garded human evolution as involving a network of popu-
lations connected by genetic interchange. This clari-
ification of Weidenreich’s views is important for Wolpoff and Caspari because the polycentric theory is the intel-
lectual predecessor of the multiregional hypo-
thesis. Thus, the multiregional hypothesis is not a polygenetic model at all but a trellis model, and associa-
tions of polygenic racism with the multiregional model
are unjustified.

This book is valuable both for its clear articulation of a
defense of the multiregional model and for its review
of the history of racism with regard to models of human evolution. Nevertheless, it has some weaknesses, both
trivial and substantial. One is its tendency toward hy-
perbole. A trivial example is the claim that the genetic
code of the mitochondrial genome is “totally different”
[p. 40] from that of the nuclear genome; in fact, out of
the 64 triplet codons, the nuclear and mammalian mito-
chondrial genomes use 61 of them in identical fashion.
A more serious one is the assertion [p. 12] that “there
can be no reconciliation between the Eve theory and
Multiregionalism because the two explanations are so
incompatible that both of them cannot be correct.” To-
ward the end of the book (pp. 312–13), in contrast, it is
acknowledged that “it is only the extreme case of com-
plete, universal replacement without mixture that the
Multiregional model denies took place.” Multiregional-
ism is compatible with the expansion of a population
into an area and hybridization to variable extents with
the preexisting inhabitants—including total population
replacement in some but not all regions (for example, it
would include the possibility that Neandertals in Eu-
rope were totally replaced). With regard to the fossil rec-
ord, multiregionalism is compatible with the origin of
a trait (or suite of traits) in one location and then its
spread and replacement of the ancestral trait condition
throughout the rest of the human range—as long as the
trait spread by gene flow and selection and not by total
population replacement. There is, then, a continuum of
alternatives connecting replacement and multiregional-
ism, and therefore some reconciliation should be pos-
ible.

There are also technical and factual errors in the
book. Once again, some technical errors are trivial for
its central themes (for example, the claim on p. 40 that
mitochondria evolved from a “virulike ancestor” in-
stead of a bacterial ancestor). However, other technical
errors relate to multiregionalism’s “primary tenet that
humans are a single polytypic species and have been for
a very long time into the past” [p. 34]. Here we see the
central paradox that must be explained by the multireg-
ional theory: there must be sufficient gene flow among
populations for all humans to share an evolutionary fate
over long periods of time, but there must be sufficient
local genetic drift and/or local selection to maintain hu-
mans as a polytypic species at any given moment in
time. Much skepticism about multiregionalism stems
from the belief that such a balance between gene flow
and local drift/seletion is unlikely. Wolpoff and Caspari
hurt their own case by saying, for example [p.
282], that “our species is unusual and difficult to model
because it is polytypic” and that “the human pattern . . .
of a widespread polytypic species with many different
ecological niches . . . is a very rare one.” These state-
ments are incorrect and reflect an ignorance of the non-
primate literature that unfortunately typifies much of
the Eve/multiregionalism debate. When compared with
many other geographically widespread species [includ-
ing other large vertebrates with strong dispersal abili-
ties], humans show remarkably little differentiation
among regional populations or “races.” Many other
large vertebrate species show much more regional dif-
ferration than humans and remarkable ecological
breadth. Polytypic species are not rare or unusual, and
it is patent from the general evolutionary literature that
regional differentiation within a species sharing a long-
term evolutionary history is commonplace. No deli-
cate balance between gene flow and drift/seletion is
needed; polytypic species occur over a broad range of
values of these basic evolutionary forces and are a
robust evolutionary outcome. The belief that multi-
regionalism requires a delicate and unlikely balance of
evolutionary forces is indefensible when humans are
put in their proper place relative to other species, but
a reader would not reach such a conclusion from this
book.

The greatest weakness of this book is its failure to
portray accurately what has been learned about basic
evolutionary processes in nonhuman organisms and
how this knowledge can be applied to the human condi-
tion. Humans are a unique species, but we have been
molded by basic evolutionary forces such as gene flow,
genetic drift, extinction/recolonization, natural selec-
tion, and the interactions among them. These basic ev-
olutionary forces operate in all species, and much insight
into the human condition and the significance of “ra-
cial” differentiation can be gained by studies on how
these forces shape patterns of genetic variation and dif-
ferration in species other than humans. These poten-
tial insights have been ignored by both sides of the Eve/
multiregional debate and by many students of racism—
much to the detriment of the field of anthropology.

Agrarian Production Practices
and Settlement Patterns

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Settlement Ecology: The Social and Spatial
Organization of Koyar Agriculture. By Glenn Davis
256 pp.

