FsQCA uses these thresholds as benchmarks to compute the log-odds of membership for each case (i.e., county) in each set, which are then transformed into fuzzy sets. The process of calibrating our data is detailed in the overview of the analytic models below. For measures that lack established substantive thresholds or external standards to guide calibration, we rely on knowledge of the empirical distribution of cases within our data (Ragin 2008). The calibration thresholds used in the data transformation, and the distribution of cases between these threshold points, are shown in Table 1.

---

6 For instance, if the solutions $A \cap B \cap C$ (A present AND B present AND C present) and $A \cap \sim B \cap C$ (A present AND NOT B present AND C present) are found to be both highly consistent, they would then be reduced to one solution: $A \cap C$. This is because B has been found to be logically superfluous in constituting the outcome.
Our first fsQCA analysis focuses on assessing factors constitutively linked with the development of UKA organizational capacity through the establishment of klaverns. Here our model uses five quantitative indicators found to be significantly associated with the development of klaverns in a previous analysis (Cunningham and Philips 2007:802-03): percent non-white, median white income, degree of racial overlap in manufacturing sectors, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) mobilization, the presence of proximate organizational resources, and strong legacies of previous racial violence. The previous analysis used negative binomial regression; here we re-perform the analysis using fsQCA. The outcome set “counties with significant klavern presence” was calibrated using the following thresholds: full non-membership occurs where no klaverns existed; the crossover threshold is .95 klaverns; and the threshold for full membership is five established klaverns (one standard deviation above the mean and median of two).

Of course, no counties existed with only 95 percent of a klavern. This calibration allows us to differentiate between the set membership of counties where only one klavern was established (just barely over the threshold for membership) and those where numerous klaverns emerged. This draws from our substantive historical knowledge that the establishment of a klavern by the UKA in a southern county was a major organizational achievement, and that any further development beyond this level was even more rare and important.
minimally requires a substantial (i.e., not low) level of black population, and incorporate additional knowledge of the distribution of empirical data.

To assess economic conditions that would provide proximate structural bases for ethnic competition, we construct two economic fuzzy sets. First, “counties with general white poverty” uses median white family income for 1960. To calibrate this measure, we use the Census’s Orshansky poverty thresholds, developed in 1963 to define and measure poverty levels in the United States (Fisher 1992). The threshold for full membership in the set is the official poverty line for a family of four ($3,130); the crossover threshold is 1.5 times this level ($4,695); and the threshold for full non-membership is two times this level ($6,260). To assess the potential for conflictive social contact in working-class labor markets, we use an additional measure of the ratio of non-white to white manufacturing workers in a given county. The fuzzy-set “counties with high racial overlap in manufacturing sectors” is calibrated using .1 as the threshold for full non-membership, .2 as the point of maximum ambiguity, and .6 as the threshold for full membership.

To assess political threats presented by increasing civil rights mobilization, we calibrate the fuzzy-set “counties with rapidly increasing civil rights infrastructure” using the percentage of increase in NAACP chapters and youth councils in a county between 1960 and 1964. Using the percentage of increase, rather than the raw number of chapters present by 1964, builds on previous findings that Klan mobilization in North Carolina was most likely in areas where minority political mobilization had rapidly increased recently, rather than areas with an established presence alone (Cunningham and Philips 2007). The threshold for full non-membership is a 50 percent increase; the crossover threshold is 99 percent (making counties where the level of NAACP organization doubled just over the boundary for membership); and the threshold for full membership is a 200 percent increase.

To assess the degree to which organizational capacities may have had effects across county lines (Cunningham and Philips 2007), we calibrate the fuzzy-set “counties with strong neighboring organizational capacity” using the percentage of neighboring (i.e., bordering) counties with at least two klaverns established. In lieu of established substantive guidelines for calibrating levels of membership, we use knowledge of the empirical distribution of our data: 95 percent is the threshold for full membership; 49 percent for the crossover threshold; and 5 percent as the threshold for full non-membership.

To assess the legacy of previous racial violence, we utilize counts of previous lynching events within a county between 1882 and 1930. Lynching was relatively rare in North Carolina (Tolnay and Beck 1995), so we expect lynchees to have predicted latent effects on Klan mobilization where their occurrence was sufficiently pronounced to sustain this legacy many decades later. Accordingly, we calibrate our fuzzy-set “counties with strong legacies of previous racial violence” using quite exclusive thresholds: the threshold for full membership is five previous lynchings (only three counties—Johnston, Rowan, and Chatham—are at or above this threshold); the crossover threshold is four (two additional counties—Beaufort and Granville—fall above), and the threshold for full non-membership is one.

**Rally Attendance**

The rally attendance analysis focuses on explaining North Carolina counties that had particularly large public rally attendance between 1964 and 1967. To create the fuzzy-set “counties with large average rally attendance,” we calibrate attendance using the empirical distribution of data as follows: the threshold for full membership is 1,000 attendees per rally; the crossover threshold is 300 people per rally; and the threshold for full non-membership is 50 people per rally. Our choice of crossover point is slightly lower than the median attendance of 350 per rally—we do so because this slightly lower threshold allows us to include counties that had generally high rally attendance prior to 1967, but where attendance declined precipitously in that year (principally as a result of FBI and state policing operations against the UKA and other Klan organizations; see Cunningham 2004).
The independent measures for the rally analysis incorporate the previous six measures from the klavern development model, but also include two new explanatory factors. First, we include the outcome set on klavern development as an independent set in this second analysis. This incorporation does not affect the order of causality between our two dependent variables, since after 1963 klaverns were always established in a county as an initial organizational step prior to the mobilization of mass public rallies and demonstrations, with subsequent rallies proposed, organized, and hosted by those local klaverns (Cunningham 2013). Second, we use another measure of the number of public appearances made by state and national UKA leaders at rallies in a county. Here we calibrate the fuzzy-set “counties with strong public leadership presence” as follows: the threshold for full membership is 4 rally appearances; the crossover threshold is .95; and the threshold for full non-membership is 0.

