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We are pleased to present to you the second annual issue of the *Washington University International Review*. This journal is a compilation of undergraduate research organized under the theme of “Relationships of Power: Formal and Informal Empires in International and Area Studies.

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**Editorial Board**

David Klayton  
Sadie Mackay  
Shuyi Shang  
Nisha Chatterjee  
Eric Hamblett

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**Principal Advisor**

Timothy Parsons is a Professor of African History and the Director of the International and Area Studies at Washington University.

---

**Assistant Advisor**

Sara Baker is the Coordinator for International Programming in International and Area Studies. She graduated from Washington University in St. Louis in 2010 with a B.A. in Anthropology and Spanish.

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**Acknowledgements**

Our editorial board would like to acknowledge the people who made this publication possible. First, we express our deepest gratitude to Professor Timothy Parsons, who not only established the Washington University International Review but was also indispensable in his role as our mentor and advisor. The success of this journal can be attributed largely to his direction and constant guidance. We would also like to thank Sara Baker, whose assistance proved to be essential to this publication, as well as Professor Jean Allman and Elizabeth Hay, who were helpful throughout the editing process. Finally, we would like to thank the authors themselves for all of their hard work and dedication towards the editing process over the past six months.

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**Stone Prize for Excellence in International Studies Research**

In honor of Dr. Priscilla Stone, a lead architect of the International and Area Studies program at Washington University, our editorial board has awarded Katharine Sullivan the Stone Prize for Excellence in International Studies Research. A cash prize of five hundred dollars is awarded annually to the best journal article of the year.
This volume of Washington University International Review explores the concept of “empire” as it has manifested within and across eras, borders, and regions. Central to the volume’s construction are the idea that empire entails the imposition of influence from a single source of authority. Three recurring themes bind the articles together: geography, legitimacy, and subjecthood. An imperial agent must adapt to geography’s constraints. It must also legitimize to all parties involved the exportation of influence. Subjects consequently experience the influence imposed upon them by the imperial agent. We emphasize in this approach that empire remains as relevant in the contemporary age as ever. An interdisciplinary and transnational understanding of empire’s parameters helps us to better accept its diachronic implications.

Extremes in climate and terrain dictate an imperial agent’s ability to impose and maintain control. In “The Afghan Taliban in 2013: Anti-Imperial Movement or Great Game Pawns?” Matthew Lee demonstrates that the evolution of the Taliban in Afghanistan was a response to intervention by foreign imperial forces. Yet unmanageable geographic features, such as the vast deserts in the south and the towering Hindu Kush mountains in the northeast, have consistently reaffirmed the region’s nickname, “graveyard of empires.” Lee begins by analyzing the impact of the region’s location and terrain on empires as early as the Persian Empire of Cyrus the Great in the 6th century BC. Lee then situates the origins of the Taliban in the 1990s in the context of the tensions stemming from the Soviet withdrawal and expansion of American influence. In an effort to assert autonomy, the Taliban initially arose in reaction to this presence of foreign influence in their land. Lee argues that in the two decades since its birth, the Taliban has evolved from an anti-imperial movement into a socio-political force intertwined in the institutional fabric of Afghanistan.

While geography is a factor that often shapes an empire, it can, at a deeper level, act as a central source of conflict in power struggles. Julia Sizek explores in “The Power of Watersheds as Methodology in Thai National Park Politics” the internal relationship between the Thai state and peripheral communities that shape the conflict over the establishment of national parks and the control of water. The north, as a source of water for southern populations, has been blamed for various water problems that arise downstream. Sizek points out that such accusations are not always accurate, and have been largely shaped by historical marginalization of the northern indigenous communities. The state nevertheless legitimizes its internal imperial policy by asserting a scientific basis for protecting the country’s natural resources from the northern communities.

Benjamin Misch explores another manifestation of imperial legitimacy by analyzing the effect of Western ideals on the expansion of the Japanese Empire from 1853 until 1945. He argues in “Scientific Racism in the Far East: A Foucauldian Analysis of Hygiene and Modernity in Imperial Japan” that Japan used American standards of “hygienic modernity” to self-strengthen and justify its control over surrounding countries. Prior to World War II, the Japanese government, an oligarchic bicameral legislature, initiated Meiji Restoration with the aim of unifying the nation and becoming a global power. The government succeeded in aligning the citizens’ interests with its greater imperial goals by promoting the idea that each individual’s health and well-being reflected the health and well-being of the nation. Leveraging Foucault’s theory of discourse, Misch argues that the Japanese state invoked hygiene in its rhetoric to legitimate to its subjects, both domestic and those in neighboring Asian countries, its self-proclaimed authority.

The issue of legitimacy not only emerges as a conscious goal of an imperial agent, but also as an inevitable consequence of economic and political centralization. In “A European Empire? The Process of Nation-State Building at the European Level,” Diana Jack analyzes European unification since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which established the notion of the sovereign nation-state. Clashing national identities ignited two world wars, and the European Union eventually materialized from post-war economic unification. Jack claims that the twenty-first century European Union is in the midst of a supranational state-building process that lacks shared
identity and popular support. She argues that the process is imperial in nature due to the necessity for the European Union to compensate for these legitimizing components.

While the dominant agent must struggle to legitimize its influence, those under imperial rule must cope with the subjecthood resulting from this relationship. In “Savage Faculty, Perfect Grace and Arabian Nights: Nineteenth Century Travels through Egypt”, Claire Arnold demonstrates the “othering” characteristic of the British Empire by providing a literary analysis of early to mid eighteenth century accounts of female British travelers in pre-colonial Egypt. Arnold emphasizes how these women maintained their sense of superiority by extending their approval of Egyptian culture only to ideas indicative of Western culture, and otherwise expressing sympathy toward the Egyptian “children.” Using ahistorical concepts of modernity and Orientalism, Arnold argues that the three women’s journals illustrate tension between their roles as agents of the British Empire and as open-minded visitors to a foreign country that would soon come under direct control of the British in 1882.

Katharine Sullivan reminds us however that subject populations are never left without agency. Her article “Crafting Identities: Indigenous Artisans and the Politics of the Handicraft Industry” examines the agency of the Mapuche community of Patagonia, in its contemporary power relationship with Argentinean state government. Since the Argentinean military conquest of Patagonia in the 1870s, the state has imposed influence upon the Mapuche community by enacting policy promoting tourism to the region. Sullivan shows that Mapuche artisans, historically subject to the lens of the “tourist gaze,” respond to such state-imposed influence by using their craft industry as a means to resist stereotypes, communicate local values to tourists, and make money, thereby gaining the means to contest the state’s influence. Those subjected to imperial influence can thus resist power imbalance by manipulating the parameters of subjectification to their own benefit.

The undergraduate scholarship presented in this issue of Washington University International Review engages the concept of empire from myriad spatial and temporal contexts. While the age of formal empires may be over, the value of this comparative study is to elucidate that the power imbalances which shaped formal empires continue to manifest themselves in the twenty-first century. Imperial relationships transcend any particular era or region, emphasized here by the focus on the overarching themes of geography, legitimacy, and subjecthood. We invite the reader to consider the implications of such contemporary forms of age-old power relationships in the context of an increasingly interconnected world.

The WUIR Editorial Board
Authors

**Matthew Lee** Matthew Lee is a senior at Washington University in St. Louis. He is an International & Area Studies and Political Science double major, with specific interest in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other areas of Central and South Asia. His study of Afghanistan began in high school and grew when he took a class on Central Asia taught by his eventual honors thesis advisor, Dr. Robert Canfield. In the future, Matthew plans to attend some form of graduate school, but he is undecided on what he will do between now and then.

**Julia Sizek** Julia Sizek is a fourth-year Anthropology/International Studies double-major at the University of Chicago. Julia has attempted to understand the intersection of people, culture, and place, and plans to continue her studies in an Anthropology PhD program.

**Benjamin Misch** is a junior majoring in Mathematics and History, with a minor in Economics. His studies have focused on the creation of the modern Japanese state and empire. He has recently begun studying Japanese and hopes to master the language. In the future, he hopes to attend graduate school in History and conduct research in Japan.

**Diana Jack** Diana Jack is a senior double majoring in International and Area Studies with a European concentration and in German. She spent six months of 2012 immersed in German language and culture in Tübingen, Germany, an experience which led to her interest in the European Union as a whole. Diana wrote her thesis on the topic of European identity as it pertains to the EU, research which strongly influenced the article in this volume. Her ultimate goal, in light of these interests and publications, is to work closely with the European Union here in the United States, either in a research or policy capacity.

**Claire Arnold** is a junior at the University of Chicago, majoring in history with a focus on modern Europe and minoring in French. She is particularly interested in questions of identity and historical memory. She has just returned from studying abroad in Cairo, Egypt, following in the footsteps of the women she writes about. Although she is not exactly sure of her post graduation plans she is certain they will include both history and travel.

**Katharine Sullivan** is a senior majoring in International and Area Studies and Spanish and minoring in Anthropology. During the fall of 2011, she spent a semester studying social movements and human rights in Argentina, where she conducted a research project on indigenous Mapuche craft production and the tourism industry in the Patagonia region. She has also spent a summer in the Republic of Georgia working in international education. After graduation, Katie hopes to continue to develop her research skills in the social sciences and to build a career using research to inform socially just policies.
David Klayton is a senior majoring in International and Area Studies (general) and minoring in Anthropology. Language study has played a crucial role in his IAS degree at Washington University. He began studying French his freshman year, spent the Spring 2012 semester studying in an immersion program in Marseille, France, and has recently begun studying Arabic. David hopes to teach ESOL in an Arabic-speaking country after he graduates before eventually building a career in international relations.

Sadie Mackay is a senior majoring in International and Area Studies and minoring in Public Health. In the spring of 2012, she spent the semester studying abroad in Cape Town, South Africa, where she worked on improving delivery of HIV/AIDS care and crisis center services in townships across the city. Following graduation, she hopes to pursue a career in business as an employee at Amazon in her hometown, Seattle, WA.

Shuyi Shang is a senior majoring in International and Area Studies and minoring in Communication Design. She has lived half of her life in China and the other half in Bangkok, Thailand. Shuyi chose to enrich her international experience even further by coming to Washington University and studying abroad for a semester in Kyoto, Japan. She hopes to pursue a career that involves international communications in a business or non-governmental organization.

Nisha Chatterjee is a senior double-majoring in International and Area Studies and Economics and minoring in Writing. In the summer of 2010, she worked with the Rural Development Foundation in Kalleda, India, and later worked for Bi-Lingual Assistant Services in St. Louis, Missouri. Her studies have focused on the South Asian subcontinent, specifically India. After graduation, Nisha hopes to work abroad with refugees and other marginalized communities.

Eric Hamblett is a senior majoring in International and Area Studies with a Western European focus, and minoring in Anthropology. Eric lived abroad his entire life in West Africa and Western Europe before attending Washington University. He spent his college summers working for the U.S. Embassy in Brussels, Belgium and has been fortunate enough to see the inner workings of the diplomatic corps. In the future, he hopes to work abroad for a multinational start-up.
The Afghan Taliban in 2013: Anti-Imperial Movement or Great Game Pawns?

By Matthew Lee

Abstract: The advent of the Taliban in the 1990s surprised much of the world. Swept from power by the United States invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, many thought that the group would fade just as quickly as it had risen. Only two years later the group was back in the form of a Neo-Taliban. Changes had occurred regarding the membership, ideology, and tactics of the group, as it now sought to rid Afghanistan of the invasive foreigners. This new insurgency sparked alarm throughout the West as it appeared that Afghanistan was once again on the brink of chaos. Following the United States presidential election of 2008, the Obama administration promised new policies to deal with the resurgent Taliban. However, as the Taliban has proven in the past, it is capable of adapting as well. It is my aim in this thesis to analyze the changes (or lack thereof) that have occurred in the Afghan Taliban in the period of 2008-2012, and determine what these changes indicate about the group’s future role in the country. I plan to do this by examining a mixture of previous texts, field reports, combat statistics, news stories and other sources. Using this data I will define the different periods in the history of the Taliban and compare them to the current characteristics of the group. This comparison will then allow me to identify the changes in the group occurring in the aforementioned period and answer the questions raised by my thesis.
Introduction

Few places on earth have had more repeated contact with the great empires of history than the area of land that is now the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. From Alexander the Great to the United States of America, Afghanistan, by virtue of being at the nexus of several disparate civilizations has found itself in conflict with many of the great empires of human history. These foreign intrusions have ended in stalemates and utter disasters; for both the foreigners and Afghans. This has earned Afghanistan the title of “Graveyard of Empires.”¹ Time and again, hubristic empires have, for various reasons, engaged in prolonged conflicts in Afghanistan. And each time these imperial giants have slunk away, often worse for the wear. However, these repeated clashes with empire have had a destructive impact on Afghanistan, especially in the past three decades. This recent turmoil has taken a catastrophic toll on the networks and institutions that were the foundations of Afghan society. In the early 1990s, a number of dissatisfied men formed a group with the aim of repairing this gaping tear in the social fabric of Afghanistan. They called themselves the Taliban. In 2013, much about the Afghan Taliban has changed, but one thing is certain: the ethos of the Taliban movement has entrenched itself within Afghan society. The evolved version of the Afghan Taliban now pose a legitimate threat to the future of the Afghan state as it is presently constituted. The question that remains is what exactly are the Afghan Taliban fighting for? Are they an anti-imperial movement in the historical tradition of Afghanistan? Or are they merely a proxy force in a new iteration of the Great Game? Or perhaps neither of these factors fuel the Afghan Taliban in 2013.

By examining the development of the group’s ideology and goals during its lifetime, it is clear that both of these strands are at play within the Afghan Taliban. However, the Taliban title is also now a source of identity and an outlet for expression for many of the frustrated men in Afghanistan that in past would not have identified with the original ideology of the group. As the US prepares to withdraw the majority of its forces from Afghanistan by 2014, the following examination of the Afghan Taliban is important to understanding why the conflict has lasted over a decade and why it is likely to continue. To answer the question posed in the title, I will first detail Afghanistan’s long relationship with empire. Then I will examine the rise of the Taliban and how their ideology has evolved over the past two decades. Finally, I will attempt to place the Taliban in 2013 within the context of Afghanistan’s tradition of resisting empire, and also determine to what extent the Taliban are an anti-imperial movement or the product of outside forces seeking to manipulate the conflict in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan and Empire

No characteristic of Afghanistan is more related to the country’s extensive experience with empire than its geographic location. Anthropologist Thomas Barfield summarizes Afghanistan’s plight in his book, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History: “Geography may not be destiny but it has set the course of Afghan history for millennia as the gateway for invaders spilling out of Iran or central Asia and into India.”² Specifically, the physical territory that is now Afghanistan has little obvious resource value (other than the recent discovery of large mineral deposits) and was important only because it was a pathway into areas that did. In this respect, a more suitable, but less catchy, moniker for Afghanistan would be ‘intersection of empires.’ Before the discovery of the New World expanded the transportation routes for empire, Afghanistan was “the nodal point between the civilizations of India, East Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and thence Europe.”³ Afghanistan’s unique location has also

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long been a thorn in the side of mapmakers, who have had difficulty placing the country definitively in any of the three regions it is connected to. This peripheral status, particularly in the most recent instances of imperial incursion into Afghanistan, has often made the country a forgotten area until it is needed to be the buffer zone for competing powers in the various historical periods.

Afghanistan’s terrain and societal structures likewise contribute to the country’s famed reputation as being unconquerable. The towering Hindu Kush mountain range stretches into the northeast and central regions of Afghanistan, and the south is primarily desert. Harsh winters only add to the arduous task of conducting a military campaign in Afghanistan. The mountains, particularly those straddling the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, have been the Afghan peoples’ best defense against foreign invaders. The renowned explorer Marco Polo noted as he made his way across Afghanistan in the thirteenth century that “this kingdom has many narrow passes and natural fortresses, so that the inhabitants are not afraid of any invader breaking in to molest them. Their cities and towns are built on mountain tops or sites of great natural strength.”4 The treacherous paths that wind through these mountains are ideally suited for guerilla warfare, a style that Afghan warriors have long excelled at. Often possessing inferior arms and smaller troop counts, the Afghans learned the art of the ambush early on. A product of their home terrain, the people found in Afghanistan form a “kaleidoscopic collection of ‘micro-societies’ (often identified by the label qawm, or ‘network’).”5 The diffuse array of self-reliant networks makes it very difficult to establish a centralized authority in Afghanistan. It is a trait that makes the country problematic to govern, but virtually impossible to conquer. With all of these factors taken into account, it is no surprise that acclaimed generals from Alexander the Great to David Petraeus have faltered under the conditions imposed upon them by the Afghan terrain and societal structures.

Although the modern form of Afghanistan did not begin to take shape until the nineteenth century, its present territory and surrounding area have dealt with empire dating back to the days of the Persian Empire. Cyrus the Great was the first great conqueror to venture in Afghanistan. His Persian Empire began the seemingly endless parade of empires into Afghanistan that would grow to include the “Greeks, Mauryans, Huns, Mongols, Moghuls, British, Soviets, and Americans.”6 The area also spawned its own set of empires. Among them were “the Ghaznavids, Ghorids, and Durranis, who spread fear of Afghan fighting prowess from Delhi to the Caspian Sea.”7 Despite their abnormally high frequency, these imperial campaigns into Afghanistan did not have a chronological pattern. Whenever the contemporary circumstances allowed for the development of an empire in either Europe or Asia, it would almost inevitably have to pass through Afghanistan.

As new methods of transportation were developed, specifically sea travel, the importance of Afghanistan to expanding empires diminished. It was during this time, roughly beginning in the sixteenth century, that “the definition of Afghanistan changed from an essential passageway between civilizations to a place more desirable as a no-man’s-land.”8 The internal turmoil and decline of the surrounding empires in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century presented an opportunity for the creation of a distinctly ‘Afghan’ empire in Afghanistan. The Abdali Pashtuns, “experienced servants of various empires” by that point, unsurprisingly had gained the “ambition and tools to run one themselves.”9 Thus began the Durrani Empire in 1747, which at its peak covered all of modern Afghanistan, Pakistan, eastern Iran, northwestern India and Kashmir. This was the first truly indigenous empire in Afghanistan and one that would set the region on the course to statehood. However, as is often the case with empires, the Durrani Empire began to decline almost immediately following

6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 3
9 Barfield, 97
the death of its founder, Ahmad Shah Durrani, in 1772. This decline threatened the possibility of an Afghan state, as many of the tribes that had united to form the empire were “just as content to live as they always had, undisturbed by any government that intruded upon their immediate concerns.”

In fact, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, many of these tribes had returned to their local forms of government, and only the return of a foreign empire to Afghanistan prevented this situation from continuing.

The downfall of Napoleon in the beginning of the nineteenth century established czarist Russia and Great Britain as the two dominant European powers. Their desire and pursuit of increased influence outside of Europe set them “on a collision course in Asia.” This competition would famously become known as the ‘Great Game’ and had significant consequences for the future of Afghanistan. As Russia pushed further south through Central Asia and the British advanced northwest out of India, Afghanistan was once again stuck between competing imperial powers. The British viewed Russia’s complete takeover of Central Asia as inevitable unless its progress was checked, and they saw Afghanistan as a natural “bulwark against Russian designs in India.” Motivated by the paranoia that is so often present in great power maneuvering, Britain engaged in three separate wars over the course of eighty years in an effort to gain control of Afghanistan. It was during these wars that Afghanistan’s title of ‘Graveyard of Empires’ truly began to take shape. Unable to conquer and occupy Afghanistan via force, the British, after significant losses, realized that “the intractable Afghans could be bought much more easily than fought.” Following this determination, made after their “crushing defeat” in the first Anglo-Afghan War, the British “offered cash subsidies, manipulated the tribal chiefs, and managed to turn Afghanistan into a client state.” Britain would invade Afghanistan twice more in 1879 and 1919, but with lesser objectives that were shaped by their prior defeat and subsequent realization that prolonged conflict in the region was futile.