The last book to be published in the Arizona Studies in
Human Ecology series is a fine example of the best work
in this field. Settlement Ecology: The Social and Spatial Organization of Koyfar Agriculture traces 40 years of frontier agrarian settlement by the Koyfar farmers of central Nigeria that the late Robert McC. Netting first wrote about in the 1960s. Drawing on field research carried out in the mid-1980s, Glenn Davis Stone presents a detailed, well-organized, and methodologically groundbreaking analysis of what has happened to Koyfar agriculture and settlement patterns as these farmers have migrated out of the hills of the Jos Plateau (where Netting's early field research was based) onto the plains of the Benue Valley [where Stone conducted the bulk of his fieldwork]. Since Koyfar settlements and agricultural practices on the frontier differ from those in the hilly homeland in ways unexplainable in terms of government or development policies, Stone's interest is in understanding what factors influenced the farmers' residential and agricultural choices on the frontier. His goal is to use the Koyfar case to contribute "to a general theory of agrarian settlement" [p. 188]. In particular, he wants to inject an appreciation and understanding of the dynamic aspects of agrarian production practices into an agrarian settlement theory, an orientation that he argues has been neglected because of the tendency in previous archaeological and geographic work to hold agricultural production constant in modeling settlement patterns. In contrast, he seeks to demonstrate and theoretically examine how agricultural production practices affect rural settlement patterns—to fill the "gap in our knowledge of how the productive activities of rural agricultural settlements affect the location, arrangement, size, and duration of these settlements" [p. 27].

His book succeeds superbly in meeting this challenge.

Stone's interest in the relationship between agricultural production and settlement patterns requires attention to population pressure, a factor both in the Koyfar homeland and on the frontier, and this leads him to scrutinize the comparative evidence on Boserup's theory that population pressure promotes agricultural intensification. Rather than simply rejecting or validating that theory, he concludes his review of the literature on intensification with a more nuanced view which serves as the starting point for an examination of his Koyfar material: "The road to intensification followed by real farmers is not as smooth and linear as the Boserupian global highway; it has bumps and turns that vary with local conditions" [p. 39]. The remainder of the book uses Stone's vast data base on Koyfar settlement and agriculture to investigate the variations in local settings that did—and did not—influence Koyfar settlement patterns.

After describing the intensive nature of homeland Koyfar agricultural practices, labor organization, and the way in which social affiliation is spatially understood in the hills, Stone turns to the frontier, where Koyfar families began farming at midcentury. Aerial photographs, Netting's data, and his own in-depth historically oriented household censuses allow him to "monitor the evolution of a real agrarian settlement system, beginning at a 'zero point' with a small initial pioneering population" [p. 89]. Chapters 6 through 11 trace in detail the kinds of settlement and agrarian choices made by Koyfar farmers as the frontier population swelled over the next several decades and model the social and ecological constraints which affected these choices. One of his most important contributions is his attention to both these kinds of constraints. His chapters on the social organization of production, which describe and model the critical role of labor organization and social propinquity in agricultural production and residential patterning, serve as an important corrective to settlement studies which privilege ecological over social factors. The frontier Koyfar's need for large labor groups and the social practices guiding the formation of such groups affected their settlement patterns, farm shapes, compound locations, residential spacing, and the "fine-grained patterning in who lives near whom" [p. 184] in ways clearly demonstrated by the book's graphic analyses. Stone also uses his data to modify Boserup's more general theory by explaining the kinds of factors Koyfar farmers weigh when deciding whether to intensify or move in the face of land pressure and declining agricultural productivity. Soil quality, local intensification slopes (the marginal return to intensifying locally), social connections, water proximity, and the location of roads all affect this decision, and Stone demonstrates how this nexus of factors produces different decisions in different areas of the Koyfar frontier. His examination of how decisions to intensify or abandon an area are made in local settings clearly demonstrates that settlement patterns are inextricable from the sociocology of agricultural production.

Stone declines to offer a predictive model of the evolution of agrarian settlement, opting instead to demonstrate how Koyfar agrarian settlement evolved and use this experience to offer more general insights on agricultural settlement patterns and choices and on intensification. One of his central conclusions is that local ecologic context and local cultural responses to that context matter and that this kind of variability cannot be accommodated in a highly generalized predictive model.

While Stone is forthright in his views that cultural backgrounds and practices are important in the business of farming and settlement (arguing, for example, that "land pressure's inhibition of swiddening may cross-cut cultural and historical contexts, but responses to land pressure may differ sharply: one group might intensify agriculture, whereas another picks up and leaves and another takes steps to rid the area of some of its farmers" [p. 185]) he would like to see a theory of settlement that includes the patterning of cultural responses to the spatial ecology of agriculture. The Koyfar responded to the conditions of the frontier in particular (and now extremely well-documented) ways, but Stone emphasizes that they could have responded very differently. He demonstrates this point in a brief comparison of the divergent Koyfar and Tiv settlement and agrarian practices in the frontier area. He would like to figure out how to grasp this variability (conceptualized here as stemming from variable "cultural goals") and incorporate it into settlement ecology. His study will undoub-
edly inspire archaeologists, cultural anthropologists, and geographers to join him in this endeavor.