RESULTS

Identifying Necessary Conditions

Before assessing the individual and joint sufficiency of the causal factors using fsQCA, we first conduct consistency tests to identify necessary conditions. This step is important, not only because necessary conditions form an integral part of causal explanation in comparative research (Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Goertz and Starr 2003), but also because fsQCA’s truth table analysis is oriented towards identification of sufficient and INUS conditions. Tests for necessity are thus an important preliminary step in fuzzy-set analysis, and aid the interpretation of results (Ragin 2000:212; Schneider and Wagemann 2010). From a set-theoretic point of view, necessary conditions can be defined as a subset-superset relationship, where the condition of interest is a consistent superset of the outcome. Our mediated competition model holds that individual sources of threat and competition are a necessary but perhaps insufficient basis for actual reactive ethnic mobilization to occur. Tests for necessary conditions allow us to assess the degree to which this statement is true: the degree to which individual threat and competition indicators, as well as the mediating organizational and leadership factors, comprise consistent supersets of the two outcome sets. Conditions found to be “almost always necessary” can be thought of as INUS conditions whose relationship to an outcome is strongly consistent (> .8) with necessity (Ragin 2003, 2008:53). Likewise, more empirically relevant necessary conditions will be those that also possess a higher proportion of coverage, meaning that their presence is more likely when the outcome is present rather than absent (Mahoney et al. 2009:119).

Results of the necessity tests for each mobilization condition are presented in Table 2. While no single condition is found to be an “all or nothing” necessary condition for either klavern development or rally attendance, we can see that several conditions are INUS conditions that are “almost always” necessary, since they fall above a .8 threshold for consistency. In particular, general white poverty and large black population are close to necessary for both klavern development and rally attendance. While political threat is not consistently necessary, its high coverage score for klavern development suggests it is still an important INUS condition that is more sufficient than necessary. Neighboring klavern capacity also falls short of being a consistent necessary condition, and thus also appears to be more sufficient than necessary. Legacies of previous racial violence are the least necessary condition, and thus most empirically trivial, but are also the most strongly sufficient INUS condition for both models. In other words, while counties with strong legacies of violence are few in number, they almost always exhibited high levels of klan mobilization. We also find that klavern organizational capacity is consistently necessary for the mobilization of large rally attendance, and is the most empirically central condition in the model.

After performing probabilistic verification tests on necessity results (Ragin 2003), we find that only the “unified” threat and competition set is found to be significantly greater than a .8 consistency threshold for both outcomes (note that significance refers here and everywhere after to the results of Wald F tests for the difference between two proportions). This “unified” set combines together the demographic, economic, and political indicators using logical “or,” which uses the maximum
membership score for all three sets (Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Ragin 2008). These results demonstrate that the strong presence of at least one threat or competition factor is very close to necessary for both forms of klan mobilization. However, because their consistency is less than one, the results also indicate the existence of alternative pathways to reactive ethnic mobilization in a few locales that did not possess strong ethnic threat or competition indicators. Taken together with the other results, these findings indicate that demographic threat and economic competition tend to be closer to necessary than sufficient conditions for klan mobilization, whereas political threat more closely approximates a sufficient but unnecessary condition. All three are important INUS conditions, and thus are likely to figure centrally in the fsQCA analyses below.

Assessing Causal Sufficiency using Fuzzy Sets

Having assessed the relative necessity of various conditions for different modes of reactive ethnic mobilization, we now turn to an assessment of causal sufficiency using fsQCA’s truth table algorithm (Ragin et al. 2006). FsQCA analysis produces three sets of results. The initial cross-case logical comparison and reduction, performed on solutions possessing at least .8 consistency and at least one empirical instantiation, yields a first set of “complex” solutions. Depending on the number of causal factors included and the complexity of the data, these solutions can often be difficult to interpret. In the next step, fsQCA incorporates counterfactual assumptions to produce a second, more parsimonious and interpretable set of “intermediate” solutions. Incorporation of counterfactuals addresses important issues of limited diversity in observational data (Ragin 2008:147-53). Because the theoretical foundations of our causal conditions lead us to expect that the presence of each condition would only make the outcomes more rather than less likely to occur, we incorporate only “easy” counterfactuals in this intermediate analysis (Ragin 2008:163-67). In addition to the intermediate set, further incorporation of all logically possibly counterfactuals produces a third set of most parsimonious solutions (Ragin 2008:169-72). While this third step is useful at identifying particularly central sufficient conditions within QCA solutions, the extreme parsimony of these results

Table 2. Necessary Condition Test Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Klavern Development</th>
<th>Rally Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic</td>
<td>.797</td>
<td>.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General white poverty</td>
<td>.824</td>
<td>.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing competition</td>
<td>.560</td>
<td>.759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>.660</td>
<td>.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Unified” set (Demo ∪ Econ ∪ Pol)</td>
<td>.942</td>
<td>.641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighboring klaverns</td>
<td>.663</td>
<td>.847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous racial violence</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>.897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klavern capacity</td>
<td>.848</td>
<td>.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader appearances</td>
<td>.362</td>
<td>.889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Represents logical “OR,” expressed as set union.
*p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 (one-tailed tests)