From the perspective of Afghanistan, this prolonged interaction with the British Empire had a significant impact on its development as a state. After direct control proved too costly, Britain’s method of establishing influence through bribes and manipulation of the tribes “ensured that [the] Afghan kings remained weak and dependent on British largesse” to fund their institutions. The period also saw the creation of a “stronger state structure and a more centralized military” and a “growing participation in politics by nonelite groups in the face of foreign intervention” in Afghanistan. These were profound changes to the prior state of affairs in Afghanistan and would have a considerable effect on later events in the country. The demarcation of the border between Afghanistan and the British Raj in 1893 was perhaps the most influential event in respect to the formation and current condition of Afghanistan. Known infamously as the Durand Line, named after the British diplomat Mortimer Durand, the man who devised it, the border was created entirely with British interests in mind. The main goal of the line was to “split the Pashtun core of the Afghan state,” and thus permanently weaken Pashtun power in Afghanistan. The partition of the Pashtun tribes secured British influence by denying the Durrani Pashtun elite part of their support base. The line also established an ethnic plurality in Afghanistan that is at the root of the country’s current problems with creating an effective state. Now the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, no Afghan government has ever officially

10 Tanner, 127
11 Ibid., 130
12 Ibid, 132
14 Jones, xi and Rashid, 11
15 Rashid, 11
16 Barfield 133 and 130
17 Ibid., 154
recognized the Durand Line.\textsuperscript{18}

Following the revolution of 1917 in Russia and the fall of the Czar, British interest in Afghanistan waned. After a final British intervention in 1919 and an agreement that granted Afghanistan full formal independence, empire once again retreated from the country. The period afterwards would prove to be a relatively stable and prosperous one, as the Afghans were once again left to their own machinations. This stability would be shattered by another intrusion of empire that would lay ruin to all aspects of Afghan society.

In the 1970s, a series of coups in Afghanistan disrupted the nascent stability and vaulted the country to the forefront of the Cold War in 1979. The Soviet Union, which had gradually pulled Afghanistan into its sphere of influence with over a billion dollars in aid in the preceding decades, invaded under the pretense of securing its southern borders.\textsuperscript{19} In the tradition of their ancestors, local Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion was fierce. All groups and layers of Afghan society took part; Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and others, urban and rural, Sunni and Shia.\textsuperscript{20} These native Afghan forces would soon be aided extensively by foreign powers seeking to contain the Soviet expansion.

The significance of the conflict brought about by the Soviet invasion is the nature of the Afghan response, and the anarchic aftermath of the carnage that paved the way for the fateful rise of the Taliban. For the Afghans, this new intrusion of empire “was yet another attempt by outsiders to subdue them and replace their time-honoured religion and society with an alien ideology and social system.”\textsuperscript{21} This sentiment was particularly strong in this conflict, as the Soviets were communist atheists whose values ran counter to those of the Muslim, tribal Afghans. The resistance would soon become a holy war led by the seven Afghan mujahideen (Muslim freedom fighters) factions supported by Pakistan, the United States and Saudi Arabia. The ideology of these factions is important, as “four of the seven parties were composed of Muslim fundamentalists.”\textsuperscript{22} Religion was a motivating factor for all of the factions, but the brand of Islam followed by some of the mujahideen was more conservative than what was traditionally found in Afghanistan. This shift would play a key role in the developments in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal.

The Soviet occupation had a devastating effect on Afghanistan. The valiant mujahideen managed to oust the mighty Red Army of the Soviet Union from their homeland, but at a terrible cost. All told, the conflict claimed at least “1.5 million Afghan lives” and left millions more as refugees.\textsuperscript{23} The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union added another tombstone to the ‘graveyard of empires’ in Afghanistan. However, in the process of accomplishing this feat, the country itself had been turned into a veritable graveyard. Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan was in dire need of foreign aid to rebuild its infrastructure and assist the resettlement of the millions of refugees. In an ironic twist, the empires of the time no longer had any use for Afghanistan. For a country that had long been at least semi-dependent on foreign financial support, this abandonment was a catastrophic blow. What ensued would later be described as a “Hobbesian state of nature” and a murderous “free-for-all” where “opportunism...[undermined] any other “ism” (Islamism, nationalism, socialism).”\textsuperscript{24} In 1992, chaotic civil war ensued soon after the collapse of the weak government left behind by the Soviets and what little semblance of state institutions that remained in Afghanistan were destroyed. From this anarchy rose a mysterious group, the Taliban, which would shape the next period of life in Afghanistan.

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\textsuperscript{19} Rashid, 13


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} Jones, 31

\textsuperscript{23} Rashid, 13

Afghanistan and affect world events far beyond the country’s borders.


The origin of the Taliban has developed into a myth of sorts. Born amidst the chaos that had engulfed Kandahar province following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the ensuing collapse of the Afghan government, the founding members were originally motivated by the crime and injustice they observed in their communities. These men, a mixture of local mullahs and former mujahideen, finally chose to fight back against the “arbitrary ‘taxation’, robbery and rape” perpetrated by local warlords.25 The group would soon be co-opted by the Pakistani government and its intelligence arm, the Directorate of Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), as a tool for use in the developing “new Great Game.”26

The most widely told anecdote related to the formation of the Taliban is that the abduction and rape of several young girls committed by the local mujahideen warlords had outraged the founders. The local warlords were the remnants of the war against the Soviet Union that had torn Afghanistan apart and left it so vulnerable. While other former mujahideen like Ahmad Shah Massoud and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were battling for control of Kabul, the country’s capital, these lesser warlords were free to exploit the rest of the country. The southern provinces, especially Kandahar, were victim to lawlessness and violence, and they were quickly “divided up amongst dozens of petty ex-Mujahidin warlords and bandits.”27 The members of the Taliban saw themselves as the solution to this dire situation, “the cleansers and purifiers of a guerrilla war gone astray” and emerged as a “Robin Hood figure” in this unjust land.28

There is still some debate over the veracity of these origin myths and whether the group was an invention of the ISI or other actors in Pakistan from the outset. However, events in October and November of 1994 strongly indicate that the Taliban’s alliance with Pakistan did not begin until early November of 1994. Prior to this period, the Taliban had not undertaken much more than the local justice efforts that were the basis of their mythologized origin. The Taliban and Pakistan quickly became interwined as the proponents of the Taliban in the country funneled cash, recruits and weaponry to the Islamic militant group, believing that they could clear a path for Pakistan’s strategic interests in the region. Pakistan, constantly in fear of being surrounded by India on both sides, has long sought to establish a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul. The ISI had chosen to back Gulbuddin Hekmatyar when the Afghan civil war broke out, and other elements in Pakistan saw the Taliban as a way to “free [Pakistan’s] Afghan policy from the ISI.”29 The ISI initially hesitated to back the Taliban, as it was committed to Hekmatyar and lacked the resources at the time to support two factions. However, by 1995 the ISI made the decision to fully back the Taliban, a bond which endures to this day.

At their inception, the Taliban lacked a “sophisticated ideological framework.”30 Their original goals, developed in the early days of the movement, were to “restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan.”31 It is uncertain how the Taliban would have expanded or evolved without the support they received from the ISI, but their goal of bringing Islamic law and order to Afghanistan was clear. Their focus was entirely limited

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26 Rashid, 2010, 145
27 Ibid., 21
28 Ibid., 25
29 Ibid., 184
31 Rashid, 2010, 22
to Afghanistan and they had little interest in or “clue about international affairs.”32 This conservative, rural approach appealed to the disempowered Pashtun tribes that dominated regions of southern and eastern Afghanistan, as they did not approve of Kabul being occupied by the ethnic minorities of the north.

These Pashtun areas were the heartland of the Taliban, and the refugees that had been displaced from these areas would form the backbone of the group. In the beginning months, “thousands of young Afghan Pashtuns studying in Baluchistan and the NWFP rushed to Kandahar to join”33 the group. Only a month after the Taliban had captured Kandahar in November of 1994, “some 12,000 Afghan and Pakistani students” had joined its ranks.34 The motivation for these recruits was often twofold. The mixture of “popular, rural Islamic values” and “revival of old glory” for Pashtuns that the Taliban claimed to represent was attractive to the displaced young Afghan men inhabiting the conservative madrassas of western Pakistan.35 Until this opportunity presented to them by the Taliban arose, these young men were directionless:

They had no memories of the past, no plans for the future while the present was everything. They were literally the orphans of the war, the rootless and the restless, the jobless and the economically deprived with little self-knowledge. They admired war because it was the only occupation they could possibly adapt to. Their simple belief in a messianic, puritan Islam which had been drummed into them by simple village mullahs was the only prop they could hold on to and which gave their lives some meaning.36

The foundational religious compass of both the foot soldiers and the Taliban leadership would prove to be one of the defining characteristics of the group.

The worldview of “nearly all of the Taliban’s initial circle” of leaders was formed from their education in, and radical interpretation of, the Deobandi strain of Islam. Deobandism is very conservative and seeks to “eliminate all modern intrusions from…pious Muslim life.”37 The Taliban merged their warped view of Deobandism with Wahhabism and the local tribal code, Pashtunwali, to create an ideological framework that was decidedly reactionary and which would have dire consequences for the majority of Afghans who were used to a more moderate Islamic lifestyle. As the Taliban burst out of the conservative south into Kabul and began to solidify their power in the country, they put into place their harsh brand of Islam. International observers recoiled in horror as the few remaining signs of modernity were stripped away from Afghan society.

The Taliban’s effort to appear as ‘God’s own soldiers’ was an integral aspect of their strategy in their formative period. The group’s spree of early victories “reinforced the perceived truth of their mission, that God was on their side and that their interpretation of Islam was the only Islam.”38 This sanctified appearance aided in their recruitment of new soldiers and strengthened their resolve. The Taliban also relied heavily on this divine “supernatural aura” to secure political legitimacy as they began their conquest of Afghanistan.39

As stated previously, the Taliban did not possess a complex ideological framework when they first rose to power and thus were a “tabula rasa on which others could project their ambitions.”40

33 Rashid, 2010, 29
34 Ibid., 29
35 Coll, 283
36 Rashid, 2010, 32
37 Coll, 284-285
38 Ibid., 33
39 Marsden, 45
40 Coll, 289
This proved true early on for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and briefly even for the United States, which wanted to stabilize the country for economic reasons. However, this seeming malleability would prove to be the downfall of the Taliban’s first period. In May 1996, following his expulsion from Sudan, Osama bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan and came under the Taliban’s protection in 1997 after befriending Mullah Omar and making a “pledge of personal fealty.”

With bin Laden came his burgeoning terrorist organization, al Qaeda, which quickly set up training camps in the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan. Al Qaeda was not the only international jihadist group that saw Afghanistan as an opportunity to carry out their missions. Soon “Chechens, Uzbeks, Indonesians, Uighurs, and Kashmiri separatists” flocked to Afghanistan.

They brought funding and served as “shock troops” for the Taliban’s ongoing struggle to gain complete control of Afghanistan. Originally strictly a Pashtun movement, the forces acting under the umbrella of the Taliban began to give the group a distinct international streak.

Partnership with al Qaeda soon made the Taliban an enemy of the United States following al Qaeda’s attacks on US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998. This problematic alliance raised the Taliban’s international notoriety, while also elevating it to “heroic status within the Islamic world.”

What had originally been a small group of Pashtun mullahs in southern Afghanistan seeking Islamic justice for their communities was now both a patron of terrorism and a symbol of Islamic resistance against the West. Throughout their conquest of Afghanistan, the Taliban had mostly remained true to their original platform of establishing law and order and purifying the country of the moral decay that they felt had taken hold in recent years. Now the Taliban were forced to develop some sort of foreign policy as they sought to receive international recognition. With little knowledge of the outside world, the Taliban leaders fell under the influence of bin Laden, and “their statements increasingly reflected the language of defiance bin Laden had adopted and which was not an original Taliban trait.”

This defiance would not be the only trait or perspective the Taliban would acquire from al Qaeda during their brief partnership. The subsequent actions originating from these new perspectives would have dire consequences for the Taliban’s political future and would threaten their continued existence.

Following the al Qaeda attacks on the two US embassies in Africa, the Taliban came under intense pressure from the US and its allies to hand over Osama bin Laden. Until the embassy bombings and the ensuing US cruise missile strikes on al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, the relationship between the US and the Taliban ranged from neutral to positive. Between 1994 and 1996, “the US supported the Taliban politically through…Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,” although it later abruptly reversed its policy in 1997 in response to pressure from feminist groups.

The adoption of a hard line stance toward the Taliban was then completed when capturing bin Laden became a primary US objective. The rapid change in US policy, especially the cruise missile strikes, drove a wedge between the moderate and more extreme wings of the Taliban. In October 1999, in an effort to isolate the Taliban and force them to hand over bin Laden, the US pushed for international sanctions against the Taliban regime. This action only hastened the “radicalisation of the [Taliban] regime.” The moderate wing of the Taliban leadership, those “opposed to international terrorism, and…secretly willing to negotiate with the United Nations and others” was dealt a crippling blow when the head of the faction,
Mullah Mohammad Rabbani died in April of 2001.⁴⁹ His death increased the influence of the Taliban leaders who most supported al Qaeda and drove the Taliban to further extremes in regards to its actions and policies. As the Taliban and their Arab allies were massing on the Shomali Plains to destroy their Northern Alliance foe, al Qaeda would carry out an attack that would ultimately bring about the return of empire to Afghanistan and the demise of the ruinous Taliban regime.

It is somewhat ironic that a group borne out of the anarchic fires of a civil war brought about by the withdrawal of empire from Afghanistan would ultimately bring empire back to the country. As stated previously, the leadership of the Taliban had very little knowledge of the world beyond Afghanistan and their initial goals reflected this. The relative stability that the Taliban regime brought to Afghanistan introduced the potential for a new ‘Great Game’ involving Afghanistan that the Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid chronicles in his book, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. Quickly after taking power, the Taliban were courted by multiple oil companies that wished to build pipelines across Afghanistan. The ‘Great Game’ was on once again, and although the subject might have changed, the location remained the same. The Taliban then manipulated the negotiations in such a way that it became clear that “they had quickly learned how to play the Great Game from all angles.”⁵⁰ The Taliban also demonstrated a similar shrewdness and independence typical of Afghans in their dealings with their backers in Pakistan. They made it clear that “they were nobody’s puppets and they resisted every attempt by Islamabad to pull their strings” by playing “one lobby [in Pakistan] against another.”⁵¹ Even though the Taliban had “deep connections to Pakistani state institutions, political parties, Islamic groups” and “madrassa network,” they, like their Afghan ancestors before them, were resistant to outside influence in Afghanistan.⁵² So while the Taliban clearly relied on support from the ISI and other elements in Pakistan, the group still maintained a considerable amount of autonomy. Much of this autonomy would be lost following the arrival of another empire to Afghanistan, one that was bent on the complete destruction of the Taliban regime.

**Return and Revolution of the Taliban: 2001-2013**

Following the horrific devastation wrought by the al Qaeda perpetrated terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the Taliban’s harboring of Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization was no longer acceptable to the United States and the rest of the international community. Less than a month after the attacks, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom and the Taliban were swept from power in mere months. The Bush Administration, keenly aware of the Soviet’s experience in Afghanistan, had no interest in nation-building that would require a long-term presence of a sizable US military force in the country. The US clearly had no intention of becoming another resident in the ‘graveyard of empires,’ but history, as it is wont to do, had other plans.

Afghanistan did not remain peaceful for long after the ousting of the Taliban. In the fall of 2002, signs began to emerge that the Taliban were reorganizing and preparing to mount a prolonged insurgency:

A recruitment drive was reported to be going on in Pakistan and Afghanistan, while propaganda pamphlets were being distributed in the villages and the first training bases were being established in Pakistani territory. Throughout the autumn the pace of military activities intensified…The resurgent Taliban started planting mines on the roads and rocket or mortar attacks on US bases became

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⁴⁹ Rashid, 2010, 218
⁵⁰ Rashid, 2010, 170
⁵¹ Ibid., 185
⁵² Ibid.
more frequent. Helicopters were targeted and the first IEDs started appearing on Afghanistan’s roads…\textsuperscript{53}

Much of this reorganization was aided, or least abetted, by the Taliban’s longtime ally, the ISI. Even as bombs from American aircraft had begun to fall on Taliban and al Qaeda positions in Afghanistan in late 2001, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, on the basis of an ISI report, ordered the continuation of “supplies of arms, ammunition, and fuel to the Taliban.”\textsuperscript{54} Despite pressure from the United Nations and United States, the ISI, with some officers who “considered themselves more Taliban than the Taliban,” maintained its strong connections to the Taliban. The ISI was committed to the Taliban for the long run and was willing to go to great lengths to preserve the foundations of the group for later use in Afghanistan. Unlike some other aspects of the resurgent Afghan Taliban (the “neo-Taliban”), the partnership with the ISI would remain unchanged from the group’s previous period.\textsuperscript{55}

The Taliban-led insurgency that would gain steam as the foreign occupation of Afghanistan dragged on would possess many links to the pre-9/11 Taliban. However, adjustments were necessary in order to meet the significant challenge of leading an insurgency against a decidedly better equipped foe. Thus the Taliban and their supporters initiated several changes to various aspects of the group. Even further changes were necessary following the US troop surge in early 2010. The most important changes to examine are those made to the group’s ideology and goals, and to a lesser extent, its membership and organizational structure. Specifically, the ideology and goals of the Taliban are the traits most connected to why the various members of the group have chosen to take part in this seemingly unending conflict.

The evolution of the organization and structure of the Taliban since the group’s humble beginnings in Kandahar in 1994 is nothing short of remarkable. In this aspect, the group is now the standard-bearer for all modern insurgencies, as it has more than met the challenge of conducting a guerilla war against the mightiest military the world has ever seen. Following their fall in 2001, the Taliban completely overhauled their organizational structure, except for their leader. Throughout the entire conflict, Mullah Mohammad Omar has remained as the top leader of the Taliban and retained the title of Amir of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Fighters far and wide swear loyalty to him sight unseen. The extent of Mullah Omar’s role in devising the Taliban’s plans has been questioned repeatedly in past years. However, by 2010, it became clear to the US and their allies that “both symbolically and pragmatically, [Mullah Omar] held all the keys to unlocking the Taliban problem.”\textsuperscript{56}

While Mullah Omar and the Quetta shura (the central leadership council of Afghan Taliban) managed the overarching strategy, “most of the time the local commanders acted autonomously, based on their understanding of the strategic and political aims” articulated by the council.\textsuperscript{57} This flexibility has led some experts to claim that this resurgent Taliban is not as unified as it may appear. They view the neo-Taliban as not “a cohesive group with a uniform mission,” but as various groups “using the Taliban name to further their causes.”\textsuperscript{58} These differing assessments of the Taliban highlight the limitations of current knowledge regarding the Taliban and how effective the group has been at maintaining their opaque nature. It is likely that this apparent lack of cohesion reflects the Taliban’s adoption of an organizational structure best suited for guerilla warfare, a structure that


\textsuperscript{54} Rashid, 2009, 77

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 79


\textsuperscript{57} Giustozzi, 93

avoids a close-knit combat force under a singular command, rather than the group splintering into several imitation groups. This distinction between division based on necessity and actual rifts within the group is an important one, and will be addressed more fully in later discussion of the Taliban’s ideology and goals.

The claim that the identity of this neo-Taliban is not as closely related to the original Taliban as it may appear is predicated in part on the increased presence of foreign jihadists in the insurgency’s ranks and the belief that the “solid Afghan roots” of the prior group had “atrophied” due to its exile in Pakistan and closer ties to many international groups. In the early years of the neo-Taliban, there was sufficient evidence to support this belief. The group was forced to “depend more on non-Afghan fighters,” which weakened their claim to be an “indigenous insurgency” similar to the mujahideen that had ousted the Soviets.

Some of the first groups to enlist in the insurgency were “hundreds of Arab and Central Asian fighters who were hiding out in FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas].” This influx of foreign fighters was a distinct departure from the composition of the Taliban in the previous period, when the group was almost entirely composed of Pashtuns from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even with this influx of international fighters, “Pakistani madrassas continued to provide an inexhaustible flow of new recruits as many Afghan families continued to send their children to study there,” and the Taliban still possessed an “appeal among the Pashtun tribal youth.”