In addition to its methodological and theoretical strengths, Stone’s book maintains a scholarly tone by incorporating the most useful aspects of earlier settlement and intensification theories without shredding the earlier theories in the process. Its evenhanded approach to the literature (chaps. 2 and 3) is commendable, and those versed in settlement or intensification theory will find these chapters lucid and useful. This book will no doubt set a standard in the fields of human ecology, ethnoarchaeology, and methodology, as well as in the theoretical areas of settlement and agrarian studies.

The Tactical Uses of Passion on Bosnia

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In her 1941 masterpiece Black Lamb, Grey Falcon, Rebecca West (1982:20) noted that travelers to the Balkans, “unable to accept the horrid hypothesis that everybody was ill-treating everybody else” there, each developed a “pet Balkans people . . . as suffering and innocent” in terms that “strongly resembled Sir Joshua Reynolds’ picture of the infant Samuel. But . . . to hear Balkan-fanciers talk about each other’s Infant Samuel was to think of some painter not at all like Sir Joshua Reynolds, say Hieronymus Bosch.” The two books under review are new contributions to West’s gallery.

Cushman and Meštrović introduce their collection of essays on “genocide” in Bosnia with a rather astonishing set of assertions. They first decry “a significant change in the habitus of modern intellectuals,” who no longer are “inclined to choose sides and fight for a cause” but instead attempt to be balanced in their discourse. “Balance is a necessary quality of intellectual life, except when it comes . . . at the cost of confusing victims with aggressors, and the failure to recognize those who are perpetrators of genocide” (p. 5, emphasis added). They, in contrast, “feel that it is vitally important to let the facts speak for themselves, particularly where genocide is concerned.” In response to those who might perhaps not unreasonably object that “the facts” themselves cannot be known except through balanced, dispassionate analysis, Cushman and Meštrović invoke Durkheim: “from the perspective of the social construction of reality, a respectable finding of genocide in Bosnia has been made” by “respectable fact-finding organizations,” such as the news media (pp. 19–20). One might well wonder what the author of The Rules of Sociological Method would have said about this assertion that social facts do not bear investigation, but certainly no one can fault Cushman and Meštrović for lack of commitment to a cause or for any pretense of balance in analysis.

The cause is the pursuit of Serbian evil. Cushman and Meštrović say unequivocally that “genocide has occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it has been perpetrated exclusively by the Belgrade regime and its proxies” (p. 16), citing The New York Times, a reporter from Newsday, the law professor Catherine MacKinnon, The Lancet, and a book by a Croatian-American that was published by Meštrović’s university press in a series under his editorship.

Drs. Cushman and Meštrović, meet Dr. Sells: “Genocide has occurred. It has been . . . fueled financially and militarily from Serbia and Croatia . . . and the primary victims have been Bosnian Muslims” (Sells, p. xxi, emphasis added). In 1992–93, “Croat and Serb religious nationalists collaborated in ‘Europeanizing’ Bosnia. . . . [Croatian President] Tudjman’s ‘Europeanization’ was a euphemism, like ‘ethnic cleansing,’ for the annihilation of Slavic Muslim people and culture” (p. 97).

In the two books under review, the authors definitely have chosen sides and decided to fight for their respective causes, but their causes and sides are clearly different. Certainly, no one can deny them the right to choose their causes or to fight for them, but how are the rest of us to assess their respective arguments about genocide if scholarly balance is unnecessary in this context?

The answer is that we are not supposed to do so. The arguments in these books are not supposed to be questioned, much less challenged. Genocide here is a “God term,” in Kenneth Burke’s usage (1969), one that denotes the ultimate in motivation and thus trumps any other argument, but it is a particularly powerful God term because of its emotional load. Genocide denotes the ultimate evil of the 20th century. To question its use is illegitimate morally.

The books under review are thus not exercises in Platonic argument, depending on reason, evidence, and logic. Instead, they employ what F. G. Bailey has called “the tactical uses of passion,” a form of argument that “seeks to eliminate the mind and the critical faculties. It provokes feeling rather than thought” (Bailey 1983: 23). These books are prosecutors’ briefs, charging the ultimate crime of genocide and brooking no defense.

Yet the two books are quite different in structure and in scholarly effort. Sells, a serious scholar of Islam, makes a serious effort to understand the events in Bosnia, even though the effort is badly flawed, as explained below. Cushman and Meštrović, in contrast, engage in nothing greater than advancing the Croatian cause.