8 It is important to note that combining multiple factors using logical “or” is not a statement of causal conjunction (i.e., logical “and”), but rather implies the general substitutability of these conditions for each other in the constitution of a threatening or competitive environment. While this statement is rather broad, it is useful for identifying cases where alternative pathways (i.e., those not relying on threat and competition) to reactive mobilization may have been present.
can make useful explanation difficult. The “intermediate” solution thus represents the optimal set of results for causal explanation since it balances empirical complexity and explanatory parsimony.\(^9\)

The intermediate solutions for 76 North Carolina counties are displayed in Tables 3 and 4, with their respective consistency and coverage scores. Solutions with multiple conditions represent a conjunction (set intersection) of conditions that are jointly sufficient for the outcome. In each solution, conditions that remained after the most stringent counterfactual analysis (i.e., inclusion of all possible simplifying assumptions) are represented as “core” INUS conditions, whereas conditions only present in the intermediate solutions (inclusion of easy counterfactuals only) are represented as “contributing” INUS conditions. In order to identify possible region-level patterns, we present disaggregated fsQCA results for coastal and Piedmont counties in Appendix Tables A1 and A2.\(^10\)

We augment these substantive findings with probabilistic tests of intermediate solutions using Wald tests in Fuzzy 10.1 for Stata (Longest and Vaisey 2008), shown in Table 5. These verification methods draw from previous studies that use probabilistic tests to assess the robustness of fsQCA results (Amenta et al. 2012; Owens 2014). First, we test for significant differences in a solution’s membership in the positive (\(Y\)) versus negative (1-\(Y\)) outcome sets. In other words, this test (\(YvN\)) assesses the degree to which a solution is consistently linked with positive (> .5) outcomes, yet not consistently linked with negative (< .5) outcomes.\(^11\) The ability to account for asymmetric causal relations (i.e., the possibility that a given combination of factors can be empirically linked with both positive and negative outcomes) is one of the core attributes of set-relational methods (Ragin 2008:15-17). It is therefore important to combine fuzzy-set results with probabilistic verification methods when concerned primarily with positive outcomes, as we are in this

---

### Table 3. Intermediate Solutions for Klavern Development in North Carolina Counties, 1964-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal Conditions</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Substantial black population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing overlap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong NAACP mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighboring Klaverns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong legacy of racial violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>.859</td>
<td>.918</td>
<td>.907</td>
<td>.906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw coverage</td>
<td>.267</td>
<td>.468</td>
<td>.547</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique coverage</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total consistency</td>
<td>.851</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total coverage</td>
<td>.783</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(=\) core causal condition (present)
\(\square\) contributing causal condition (present)
\(\circ\) core causal condition (absent)
\(\Diamond\) contributing causal condition (absent)

---

9 Table C1, detailing the simplification process from complex to intermediate and parsimonious solutions, is available in an online appendix (see [http://socpro.oxfordjournals.org/](http://socpro.oxfordjournals.org/)).

10 Further analyses of negative (1-\(Y\)) outcomes yielded one solution sufficient for the absence of klavern development: ~racion_vh~neighbklav~naacpgrow~lowwhine~blackpop (Cons: .836, Cov: .290), which applies to only two counties. Analyses for negative rally outcomes yielded two solutions sufficient for low average rally attendance: ~racion_vh~neighbklav~naacpgrow (Cons: .837, Cov: .535), which applies to 14 counties, and ~leader^1~klav~racion_vh~neighbklav (Cons: .872, Cov: .524), which applies to 11 counties.

11 Because of the asymmetry of set relations in contrast to correlations (Ragin 2008:15-17), a solution’s high consistency (set-theoretic sufficiency) for a positive outcome does not preclude it also possessing high consistency with a negative outcome.
study. In doing so, we find that all klavern and rally solutions are significant at the .01 level with the exception of klavern solution 2, which is significant at the .1 level. A second test (YvV) assesses whether or not a solution’s consistency (i.e., causal sufficiency) is significantly greater than a baseline proportion of .8 (see Ragin 2000:273). Klavern solutions 1 through 3 are found to be significant at the .01 level, while klavern solution 4 is significant at .1. Rally solutions 1 and 3 are highly significant, while solutions 2 and 4 are not significantly greater than the baseline threshold.

Pathways to NC Klan Mobilization: Key Findings

For klavern development, we see that the solution with the best blend of consistency and empirical coverage, solution 3, represents counties with significant black populations and significant increases in NAACP mobilization. In addition, the combination of neighboring klavern capacity with either substantial increases in county NAACP mobilization or impoverished white populations, high rates of competition in manufacturing sectors, and substantial black populations (solutions 2 and 4), was also closely linked with klavern development. These three solutions support our previous contention that demographic threat operates as an INUS condition that is only sufficient for mobilization in the presence of political challenges or economic competition; specifically, in the context of sustained political and economic challenges to the Jim Crow status quo, these demographic factors increased the likelihood of conflictive social contact between blacks and aggrieved whites, providing a conducive environment for the development of UKA organizational strength.