As the insurgency gained in strength, the Taliban were able to more effectively recruit within Afghanistan, thanks to civilian dissatisfaction with the Afghan government, and the importance of the international jihadists within the Taliban ranks declined. When the Taliban expand into new areas, “recruitment starts at the individual level” and they rely heavily on “personal relations.” Often these new members are impressionable young teenagers “who can easily accept to die” and locals seeking a “settling of scores” with coalition forces and rivals in their communities. This recruitment strategy is a change from the first period, when Taliban reinforcements were largely drawn from Pakistani madrassas. The recruitment of Afghans from local Afghan communities reinforces the assessment that the Taliban have returned to being primarily a nationalistic movement. Further evidence for this development is in the diminished role of foreign fighters within the Taliban. In the early years of the Taliban’s second period, foreign fighters played a “training and facilitation role,” along with providing some funding. By the end of the second period, however, “the importance and relevance of [foreign] fighters” have “diminished greatly.” This change is important in that it solidifies the belief that the Taliban movement is truly Afghan and is primarily concerned with achieving success in Afghanistan alone. While foreign militants continued to play important roles as advisors and trainers for bomb making, they were no longer needed as the primary foot soldiers of the insurgency. The evolving composition of Taliban fighters, along with the parallel activity of various militant groups that already existed within Pakistan, have contributed to the perspective that the neo-Taliban lacks cohesion.

Apparent conflicts in the ideology and goals of the neo-Taliban have further increased confusion over the exact nature of the new movement. Understanding the Taliban’s ideology is a crucial aspect in the process of anticipating how the group will act following the expected withdrawal of foreign troops in 2014. Of equal importance is evaluating whether the Taliban leadership have al-

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59 Barfield, 328
60 Ibid., 329
61 Rashid, 2009, 244
62 Giustozzi, 39
66 Ibid.
tered their ideology in recent years and if any apparent changes will be lasting. When the Taliban first came to power in 1996, they demonstrated an extreme, anti-modern ideology that was a product of the unique backgrounds of the group’s leaders. These leaders mixed their rural Pashtun heritage with their radical Deobandi- and Wahhabi-based education to create a truly unique ideological foundation for the Taliban. This reactionary ideology would set the Taliban apart from the traditions of the majority of Afghanistan and shock the world. As a result of their partnership with al Qaeda in the Taliban’s first period, Mullah Omar and many of the Taliban leaders became “much more integrated in the internationalist jihadist movement.”

Some of the disagreement regarding the nature of the changes in the Taliban’s ideology likely stems from the previously noted opinion that the group initially “lacked a sophisticated ideological framework.” As the Taliban developed as a movement and was faced with the challenge of governing, they were forced to more clearly define their ideology. The conservative Islamic foundation of the Taliban ideology is clear from the group’s social policies while in power. Their initial governing actions made it easy to conclude that the Taliban had consciously made the decision to adopt a narrow ideology that did not include support for international jihad. In fact it is likely that the group had no need for a broader ideology at that time. The Taliban leadership almost certainly did not intend to become involved in the burgeoning international jihadist movement when the group was formed in 1994, and the group did not invite Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to come to Afghanistan in 1996. But when presented with multiple opportunities to surrender bin Laden and disconnect themselves from international jihadism, the Taliban refused. This stubborn espousal of ideological aims beyond their local ones in Afghanistan indicates a decided evolution in the Taliban’s ideology. Consequently, the neo-Taliban’s support for international jihad in 2001-2006 during the group’s second period should not be seen as a completely new development, especially since the group had been thrust into the international spotlight without deliberate intent following 9/11.

By 2007, the Taliban had firmly reestablished themselves as a threat to stability in Afghanistan and it made more sense for them to tailor their ideology to appeal to elements of the Afghan public that might be open to their return. One element that the Afghan people had little interest in, especially those living in rural areas, was support for global jihad, and thus this aspect of the Taliban’s ideology diminished just as quickly as it had appeared. Local goals have thus increasingly become a key part of the group’s platform. In fact, according to the renowned Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, “when the Taliban did reappear, their major slogan was that they would restore law and order.”

Evidence of the diminished stature of international jihadism and the return to local concerns in the Taliban’s ideology can be seen in many sources, including statements on their website, quotes given to journalists, and speeches by Mullah Omar. In a statement on the Taliban’s website in August 2008, the group stated they “had and have no plan of harming countries of the world…our goal is the independence of the country and the building of an Islamic state.” This is corroborated by the findings of a study done by British Department of International Development (DFID) conducted in 2008 on the radicalization process of the rank and file of the Taliban. Among the many interesting claims of the report is that the members of the Taliban that were interviewed “made little common cause with Islamist movements outside of Afghanistan.” The Taliban had returned to being solely

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67 Rashid, 2010, 87
68 Ibid., 13
69 Nojumi, 106
70 Rashid, 2009, 211
an Islamic nationalist movement after their brief flirtation with global jihad.

Similar to their ideology, the group’s goals underwent slight adjustments in their second period. The goals of the Taliban are crystal clear in some ways and entirely shrouded in mystery in others. The primary goal and demand of the group throughout the entire insurgency has been “the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces.” However, this demand raises the obvious question of what will follow the withdrawal of the combined forces of the US and its allies from Afghanistan in 2014? Will the Taliban consider sharing power with the Afghan government, or will they launch the country into a full-scale civil war? Much of this uncertainty is a result of the Taliban’s deep ties to the Pakistani ISI. In a prior attempt at negotiations in 2010, the Afghan government did not include Mullah Omar. The Afghan government viewed Omar as a puppet of the ISI, which an Afghan official claimed, “will try to prevent these negotiations from happening.” At the time, this approach appeared foolhardy and yet also insightful. Richard Holbrooke, a veteran of many negotiations, told journalist Steve Coll, “I don’t think we can negotiate with Mullah Omar.” However, Holbrooke also believed the Taliban leader must be killed before negotiations could happen, saying “if you could choose between [eliminating] Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, I personally would lean toward Mullah Omar.” Unsurprisingly, these talks led to no results and new approaches were sought.

After over a decade of war, it appears that the goals of the Taliban have remained relatively unchanged, even as other aspects of the group have evolved significantly. As the group still recognizes itself as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, it is clear that their desired goal is to regain authority in Afghanistan and establish an Islamic state. This is also an acceptable outcome for Pakistan and the ISI, as it accomplishes their goals of having a significant amount of influence in Afghanistan, and also limits the possible role that Pakistan’s eternal rival India could have if the Karzai-led government is allowed to remain. How all of this will play out in the upcoming years is extremely uncertain. However, what is known is that the process will not involve a peace deal between the US and the Taliban. After talks fell apart in early 2012, “American generals and civilian officials acknowledge[d] that they have all but written off” the possibility of a settlement and have begun to focus on strengthening the Afghan security forces so that they would be ready to meet the challenge of the Taliban following the withdrawal of most coalition troops in 2014.

Overall, many of the differences between the original Taliban and the neo-Taliban stem from the group having to match the nature of their new opponents. The original Taliban joined together as reaction to the sickening injustices they observed in their communities that were a result of the warlordism and civil war in Afghanistan. The arrival of the US and its allies brought increased stability and some improvements in the quality of life for many Afghans. However, it also marked the return of empire to Afghanistan, an entity that many Afghans, especially the Pashtuns had long resisted. It should be no surprise then that an insurgency developed to oust this foreign presence on Afghan soil. This insurgency continued to call itself the Taliban, and in many ways, that claim is true. However, what is not clear in 2013 is what this changed Taliban will do once the vast majority of foreign troops leave Afghanistan at the end of 2014.

The Taliban in 2013 and the Future

The Taliban in 2013 are still a mysterious group that most outsiders have only a surface-level

75 Coll, 2012, 52
76 Ibid.
understanding of. This limited understanding makes it easy for motivated actors to frame the Taliban in a particular way. In the title of this article, two possibilities for the central driving force of the Taliban are given. The truth is that both of these options are correct to varying extents, and that there are also numerous other varying local concerns that should be considered. The Taliban are a disparate bunch of individuals, united under a common name in order to advance their own interests. These interests vary by region, and this variance in goals is reflected by recent compilations such as *Decoding the New Taliban* and *Talibanistan*. Each of these books contain chapters that highlight the state of the Taliban in different regions, indicating that the Taliban is not a perfectly uniform force as it might seem from depictions of the group in the mainstream media. However, even when this diversity amongst the ranks is taken into account, there are several unifying factors within the Taliban. In their recent book *An Enemy We Created*, the researchers Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn are able to place the Taliban’s objectives and strategy into a common section across various chapters. These examples testify to the difficulty of analyzing the Taliban and the importance of understanding that many statements made about the group will almost certainly only apply to certain sections of it.

With this note of caution taken care of, the important matter of answering the question posed in the title can begin. It is a critical question for the future of Afghanistan, as the extent to which the answer leans to either of the possibilities will be predictive of how long the conflict in Afghanistan will continue. A useful starting point for this deliberation is the Taliban’s stated goals, as they hint at what motivates the members of the group. The most important of these goals is the Taliban’s continued demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. This objective is in line with those of Afghan warriors of yore. No group of people with some semblance of collective identity is willing to accept the intrusion of dominating foreign force. Time and again this has proven to be especially true of Afghans, diverse as they may be. In this way, the Taliban are descendant from the long line of Afghans who have fought against the presence of empire in their homeland. However, this connection does not mean the Taliban are motivated entirely by this traditional cause. The Taliban demand that all foreign troops leave Afghanistan is only a pre-condition for negotiations with the Afghan government and not one that will end the conflict by itself. This subtlety would seem to indicate that there are other factors at play, and that the Taliban in 2013 are not purely an anti-imperial movement.

Unfortunately, in regards to securing peace and stability in Afghanistan, determining the specific reasons why the members of the Taliban fight against the current Afghan government is somewhat of an impossible task. The larger reasons, the ones outlined above, are fairly obvious. However, identifying and addressing the smaller, more immediate, local concerns of the insurgents is a process that will require lots of time and resources. It is also unclear who will provide these resources. Afghanistan is desperately dependent on foreign aid for the reconstruction of its infrastructure and the maintenance of its security forces. As is often the case, this foreign assistance will not come without strings attached. These strings will trace back to Washington D.C., the center of the last remaining superpower and, in the view of some, empire on earth.

The resentment amongst segments of Afghan society towards the US along with its dissatisfaction with the rampant corruption that cripples the Afghan government and its institutions are factors that directly fuel the Taliban in 2013. The factors allow the Taliban to portray “themselves to disgruntled and insecure communities as the saviors of Afghanistan.” The anthropologist Robert Canfield, borrowing a concept from Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*, does an excellent job in summarizing how all of these negative feelings of dissatisfaction, resentment, and insecurity drive Afghan civilians to join the Taliban (italics from the original):

77 Strick von Linschoten and Kuehn, 284, 303, 327
These Islamists share a sense of *fraternity* as Muslims, in fact, in this case as Sunni Muslims, who desire a more just world in which Muslims have more leverage, more dignity, more hope. They share a common conception of *power* in that they grant leadership to individuals who speak in the name of God and can muster a force by which to actively confront the cultural juggernaut of the West, some of them even supposing that their martyrdom for this cause would be honorable and spiritually rewarded. They share a common sense of *time* in the sense of a cosmology and an eschatology that situates their present dilemmas in a trajectory of history.

For the aimless youth previously described in the section about the formation of the Taliban, these concepts of fraternity, power, and time provide connections and an access to an identity that they would otherwise lack. Three decades of war left many of the traditional societal networks in Afghanistan in disarray. The original Taliban were an immediate response to this disarray, and the Taliban in 2013 are a continuation of this reactionary impulse. They despise the presence of empire in Afghanistan, and yet many of them are also driven by entirely unrelated reasons. The Taliban in 1994 were not a response to, or the creation of, empire; and this will remain true for the group after 2014. The withdrawal of US forces in 2014 will ease some of the tensions that fuel the Taliban, but the dissatisfaction with the Afghan state will remain. And so will the Taliban. The Taliban title has taken on a meaning far more significant than that of an anti-imperial movement or a proxy force for Pakistan. The group has become a source of identity and purpose for the thousands of disaffected Afghan males that seek stability in a chaotic space and time. The events and processes that led to this chaos are rooted in the culture and societal structures of Afghanistan and its destructive contact with empire. Decades will likely pass before the circumstances necessary for prolonged stability in Afghanistan are achieved. In the meantime, the Taliban ethos has firmly entrenched itself in the societal fabric of Afghanistan and will live on in many forms, whether as an anti-imperial movement, a proxy force for outsiders, or something else entirely.
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Abstract: Thailand (formerly known as Siam) was never formally colonized or part of a European empire. Thus, Thai historical accounts can claim that Siam transformed into modern Thailand internally and organically, without sacrificing the traditions of the Thai. This natural modernity, though, is constantly questioned by the indigenous hill communities of northern Thailand, as their existence threatens modern state structures and the project of national integration. In this paper, I approach the power struggle between the state and the hill communities by examining the forestry policies of Thailand in the past century, arguing that the state’s shift in managing forests as economic sites to maintaining them as conservation areas reflects their desire for continued control of Thai natural resources. Furthermore, the state links water management to scientific forest conservation in order to justify their control over national parks. I argue that the state’s legitimization of watershed and national park policies on a supposedly scientific basis is in fact influenced by cultural and historical ideologies, and the creation of national parks in northern Thailand has exacerbated the marginalization of indigenous hill communities. By portraying these hill communities as primitive and unscientific environment destroyers, the state has delegitimized these people’s rights to their homeland, thus engaging in an internal imperial relationship.
Introduction

In 1988, devastating floods and landslides hit southern Thailand and killed hundreds of people. Pictures of uprooted trees around mudslide zones led to speculation that deforestation was to blame, followed by public outcry against the economic forestry regime at the time, which included timber extraction for economic purposes. In 1989, Thai state passed a logging ban that functionally ended the era of economic forestry and the profit-oriented vision of forests. While in the past, the state used high prices of teak and other forest products to justify increased timber extraction, this was no longer possible after public outrage and the logging ban. Under the current forestry framework, the state, using new scientific and biological arguments to justify the creation of new national parks, maintains that the forest is to be protected for its value as a watershed, which it defines as “a spatial unit surrounded by mountain ridges which collect rainfall amounts from main streams” (Watershed Conservation Office q. in Pinkaew 2001). While the old ideological framework identified forests as regions for safe and monitored economic extraction, the new regime claims to preserve the sanctity of forests as regions for ecological protection and conservation maintenance. Thus, the use of forests has changed drastically to accommodate environmental protection, but is still justified on the basis of apparently scientific knowledge concerning forests and forestry practices. Specifically, the new form of conservation is one in which the state has established national parks in forest regions in order to protect watersheds and headwater areas. While the old system legitimized extraction of raw materials though scientific claims, the new system likewise uses biological knowledge to justify the protection of forested areas.

However, this discourse can neither claim scientific accuracy nor objectivity. Though the new watershed framework appears to be objective and fair, at least relative to older system, the history I present in this paper demonstrates its links to cultural and historical factors in Thai society. By examining how forest, water, and power have come to be interrelated in Thai state discourses,1 I explore the cultural logic of watershed protection in Thailand and the ramifications it has on indigenous communities that reside in the forest. I demonstrate, by examining the resistance of a hill tribe (the Karen) against the government’s establishment of Mae Tho National Park in northern Thailand, the tenuous scientific ties between watershed protection and the state’s forestry policies, and ultimately argue that the state’s supposedly scientific management of water has been influenced by cultural factors. I will further show that their conservation policies control forests in northern regions, exacerbating the marginalization of indigenous communities.

Background: Forests and National Parks in Thailand

In this section, I will provide a brief history of water and watershed politics in Thailand, both in terms of the cultural significance of water and its relationship to forests. Additionally, I will briefly discuss the history of national parks in Thailand so as to provide a basis for understanding the evolution of national park management in the country. Ultimately, this section serves to demonstrate the intertwining of water and forest policy over time, culminating in the state’s current watershed-based justification of controlling national parks in Thailand.

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1 In this paper, discourse is simply the general framework of language surrounding a certain topic. Most often in this paper, discourse is relative to the ways in which the Thai state government uses stylized ideas to refer to watersheds, often relying on certain tropes of discourses that do not necessarily reflect the accuracy of their statements. For example, Thai state use of scientific discourse is not always accurate, but has all of the markers and trappings of scientific discourse, which gives it credibility and currency among various constituency groups.
Forests: A Cultural History of water, muang, and pa

The cultural history of pa, or forest, illuminates the history of forests relative to the history of the geo-body. Pa has always been defined against muang, or political communities (often in the form of cities) (Pinkaew 2001: 67). It also designates an area outside of the control of the state, both materially as well as spiritually (67). Materially, the forest was useful for its resources; with trees and other plants in abundance, Thai could use the provisions of the forest to support themselves. However, the forest was also considered a dangerous, uncivilized place, where the untamed power of human spirituality could exist unperturbed. Thus, while the forest was distant and peripheral, it still played an important role in constituting Thai identity. As a source of wildness and power, the forest was valuable and, in contrast to muang, defied many of the trappings of modernity.

As mentioned, pa was historically considered to lie outside of the political community. In fact, the expression “hak lang thang phong” (clear the forest to make a land) was used to commend good citizenship (67). In the context of this saying, citizens were to destroy the forest, transforming the pa into the muang. The cleared land would be used for irrigated rice paddies. Rice, important as a food staple for Thai people, also held significance as a cultural object that represented, in Thong-chai’s words, “Thainess.” Another saying highlights the importance of rice paddies: “In the waters fish abound; in the fields rice grows high” (Rapee 1989: 4). This saying emphasizes the naturalness of a rice padi, which is, in fact, a human-made wetland that requires large quantities of water to irrigate. Just as humans depend on the wilderness and its resources, rice depends on water. The politics of water, then, is deeply intertwined with Thai agriculture and plays a central role in Thai identity. Water, like forest, is also intimately tied to the notions of muang and pa; within the muang, water is controlled and used for irrigation. Despite human attempts to manage water, it remains a powerful force of nature. The dual aspects of water mirror the muang/pa distinction, and reminds humans of the tenuous control society has over nature.

Rice agriculture, as a labor-intensive enterprise, became a means through which manpower was concentrated into an early-modern state, now identified as a padi state, which depended on the readily accessible rice taxes and corvee labor supply (Scott 2009: 65). Though the pre-modern state was not necessarily defined by its ethnic or linguistic composition, many of the ethnic Thai lived—and still live—in the flat, southern regions, which are suitable to wet-rice agriculture. In contrast, the north is populated with ethnic minorities (those who are not Thai) who practice swidden (slash-and-burn) agriculture. In a land-extensive swidden agricultural system, long fallow periods augment crop rotation and intercropping methods, permitting less sedentary lifestyles. In contrast, southerners cannot easily move their padi fields, and their production can be hamstrung by environmental or irrigation issues.

In wet-rice agricultural systems, water is significant as a determinant of agricultural success.

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2 In religion, this was deeply tied into the lowland Theravada Buddhism present in Thailand: as part of an endless battle between dharma and adharma, the wilderness represented the areas where power and demons could flourish, though they would be later subjugated to the king and his power (Stern 1968:300).
3 One could say here that the rice padi has been cultivated as a culturally natural object, though it is not necessarily considered scientifically natural (or endemic to the local ecosystem).
4 Note that water also has a symbolic dimension, not only material: “The water symbol [naga] finds its way into almost every facet of Thai life from kings to ordinary people, appearing in royal paraphernalia, temple architecture, and ordinary village huts and utensils” (Sumet 1989:13). This emphasis on water even extended to the “upcountry menfolk,” those who are not affected by yearly floods in Bangkok (13, 19). Further, background information about this piece shows the importance of water as a cultural object. Even if the author is only retroactively creating water as an important element of Thai heritage, it does so through a Symposium sponsored by the Thai government, thus reinforcing the idea that water is essential to Thai identity. The King has also spoken publicly about water and its importance, as in the case of the proposed “monkey cheeks” dam project (Kupluthai 2011).
5 Wet-rice agriculture and what James Scott calls “padi states” require substantial man-power (construction of padi fields and their maintenance, primarily). Thus, these states are people-dense, which helps create a pre-modern state, which does not have technologies to transcend the “friction of geography” that Scott discusses.
Given the demand for consistent and reliable water use, water-related conflicts abound, and are further complicated by the physical and cultural geography of Thailand. With the northern provinces at a higher elevation, rivers generally flow from north to south, making southern provinces dependent on the north for water and thus allowing upstream populations to hold political power over ones farther south. Northern groups can sabotage the southerners’ agricultural livelihood, causing pollution or water shortages for downstream populations (Forsyth and Walker 2009: 121). This fear of water sabotage is only exacerbated by the cultural geography of muang and pa. In the civilized south, the political community (muang) depends on unreliable water from the forested and uncivilized north (pa). Water problems in the south are often attributed to the north, where ethnic minorities and other politically marginalized populations live. Ethnic minority groups, legally titled “hill tribes,” are among the poorest populations in Thailand, often lacking citizenship and other forms of political rights. Thus, a water distribution problem is not only a resource problem, but one that carries cultural and historical weight.