It is also important to note the contingent role of neighboring organizational strength in developing within-county klan organizational presence in counties with distinct competition/threat profiles. In solution 2, we see that this proximate influence was key in developing in-county klaverns in areas where NAACP mobilization was also quite strong, while solution 4 demonstrates that ethnic overlap in sensitive manufacturing sectors was sufficient to promote UKA organizational growth when paired with general white impoverishment and significant demographic co-presence. Organizational resources thus were relatively central in mobilizing grievances that arose from distinct structural arrangements. The sufficiency of combined demographic co-presence and political threat in solution 3,
in the absence of proximate UKA organizational capacity, can likely be attributed to the success of statewide UKA framing efforts, which sought to link increased NAACP mobilization with latent white fears of dangerous changes to the political and racial status quo. In counties where such NAACP mobilization occurred alongside relatively large local black populations, this may have signaled the potential for even larger potential mobilization in the future, necessitating reactive mobilization by segregationists.

The most empirically trivial but also most highly consistent solution, solution 1, demonstrates that particularly strong legacies of racial violence alone were sufficient for klavern development in a small minority of central Piedmont counties (see results disaggregated by region in Appendix Table A1). Though its empirical coverage is low, this result is nevertheless theoretically relevant to our previous finding that some form of threat and competition is almost always necessary for reactive ethnic mobilization to occur, and thus may suggest the existence of an alternative causal pathway to klan organizational development. An additional consideration in weighing the import of this solution is its relatively low level of unique versus raw coverage. Unique coverage measures the proportion of an outcome covered by one solution, net of all other sufficient solutions: uniquely covered cases cannot possess membership in more than one solution.\textsuperscript{12} Comparing the raw and unique coverage of a solution thus helps assess the degree of case overlap between that solution and other solutions in the results. For solution 1, only one of six cases possesses unique membership in this solution. This means that counties with strong legacies of racial violence also usually exhibited factors conducive to threat or competition, with the exception of one particular case: Rowan County.

Direct comparison of the fsQCA findings for klavern development with previous linear models (Cunningham and Philips 2007:802-07) illustrates key tradeoffs between identifying cross-case

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Results of Wald’s Tests for Intermediate Solutions}
\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
\hline
\multicolumn{1}{c}{Solution} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{Ycons} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{Ncons (1-Y)} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{YvN} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{YvV (>.8)} \\
\hline
\textbf{Klavern development} & & & & \\
1. racviol\_vh & .924 & .555 & 19.07** & 11.09** \\
2. neighborklav \& naacpgrow & .918 & .419 & 57.26** & 19.86** \\
3. naacpgrow \& blackpop & .907 & .481 & 38.60** & 12.82** \\
4. neighborklav \& lowwhinc \& mfgcomp \& blackpop & .869 & .411 & 35.58** & 3.81† \\
\textbf{Rally attendance} & & & & \\
1. klav \& racviol\_vh \& leader & .989 & .680 & 11.06** & 784.63** \\
2. klav \& neighborklav \& naacpgrow \& ~lowwhinc & .880 & .675 & 3.6† & 2.41 \\
3. klav \& leader \& lowwhinc \& mfgcomp \& blackpop & .960 & .593 & 30.06** & 164.72** \\
4. klav \& neighborklav \& lowwhinc \& blackpop & .816 & .513 & 10.11** & .12 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{12} Case membership in fsQCA solutions is not mutually exclusive, and cases often possess membership in more than one. For example, solution 2’s relatively low unique coverage is likely due to membership overlap with solution 4, given that they share the same core condition. This means that almost 83 percent of counties that exhibited strong neighboring klavern capacity and strong NAACP mobilization also exhibited high levels of demographic and economic competition. Unique coverage is calculated by finding the solution coverage, then calculating the coverage of all sufficient conditions together except the solution of interest, and then subtracting the total value from the single solution value.
\end{flushright}
\end{table}
linear trends using regression methods, versus specifying the configurational means through which factors helped to constitute outcomes within specific cases. Specifically, while all factors included in the previous linear models were significantly associated with klavern development, our QCA results illustrate how different areas drew from distinct concatenations of threat and competition-based factors to mobilize organized klan activity. For instance, consideration of solutions 2 and 4 alongside the necessary conditions test results suggests that economic competition and political threat acted as interchangeable necessary conditions in mobilizing ethnic contention: either one or the other was almost always necessary, but insufficient alone, to give rise to klan organizational development. Cases that exhibit shared causal patterns and also cluster together along other relevant criteria, such as geographic location, demonstrate the utility of such insights. For example, solution 2’s case coverage focuses on urban areas such as Orange and Wake counties, identifying the importance of insurgent civil rights challenges to Jim Crow social practices in mobilizing whites in urban areas; likewise, solution 4 identifies the importance of perceived economic challenges to white dominance in the state’s rural agricultural belt, in counties such as Jones and Martin. Furthermore, the finding that strong legacies of racial violence alone were sufficient in Rowan County to contribute to high levels of klan organizational development suggests the utility of looking more closely within this deviant case, in order to identify alternative causal mechanisms omitted from initial models (George and Bennett 2005).

The results for high rally attendance demonstrate the particular importance of organizational and leadership factors in transforming initial UKA organizational capacity into sustained reactive ethnic mobilization. The solutions emphasize the empirical necessity of previous klavern organization in mobilizing sustained levels of rallying, with klavern capacity being present in every solution. In the most statistically significant solutions (1 and 3), we see that this organizational capacity was made sufficient in part by frequent appearances by state and national UKA leadership. The authority work of UKA leaders was particularly critical in areas where neighboring organizational capacity and growing NAACP presence were absent, but where there were substantial black populations, generalized white poverty, and high perceived competition in manufacturing sectors (this leadership was particularly important in economically depressed eastern counties; see Appendix Table A2, eastern solution 1). The presence of visiting leaders was thus critical to mobilizing aggrieved whites in more remote outposts that were geographically and socially distant from the militant core that comprised much of the UKA’s formal state leadership, especially when those peripheral locales also lacked the push factor of incipient civil rights mobilization. This finding highlights the uneven topography of authority work, and—more precisely—how the presence of leaders at local rallies served as a contingent factor that could, in some settings, overcome a lack of structural affinity for the KKK’s recruiting efforts. The other strongly consistent, though not equally robust, rally solutions (2 and 4) demonstrate the continuing importance of neighboring organizational capacity in fostering rally mobilization. These solutions indicate that organizationally capable and interconnected counties could exhibit strong popular mobilization when UKA organizational capability was directly countered by the development of robust NAACP infrastructures (solution 2), or where impoverished white populations experienced heightened social contact with local black populations (solution 4). In general, klan rally attendance seems to display the same regionally specific dynamics seen in UKA organizational development: when the rally attendance results are disaggregated by region (see Appendix Table A2), we see that general white impoverishment primarily drove popular mobilization in poorer eastern coastal areas, while NAACP mobilization was more central in the less impoverished but politically charged urban Piedmont. We also note the important role of the UKA’s leadership in mobilizing large rally events in areas that were outside of its core (i.e.,

Stated in logical terms, substitutable necessary conditions are necessary conditions joined by logical “or,” where the presence of at least one condition is necessary but insufficient for an outcome to occur. For further discussion, see Goertz and Mahoney (2005).
densely interconnected) organizational environments. In this sense, klan leadership and organizational influence operated interchangeably to mobilize whites in contexts marked by distinct profiles of perceived threat and competition, which arose from regionally distinct struggles for economic and political resources.

Lastly, solution 1 again displays a similarly puzzling result as in the klavern analysis: a small but highly consistent set of Piedmont counties (see Table A2) that exhibited none of the generally necessary threat or competition indicators, but that nevertheless yielded strong reactive mobilization through a combination of strong leadership and organizational capacities, and particularly strong legacies of previous racial violence. However, just as in the previous analysis, this solution’s relatively low level of unique coverage identifies the same county, Rowan, as the only uniquely covered case. Rowan County featured quite strong levels of Klan mobilization, combining both strong klavern development and high rally attendance, while exhibiting no observably strong indicators of threat or competition. While linear and additive approaches might consider such a county to be a minor error in an otherwise strong relationship between threat, competition, and mobilization, in case-based research such empirical instances represent important opportunities to refine theory through identification of omitted causal mechanisms (Goertz 2013; Schneider and Rohlfing 2013). To the extent that these mechanisms are unaccounted for in the formal QCA model, but may constitutively drive outcomes in theoretically and empirically relevant cases, additional comparative analysis is required. In order to trace these unaccounted-for mechanisms, we move from a cross-case comparison of counties in fsQCA towards a focused comparative analysis of causal processes within one county with a highly typical UKA mobilization profile (Pitt County) and the county with the most divergent profile (Rowan County). For detailed discussion of the formal procedures used to identify typical and deviant cases relevant to our necessary conditions hypothesis (i.e., that intergroup threat or competition is necessary but insufficient for reactive mobilization to occur in an area), see Appendix B.

Comparative Case Analysis: Pitt County

Pitt County is a largely rural and agrarian county in the eastern coastal plains region. Pitt’s economy revolved around tobacco, with the county’s agricultural production exceeding any other in the state. Greenville, its county seat, was home to a number of large tobacco warehouses, which in 1960 held (and sold at auction) nearly 62 million pounds of flue-cured tobacco. In many ways, Pitt County epitomized the threat-based factors that made the eastern plains a bastion of UKA mobilization. The county had a relatively high proportion of black residents (43 percent), emblematic of the eastern plain overall, which encompassed the state’s “black belt.” The county’s NAACP presence also grew quickly in the early 1960s, with its number of active chapters more than doubling following the galvanizing 1960 sit-in campaign that had begun 150 miles to the west, in the city of Greensboro.

Pitt’s white population was relatively poor, and suffered disproportionately from the state’s agricultural job loss in the 1960s as mechanized farm work reduced the need for labor. Poor economic conditions for whites were attenuated by rising rates of manufacturing employment, spurred by the Pitt County Development Commission’s campaign to attract industry to the area (Howard 1963). While direct interracial contact and competition had been minimized through training opportunities and hiring practices that heavily advantaged white workers (Greenville Daily Reflector 1964; Moore 1963; North Carolina State Advisory Committee 1962), challenges to the legality of such systematic practices threatened to alter predominant patterns of racial dominance and thus provided fertile ground for white grievance formation. Compounding this economic vulnerability, the state’s white residents were, on average, also poorly educated, with performance in Greenville’s segregated white schools rivaled by an exceptionally rigorous scholastic program in C. M. Eppes, the city’s black high school (Cunningham 2012).
As we argue here, these conditions related directly to the rise of Pitt County’s dense and evolving network of UKA klaverns. Across the county, seven klaverns and a parallel “ladies auxiliary unit” (comprised primarily of the wives of Klansmen; see Cunningham 2013) were chartered. Most of these klaverns were unusually large and active as well. FBI investigators estimated the Greenville klavern’s membership at more than 300, and members were well-known in the area for engaging in a spectrum of politicized activity, from terroristic night-riding to placing full-page UKA advertisements in the local newspaper (see, for example, Greenville Daily Reflector 1965b). The county was also near the center of a regional hotbed of UKA units. Directly to the south, Lenoir County boasted a total of nine klaverns (including two ladies auxiliary units), and was also home to “Catfish” Cole, the KKK’s most charismatic leader in the 1950s and an active Klan adherent until his death in a 1967 auto accident (Cunningham 2013). This organizational strength enhanced the county’s influence in broader Klan circles, and state and national UKA leaders made frequent and heavily advertised visits to rallies in the county, which helped to draw enormous crowds. When in May 1965 those leaders decided to hold a “Klan wedding” during a rally as a publicity stunt of sorts, they chose Pitt County as the site, and an estimated 5,000 spectators turned out (Greenville Daily Reflector 1965a; North Carolina News and Observer 1965).