A Legal History of National Parks

Created alongside new court structures, modern national park politics in Thailand began with the designation of Thai forests as state-owned in 1892. Reflecting general land policy trends in Thailand, forestry policy has had periods of both rapid privatization and nationalization. Currently, forests are primarily nationalized, and the Thai government aims to maintain 25% of land as conservation forest (Forsyth and Walker 2009: 45). While almost enough land is designated as such, not nearly enough of it is actually protected. In this section, a genealogical history of forestry policy will help explain the present state of Thai forestry. This history draws methodological inspiration from Richard Grove, who argues that modern conservation policy emerged from colonial European and indigenous negotiations (1994: 3). Grove demonstrates that conservation was not necessarily a Western notion, but one that dialectically formed alongside indigenous traditions and understandings of land. Thus, the modern regime shares aspects of both European and indigenous traditions. While Grove’s case was specific to the British Empire and its various conservation projects, this idea of negotiation is exceptionally relevant to the Thai case and its water politics. The Thai state has adopted scientific (European) concepts concerning bounded, ordered space and resources to partially replace indigenous ideals (such as the muang and pa ideas about land). Thus, the tension here is between scientific practices and cultural management of the land, inasmuch as they demand different justifications for land use and non-use. Finally, this history of forestry policy is intimately related to resource management issues, which ties back into discussions of wet-rice agriculture (Lohmann 1993: 187). This section focuses on the following main conservation periods: 1897-1961, 1961-1989, and 1989-present.

In 1897, the Royal Forestry Department (RFD) was established in Thailand, marking the beginning of an era of state-led forest management. Concurrent with the establishment of RFD, the Forest Preservation Act and Teak Preservation Act (both 1897 acts) criminalized logging without a government permit (Usher 2009:67). Because most teak forests were located in the north, these acts primarily affected ethnic minorities who heavily rely on forests for their livelihood. Enforced by the RFD, these acts prevented ethnic minorities and other groups without formal land tenure from cutting down trees on their traditionally-held land while simultaneously permitting commercial logging in forested areas while restricting local use. Using economic justifications for their logging activities, the Thai state often granted these permits to foreign companies, though all leases for foreign-held companies ended in 1955 (Usher 2009: 76). Thus, by leasing natural resources, the Thai govern-

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6 Formerly, these populations have been called khon pa, or “wild people” (Pinkaew).
ment began to prioritize the development of forests. Though forests were still considered wild,\(^7\) they became a cornerstone of Thai government income.

The year 1961 marked the establishment of Thai parks officially through the National Park Law. This law, along with others that preceded it (the 1941 Forest Act), represented a noticeable change from the extractive policies of the past. Alarmed by the vast consumption of forest by logging companies, the government established a National Park Law (1961) and National Forest Reserves Act (1964). While these policies still allowed for some industrial production of timber, they also designated certain areas permanent forests by royal decree (Forsyth and Walker 2008: 41). Influenced by American park policies,\(^8\) Thai national parks were established under Western conservation ethics. In this model, people were not allowed to live within the bounds of the park, which would be maintained for tourists and pleasure-seekers, rather than for subsistence farming (Usher 2009: 163). Such a model implied the displacement of local peoples from northern national park land, thus furthering the cultural dissonance between upland and lowland peoples. At the same time, deforestation did not end during this era, with the Thai national companies continuing their logging activities. Although these forests were created to protect the area from timber extraction, they proved very ineffective until 1989, and still do not prevent all timber harvesting in the present day.

Despite the failure of the state to protect national parks from logging, these policies designated the forests as sites of both economic and conservation activities. This was reinforced through the National Forest Policy of 1985. Under this policy, federally-designated forests were divided into both economic and conservation forests. In economic forest areas, trees could be logged without punishment, while conservation forests were closed to economic consumption. The forest thus became a federally managed object to be used both for future conservation and for immediate consumption. Although these laws served to prevent logging, they were not necessarily effective at doing so. While there had been widespread “cheating” within the system by timber companies,\(^9\) corporations also logged outside of legally-condoned timber extraction. Due to inadequate policing and corruption within the RFD itself, illegal logging continued to pose a serious threat to forest reserve areas.

In 1989, a flood caused death and destruction in central (lowland) Thailand. The flood, blamed on deforestation in the northern region, marked a transition to the integration of the public’s forest- and water-related concerns. The flood itself instigated a shift in forest policy in Thailand, beginning with a logging ban that spelled the end of forests as sites of economic activity (Usher 2009: 147). While so much of the forest’s previous existence had been predicated on economic benefits, the forest could now only be established as a conservation entity. Despite, or perhaps because of, this shift in forest policy, the state continued to strengthen control over the land. Following the logging ban, forestry legislation restricted more areas of land, which strongly affected the northerners, especially those who continued to depend on forest resources for their income. Since their swidden agricultural land often overlapped with state-run national park projects, they were dispossessed from their land upon the establishment of new parks after the 1989 logging ban (Lohmann 1993: 185). Unfortunately for hill tribes, this dispossession has continued even after the establishment of the 2007 Community Forest Act, which guaranteed communities access to collective land tenure rights in forested areas along with limited forest use. Despite the Act’s intention to empower communities

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\(^7\) Take, for example, the prevalence of Karen and other hill tribes as guides for foreign foresters (Usher 2009: 68). Their presences as guides indicates the importance that a “guide” for the wilderness had for European countries, and the potential fear of the Thai wilderness in forested areas.

\(^8\) Often, Yellowstone is used as a park indicative of American Park ideals. In this park, people and park have been historically separated, despite evidence of human activity in the plains areas of the park. At the same time, Yellowstone is also indicative of American racism against Native American groups that occupied the parks (Usher 2009). Finally, Yellowstone is also an example of an area of great wilderness.

\(^9\) For example, ignoring restrictions on tree sizes (Usher 2009: 79).
and stop collective dispossession from land and its resources, it has done little to solve past injustices and has been poorly enforced to protect the rights of hill tribes in forested areas.

By studying a brief history of national parks in Thailand, it is evident that the motivations underlying the national park project have changed over time. However, though the basis of park establishment has shifted from economic activity to conservation efforts, the Thai state has maintained its control over land. Just as the padi state controlled the territory of a *muang*, the modern state now controls the forest (*pa*), which, though formerly peripheral, has now become a central issue in national policy, largely due to its intertwine with water policy. We can see the increasing overlap between water and forest issues by examining in detail the establishment of Mae Tho National Park. The conflict between the Karen hill tribe and the Thai state over the Park demonstrates the ways in which discourses of power have come to characterize the national park project in Thailand and illustrates the integration of water and forest policy, with the state using watershed as justification for national park creation.

### Establishing Mae Tho National Park as a Watershed

The government’s argument for the establishment of the Mae Tho National Park rests primarily on watersheds, or regions that collect water into streams and rivers. The Thai government defines a watershed’s primary import as a source of water for downstream regions. Watershed policy, which synthesizes various components of land and conservation management in Thailand, also links together scientific discourse with an age-old conflict between south and north and their respective Thai and non-Thai peoples (Pinkaew 2001: 141). Thai state actors (the Royal Forestry Department in the past, now the National Park, Wildlife, and Plant Conservation Department\(^\text{10}\)) currently cite the importance of watersheds in their arguments supporting national park creation. While watershed analysis often uses Western scientific forms of knowledge as support, it is still critiqued by indigenous groups on the basis of their own relationships with and understandings of the forest. Here, I will discuss both the scientific argument that generally justifies watershed creation as well as the cultural import of watershed management practices in Thailand. I will also detail Karen resistance to watershed categories, outlining their arguments for people-centered watershed conservation.

#### Watershed Logic under the State

Mae Tho, one of many high-altitude forested regions in the north, is considered an important watershed, or a region that collects water for sub-orders and orders of rivers for future use in downstream regions. Situated in the Mae Chaem district of Chiang Mai province, Mae Tho National Park is relatively close to other national parks. This proximity in placement raises questions about the necessity of the Park. Additionally, resistance from people who live in the area has challenged the Park’s existence. Because the Karen lived in this forest area prior to the establishment of the Park, they do not want to be relocated. Despite lack of legal support, hill communities have been marginally successful in protesting Mae Tho’s establishment through their collaboration with non-profit organizations, petitions, and demonstrations. Indeed, there seems to be no real benefit to Mae Tho’s creation, and the conflict surrounding it only exacerbates the issue. Nevertheless, the Thai national government chooses to justify the creation of the Park based on watershed protection.

The government’s special interest in watersheds lies in their role as headwaters, or the source of rivers, which are considered to be of higher import than the complete river system. Since the

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\(^{10}\) The important note here is that the Thai Government reorganized in 2002, resulting in the creation of the National Park, Wildlife, and Plant Conservation Department (NPWPC) and the restructuring of the RFD to deal instead with forest areas outside of protected areas (FAO 2009:77).
protection of the source of water ensures the quality of water further downstream, the state emphasized the identification and protection of watersheds. The government, which has claimed much of the land in the north in order to protect watersheds through the application of 1941 Forest Act and the National Forest Reserves Act of 1964, determines which watersheds are of value and which are not through collection of scientific and topographic data (Usher 2009: 61). It then designates and protects watersheds through reforestation and classificatory land schemes. As important watersheds are often located in forest areas, state regulation of water frequently includes the designation of these locations as protected forest. In this overlapping water and forest classificatory system, the watershed is ultimately protected from potential threats.

Before continuing, it is necessary to note that water and water sources have recently taken on added value with the acceptance of scientific environmental knowledge in forestry management practices. For example, after disastrous floods in 2011, the Thai government held an exhibition called “Determined to Work and Management Water Resources for the Public” (The Nation (Thailand) 2012). This exhibition reified the differences between the mainly ethnic-Thai south and the ethnic-minority north, and solidified the role that each played in water production and consumption. While the south could freely consume water, the north was obliged to protect it for downstream use. Further, northerners were at a higher risk of implication in flood disasters, such as after the 1989 flood, which was presumably caused by deforestation and environmental destruction in upstream areas of the river. This exhibition, which was primarily aimed at convincing southerners of the necessity of government water conservation programs, also relayed an important message about the role of water in Thailand: that water, above all, is an essential resource, and that protection from floods depends on successful management of upstream resources.

Considering the consequences of mismanagement, such as irrigation water shortages or massive floods, it seems as though water regulation in the south would take precedence over that in the north. However, water is actually managed through the headwaters of the north, under land protection policy and a five-class scientific watershed classification system. Government projects, intended to protect and manage water for optimal use, designate forests as a primary mechanism to protect downstream water resources. The most important protected classes in this system (I and II) are regions common in the north: headwaters at high elevations. Though these categorical distinctions are logical in terms of water protection efficacy, they severely affect groups living in surrounding areas. For Class I (including Class IA and IB) watersheds, forested area is designated as either protected or reforested, with potential uses only including agroforestry (importantly, not agriculture) (Forsyth and Walker 2008:44). This curtails any agricultural practices of hill tribes, even those who lived in a Class I watershed prior to its designation. Class II watersheds, differentiated from Class I watersheds in terms of elevation and slope (they are at “high,” not “very high,” elevation, and have “steep,” not “very steep,” slopes) are similarly protected -- they cannot be used for agricultural activities, though resource extraction (mining and commercial forestry) can potentially be permitted (44). As there are no explicit legal acts concerning watershed protection, watersheds are maintained and protected through state-mandated reforestation and forest protection (FAO 2009:24). In this way, the forest has become the primary means by which to protect water.

More than just government policy has tied Thai conceptions of water to the well-being of forest areas. The Royal Forestry Department has posted roadside signs throughout the north with messages like ‘if the soil loses forest, the sky loses rain and people lose their hearts’, ‘if the forest is destroyed, the soil is dry, rain disappears and the rice dies’, and ‘the streams will dry out if the covering shade of the forest is lost’ (Forsyth and Walker 2008:87). By constructing the forest as the producer and protector of both water and rain—inevitable resources on which the Thai people depend –

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11 At the time that these laws were enacted, they were not intended for application as true conservation documents. However, they are currently used as documents to reinforce the current conservation regime, despite their original intent as economic documents.
the RFD encourages Thai people to ensure their own success and happiness by protecting the forests. The signs thus indicate that water is situated within a wider framework of responsibility that incites Thai citizens to protect resources for the south and the state. In addition to fostering conservation efforts among the population, the signs also reinforce the power of the state by conveying its role in establishing nationalist discourses of watershed protection.

Such state-led discourses surface in Thai scholarship as well. At an academic conference addressing the role of culture and environment in Thailand, Rapee Sagarik asserted that “When they [forests] still covered most of the country, forests were successful in acting as a watershed. The rains fell so regularly that even crop cultivation could be based entirely and predictably on rainfall. The soil retained sufficient amounts of water” (1989: 4). These kinds of statements, which again reinforce relationships between water, forests, rice and the Thai people, rely on certain cultural and environmental assumptions regarding rain: first, that increased forest cover causes rainfall, and second, that forests serve as “sponges” that absorb seasonal rainfall and release water throughout drier periods (88). Under such logic, deforestation would cause an obvious threat to water quality, and the scientific solution would be to promote reforestation, rather than agricultural production, in these areas. However, this logic is not factually correct. Though forests do play an important role in watershed protection, there is evidence that their significance holds more cultural, rather than scientific, weight. Long-term studies of rainfall in Thailand have shown that there has not been a statistically significant decrease in rain since the adoption of forest conservation policies (100-101). Additionally, altitude—not density—of forests determines amount of rainfall (104). Causation has become mistaken for correlation between rainfall and forest cover. Thus, water distribution may be a larger challenge to the southerners rather than lack of water. Despite evidence that puts into question the scientific basis for equating forest and water conservation, the state established Mae Tho National Park with the intention of protecting water resources. Since the district in which the Park is located is currently about 80% forested, the state designated it as an ideal location for watershed protection, especially given the area’s proximity to the Mae Chaem and Ping Rivers (Roth 2004: 126, 127). At Mae Tho National Park the watershed argument is mobilized in the protection of the park. Here, there is no recognition of the distinction between water and forest in Thai government language or policy.

Though the impacts of the conflation of water and forest seem minimal, watershed policies have real implications for those who live in national park regions. In the past, a government policy allowed for police and the RFD to remove groups without land tenure documents (a vast majority of individuals in rural areas) from national park and forest reserve areas, even if these groups had lived in the area prior to the establishment of the park. Although this policy is now defunct and no longer officially allows the state to relocate people from national park areas, many indigenous communities are still severely limited within national park and Watershed 1A regions. In 2003 at Mae Tho National Park, the Watershed Unit of the RFD13 enforced Watershed 1A classification in the area, resulting in a military presence that demanded Karen villagers to cede claims to half of their agricultural land (Roth 2004: 216).14 Because the land was not formally titled, the RFD was able to take away the land at their discretion, effectively disposing the Karen village of much of its functional agricultural land. In practice, the state effectively prevents the Karen from earning income and subsisting

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12 Some of which are supported by biological evidence, others not.
13 Note that this was during the process of reorganization within the state, so responsibilities of the RFD were changing as the national park department was being formed.
14 To add to the confusion of villagers, this process happened alongside a general willingness of park officials to negotiate with the villagers (Roth 2004:216).
on the land, for without agriculture, the Karen cannot continue to maintain their lifestyles.\textsuperscript{15} This conflict between the state and the Karen demonstrates the evolution of the national park into a site of conflict, with the villagers unable to coexist alongside a successful watershed management program. Finally, by framing this conflict in terms of watershed protection, the state links the Karen to watershed destruction, thus painting them as non-Thai citizens. The Thai state actions that eliminate Karen cultural practices on their own lands are then not limited to conservation policy, but are part of a wider discourse that depict the community as outside or against the state.

\textit{Indigenous Critiques of Watershed Logic}

While the watershed argument is relatively self-sustaining within the state’s assumptive scientific framework, it has been met with resistance from hill communities and their advocates. These groups critique both the general infrastructure of watershed analysis and the perceived effects of their communities on watersheds. They question the validity of measuring watershed health through forest cover. As previously noted, watersheds are considered intimately connected to the forest, and thus, the health of a watershed has been measured through the health of the forest. However, this ignores confounding causes, such as industrial development and increased lowland agriculture, of watershed deterioration. Industrial development pollutes water sources, while intensification in lowland agriculture causes increased demand for water (Pongphon 2011, Forsyth and Walker 2009: 132). It is evident that factors other than deforestation contribute to a decrease in quality and quantity of water.

This controversy over the causes of watershed deterioration has led to a recent court case by the Land Reform Network of Thailand against the state. The Land Reform Network is asking for the re-evaluation of a method used to calculate compensation from forest encroachers\textsuperscript{16} in reserve areas (Pongphon 2011). This case calls into question the established belief that forests alone directly determine the health of watersheds. However, this challenge against the dominant framework has been unsuccessful, as the court cases have been barely effective at changing government policy or actions. This failure can be attributed to a myriad of reasons, including institutionalized racism and ineffectiveness of Karen arguments in the courtroom context. Though the Thai government has adopted some new policies, changes in implementation have been extremely slow on the ground (Lang 2012).

A second critique of watershed politics comes from the Karen, who believe that their impact in Class I (restricted) watershed areas is minimal. They argue that their traditional practices, as knowledge systems used to protect both the forest and water resources, have been effective at preserving watersheds, and thus should be protected by the state instead of dispossessed from their land. The defense of community forests has been more successful for the Karen than it has been for other tribes, perhaps due to their large population and willingness to work with outside institutions (Forsyth and Walker 2008:135).

Within popular Thai discourse, Karen practices are summarized as: “to eat from forests, we must protect forests” (Pinkaew 2001:57). This demonstrates the Karen’s recognition that they must have minimal impact on the forest in order to maintain their lifestyle. While such a phrase reflects

\textsuperscript{15} Note that in the pilot project portion of this park, Karen are actually being allowed to live within the park, in particular areas that are designated for them (Roth 2004: 184-185). However, the general trend within Thailand has been to remove or severely limit the mobility of groups who live in these protected regions, such as under a relocation project in the 1990s. Thus, this treatment of the Karen in Mae Tho is actually considered generous, and a potential reason for the lack of designation of Mae Tho as an official national park is likely the existence of indigenous peoples within its bounds. Additionally, even under the generous treatment of the Karen within the park, they are still expected to conform to many restrictive aspects of Thai National Park management, mostly those that change certain aspects of everyday life (e.g. agricultural production) (185).

\textsuperscript{16} In this case, forest encroachers are individuals living in the forest illegally, often poor farmers or ethnic groups, through this term can also apply to wealthier individuals who build houses and tourist attractions in the forest.
and romanticizes the environmentalist nature of the Karen, the Thai state has used it in a way that portrays them as barbarians who live on the land. If the Karen justify their practices as scientifically-based, they threaten their credibility as barbarians who live on the land, thus allowing them to be demonized as “forest encroachers.” As “forest encroachers,” the Karen are viewed as captialists who unfairly take advantage of the land, rather than barbarians who harmonize with it (58). Thus, if the Karen deviate from their state-ordained role as subsistence farmers working with and for the forest, they become caught in a debate of past and present—they can either risk being barbarian or environmentally damaging (58). There is no real way to win this debate, as an uncivilized person has no legitimate voice against the state. There seems to be no way out for the Karen: they are doomed to be considered anti-state under state watershed and water conservation regulations. In fact, some forest conservationists have taken an even harsher stance, saying that any amount of environmental damage is dangerous, and that any hill communities living in forests should not be permitted (58). This results in land dispossession and severe restrictions on the everyday life of the Karen, and it all stems from the seemingly harmless conservation discourse and ploy to protect Thai water resources.

Conclusion

The creation of Mae Tho National Park is a story in which water has taken an increasingly large role for the Thai state and its justification for control over a forested region. Through legitimizing park creation in terms of a watershed, the state has been able to maintain hegemonic control over scientific and cultural discourses for park creation in order to paint the Karen as forest destroyers. Despite potentially powerful counterarguments by the Karen, the integration of national cultural and scientific discourses in park discourse has rendered watersheds both literally and figuratively untouchable as political objects. Despite the scientific flaws in watershed-based arguments, the idea of a watershed holds great cultural and historical salience that allows it to be utilized without being formally contested on the basis of empirical fact. Because the watersheds are sacrosanct and useful, Mae Tho National Park has become a site of conservation. The resulting conflicts over park placement and policy enforcement exacerbates divisions between north and south and creates real implications for hill communities, such as the Karen. Though national park policy appears to promote environmentalism, it actually helps perpetuate structures that marginalize indigenous populations. Without a voice to fight back against these policies, these communities are often stereotyped as uncivilized forest destroyers. In response, the state takes control over forest lands. By shifting from an economic approach to a conservation approach, the state intimately and discursively links the well-being of the forest to the fate of water resources. Ultimately, this link of water and forest legitimizes the state’s own power over forested areas, despite their supposed “wildness” and location in the periphery of the state. Through the integration of water, forest, and their related politics, the pa has become the muang, and the national park has become a symbol of the state and its power.
The Power of Watersheds as Methodology in Thai National Park Politics

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The Power of Watersheds as Methodology in Thai National Park Politics


Scientific Racism in the Far East: A Foucaultian Analysis of Hygiene and Modernity in Imperial Japan

By Benjamin Misch

Abstract: Among the many powers of the modern world, Japan’s process of modernization from unification to empire proceeded at an unprecedented rapidity. Starting with the Meiji Restoration in 1868, this paper traces the evolution of hygiene from a mechanism of Japanese unification and modernization to a justification of Japanese imperialism and superiority. Drawing on the works and theory of Michel Foucault, this paper analyzes the mechanisms of power underlying this discourse of “hygienic modernity” as it pertains to the establishment and maintenance of the Japanese empire. Additionally, this paper links the Japanese empire to its Western counterparts by analyzing this discourse in terms of modernization and a broader concept of colonial discourse as delineated by Edward Said and Albert Memmi.
When Commodore Matthew Perry and his ships forcefully entered Japan in 1853, ending hundreds of years of Japanese isolation, the entirety of Japanese civilization suddenly came under the scrutiny of the powers of the Western world. At the same time, elites in Japan were forced to reckon with the understanding that their country was comparatively weak and ill-equipped to fight off any colonization effort by the imperialist Western powers. In response to this threat, a rapid consolidation of authority and power across Japan took place, and Japan began a process of swift modernization called the Meiji Restoration. By analyzing the elites’ quest to create a unified Japan capable of establishing itself as a world power equal in strength to the West, I will explore how Japanese central authority created and propagated a sense of nationalism among the population. Looking at history through a Foucaultian lens, I will trace the development of hygiene in Japan with respect to the establishment of a Japanese consciousness coincident with a strong central authority. Furthermore, I will analyze Ruth Rogaski’s discourse of hygienic modernity with focus on its development and its role in transforming Japan and its people as well as in uniting and motivating the population in the pursuit of empire. In the Meiji Restoration, hygiene created a public consciousness within the Japanese population by aligning the interests of the population with the goals of the state. Later in Imperial Japan, hygiene became a mechanism through which Japan defined its superiority and justified its imperial civilizing mission. Japan used its understanding of hygiene the same way that the West used race to justify imperialism.

Although Commodore Perry forcefully opened up Japan with the intent to trade, the Tokugawa elites understood that this was merely a prelude to Western imperialism. The first vestige of this imperialism was a set of unequal treaties, initiated by the Kanagawa Treaty in 1854. The Kanagawa Treaty set the stage in 1858 for the United States-Japan Treaty of Kanagawa, which included the highly contentious clause of extraterritoriality and granted the Americans some control of Japanese tariffs and the ability to set up concessions or small bases of operations in Japan. Following the American example, many Western nations forced their own unequal treaties onto Japan. Controversies over these treaties split the Shogunate into many rivaling factions. Some factions argued that Japan should embrace Western modernization in order to protect itself from more violent Western interventions. The colonization of China and the Second Opium War (1856-1860) drummed up support for this view. Their mantra comprised combining Western technological advances with traditional Eastern culture. On the other hand, other powerful daimyo called for expelling the West through warfare and continuing the policy of isolation at all costs. These two factions ensnared Japan in chaos and warfare, undermining the authority of the Shogunate. During this tumultuous time, the West’s manipulation of the Tokugawa gold exchange rate completely destroyed the Japanese economy, leading to public unrest. In the face of public outrage and warring factions, the Japanese emperor, traditionally a symbolic figurehead, involved himself in matters of governance by issuing the “Order to expel barbarians [sic].” The emergence of the emperor split the people into two rival factions: those loyal to the shogun and those loyal to the emperor. The latter group included a powerful samurai class who eventually overthrew the Shogunate and established an oligarchy by way of bicameral legislature. This oligarchy, called the genro, initiated the Meiji Restoration, during which Japan experienced rapid modernization.

These elites, seeking a modernized Japan, looked for a quick way to simultaneously catch up to the West’s military and economic power as well as introduce itself as a major player in international affairs. In order to uncover the secret to modernity as well as contest the unequal treaties, the new Meiji government formed the Iwakura mission in 1871 to scout the governments and societies of the Western world. Among those sent out to study the systems of medicine and science in the West was Nagayo Sensai, a high ranking bureaucrat in the Meiji government. In his quest to discover the essence of Western modernity, Nagayo Sensai not only discovered the medical and technological advances being made in the Western cities, but also ascertained through Western medicine a new way
of structuring government. In reference to Europe, Rogaski writes: “To varying degrees, each nation supported a web of engineering, education, policing, and laboratories that linked the health of the individual to the health of the nation.” \(^1\) Nagayo Sensai encapsulated the Western ideal of public health and hygiene with the word, a combination of the characters ei (guard) and sei (life). In contrast to the traditional understanding of cleanliness in Japan, which was oriented toward the individual, eisei focused more on society and the impact each individual had as a constituent of that society rather than simply on family or personal health. This new form of public hygiene came to encompass anything that could have been considered dangerous to the health of the nation. Implicit in this definition was the justification for government intervention at the personal level. Chief among these interventions was the act of quarantining people during the cholera epidemics of the early 1870s, an issue I will explore in more detail later. Because the health and fortune of the nation was dependent on the hygiene of each individual in the population, the government assumed the duty of ensuring the proper hygiene of each individual in order to preserve and strengthen the state. The new government administration of hygiene intervened into private affairs as never seen before in Japan. With both a newly centralized government and its intervention into previously private affairs, it seems unlikely that the population would have supported such a dramatic change in lifestyle without a large amount of resistance. Viewing the rapid implementation of eisei through Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and biopower illuminates why there was little violent resistance to these new intrusive policies and explains how the government controlled those who did resist.

Foucault’s governmentality can best be defined as “the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that” creates in a society a sovereign authority that has the ability to govern with the constraint of being externally controlled by the society over which it presides. \(^2\) The key element of governmentality is that the end purpose of the state is the population. No longer is the state a top-down entity issuing laws to control the population; rather, governmentality creates a state that has specific goals and the ability to achieve these goals within the interests of the population. In other words, the governor’s objective is no longer the continuation of his own authority. Rather there exists a state of government wherein the governor draws his power from the population which, in turn, uses the government to further its own collective goals. In terms of the Meiji Restoration, this is the transition from the shogun to the new bureaucratic central authority. Whereas prior to the Meiji Restoration the shogun disciplined and controlled his subjects in order to achieve his own objectives, the foremost of which being the continuation of his own prepotency, the Meiji government removed such a sovereign figure and replaced it with a nebulous central bureaucracy with the primary motive of inculcating in the population the state’s goals, predominantly the modernization and survival of Japan.

Biopower is the mechanism by which the state instills in the population the goals of the state. According to Foucault, it is the quantification and administration of all life within a population through the processes of regulation and normalization. A government exercises biopower in order to understand the collective preferences of a population and subsequently influence such preferences with the aim of aligning them with the objectives of the state. In the case of the Japanese, it was immediately necessary that the population understand the rationale behind modernization and support its implementation despite the risk this transformation posed to hundreds of years of traditional life. The instability brought about by the West and the Meiji Restoration caused much fear among the population about their individual futures. Although Tokugawa Japan was a preindustrial society, the Japanese population was highly literate and educated, and the threat of the West was easily realized

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by the population. With this existential threat in mind, the Meiji government instilled in the population a sense of danger on a collective, societal scale such that the actions of the individual were motivated by the survival of the country. This exercise of biopower during the Meiji restoration can be interpreted as an active collectivization of preferences among the population with specific attention to the state’s objective of modernizing Japan.

Eisei was not just coincidental with a strengthening of central authority; it was among the principal motivators in establishing a strong central government with programs created to attain statistics and records about the population. Rogaski writes: “…Meiji medical elites were also convinced that the people of Japan could be tutored in civilization and enlightenment, and would willingly equate the goals of the state with their own. Thus eisei also included campaigns about diet, nutrition, and the habits of daily life in the hopes of transforming the people into the healthy constituents of the national body.” In order to bring the health of the individual into the public domain, the Meiji government developed methods for gathering statistics and keeping records on each individual. The establishment of health records was chief among these initiatives. In addition to keeping track of the healthiness of each individual, these files accompanied a much broader initiative to categorize and document the population with regard to information such as home address, family lineage and status, and other private information. The Japanese government gathered such detailed information on the population so that it could better manage its constituents by way of biopower. By instilling in the population the idea that their health fell under the public domain, the government was able to achieve its own goal of expanding its powers with the objective of modernization by normalizing the population in a way such that eisei was both a collective and individual preference. The consolidation of authority and the establishment of a unified Japan is governmentality by way of eisei. In other words, eisei had established the Japanese population as an administrable entity and had united the Japanese population with the Meiji government. The modernization of Japan was tied to the idea that the fate of the nation rested upon the behavior of its constituents. By getting the population to internalize the idea that their individual actions affected the collective health of the country, eisei unified the Japanese population. Each individual’s feeling of inclusion into society and each individual’s belief that their actions affected society together created an environment wherein the regulatory processes of biopower functioned implicitly in the framework of eisei. The emergence of a social consciousness within the population brought about a self-reflexive and self-regulating disciplinary structure that can be better understood through Foucault’s panopticon. Foucault argues that along with the invention of liberty, democracy, and individuality as an ideology, the enlightenment philosophers also created discipline and the procedures of observation and examination—the two modern methods of regulation and normalization employed by the state and society. The culmination of these disciplinary forces was the panopticon, a prison designed by Jeremy Bentham to be the ultimate method of surveillance and distribution of power. The concept of the panopticon demonstrates not only how governments control and normalize their populations, but also how society perpetuates its own regularization.

To best understand the panopticon, Foucault’s concept of discipline must first be explored. Discipline is an entirely individual-focused concept that anonymizes individuals with respect to the general population. Foucault writes, “it might be said that discipline creates out of the bodies it controls four types of individuality, or rather an individuality that is endowed with four characteristics: it is cellular (by the play of spatial distribution), it is organic (by the coding of activities), it is genetic (by the accumulation of time), it is combinatory (by the composition of forces).” Discipline, as a mechanism of power, establishes individuals as nameless units endowed with unique characteristics and allows the management of these units in terms of economy and politics. In the Meiji Restoration,

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3 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 164.
the statistics gathering and record keeping allowed the government to document each individual’s unique characteristics. Because the government documented the population uniformly, each record remained anonymous, thereby establishing governable units. In order to analyze how the government administered these units, the concepts of examination and the panopticon need to be examined. According to Foucault, examination “transformed the economy of visibility into the exercise of power.” In this sense, subjects are regulated by their own visibility. Foucault writes, “It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able to always be seen, that maintains the disciplined in his subjection. And the examination is the technique by which power, instead of emitting the signs of its potency, instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a mechanism of objectification.”

The Meiji government’s documentation of the population brings the population into visibility, and from this visibility follows the panopticon.

Foucault sums up the panopticon best with the phrase: “visibility is a trap.” He gives a brief description of its physical layout:

“at the periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker, or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theaters, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. The panoptic mechanism arranged spatial unities that makes it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately.”

The four acts of discipline are immediately clear. Each body is separated, categorized, and catalogued; the prisoner’s actions are controlled by virtue of incarceration. The prisoners are governed by a warden that is never seen but is always watching. The subjects have replaced the sovereign as the visible entity, and the act of being visible presupposes the exercise of power. However, the prisoners are not the only governed entity. The prisoners are dominated by the guards, the guards dominated by the warden, and the warden dominated by society. The panopticon represents the most ideal representation of modern power; it maximizes the domain of power while minimizing the cost of maintaining it. It creates an aura of anticipation wherein intervention is expected but never actualized. Foucault writes, “Because, in these conditions, its strength is that it never intervenes, it is exercised spontaneously and without noise, it constitutes a mechanism whose effects follow from one another. Because, without any physical instrument other than architecture and geometry, it acts directly on individuals; it gives ‘power of mind over mind.’” The panopticon is characterized by a society wherein everyone is simultaneously watching and being watched. The visibility that pervades society regulates and normalizes unwanted behavior. The idea of panopticism creates a society wherein power is exercised economically and efficiently without the need for a sovereign entity. The emergence of a public consciousness among the Japanese population following from eisei created

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the necessary environment delineated above wherein each individual watched and was watched. Once the idea that embracing eisei would create a stronger and purer society took hold, the enforcement of individual hygiene became self-reflexive in that Japanese society governed itself by its own visibility.

In order to first create the environment necessary for such panoptic regulation, the Japanese government waged a public war on disease. In the Kanagawa Treaty in 1854, the West forced the Tokugawa government to accept Western ships into certain Japanese ports. Following this treaty were several more treaties establishing Western extraterritoriality – a clause that deprived Japan of jurisdiction over Western citizens. In 1879, a cholera-infested German ship approached the port of Yokohama. Although the Japanese forbade the Germans from landing, the Germans landed anyway, arguing that extraterritoriality gave only Germany the right to issue such an order. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese died from the ensuing epidemic. These massive cholera outbreaks, brought by the West, were met with government quarantine and medical teams created under the Meiji government’s new public health initiatives. The quarantine strictly separated the sick from the healthy and made the war on disease very public. The forced quarantine of entire families and the burning of bodies after death were very new and visible government interventions into traditional Japanese culture, wherein ancestor worship required bodies to be buried alongside family members. Furthermore, these interventions created a system that incentivized informing on the sick as well as individual personal hygiene. The first iteration of this system was that personal hygiene and notification of authorities were beneficial to each individual and family because it kept them healthy and less likely to contract a fatal disease. Once this system had become internalized by the population, it followed that informing on others and maintaining personal health was necessary so as to keep society healthy – the second iteration. Here, eisei evolved from a government policy imposed on the population to one supported and advanced by the population in the interest of maintaining a healthy stability. In other words, the people internalized the state’s goal of keeping the population healthy and productive in response to the massive casualties brought on by the foreign epidemics. Through biopower, the Meiji government manipulated the population’s preferences over time by way of eisei so as to promote public health and hygiene. Once these preferences were engrained in the population, its regulation became self-reflexive by the mechanisms outlined in Foucault’s panopticon. Each person maintained his own health and hygiene so as not to contract the disease and be reported to the government for quarantine. Additionally, each individual sought to inform the government of others’ illnesses so as to not become sick themselves. The cycle repeated itself until the population became healthy despite being forced to accept ships with foreign diseases. Through this delineation of the population’s internalization of eisei, it becomes clear how Japan exercised biopower in utilizing panopticism and governmentality to manipulate and influence the preferences and goals of the Japanese population.

At this point eisei had undergone four iterations in the modernization of Japan. Firstly, it had created a justification for the creation of a central authority and the unprecedented level of government intervention in society that followed from such authority. Secondly, it had governmentalized Japan in that its population internalized the goals of the state. Thirdly, it had created a social and public consciousness that at once united and regulated the entire Japanese population. Finally, eisei had given the government a biopolitical mechanism by which to discipline and influence the collective preferences of its population. From these followed the rapid modernization of Japanese society over a staggeringly short period of time: 1870-1895. It follows then that eisei can be called, in Rogaski’s words, “hygienic modernity.” These iterations of eisei also demonstrate the extent of its influence in informing the behavior of the population. In other words, life under Japanese modernization was governed by a framework created by the discourse of hygienic modernity.

The discourse of hygienic modernity that underlay the modernization of Japan encompassed more than just public health and the war on disease. Following from hygienic modernity was na-
tional identity, state racism, warfare, and ultimately imperialism. To better understand the idea of hygienic modernity as a discourse, I look to Foucault. Foucault’s discourse can be best defined as a set of knowledge and general understanding generated through the mythos that underlies the mechanisms of society. Because the population participates in and is affected by a discourse, identifying a discourse can give historians and other scholars a lens through which knowledge and power in the past can be understood in a comprehensive framework. A discourse comprises the foundations of knowledge at any given point in a society and, therefore, is the exercise of power at its most basic form. In Foucaultian terms, Brown writes: “It is power vested in language that demands that every individual internalizes it and by which s/he becomes self-disciplined. The citizen becomes his/her own policeman through a language of discourses dominating their thoughts and activities.”

Certainly this falls under Foucault’s idea of “power of the mind over mind” explored in his description of the panopticon. However, it would seem that the panopticon and its component discipline are active or observable representations of power, while the power underlying discourse is a self-generating and invisible exercise. In this sense, discourse is more similar to biopower in that the two create the framework in which a society operates. In contrast to this, panopticism would be found in the scope of operations within such a framework. Discourse is therefore a formalized understanding of things that creates the disciplinary mechanisms by which knowledge and power are enjoined.

The prior analysis of the Japanese quarantine of events can be applied to these definitions. The act of quarantining people—moving people from their houses, limiting their ability to interact with others freely, and burning their bodies after death—is an explicit display of biopower on part of the government. As demonstrated earlier, the policy of quarantine was a manifestation of Foucault’s panopticon that embedded eisei at the foundation of Japanese life. Once personal hygiene had become widely accepted and expected, the discourse created by eisei became one of clean versus dirty. More generally, this dichotomy can be understood in terms of governmentality. If one was clean, then he was a dutiful and productive member of society and was therefore superior to his unclean counterparts. Conversely, being dirty would have been seen as subversive to both state and society. Brown writes: “It is not a thing, in Foucault’s view, but a practice—a doing, an activity and a normalized thing in society, one enjoining activity and conformity. To transgress the injunction of a discourse is to become deviant. The discourse is thus about power to which elites will commend each member of society to adhere.”

The superior-inferior dichotomy rooted in cleanliness and hygiene was thus born in Japanese society beginning with the internalization of eisei. Later, I will discuss how this discourse of hygienic modernity transformed into state racism in order to provide an internal justification for Japan’s imperial conquests.

Before further investigation, a quick history of Japanese imperialism is necessary. In 1895, Japan acquired Taiwan (Formosa) after defeating China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The war concluded with the Treaty of Shimonoseki which granted independence to Korea and gave Japan control of the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan, the Penghu islands, and a massive influx of wealth from Chinese indemnities. However, France, Germany, and Russia intervened (the Triple Intervention) on part of their own colonial interests and prevented Japan from taking the Liaodong Province. This war was the first important test for Japan as a modernized nation. Putting twenty years of modernization to test, Japan came out the unquestionable victor, thereby replacing China as the pivot of power in East Asia. In Japan, this victory set patriotism ablaze and set the stage for Japan’s military involvement in future affairs. In 1900, the Japanese earned more indemnities and a concession in Beijing after sending a group of ten thousand troops to put down the Chinese Boxer Rebellion. In 1904-1905, Japan engaged Russia in the war after the two nations’ imperial ambitions came to loggerheads. A quick and decisive victory by Japan over the great imperial Russia shocked the world.