Comparative Case Analysis: Rowan County

In contrast, Rowan County sits on the western edge of the more urbanized Carolina Piedmont, in a predominantly white rural area located between the Greensboro and Charlotte metropolitan centers. While a few Piedmont communities—most notably Greensboro—became known as Klan centers, the KKK tended to make inroads in the region only where economic challenges from African Americans (based largely on vibrant black college enrollments and related educational opportunities) were exceptionally high (Cunningham 2012). Indeed, unlike the eastern plain, with its emphasis on unskilled farm labor, the institutionalized segregation that characterized the Piedmont’s rising service economy tended to insulate white workers from significant racial competition. Overall, white deprivation was less pronounced than in the east as well, with the average white family income in Rowan exceeding that in Pitt County by more than 22 percent. Similarly, unlike Pitt—where the proportion of black residents exceeded 40 percent—Rowan’s black population hovered around 16 percent throughout the 1960s, reducing the perceived political and social threat constituted by looming desegregation. While Rowan County exhibited relatively low levels of racial competition that, as we have found, served as a primary driver of KKK mobilization, its status as a highly active geographic outlier related to two other factors. First, Rowan is notable as one of two counties with the highest level of previous lynchings of any county in North Carolina, with six recorded events between 1882 and 1930. Second, the county was the site of the UKA’s initial foothold in the state, with Grand Dragon Bob Jones and his inner circle all residing in and around Granite Quarry (a small town less than five miles to the southeast of Salisbury, Rowan’s county seat). Legend had it that the Carolina Klan was born at a meeting attended by eight local residents in Jones’s living room, and unquestionably that core group filled out the UKA’s state officer ranks, earning KKK-furnished salaries that allowed them to travel around the state to rallies and other Klan functions. Granite Quarry also housed Jones’s state UKA headquarters, and by 1965, Rowan County’s ground-zero status led reporters to dub it “Klansville, NC” (Cunningham 2013).

In sum, Rowan County’s active Klan profile was not primarily a result of pronounced racial competition, as UKA leaders could not easily draw from structural conditions conducive to grievance formation, since these factors were not nearly as prevalent as in the east. Instead, early organizers relied on: (1) preexisting networks of Klan activists constructed by earlier KKK organizations, such as the U.S. Klans and the North Carolina Knights, both of which were active throughout the 1950s; and (2) the county’s entrenched legacy of racist violence and reactionary ethnic mobilization. Its organizational centrality, cemented by the sustained presence of influential state leaders, meant that in Rowan
the UKA was able to conduct effective authority work, demonstrating its unity and viability more so than anywhere else in the state.

While these profiles of Pitt and Rowan counties illustrate two distinct historical pathways to sustained Klan mobilization, and in particular underscore the multifaceted role played by state leadership, historical data also suggest important interconnections between these two patterns of mobilization. In Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4, we extend our discussion of generalized settings conducive to large Klan rallies by presenting geocoded address data, obtained from State Highway Patrol reports, for all vehicles present at several UKA rallies held in North Carolina between 1963 and 1964, using spatial buffers to calculate the approximate distance traveled from each address to the event. These data help illustrate the geographic distribution of rally attendance.

These rally attendance maps demonstrate that UKA rallies in the eastern plains drew the bulk of their attendants from the immediate surrounding area. However, eastern rallies often featured a small but important core group of supporters who played key roles as UKA organizers and recruiters. This pattern is first demonstrated in an October 5, 1963, rally held in Williamston, Martin County (see Figure 3.1). While the majority of attendees were from within 40 miles of the rally site, a small contingent of Piedmont attendees drove upwards of 200 miles for the event, with four cars travelling from Rowan County. In 1964, we see a similar pattern for two more rallies, one held in Supply in the southern end of the coastal plain in July (see Figure 3.2), and the other in October in Louisburg (see Figure 3.3). For both rallies, the vast majority of attendees came from within 40 miles, and predominantly from the coastal plains region. However, we once more see a small but important group of attendees traveling great distances to attend the rally, with most coming from Rowan County and neighboring areas in the Piedmont. However, later in October 1964, a Piedmont rally held in Davidson County failed to draw any attendees from the eastern plains, suggesting that long distance travel to rallies was likely specific to core Klan members based in the Carolina Piedmont region (see Figure 3.4).