Brown, Postmodernism for Historians, pp. 63-64.
and immediately vaulted Japan into the spotlight. This was the first Asian victory over a great Western power in the modern era, and nationalism within Japan reached fever pitch. The war concluded with the Treaty of Portsmouth, which gave China sovereignty over Manchuria and Japan control over the Liaodong peninsula, the Russian rail system in southern Manchuria, and the southern half of the island of Sakhalin (Karafuto) just north of Hokkaido. Because Japan had been recognized as a major power in international affairs after the Russo-Japanese War, its annexation of Korea in 1910 met scant protests. Furthermore, the unequal treaties with the West that had dogged Japan were finally lifted in 1911 when Japan regained tariff autonomy. The recognition of Japan by the West left the Japanese people overjoyed and jubilant. The Japanese had learned that to be accepted as equals in the world, they would have to fight more wars and conquer more territory just like the West had done in Africa. Additionally, they would have to administer to the people of these new conquered lands. Thus, inspired by such events and ideas, Japanese imperialism took shape from the mold left by the West.

Following the German defeat in World War I, the Japanese managed to pick up several German territories in East Asia including the Shandong peninsula in China and the South Sea Mandate. The slow creep of Japanese imperialism after the annexation of Korea quickly geared into overdrive. In 1931, the Japanese army covertly attempted to blow up a bridge in Manchuria that was owned by the South Manchuria Railway company, a Japanese state-owned corporation. Blaming it on Chinese dissidents, Japan used this event as a pretext for a full-scale invasion of Manchuria, an event that came to be known as the Manchurian Incident. In six months, under the justification of liberation of the Manchu people, Japan had set up the puppet state of Manchukuo with Puyi, the last Qing emperor, as its ruler. The international community saw through Japan’s plans, and Japan isolated itself internationally after the League of Nations refused to recognize Manchukuo. From 1933 onwards, the Japanese slowly annexed mainland Chinese territories into Manchukuo until the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, which triggered the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). This war saw such incidents as the Nanking Massacre and the biological warfare attacks of Unit 731 in various parts of China by the Japanese troops. Following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, the war on China gradually merged into the broader Pacific War. During this time, the Japanese also extended their reach into almost all Western colonies in East Asia, including Indochina, Thailand, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and many more. The Japanese had escalated into a state of full-scale total warfare by the early 1940s. The Japanese Empire managed to conquer a truly terrifying amount of land in an unbelievably short time frame, until the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan and the Soviet invasion in 1945 cemented Japan’s defeat. Japan surrendered unconditionally to the allies in 1945, and was then immediately isolated to its four islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu.

Although Japan was relatively late to the imperialist venture in comparison to the powers of the West, Japanese imperialism closely followed the Western model with respect to the Japanese justification of imperialism, the rise of militarism in Japan, and the administration of subjects in Japan’s colonies. In other words, Japanese imperialism is not different from that of the West. To demonstrate this assertion, I will analyze the colonial discourse present in Japan in comparison to that of the West. The superior-inferior discourse following from eisei can best be understood through orientalism and the dichotomy of colonizer and colonized. Edward Said, in Orientalism, argues that the discourse of the orient was such that it created two worlds: the orient as understood by the West and the West as understood in contrast with the orient. Brown writes: “In a simplistic way, a discourse is conceived as an injunction that something is good, its opposite is bad. There is thus a this/that, or on/off quality to discourses. This means that embedded in every discourse is a sense of ‘the other’, even

12 For a more detailed history, see James L. Huffman, Japan and Imperialism, 1853-1945 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Association for Asian Studies, 2010).
when it is not specifically mentioned.”

Emergent from discourse is a point-counterpoint duality wherein things are understood by what they are not. In terms of the discourse of hygienic modernity, Rogaski’s discussion on the Japanese influence of eisei in Tianjin, the port city of Beijing, provides us with an example of this dichotomous nature of discourse. In contrast to Japanese society wherein cleanliness and public hygiene were paramount, the Chinese elite internalized the idea that they were dirty and therefore deficient in the face of such order. Albert Memmi writes: “This conduct, which is common to colonizers as a group, thus becomes what can be called a social institution. In other words, it defines and establishes concrete situations which close in on the colonized, weigh on him until they bend his conduct and leave their marks on his face.”

In this context, the Chinese were the colonized and Japan its colonizer. The Chinese elite internalized the idea that their way of life was inferior to the Japanese by virtue of the Japanese colonization. Memmi writes: “…it can be stated that colonization creates the colonized just as we have seen that it creates the colonizer.”

A colonial discourse creates and emerges from the environment by which colonizers justify their colonization and in which people submit to being colonized. This idea can be understood through Said’s example of the English colonization of Egypt as a discourse contained in orientalism:

“England knows Egypt; Egypt is what England knows; England knows that Egypt cannot have self-government; England confirms that by occupying Egypt; for the Egyptians, Egypt is what England has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes ‘the very basis’ of contemporary Egyptian civilization; Egypt requires, indeed insists upon, British occupation.”

This discourse was present in both English society, as the colonizer, and Egyptian society, as the colonized. The extension of this discourse was that England and the West were superior to its colonies, the orient. It followed naturally and circularly from the discourse itself. If England were not dominant, then it would not be ruling Egypt. Conversely, from the Egyptian perspective, if Egypt were not inferior, then Egypt would not be ruled by the British.

Rogaski’s analysis of the discourse of hygienic modernity follows the same point-counterpoint nature as the colonial discourse outlined above. In supranational terms, hygienic modernity came to separate Japan from its colonies by the same clean versus dirty dichotomy present in Meiji Japan. For example, the Japanese citizens living in colonial Korea would use hygiene to separate themselves from the indigenous Korean population. Rogaski writes: “[The Japanese] perpetually decried the unsanitary habits of their Korean neighbors and criticized the government for not doing enough to ensure the hygienic security of Japanese. . . . this anxiety [can be attributed] to the relative lack of clear boundaries of class or race between colonizer and colonized in Korea. . . .”

Just as the Western powers had used race to elevate themselves above their colonial subjects, the Japanese people felt that their hygiene made the Japanese superior to their Asian neighbors and subjects.

Hidden in the definition of discourse is the idea that the segmented “other” informs the discourse potentially in ways greater than the general population living under it. In this sense, the understanding that the Koreans were dirty in contrast to the Japanese served a dual purpose. Firstly, it created a justification for occupying the Korean peninsula and administering its population; secondly, it reinforced the practice of eisei in Japan. The establishment of the Japanese state was concurrent with the creation of its empire, and both how the Japanese affected its colonies and how its colonies affected Japan are therefore equally important. Todd Henry, a postmodern Korean historian, discuss-

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13 Brown, Postmodernism for Historians, pp. 61.
15 Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, p. 91.
17 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 259.
es the role of discourse in early colonial Korea with respect to hygienic modernity and the Japanese effort in cleaning Seoul. Henry identifies and examines the manifestations of hygienic modernity in colonial Korea by analyzing popular Japanese ethnographers, Japanese government programs and records, and Japanese sponsored media such as newspapers and tourism programs. The development of the discourse of hygienic modernity can be traced in Henry’s exposition on the Japanese administration of public health in Korea by the series outlined in Brown’s article on discourse analysis for postmodernist historians. This series comprises several successive steps, namely: sign, statement, positivity, discourse, discursive relations, and episteme. After studying Henry, the development of hygienic modernity from sign to discourse becomes clear.

In particular, in order to trace the development of the discourse of hygienic modernity in Colonial Korea and Imperial Japan, the sign “filth” or “excrement” can be treated as the seed. Okita Kinjo, a Japanese ethnographer, based many of his writings of Korean culture and society on the enormous amount of filth in Korea and the Korean ambivalence towards it. The most poignant example in describing Seoul as the so-called capital of excrement is Okita’s description of a woman washing her face with a chamber pot right beside her. He wrote, “Here is another unhygienic portrait. Koreans decorate their rooms by putting the chamber pot and wash pan next to each other. When they awake in the morning, they urinate and wash their faces with the same hand. When one thinks about it, this description is indeed a filthy one.”

Indeed, many of Okita’s descriptions of the Korean household revolved around filth and waste. Additionally, Okita argued that this state of filthiness in the household could be attributed to the privacy given by the construction and style of the typical Korean house as compared to the less private Japanese style of housing. Complementing this statement was the Japanese converse. In arguing that the source of the Korean uncleanliness is their privacy, it was implied that to remain pure, the Japanese must maintain an open and visible existence. Therefore, there was a partition in terms of visibility between Korea and Japan. “Okita argued that this household configuration likewise produced a sheltered sense of arirang individualism, making Koreans deploy suspicious, full of cunning, and thus unable to make progress. The house, wrote Okita in a typically condescending and hyperbolic manner, thus functions as an ‘immoral and unethical factory of criminality.’”

It is clear from this quote that Okita had displayed a shift from sign to statement. Assuming that the readers of the ethnographies had understood the level of filth present in Korea, Okita proceeded to make statements about the overall character of Koreans, carefully contrasting their nature to that of the Japanese. Okita wrote “that all Koreans were individualists and clannish and thus lacked a sense of public consciousness that their Japanese colonizers were, in contrast, said to possess.” The state of public waste in Korea was thus attributed to the lack of public consciousness among the Korean people. Looking at this reasoning further, the corollary of such a conclusion was that Japanese society can only remain clean and superior by virtue of maintaining a public consciousness, supported by upholding personal hygiene.

Following these statements was positivity—that is, how Japan acted on these ethnographies in creating policy specifically dealing with public hygiene and urban planning in Korea. Okita did not stop at simply describing the Korean way of living; rather he initiated the discussion of public intervention in his writings. Henry writes: “Okita argued that the best cure for the morally and hygienically depraved conditions of the Korean home was to break down the door and crush the residents’ ‘stubborn pride.’”

On the policy level, implementing institutions capable of collecting statistics and then using those statistics to inform public hygiene policy mirrors Okita’s call for breaking down doors. Henry writes: “Okita presciently suggested how urban filth, as discursively construed by him

and other popular ethnographers, could be transformed into an array of sanitizing projects that might serve both to clean up the city and bring Japan a profit.”

Using the statistics gathered with or without Korean consent, Japan created several institutions designed to clean up the city. In the metropole, these policies had two effects. Firstly, the use of statistics to improve the Korean standard of living instilled in the Japanese population a sense of ease in contributing to their own domestic statistics, a relatively new government intrusion that had neither been fully implemented nor accepted. Secondly, it reinforced the foundations of a central authority in coordinating the welfare of society by means of public health and its administration. In colonial Korea, this discourse accompanied the new public health institutions and urban planning policies during the later years of the 1910s. Henry writes: “In all these areas, writers in the [Korean newspaper] Maeil Sinbo repeatedly emphasized the important role of the self-regulating ‘individual’ in carrying out these responsibilities, both for one’s own health and for that of one’s surrounding community.”

In this sense, it was understood that in maintaining cleanliness of the individual, one would both maintain the cleanliness of society as well as contribute to its prosperity and development—a clear echo of eisei.

This discourse emergent from the Japanese treatment of sanitation conditions in Korea was Rogaski’s discourse on hygienic modernity. Furthermore, this was the second iteration of hygienic modernity as a discourse. The discourse of hygienic modernity emerged from eisei during the Meiji Restoration by using the practice of quarantine as an example. In Meiji Japan, to be healthy and clean was to be a productive member of society, and, conversely, to be unhealthy and dirty was to undermine both state and society. Through warfare and conquest, Japan established itself as an imperial power toward the end of the twentieth century, and inherent in this was the evolution of hygienic modernity into its second form, as demonstrated in Henry’s analysis of early colonial Seoul. The discourse still maintained a clean versus dirty duality—and inherent superior versus inferior duality—as present before imperial conquest, but now the discourse had evolved into a colonial one. In this regard, the dichotomy presented by the discourse was colonized versus colonizer—Korea versus Japan—in that the colonies were dirty and therefore inferior to the clean and superior Japan. The common understanding in Japan was as follows: “if the colonies were not inferior then we would not be able to colonize them. Conversely, because we have colonized them, we are superior. But, given that we are superior, what makes us better than our colonies?” In the Western world, this superiority was attributed to race. The understanding, coincident with Darwin’s theory of natural selection, was that the white race was superior because it had become the most advanced race technologically, culturally, intellectually, militarily, and so on. Although the Koreans and the Japanese were of the same race, the Western rationale of superiority based on level of modernization can be found in this exact same form in Japan. Just as the West had attributed its modernization to race, the Japanese had attributed its modernization to, among other things, eisei. Therefore, the second iteration of the discourse of hygienic modernity was an imperial and colonial discourse based on a partition built in the framework of eisei.

Hygienic modernity, as a discourse, separated the population into two disparate groups. Inherent in the partition of clean versus dirty—Japan versus its colonies—was state racism. The government of Japan used the discourse of hygienic modernity to justify the conquest and occupation of Korea, simultaneously using this conquest to normalize the Japanese population with respect to the goals of the state. In terms of biopower, the colonies served as the “other” against which Japan normalized its population. In focusing on these outliers, states or other biopolitical entities can normalize and regulate a population by recasting the enemies of the state—or even those insensitive to or unresponsive to the normalization policies promulgated by the state—as a danger to the well-being of society and therefore the population as a whole. Indeed, this segmentation and disjoint
partitioning of the population is defined by Foucault as state racism. With respect to hygienic modernity, the Japanese government casted the dirty “others” as a parasite or disease that could only infect society and damage its overall health and fortune. Foucault writes, “That is the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower.”

Foucault’s definition of the biological continuum is exceedingly vague; what he means by biological continuum and even biopower in general is separate from the biological processes typically studied. In Foucault’s sense of the word, biology or bio-mechanism simply refers to the assumption that humans are stochastic and active entities—as opposed to passive participants—bestowed with unique preferences. State racism, perhaps the only instrument of biopower, is the act of creating, shaping, and propagating a collective preference among the population by which a state can manipulate its citizens’ actions. It seems natural that Foucault has termed this “biopower” since the most basic and foundational preference and instinct of any individual living being is that of survival. Indeed, in targeting that evolutionary instinct, state racism accomplishes the conception of a collective preference by instilling two sensations among the general population—that of purity and superiority of race and that of constant existential threat. These sensations serve to both unify a population as well as justify state actions in the name of protecting or enhancing the purity of this unification. Japan pushed state racism to its limits leading up to its defeat in 1945. As hygienic modernity established the idea of purity and superiority of race within the Japanese people, the constant militarism accompanying the Japanese imperial conquests instilled in the population the idea that military success was the only avenue through which Japan could demonstrate its superiority. In turn, this militarism caused the constant existential threat necessary for the Japanese government to motivate and regulate its citizens and subjects. The astonishing breadth of the Japanese empire at the time of its defeat is a testament to Japan’s successful use of state racism in motivating its people while keeping dissidence in check.

In delineating the transformation of Japanese society during the Meiji Restoration through eisei, I have identified and analyzed the development of the discourse of hygienic modernity with respect to the following: the creation of the Japanese state, the unification of the Japanese population, the modernization of Japan, and the establishment of the Japanese empire. Starting with Nagayo Sensai’s eisei as the seed of Japanese modernization, I argued that the government’s administration of public health and hygiene simultaneously established a centralized government and statistics therein, as well as a framework through which the government intervened the personal lives of the population. Although I discussed this new intervention only with respect to health and hygiene, this level of discipline was spread throughout the other aspects of government, namely the urban and economic planning policies and prisons. These policies, following from and in conjunction with the government administration of eisei, contributed to the creation of a collective social consciousness. In regards to hygienic modernity, prisons were a necessary institution in maintaining the health of the nation, insofar as removing criminals from the population was analogous to quarantining the diseased. Following from both prisons and eisei, it is evident that the dichotomies of clean versus dirty and healthy versus sick were the same. This partition demonstrated how the Japanese government used state racism as an exercise of biopower by using the dirty and sick as the “other” against which the population was normalized in contrast. Ultimately this state racism extended beyond Japan in serving as the justification for Japanese imperial conquest of neighboring countries. By casting the constituents of the colonies as unhygienic and self-indulgent, Japan positioned itself as the pure and superior race. Notice that the preceding discussion on the evolution of hygienic modernity mirrors many developments in the West with respect to Western imperialism. Just as Japan used hygienic modernity to segment the populations under its domain, the West used the discourse of scientific racism to position itself as racially superior in comparison to the rest of the world. Even within its

own territory, the West used the heterogeneity of its population in terms of culture and race to create a sense of nationalism in the majority by “othering” the minorities. Therefore, I conclude that Foucault’s theories—which he outlines through the lens of the development of modern Western civilization—are easily applicable and relevant to the modernization of Japan. Because Japan and the West share completely divergent histories, it would be interesting to further analyze if Foucault’s philosophy is merely one of modernization regardless of previous history, or if it applies to Japan simply because Japan modeled its modernization after the West by means of exploration committees such as the Iwakura mission. Regardless, by viewing hygienic modernity through the concepts of governmentality, biopower, discipline and the panopticon, discourse, and state racism, the Meiji Restoration and Imperial Japan provide a cohesive and effective illustration of Foucault’s views on the nature of modern governments and power relations with specific attention to empire.
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A European Empire? The Process of Nation-State Building at the European Level

By Diana Jack

Abstract: The European Union has a strongly supranational governing structure, one that increasingly resembles a nation-state, after 60 years of institutional development in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Despite having gained considerably in individual rights on the European level, European Union citizens do not identify with the supranational project as much as they do with their nation-states. This poses a problem for the legitimacy and further development of the European Union. However, the elites who run and perpetuate the EU can harness the processes of nation-state building that artificially created national identity in nineteenth- and twentieth-century European countries, in order to build the same kind of attachment to the EU project. This article details that nation-building process, examines the existing attachment to the EU and applies the methods of the nation-level processes to the supranational level. The promotion of attachment to the EU will require elites and institutions to play an increasingly imperial role on the continent.
Introduction

The European Union is an unprecedented and incomplete project that escapes definition, an ambiguity that causes confusion, discord and disorder within its boundaries. Though its foundations rest on institutions rooted almost entirely in economic need and cooperation, the European Union has expanded from the Common Market into the Economic Community into the European Union, complete with elected governing bodies, a flag and programs in an ever-widening scope of citizens’ lives. Indeed, there are now European Union citizens, a designation that has become more prominent in and relevant to political discussion in recent decades. The goal of an “ever-closer Union,” having until now guided the creation of these far-reaching institutions, has led to a supranational structure resembling a nation-state of the very sort that it encompasses. Thus, the relationship between the countries within the European Union and the supranational institution is complicated and sometimes a source of conflict on the continent. The European Union has, with partial hegemonic consensus from the nation-states, created a Westphalian nation-state model of empire by taking over certain areas of sovereignty from European countries. The European Union project can be described as imperial in that the enforced change in the balance of power on the continent increasingly comes from the supranational level rather than from the nation-states. This imperial federation has long been the goal of European rulers, politicians and intellectuals, and though the nation-state building process is not yet complete, the progress is unmistakable.

This article explores the processes of nation-state building as they have been modeled before by Eugen Weber and by Benedict Anderson, and examines the extent to which this has occurred on a European level. It focuses on the cultural and social aspects of such a transformation, given that the political institutions generally considered necessary for legitimacy already exist. While the complete transformation to a truly supranational nation-state governing structure is still far in the future, the European Union represents the latest, potentially most lasting, attempt at unifying the continent. The direction at this stage in the unification process must be towards further integration and a deeper adherence to the supranational project. However, the question remains whether or not the nations of Europe will ever be willing to yield their sovereignty to a federation that cannot otherwise succeed. The first section of this paper details the processes of nation building that developed European nation-states until the end of World War II. The second section analyzes the extent to which the European Union resembles a nation-state and the ways in which it lacks vital loyalty from its citizens. The final section expands upon the steps the EU needs to follow to develop that loyalty, and argues that those steps will strengthen the Union’s imperial role on the continent. In order to properly act as a stronger power and governmental structure, the EU must work to more closely resemble an empire.

The Creation of Deeply Ingrained National Sentiment

The process of creating the European Union mimics the creation of an empire. Compared with the two most recognizable empires in modern European history, those ruled by Charlemagne and Napoleon, the EU employs similar tactics with a democratic twist. While the European Union is not a forceful collusion of countries overseen by a solitary personality, it is a uniting supranational power, and a peaceful one. However, in seeking to increase its power and further integrate the countries it combines, the EU acts increasingly like the government of the European nation-states that the EU encompasses. The Union therefore encroaches on the sovereignty and the idea of nationhood to which citizens of those nations are attached. This infringement underpins the imperial nature of the EU project: tensions abound because national sovereignty and concept of nationhood have been
fostered by centuries of nation building. This section will explain how the process of nation building has created citizens that are more attached to their individual countries than they are to the European Union project.

Nation building is vital to the self-understanding of citizens, and its development occurs along two paths. The first is the development of the “state” portion of the government, including the actual institutions, laws and figures to provide infrastructure. The second is the “nation” portion which defines the cultural and historical background of the peoples to be governed. These two aspects of a nation may develop independently of one another; in fact, the development of the “nation” may be driven by the already established “state.”

The accepted beginning of European nation-state development coincides with the end of the Thirty Years’ War and the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The Treaty, which defined “Westphalian nation-state,” did so by promising the rights of sovereignty and self-determination of states, asserting the legal equality between states and establishing a policy of non-intervention in internal affairs. The Westphalian System thus defined a group of nation-states under these criteria: France, Switzerland, the states within the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, Sweden and others. The beginnings of national militaries, rulers and specific borders within which to govern set the stage for nation-states to develop more fully. Throughout the next two hundred years, real governing bodies were created in order to more comprehensively serve the needs of citizens. Parliaments and other legislatures, judiciary systems, laws, regulations and programs provided the infrastructure for the “state” to function. As part of the states, monarchs and parliamentarians alike had to perpetuate the idea of the “nation” in order to increase participation and legitimacy. Nations were thus an idea created in order to promote the idea of citizens’ solidarity with one another and with their governments, and to reinforce the perception of their difference from other nationalities. Those fledgling states sought to create founding myths and mold a national identity that created the nation part of the state.

The project of creating national sentiment seems to start from scratch. Even in 1870 the people living in territories deemed “French,” “Spanish” and “Italian” did not actually consider themselves French or Spanish or Italian, if they even knew anything of the government and history of the area at all. Identities had to be created. Nation-states must labor to cultivate their countrymen’s legitimate understanding and subsequent recognition of governing bodies. At the beginning of the process, when most Frenchmen were “peasants” with no real concept of their “Frenchness,” the residents of the countryside were often referred to as savages with no connection to life in Paris, and without the ability to speak the French language. Eugen Weber explains that “[t]he peasant had to be integrated into the national society, economy, and culture: the culture of the city and of the City par excellence, Paris.” People in regions outside of the capital had little real contact with the city whose history defined what it meant to be French. There was also no standardization among the regions that would have defined them as French. They had no common currency, no common unit of measurement, not even roads to connect the départements to one another.

Perhaps the most telling of these impediments, however, is the lack of a common, standardized language. Official government statistics (which were probably generous), stated that 24 of the 89 departments did not speak French, and that, in fact, for a huge swath of the geographic population of France, and particularly for children in local schools, “proper” French was a foreign language.

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4 Weber, Peasants, 241. “In these areas evolution towards modernity, that is, to an awareness of and concern with issues on a national or international plane, seems [sic] to begin after the 1870’s.”
They instead spoke a *patois* – a local dialect – or a practically different language altogether, as in the case of Brittany. They could not communicate with Paris, nor could they communicate with each other outside of a miniscule geographic region. The synthesizing of extant languages or the enforcement of a dominant language within a region was, in France’s case, necessary to create a national life “integrate” the peasants into what Parisians considered civilization. This was accomplished most successfully through educating children, though the process was complicated. Given a number of years, and an increasing ability to communicate with the different regions, départements and Paris, some level of standardization eventually surfaced. It is important to note the constructed standardization that occurred: it was not a natural process that created today’s French, but a superimposition of rules.

The rest of the nation building process, though, flowed more smoothly. Once a common language and method of communication were established or on their way to being more available, other mechanisms for identity creation sprang up across the continent. These mechanisms also laid the groundwork for the development of a few elements of identity: political symbols, collective memory and self-representation. The use of language automatically develops a viable foundation for a national canon of literature, philosophy, music and journalism. Benedict Anderson highlights the crucial role of print-capitalism in creating an “imagined community” among citizens of developing European nations. The ability to reach a national audience, engage in a national discourse and hear about current events in other parts of the country all contribute to a sense of nationhood and belonging. He writes that print-capitalism and particularly the printing press “made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways.”

These newly cognizant people essentially thought themselves into nations. They imagined themselves to be members of disparate groups: Germans, Frenchmen, Croats, Poles, and more. The ability to engage in a national discourse about one’s nation was, perhaps, the most important development to come out of standardized language. Recording national history and contemporary events solidified that common experience in citizens’ and elites’ minds, and ensured its durability for future generations. Writers and philosophers commented endlessly on the inherent differences between Frenchmen and Germans, the qualities imbued in Englishmen for centuries and the ‘way’ that Russians and Italians ‘are.’ Their writings helped create and perpetuate essentialist ideals of nations. Victor Hugo wrote classics of French literature and Goethe was proclaimed the greatest German writer in history. Don Quixote was forever engraved into a Spanish national myth. Madame de Stäel, a prominent female writer and salon owner in France in the 19th century described the German people in great detail and conceived of Germans as a single entity. She attempted to encapsulate all that is German, to describe the German nation as a single, solitary unit: Germans “lack energy and seem in general to be dull and narrow,” they “can conceive art better than they can practice it,” and are enthusiastic and thus happy. Prompted by intellectuals, governments and elites deliberately circulated publications describing differences between nations that would be adopted by each member of that supposedly distinct clan.

Having a tangible path of development for newly discovered identities was a vital step in nation development. Political symbols, cherry-picked out of that developing national myth, produced rallying points and concrete ideas with which to identify. In most cases, elites also appeared at this stage and reasserted power at a more legitimate national level via “official nationalism”, harnessing

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6 Weber, Peasants, 310.
myth and print capabilities for their own use and propaganda. Thus, with collective memories and public conceptions and discussions of the nation, along with elites to lead the nation-states’ progress, nations developed to match the states of Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. During the period after this consolidation until the end of the Second World War, the countries of Europe operated within this highly nationalistic model of government. With print-capitalism, national identity suddenly became something that had always existed and was inherent to each of the nation-states in Europe. This idea was perpetuated through policies and political beliefs like those promulgated by Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm I and II. Using the ideal of Das deutsche Volk as a guide, Bismarck fought the Franco-Prussian War and the Kulturkampf to promote his idea of Germany and to eradicate qualities that were “un-German” in the people under the newly united government. In Italy, roughly the same pattern of finalizing the national project under one banner brought together five or more separate kingdoms. By the beginning of the First World War, there were truly monolithic, legitimate governments on behalf of each ‘nation’ on the continent.

national character through the end of the Second World War. The rivalries between nations also caused and worsened tensions between actors on the continental stage, eventually leading to World War II. Nationalism died to a certain extent with the Unknown Soldier, and Europe began to come together in the aftermath. However, ultra-nationalist sentiment was not the only thing lost in the rubble: the fierce independence of the nation-state and durable, impenetrable borders also became more porous. The era of the nation-state started breaking down, and in its wake left an opening for the beginnings of the European Community to take hold. Transnational cooperation begat transnational communication, and the continent entered what political scientist Dario Castiglione terms a “post-national” period. Castiglione argues that the “nation-based conception fails to appreciate the changing nature of political identity in a more globalized and internationalized world…”

While Europeans’ political identities are changing, the process is slow. Ultra-nationalism may have been defeated, but ‘nations’ were not. Nation-states and their citizens still cling to this familiar and entrenched idea of self-identification, and the elite project of realigning alliances makes progress in fits and starts. Remaining attachments to European nation-states have hindered the development of the supranational identity in post-war Europe.

However, the processes by which European nation-states developed provide a detailed outline for the potential development of a similar supranational European state. The superficial, intentional imposition of the “nation” may be possible, and diverting European citizens’ loyalties from country to Union could help approximate a European country.

**European Integration and the Progress of Europe Building**

In the wake of weakening national borders and strengthened global awareness, the European Union has begun the process of creating what may eventually become a European nation-state. The “state” half of the nation-state is largely in place, as it was for European countries when the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, but the “nation” portion is underdeveloped. Under these circumstances, it seems that the project has nowhere to go but forward: further synthesis of the “state” and an increased role for “nation” seem inevitable, given the progress that has already been made and in light of crises that have tested and proven the project. This section explores the development of the “state” and the progress in creating the “nation.” In order to be considered fully legitimate, and to eradicate...
problems within its structure, the EU’s supranational powers must augment their influence to promote the same sort of developmental path that Weber and Anderson examine for nation building. Increasing the role that the EU-level institutions and elites play in promoting themselves will force the EU into an imperial, authoritative role on the continent.

The European Union has been adding layers of sovereignty and legitimacy in different areas since its inception. While its beginnings lay in the economic project that was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), both political and cultural agendas have been added to the program. The institutional, “state” groundwork of the European Union has been carefully laid since the demolition of European states and economies in the post-war era, beginning with the ECSC, a 1951 economic agreement mainly between France and Germany. While the project started as simply an economic endeavor meant to entangle European economies enough to prevent war, the ECSC broke down some political barriers and set the stage for greater cooperation on an international level by arranging negotiations among six European countries. By beginning with an economic union: “a supranational authority with real power in a restricted field,” elites like Jean Monnet laid the groundwork for contentious political problems to be resolved in later years. The European elites guiding the project started small, but had great aspirations for European integration in many different areas.

Hence, with the groundwork for economic interdependence laid, the likes of Monnet and Robert Schumann began pushing for new layers of integration. Also within the realm of European “state” building, treaties began to include political institutions and goals. The ECSC quickly expanded into the Common Market with the removal of tariffs and the unification of some regulation policy. Deeper economic reform necessitated the political clout to enforce it, and the European Community developed out of the new laws and institutions. Each treaty – Rome, Brussels, the Single European Act, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and, most recently, Lisbon – has contributed to the layering of political power upon economic necessity that defines the European Union. Over time the European Community has seen the establishment of the European Parliament, the Commission, the Council and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). These political institutions have both legitimized and deepened the integration of the European project. Since they were created with the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the endeavor has been referred to as the European Union, indicating its true sovereignty and its permanence on the continent. The EU now has the reins of justice, foreign affairs and security, immigration, environmental policy, health, education, culture and even space exploration. Clearly, the establishment of the political and economic European “state” is well underway, if not yet complete. Its presence in such a wide spectrum of political areas is problematic, though, for the countries that it unites.

The European Union has expanded its reach into the lives of citizens – the creation of the “European citizen” in and of itself is an important development, and one that was likely unforeseen at the outset of the European project. Simon Hix and Bjørn Høyland analyze this expansion and conclude that the EU is a stable but complex political system that has taken a measure of power from national governments, making it integral to decision-making across the continent. Most importantly, Hix and Høyland assert that “[t]he EU is gradually encroaching on the power of the domestic states to set their own rules in the highly contentious areas of taxation, immigration, policing, foreign and defence policy.” The gradual establishment of tax and defense policy intimates a move towards sovereign statehood as defined by the Treaty of Westphalia. More remarkably, their use of the word ‘encroaching’ reveals the extent to which the European Union is becoming a daily reality and force on the continent, and, possibly, the hostility with which citizens regard it.

16 Willis, New Europe, 211.
18 Hix and Høyland, European Union, 13.
The question remains, however, whether the European Union has replaced the European nation-state entirely. The answer is certainly ‘no,’ at least right now. The goal of “ever-closer Union” intimates an ultimate end of approximate nation-statehood. The level of integration that the EU has already achieved actually requires even deeper integration. The European Union today seems to be a permanent installation on the continent, as the only supranational empire to last more than a few years or decades in the continent’s history. Given the deep interconnection of policies on the supranational level, the unraveling of the ‘state’ seems unlikely. In fact, the integration already attained demands further integration, and hence more defined movements towards nation-statehood. The EU must continue to exist and thus increasingly play a supranational, imperial role on the continent.

The European Union has, more than anything, intertwined the economies of sovereign nations together to the extent that they cannot easily be undone. The Economic and Monetary Union in conjunction with the common currency has reduced trade barriers, pegged currencies together, facilitated the construction of common financial monetary institutions and regulations, and has made it so that if one country’s economy fails, the contagion spreads across the continent. The euro crisis of 2008 has shown that euro (and generally European) economies are inseparably dependent upon one another. Given the fundamentally economic basis of the European Union, the project must continue to perpetuate economic progress: the alternative is the breakup of the Union and the euro, a disintegration that would hurl the continent into economic (and almost certainly political) turmoil. It has also set the precedent that the countries will come to the aid of others’ failing economies. The euro crisis has underlined the need for further integration in nearly all sectors, rather than a break-up of the monetary integration.

In particular, the European Union needs a fiscal policy that would regulate the behaviors of each member of the eurozone and stabilize the teetering continental market. It would also stabilize the European Union economically, namely through the right of taxation. The existence of fiscal policy and taxation is important for two reasons: 1) without the ability to tax European citizens directly, the European Union relies on national governments for its funds, weakening the project and strapping the project indefinitely to its member states, and 2) without a single, collective fiscal policy by which to regulate spending, debt, record-keeping and any number of other economic functions, the economies in the eurozone vary wildly. The Economist also suggests in its Charlemagne editorial that the euro zone is desperately in need of a banking union that will regulate the actions of independent banking institutions, in order to protect governments and their debt holdings from reckless policies. The editorial states:

Other currency unions place the main responsibility for the financial sector at “federal” level. But doing so in Europe is difficult. Even the first step, the creation of a new euro-zone supervisor based on the European Central Bank (ECB) is contentious. It fits awkwardly in a system where the financial market is integrated more broadly, across the 27 members of the EU, but the money to pay for bank failures still lies in national coffers.

That nations still control the purse strings and the ability to tax their citizens remains an issue for the economic union, and is the main reason the potential banking union is so problematic. However, the ability to regulate banking on the “federal” or European level is a desperately needed power. Deeper integration is vital to acting decisively and swiftly in the face of economic crises and supporting the general economic project. This economic integration must be matched by better political and cultural integration, so policies and legislating run more smoothly during both catastrophic

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events and in daily activity. The way forward is towards ‘more Europe’ rather than less.

Political and cultural integration has partially taken place, but it is obvious that the ingrained country mentality still abounds. The concept of a European ‘state’ has been established, but perhaps is not as present as the concept of the ‘nation.’ There is ‘European sentiment,’ but mostly in conjunction with national sentiment. To draw a parallel with Weber’s France, most Europeans consider themselves Breton as opposed to French. They adhere strongly to their German, French, Spanish, Swedish, Polish identities, and thus are less aware of and less active in European-level life. In order for the European Union to run more smoothly, and to continue to develop as a nation-state, the ‘nation’ must be nurtured by European elites.

Europeans do feel some attachment to ‘Europe.’ A collection of different Eurobarometer surveys from 2006 and 2007 shed light on the extent to which Europeans feel “attached to” various levels of government and community: city/town/village, region, country and Europe. The following graphs denote the level of attachment that citizens of each European nationality feel to their own country and to Europe.\(^{20}\)

Table 1: Attachment to Nation and to Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Very/Fairly Attached to Nation</th>
<th>% Very/Fairly Attached to Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The EU-27 average for city/town/village “very attached” respondents in 2007 was around 66 percent, but nation attachment was at 72 percent in the same year. This result may be is contrary to what many would assume to be true, that smaller communities to receive higher levels of attachment. It would seem, given this evidence, that the nation is actually a greater source of emotional attachment for citizens than cities and towns. But in comparison with EU-level attachment, national attachment is also higher. Please refer to Table 1, in which “very attached and “fairly attached” responses have been aggregated, to understand this relationship more clearly. These countries are meant to be representative as pro-European or pro-integrationist (Germany, France, Spain); anti-European or anti-integrationist (Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden); and as recent additions to the EU through the Expansion in 2002 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland). In each case, the total percentage of respondents who felt very or fairly attached (positively attached) to their nation was higher than that to Europe or to the European Union. It seems that citizens do indeed feel some sort of responsibility to or interest in Europe, but not to the extent that they feel it for their nation. On average, 91 percent of respondents feel positively attached to their countries, whereas 65 percent feel positively attached to Europe. This 26 percent discrepancy mirrors the 28 percent discrepancy in voter turnout. Thus, some general conclusions may be drawn that higher attachment means higher voter turnout, and a better

\(^{20}\) Compiled from data from the Eurobarometer Interactive Search System, provided by the European Commission Public Opinion department.
chance at democratic legitimacy. These data about attachment may also shed some light on the way that Europeans define themselves, and the way they regard their fellow Europeans.

In Thomas Risse and Matthias Maier’s survey published in 2002, the results intimate that the majority of Europeans identify with their “country first, but Europe too.” Risse also cites similar Eurobarometer data averaged from 1992-2004 in *A Community of Europeans* that analyzes the extent to which Europeans consider themselves European, their nationality, or both. In 2004, roughly 41 percent of respondents considered themselves only their nationality, and 45 percent considered themselves their nationality first and European second. This reflects the lukewarm attachment to Europe that is demonstrated in the above data. European citizens are clearly unprepared to divest themselves of their national identities and attachments. Because the development of the European Union project is constantly in flux, it may be difficult to follow a teleological path to a ‘demos’ that would mimic national identities, but it seems clear that its creation is necessary. The changes and new rights provided by treaties do not matter if there is no European identity to bring all of the citizens together. Hrbek writes that,

> Without a common European identity, there can be no convincing legitimation without the preexistence of a particular “we feeling,” or at least a certain minimum level of one, individual institutions and their procedures lack the necessary prerequisite to realize their communicative and integrative functions.

As Hrbek suggests, a certain level of identification among and between Europeans and nationalities is also important for understanding oneself as European and as a citizen of the developing European Union nation-state. At a very basic level, this camaraderie can be measured through trust levels between countries and ethnicities. Using Debby Gerritsen and Marcel Lubbers’s article and survey of “diversity and inter-population trust in Europe,” it is easy to see where there are discrepancies in trust between cultures. This survey of trust between nations and between ethnicities is significant for intercultural relations, and ostensibly for European-level negotiations and policy-making. Gerritsen and Lubbers begin with a number of hypotheses, including 1) “individuals have more trust in populations of EU countries that are culturally more similar to their own country,” 2) “populations in countries further away from one’s own are less likely to be trusted because less is known about these countries and cultural differences are expected to be larger,” and 3) “the more people in a society are unfamiliar with a country (‘s population), the more likely people are to distrust that population.” The following data table illustrates the Gerritsen and Lubbers’ findings. The same representative countries have been included as in the last table in addition to a number of other nations for a better-rounded view of international trust.

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22 dass es ohne eine gemeinsame europäische Identität keine überzeugende Legitimation europäischer Politik geben kann. Ohne das Vorhandensein eines solchen Wir-Gefühls, jedenfalls eines gewissen Mindestmasses davon, fehlt auch einzelnen Institutionen und Verfahren die unerlässliche Voraussetzung dafür, dass sie ihre kommunikativen und integrativen Funktionen wahrnehmen können.
24 Gerritsen and Lubbers “Unknown,” 278.
Table 2: Trust Within and Among Populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Trusted by other populations</th>
<th>% Population with trust in own population</th>
<th>% Population with trust other populations</th>
<th>% Unfamiliar among all populations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data in Table 2 are enlightening for a number of reasons. First, various national groups are generally very trusting of their own populations. This clearly indicates a high level of connection with and attachment to one’s own countrymen. Second, the levels of trust in other populations are lower than intranational levels, but not so much lower that international or intranational trust is nonexistent. Third, there is a wide range of trust in specific countries across Europe. Sweden enjoys the highest level of confidence (80 percent) from other nationalities, whereas Romanians, on the low end, are only trusted by 30 percent of their fellow Europeans. Finally, the data clearly show that a higher level of unfamiliarity indicates a higher level of distrust. If Europeans could be as familiar with and trustful of other nationalities as they are of their own, the foundations of a supranational working relationship would be laid. Because there is a discrepancy between how much trust Europeans have in their own nation and the amount they have in other nations, the ability and willingness to understand other cultures and groups is diminished. Given the wide gap between levels of trust of various nations (Sweden versus Romania), it would seem that there are countries that are better liked and better accepted within the European Union than others. This inequality might easily lead to misunderstanding and in- and out-groups within the Union. This is most clearly modeled by the discrepancy between trust of EU-15 (pre-Eastern Expansion) and EU-27 (present) countries. All of the countries on the lower half of the trust scale are those that joined the EU in 2002 as part of Expansion, except for Britain.25 There is a clear break between EU-27 countries, who are all trusted above 60 percent (again, except for Britain), and the later additions, who are trusted on average only 48.5 percent. This difference is explained, as Gerritsen and Lubbers suggest, by a higher level of unfamiliarity, and likely the effect of distance from the EU-15 countries. The 2004-and-after entries may be perceived as culturally and economically different due to their relatively recent change from communism to capitalism, and from totalitarian rule to democracy. This perceived difference may trans-

25 Britain has always been a very special case in relation to the European Union anyway. The extent to which Britain plays an active role in, and believes in the program of, the European project has always been on the lower side for a country that came in early on in the process. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that they would not be trusted as highly by other Euroophile and euro-currency countries.
late into distrust on the part of Western countries. It may also relate to differences in attachment to
tations and to Europe. Higher trust may influence greater attachment, perhaps the other way around;
regardless, it is clear that the national community is more familiar, more emotionally important, and
more actively participated in than Europe is.