Above all, these maps illustrate the importance of the aggressive organizing efforts undertaken by the UKA’s militant base in Rowan County and adjacent areas to mobilize UKA support across the state. Grand Dragon Jones, whose base of operations was UKA klavern “#1” in Granite Quarry, often bragged that he drove “upwards of fifteen hundred miles a week” attending to Klan business (Cunningham 2013:46). Other longtime core members of the NC UKA, many of whom were based in Rowan and surrounding Piedmont counties, were similarly “charged with recruiting members statewide, making rally arrangements, or giving . . . featured speeches” at rallies (Cunningham 2013:48). These core leaders and organizers from the central Piedmont crisscrossed the state to mobilize segregationist support in eastern counties where whites may have developed deep-seated grievances against changes in the racial and economic status quo, but lacked requisite organization and leadership to translate these grievances into contentious action. The structural conditions characterizing much of the eastern plain—i.e., relatively impoverished white populations, with large black populations that could (in the absence of Jim Crow restrictions) gain significant political and social influence—were conducive to the formation of collective grievances on the part of many whites, yet these grievances were not sufficient to drive reactive ethnic mobilization on their own. The durable commitment of the UKA’s militant Piedmont core, drawn from earlier cycles of Klan mobilization, racial violence, and vigilantism, helped to translate these fertile conditions into widespread reactive ethnic mobilization. They did so through a sustained commitment to demonstrating the movement’s unity and viability to potential adherents. Rather than ebbing as the UKA consolidated its organizational presence in the state, this authority work continued to be used to motivate aggrieved whites towards racial extremism in areas that remained peripheral to the UKA’s traditional centers of popular influence (i.e., the eastern plains). This effective interplay between organizational resources and authority work together enabled the UKA to mobilize broadly across various urban and rural areas of the state.
Figure 3.1. Distance Traveled to KKK Rally, Williamston, Martin County, NC, October 5, 1963
Figure 3.2. Distance Traveled to KKK Rally, Supply, Brunswick County, NC, July 11, 1964
Figure 3.3. Distance Traveled to KKK Rally, Louisburg, Franklin County, NC, October 17, 1964
Figure 3.4. Distance Traveled for KKK Rally, Lexington, Davidson County, NC, October 24, 1964
This study has focused on analyzing variation in the mesolevel forces that enable or suppress the mobilization of social control efforts across divergent social contexts. Previous studies of ethnic competition and conflict identify important theoretical mechanisms that link competitive or threatening contexts with mobilization outcomes, but rarely make comparative analysis of these mechanisms an explicit objective. As a result, their constitutive roles within larger processes of grievance formation and ethnic mobilization remain obscured. Using comparative configurational techniques that allow for a formal dialogue between cross-case and within-case analyses, this study addresses this important oversight by demonstrating how organizational strength, propinquity, authority work, and legacies of racial violence mediate the mobilizing effects of demographic co-presence, in-group poverty, economic competition, and political threats to the Jim Crow status quo.

In focusing on the role of collective mechanisms in larger-group conflict dynamics, this study seeks to join the insights of social movement scholars, who have focused on how collective outcomes are mediated through various meso- and microlevel processes, with structural insights of the ethnic competition and group threat literatures. Scholars of ethnic conflict and social movements often study very similar phenomena using quite different conceptual tools. Here we have aimed to unite robust theoretical predictors from both literatures to assess their comparative importance within different locales. Our analysis finds strong support for the central prediction of the mediated competition approach: that economic competition and group threat are generally necessary, but insufficient, to mobilize ethnic contention. In addition, we locate the importance of organizational strength, the authority work of UKA leaders, and legacies of previous racial violence in ultimately making many North Carolina counties sites for enormous white supremacist mobilization.

Furthermore, within-case analysis demonstrated the importance of activating dormant networks among key constituencies in the early stages of right-wing mobilization, suggesting that abeyance structures were an important mechanism in mobilizing extremist activity across protest cycles (Nepstad 2004; Taylor 1989). Absent the durable Klan networks in Rowan County and the Carolina Piedmont, much of which were holdovers from previous Klan challenges to desegregation in the 1950s, the UKA may not have had such a meteoric rise in North Carolina. While the organizational capacity of the UKA in Rowan County drew its early strength from these prior networks, it was then able to use this capacity and authority to mobilize popular support in more competitive or threatening, but less well networked and organized areas. Further inquiry into how such durable networks of ethnic contention are maintained and potentially diffused presents an important new direction for ethnic competition research. The question of continuity and persistence is especially germane to contemporary racist and right-wing movements, which utilize various intra- and trans-movement “free spaces” to bolster identity and commitment to movement goals in a less favorable contemporary political climate (Simi and Futrell 2010).

This within-case finding also invites reconsideration of North Carolina’s reputation as more accommodating of civil rights challenges. Taking the absence of Klan activity as one marker of accommodation, we see that this activity was enabled and suppressed by a range of factors that combined to create local, regional, and cross-state patterns of contention and mobilization. It may be more accurate to understand this state, and likely any geographic area, in terms of its diverse “microclimates” of ethnic contention (Ward 2014), where mobilization is ultimately contingent on a range of contextual factors. Similar insights have informed studies of mass collective violence, which seek to identify meso- and microlevel mechanisms that variously mobilize or demobilize adherents across divergent social environments (Karstedt 2013; Owens, Su, and Snow 2013). Interestingly, as our legacies of racial violence and propinquity findings indicate, and the distinct local history and statewide role of Rowan County best illustrates, these microclimates are not confined spatially or temporally, but rather have radiating influences.
The study also identifies qualitative comparative analysis as an important tool of inquiry for the comparative study of racial and ethnic conflict; the method seems well paired with the mesolevel direction of recent studies. The stabilities of systems of ethno-racial domination, as noted by Omi and Winant (1994), are continually offset by collective challenges and efforts taking place at the meso- and microlevel. Identification of both unique and deviant cases using QCA provides an important venue for testing general theories of ethnic competition and group threat, particularly those derived from linear analyses, while also extending theory through the identification of novel causal processes in deviant cases. Because of these relative benefits, we encourage further use of fsQCA and other formal qualitative techniques (e.g., George and Bennett 2005) in the study of racial and ethnic contention.

Because of the county-level nature of our data, we rely on fairly broad claims regarding processes of framing and meaning making, particularly with regard to UKA depictions of the NAACP. Since leaders are primary communicative agents for social movements, further study of the role of leadership and organization in reactive ethnic mobilization should address how interpretive frames are differentially invoked by leaders and received by participants at, for example, public rally events, as well as the potential for intramovement frame disputes (e.g., Benford 1993).

While the mobilization of the North Carolina Klan during the civil rights era could be viewed as a single case, of comparative relevance to other state-level instances of Klan mobilization in the South, we have sought to delve further into county- and community-level mechanisms to generate broader theoretical insights into the mediated relationship between contention and reactive ethnic mobilization. In doing so, we combine general accounts of statewide dynamics with proximate, mesolevel explanations for differential patterns of mobilization. We hope that other studies of ethnic contention will follow such a direction, helping to further connect insights from the social movement literature with important macrolevel insights on ethnic conflict. These cognate fields have much to offer each other, and we encourage further study in this direction.

APPENDIX A

Table A1. Intermediate Solutions for Klavern Development Disaggregated by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal Conditions</th>
<th>Eastern Coast</th>
<th>Central Piedmont</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantial black population</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General white poverty</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing competition</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong NAACP mobilization</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighboring klaverns</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong legacy of racial violence</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>.992</td>
<td>.899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw coverage</td>
<td>.435</td>
<td>.591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique coverage</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= core causal condition (present)
■ = contributing causal condition (present)
○ = core causal condition (absent)
□ = contributing causal condition (absent)
Methodological Appendix: Case Selection Procedures

Since QCA analysis endeavors to build explanatory leverage through a combination of cross-case comparison and in-depth knowledge of cases (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2010), it provides a natural starting point for making theoretically relevant case comparisons (George and Bennett 2005). Here the selected cases must not only exhibit a central theoretical insight about the particular causal mechanisms under investigation, but also avoid being merely a convenience sample for the researcher (Fearon and Laitin 2008). Rather than assessing a case’s representativeness within a defined population (e.g., Lieberman 2005), the selection of cases is guided by the logic of necessary and sufficient conditions and an attention to equifinality: the potential for multiple causal pathways leading to an outcome.

Here we leverage methods provided by Carsten Schneider and Ingo Rohlfing (2013) for selecting cases for focused comparison using fsQCA results. Because of our focus on the hypothesized necessity of threat and competition for reactive ethnic mobilization, and the possibility of alternative causal pathways leading to mobilization, our case comparison requires both a typical (positive) case and a deviant case for consistency (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013:579). The typical case must include the presence (≥ .5 membership) of both X and Y, and must be consistent with set-theoretic necessity (X > Y). In other words, the typical case needs to fall within the upper right hand (1,1) quadrant of the X-Y plot, but be located below the X-Y diagonal, in order to be an exemplar case for necessity. Likewise, the deviant case for consistency must demonstrate a strong instance of the outcome in the absence of the causal condition, and be inconsistent with set-theoretic necessity, thus falling within the upper left (0,1) quadrant of the X-Y plot (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013:580-81).

We utilize these methodological insights in order to test and potentially refine the central argument of the mediated competition approach: that individual forms of threat and competition are necessary but insufficient preconditions for reactive ethnic mobilization to occur. The fsQCA results above demonstrate that these conditions generally operate as “almost always” necessary conditions (or INUS conditions that closely approximate necessary conditions) for both modes of Klan mobilization, but that alternative causal pathways featuring organization, leadership, and violent legacies also explain mobilization outcomes in specific counties. Thus, we seek to specifically interrogate structural

APPENDIX B

Table A2. Intermediate Solutions for High Rally Attendance Sorted by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal Conditions</th>
<th>Eastern Coast</th>
<th>Central Piedmont</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantial black population</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General white poverty</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing competition</td>
<td></td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong NAACP mobilization</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighboring klaverns</td>
<td></td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong legacy of racial violence</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent leadership appearances</td>
<td></td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong org capacity</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>.958</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw coverage</td>
<td>.365</td>
<td>.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique Coverage</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

● = core causal condition (present)
■ = contributing causal condition (present)
○ = core causal condition (absent)
□ = contributing causal condition (absent)
threat and competition versus organizing and leadership explanations for reactive ethnic mobilization through a focused comparison of two counties, both of which exhibited strong levels of sustained Klan mobilization.

The X-Y plot in Figure B1 displays all counties' membership in the “unified” threat and competition set (“threat_or”), versus the outcome set “sustained Klan mobilization” (“mobil_and,” which uses the set intersection of klavern development and large rally attendance using logical “and”). First, it is important to note that the relationship between threat, competition, and sustained Klan mobilization is highly consistent (.972) with a statement of set-theoretic necessity without sufficiency (Ragin 2008: 54). The five counties that deviate from this relationship of necessity are above the X-Y diagonal. The most deviant county for consistency—the one exhibiting the strongest violation of the necessity of threat and competition for reactive ethnic mobilization, while still exhibiting a high level of sustained mobilization—would thus be Rowan County. For a typical county, we select a case with a similar level of sustained Klan mobilization but much higher levels of threat and competition, and that is fully consistent with set-theoretical necessity: Pitt County.

REFERENCES


Ragin, Charles C., Kriss A. Drass, and Sean Davey. 2006. “Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 2.0.” Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ.