Whatever the mechanism of these discrepancies, the fact that these differences between West-
ern and Eastern countries exist puts in question what it means to be European, or who can be Euro-
pean. There is no firm concept, especially since the Expansion, of what it means to be a European.
Thomas Risse writes,

[W]e do not observe the emergence of a single European identity above and
beyond national identities, but rather the Europeanization of national identities
whereby a sense of European community is expressed in various national colors
that are largely complementary and tap into similar meanings and interpretations
of what “Europe” signifies.26

The multifaceted but similar interpretations of “Europeanness” across Europe are an effect
of the amorphous definition of the European Union’s style of government, and reflect a confusing,
colorful multiethnic fabric of European populations. There certainly is no single historical view of
Europe, or even one thread of history that is generally accepted across all 27 countries of the nature
proposed in the last section. Whatever the reason for the lack in trust, and thus in solidarity between
countries and ethnicities, the discrepancy marks a rift within the European Union that may poten-
tially hinder its comprehensive hegemonic power.

This hindrance manifests in an examination of voter turnout in the countries of Europe com-
pared with European Parliament election statistics. Turnout in European elections is often used as an
indicator of attachment to, and support of, European Union endeavors and integration.27 There is a
clear divide between national and European turnout. This suggests to political scientist Mark Frank-
lin that European Parliament elections are not very important in citizens’ minds. Across the board,
excluding countries with compulsory voting, national election turnout is higher than EP election
turnout. European Parliament election turnout was 46 percent in 2009.28 This number is lower than
the 54.8 percent voter turnout in 1999 (see Table 1, Franklin 311). This is due in part to the structural
changes mentioned by Franklin, but the political climate today is much different than it was in 1999
and the prognosis for the future requires that the turnout rise again. The statistics on national election
turnout versus European election turnout are extremely telling in terms of possible attachment and
identification questions. Franklin uses the most recent statistics from 1999 in his 2001 article, but
these do not include the countries added during the Eastern Expansion. The numbers from the most
recent European Parliament elections (generally held in 2009 in members states, though election
years differ across countries) provide a much more accurate and contemporary look at the state of

26 Risse “Europeanization,” 38.
27 Daniel Stockemer. “Citizens’ Support for the European Union and Participation in European Parliament Elections,” in Euro-


Mark N. Franklin, “How Structural Factors Cause Turnout Variations at European Parliament Elections,” in European Union Politics 2

It has been brought to my attention by Matthew Gabel that the way in which I will interpret turnout statistics is not the traditional
method within the literature. Generally, political scientists try to avoid attributing stability and identity to turnout figures, but rather fo-
cus on the extent to which the data indicate democratic performance. For my purposes, I will be attributing the turnout of EP elections
to a certain level of political identity, or at least to the prominence of the European Union in the minds of constituents.
28 Stockemer 27.
electoral politics at the European level. Table 3 highlights the statistics from a selection of countries in these two groups.

Table 3: Turnout in National and European Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>83.48</td>
<td>70.78 (2009)</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>43.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>70.48</td>
<td>55.40 (2012)</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>40.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>73.90</td>
<td>68.94 (2011)</td>
<td>61.9 (1987-1999)</td>
<td>44.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>81.00</td>
<td>74.56 (2012)</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>36.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>85.92</td>
<td>87.74 (2011)</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>59.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>87.57</td>
<td>84.63 (2010)</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>45.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>72.65 (1991-1999)</td>
<td>60.64 (2009)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>38.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>63.84</td>
<td>48.92 (2011)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>24.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is important to note here is not necessarily these countries’ opinions on the European Union, but their attachment to their national governments rather than to the European Parliament. In each case, no matter when the country joined the Union, or whether they are as a rule more nationally inward-looking or interested in deeper European integration, national average turnout is much higher than European Parliamentary turnout. Especially when comparing the most recent election statistics, the average discrepancy between national and European level turnout is 27.99 percent – nearly a third more of national electorates participate in national elections than in European elections. Another important factor to notice about the percentage turnout for national elections: they are higher than a 51 percent simple majority that provides a legitimizing electoral turnout (except Poland), whereas (except for Denmark) the turnout for European elections is far below that 51 percent. This would indicate again that there is stronger identification with national-level politics rather than European level. This says nothing, of course, about which way voters are choosing – more or less Europe, pro-euro or anti-, etc., and it says nothing about political changes within countries or the demographics that are voting in either election type. It is simply meant to highlight that European elections are far less prominent issues in the minds of European citizens than national elections. This missing sense of responsibility to vote partially stems from underdeveloped attachment to and identification with European institutions. The EU’s progress and hegemonic power may be hindered by

30 Complied from the “Idea Voter Turnout Website” 2012; Franklin 2001.
31 Turnout in the United States, which is often used as a comparative governmental body to the EU, was 57.5% in 2012, 62.3% in 2008, and 60.4 in 2004. This indicates a quorum of the electorate as participants in the national election, thus legitimizing the electoral process.
democratic deficits such as drawing lower voter turnout than the countries it overarches.

The undesirably low measures of, intranational trust, attachment to, identification as and pride in being European point to the lack of a supranational European identity as part of citizens’ self-images. These missing elements are particularly poignant when compared with their counterparts in national identity: it is clear that citizens identify much more closely and deeply with their nations than with the European Union. In light of citizens’ current alliances, the European ‘nation’ does not exist, undermining the legitimacy of the ‘state.’ The ‘nation’ could exist, and should, if the European Union is to develop further towards its logical conclusion.

As Hix and Høyland argue, however, the nation-state building process is beginning to encroach on national sovereignty. An expanded elite role in convincing citizens to identify with and appreciate the European Union could potentially be seen as imperialistic by those citizens and their national governments. The European elite must win the struggle between national-level and supranational-level governance if the project is to develop culturally and solidify its stability.

**An Increasingly Imperial Europe**

There is clearly tension between the idea of nation-state and supranational nation-state. The fact that the European Union has continued to expand its powers but does not have the accompanying cultural identification means that its nation-state progression is not yet complete. In order to further legitimize the state portion of the European nation-state, the European Union must go through the process described by Weber and Anderson. It is vital that the European Union experience public discourse through a standardization of language, print-capitalism and the capture of elite thought and media for use in official national propaganda. This is the point at which the European Union acts as an imperial force consolidating its power, though not in a traditionally militaristic way. The further integration necessary for the EU to function properly will further encroach on European countries’ power and will increasingly play an apparent role in citizens’ minds. Through these processes, the EU will become a hegemonic, imperial quasi-nation-state entity.

The standardization of language, according to Weber, is a first vital step in the consolidation of culture and in the creation of a nation. The EU has 27 languages, and all processes, publications, treaties and discourses are forced to take place in 27 different languages. Europeans must translate one another’s words in order to effectively communicate ideas. While the complete eradication of disparate European languages would be a tragedy, the perpetuation of the use of English and French, the official languages of the EU, should be enforced. Through schooling and print-capitalism, English and French use should be increased, and knowledge of the languages should be disseminated more widely. The increasingly ubiquitous European media and European elite discourse will aid the standardization of EU-level communications. While national media sources report on happenings on the EU level, more international media sources that can be understood by all citizens will draw new thinkers into the debate on the EU and solidify the idea of the European imagined community. The idea of the European nation – or at least of a European sentiment and collective memory, will be propagated more effectively by the elites who harness the discourse for official nationalism. Recall that the process is not a natural one: each actor must play his or her part and each institution must utilize its designated portion of the nation building process in order for the outcome of the cultural program to match the outcome of the continuing political and economic program. The inevitability of further European integration necessitates and predicts the coming of a greater European sentiment.

Official nationalism development will play an especially imperial role on the continent. The overstepping of national sovereignty and self-determination through propaganda and government
programs will effectively ruin the already weakened sovereign borders and rights of nations to govern themselves. Changing citizens’ definitions of themselves and loyalties to governing institutions is certainly an imperial project. Imperialism, “the policy, practice or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation... especially by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas,” plays a role in the EU project, though without the use of military force. In fact, the EU could at one point be considered a perfectly hegemonic empire, because all of its power and legitimacy was created by the national governments that created it. However, as it becomes increasingly powerful and supranational, the EU will have to undertake more advocacy of itself – the political and cultural propagation of the project. This redoubling of propaganda efforts will also bolster the imperialistic tendencies of the European Union. As it becomes more legitimate in its own right, the development of the project must come from the top-down, rather than from the national governments. If the EU institutions wish to extend their clout and reach deeper into the sovereignty of national governments and further into the lives of citizens, they must act more imperially.

The European Union presents a unique example of a governmental structure that, after its creation by national governments, has nearly taken over their roles. The EU, in seeking to deepen its integration out of economic necessity, will need to begin advocacy of its programs on a scale that could be considered imperialistic. As the EU expands economically, politically and culturally, it will subsume the nation-states that it governs into a nation-state structure of its own, a process that requires the active participation of all citizens and top-down leadership from the European imperialist elites.
A European Empire? The Process of Nation-State Building at the European Level

Works Cited


Abstract: This paper examines the experiences of nineteenth century British women travelers Egypt as a method of thinking about the power relationship between travelers and their colonial subjects. The paper is primarily based on the travel journals of three of these women, paying close attention to their narrative styles and constructed ideas of the country and its inhabitants. Through many of their descriptions of the country, it is apparent that these women are able to offer a more critical and open-minded account, in part because of their independent spirit and position outside the traditional colonial narrative. Nevertheless, their accounts remain suffused with moments of condescension, objectification, and dominance expected from an imperial voice. This suggests that as empathetic as these women attempt to be, they have limited tools for synthesizing and describing their experiences, and these tools contain an inherent sense of superiority. These accounts demonstrate both the inconsistencies that imperial rhetoric develops through use by individuals, and how one’s own culture inevitably and unconsciously shapes how foreign cultures are experienced.
As they traveled through Egypt in the mid-nineteenth century, Emma Roberts, Harriet Martineau, and Lady Lucie Duff Gordon recorded their encounters and impressions of the country and its inhabitants. The resulting travel accounts demonstrate an intriguing tension between their open-minded curiosity about Egypt and their inclination, as citizens of imperial Britain, towards cultural superiority. These three women, with their independent spirits and positions outside of the male-dominated colonial narrative, succeeded in producing accounts that are more culturally sensitive and open-minded than their contemporaries in other colonies of the British Empire. Nevertheless, at many points in the texts, these women adopt a condescending, objectifying tone, often unconsciously. Understanding why these conflicts arise in the texts requires a closer examination of three major narrative methods these women employed to understand and describe their surroundings: the language of “natural sympathy,” aesthetics, and historical study. By using these culturally dictated narrative methods, descriptions initially intended to be open-minded are inevitably shaped into expressions of imperialist superiority. This paper will examine these three narratives methods and their origins, then present examples of how each shapes these women’s experiences of the country.

Although these women traveled before direct British control of Egypt, Western interest in the country had increased as Egypt rose from an overlooked Ottoman province to a significant military and economic power. This transformation had begun at the turn of the nineteenth century, when the aftermath of French occupation and defeat resulted Ottoman general Mohammad Ali’s seize of the country. Nominally provincial governors of the Ottoman Empire, Mohammad Ali and his successors Abbas (1848) and Sa’id (1854) embarked on an ambitious series of projects intended to make Egypt an imperial state in its own right. The creation of a European style military and education and state controlled economic production allowed Egypt to expand in territory and influence in the next three decades, slowly gaining independence from the struggling Ottoman Empire. However, these reforms came at a price for Egypt’s peasants, who were forcibly conscripted into both the military and various public works projects, and suffered economically from state monopoly. By the mid-1800s, Egypt’s rulers were viewed with resentment by most Egyptians, a sentiment exacerbated by the policies of grandson Isma’il (1863-1879), who spared no expense in both funding expensive projects and lavish ceremonies to impress European allies. The enormous debts incurred by the Egyptian government in this period resulted in European intervention, which in 1882 culminated in direct British rule. In addition, Egypt’s rise in the global community throughout the 1800s had made the country more accessible to European visitors, who wielded important economic and cultural influence.

In 1839 Emma Roberts passed through Egypt on her way back to India, where she had been working for the British Asiatic Journal. A member of a titled, respectable Welsh family, Roberts was highly educated and had written a lengthy historical work concerning the houses of York and Lancaster. Upon traveling to British India in 1828 with her newly married sister, she began producing amusing character sketches, poetry and formal papers on life in the country. When published after her return to England these works became quite popular, prompting her to return to India in 1839, a journey that led to the publication of Notes of an Overland Journey through France and Egypt to Bombay. Given that her true work focused on India, her passage through Egypt was more a diversion than a serious study; nevertheless, her descriptions maintain the sensitivity to character and evaluations developed in her other works.

A decade later, Harriet Martineau traveled to Egypt for intense study of Egyptian culture. Like Roberts, Martineau was a recognized writer, having publishing multiple novels, religious papers, and commentaries on political and social issues. A vocal supporter of more radical political and scientific practices, Martineau achieved small celebrity status in England. The journey that produced Eastern Life: Past and Present was more personal than Roberts’, undertaken from 1846-7 after her

recovery from a life-threatening illness. This work intended to combine her impressions as a traveler with a rigorous historical study of the Middle East, interspersed with religious analysis. Her writings, however, remain first and foremost a record of her personal experience and reflection.

Over a span of four years, beginning in 1862, Lady Lucie Duff Gordon produced the most explicitly personal work of the three women. Although lacking the literary prestige of Roberts or Martineau, Duff Gordon did move within intellectual circles of note at home and regularly entertained up-and-coming thinkers, including Charles Dickens, William Thackeray, and John Stuart Mill. She left her family in Britain to travel to Egypt in search of warm weather, after having contracted tuberculosis in 1851, and settled outside Luxor for several consecutive winters. The series of letters she wrote to her husband and mother were collected and published in *Letters from Egypt, 1862-1865*. Detailing her daily life and new friendships, these letters present a more intimate account than those of the other two women.

The travel accounts produced by Robert, Martineau and Duff Gordon are notably distinct from the traditional colonial narrative, a deviation compounded by their personalities, gender, and the nature of Britain’s limited political role in Egypt. From their biographies alone, it is apparent that these women share the independence and intellectual self-confidence necessary to produce intelligent and individual accounts. All three received substantial, progressive education, and exhibit confidence in their intellectual abilities: both Roberts and Martineau had developed reputations as respectable writers, while Duff Gordon rubbed shoulders with prominent social thinkers of the time. They unquestionably had the capacity to both critically engage with and comment upon what they saw in Egypt. Furthermore, all had traveled to foreign countries before their journeys to Egypt, allowing them to be less overwhelmed by the process of travel or the foreignness of the country. That they chose to leave domestic life to travel more or less alone demonstrates a spirit of adventure and self-confidence atypical to the average English woman of the time. These women were more than comfortable in forming and defending their own opinions, and initially appear unlikely to be swayed by the standard British imperial rhetoric of their time.

Even had they desired, their gender prevented them from engaging whole-heartedly in the typical British epistemic lens of understanding the East. Under the Orientalist paradigm, colonizing authors in the nineteenth century had developed a framework of relating the East and the West that portrayed the two as irreconcilable cultural antitheses, with the West acting as the dominant ‘parent.’ The pattern of language used to express these differences, especially with regard to the Near East, was strongly gendered. Femininity became the means through which Eastern culture was demeaned and weakened, with the country and its male inhabitants portrayed as weak and feminine and its female inhabitants as sexually available. As women, Roberts, Duff Gordon, and Martineau were unlikely to consider Egypt within this framework, nor were they pressured to, as women’s travel accounts were expected to take a more personal, sentimental, or anecdotal form. Although they were not discouraged from taking a superior cultural stance, their gender prohibited them from using the standard, heavily masculine language used to do so.

Besides their positions as women, their limited political relationship to the British Empire also kept them from conforming to the traditional colonial narrative. Because Egypt would not come directly under British control until 1882, there was no explicit colonial relationship for them to

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7 Mills, *Discourses of Difference*, 50-1.
uphold. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the purpose of their travel through Egypt was personal, not political. They did not necessarily see themselves as representations or ambassadors of their culture, and, with the exception of Martineau, their texts were not intended as social or political commentary so much as informative portrayals of the country. Although a colonial perspective was certainly part of their writing, they were not explicitly endorsing or justifying colonial rule of Egypt in these texts.

Because these women were independently minded and generally uninterested in adhering to the standard colonial depiction of Eastern countries, it seems reasonable to expect them to be more empathetic and open-minded than their contemporaries in their account of Egypt. Although this expectation is often met, imperialist rhetoric does heavily influence their work. This rhetoric is often the unintentional result of the methods used to depict Egypt and Egyptians. Using the three most prominent discursive languages of the texts, we can understand how sentiments intended to be empathic become condescending and demeaning.

**Language of “Natural Sympathy”**

The first, and perhaps most, fundamental descriptive method used by these women is a language of “natural sympathy,” derived from their position as female citizens of the growing British Empire. The idea of women’s “natural sympathy” came from Victorian casting of women as caregivers, educators, and dispensers of charity in a domestic setting.\(^8\) This position complemented the sentimental and personal tone expected from women’s travel accounts, making it an appealing mode of discourse to take abroad.\(^9\) This overt sympathy, though, often resulted in self-affirmation for their feelings of superiority, which, in these texts, takes the form of subconscious projection of British cultural and social standards. Thus, while their position as women allowed for more sentimentality, the women manipulated their ‘natural’ understanding of the culture to produce works that spoke condescendingly of their adopted culture. The oscillation between open-mindedness and superiority can be demonstrated by examining their relationships with Egyptians and their attitude towards poverty and suffering.

On one hand, Roberts, Duff Gordon, and Martineau frequently attempted to kindle friendships with Egyptians, despite language barriers. Roberts asserted that although their boat captain “did not speak a word of English” they “were, nevertheless, excellent friends. He was very good-humored, and we were always laughing, so that a bond of union was established between us.”\(^10\) Duff Gordon, over the course of her first year, formed a relationship with her aide strong enough that she writes: “I shall say farewell to Egypt with real regret; among other things, it will be a pang to part with Omar.”\(^11\) Even in situations of limited interaction these women often admired the Egyptians’ intelligence and abilities. Roberts describes her servants as the most “intelligent men in their rank of life” she has ever met.\(^12\) Duff Gordon describes others as “clever” and was frequently impressed with their faith and open-minded acceptance of her Christianity.\(^13\) In personal interactions such as these, the women presented an empathetic portrait, reaching past cultural and language barriers to engage with Egyptians. However, the language of “natural sympathy” used to express these sentiments often twists these initially positive and level-handed depictions into patronizing expressions of imperial dominance.

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8 Mills, *Discourses of Difference*, 96.
9 Mills, *Discourses of Difference*, 73.
12 Roberts, *Notes of an Overland Journey through France and Egypt*, 104.
Imperial rhetoric emerges from Roberts, Martineau, and Duff Gordon’s tendency to describe Egyptians as “children,” a word choice that aligns with the language of “natural sympathy.” This is prominent throughout the texts: “we treated them as children; and this answered perfectly well,”14 “extremely clever and nice children,”15 and “complete children, but amiable children.”16 As condescending as this rhetoric may sound, the language does not appear to be a deliberate attempt to insult Egyptians, as it is often paired with admiration of the same Egyptians’ virtues as described above. Instead, the women’s language of maternal admiration complements the narrative of ‘parenting’ the supposedly underdeveloped Egyptian culture and fulfills the cultural expectation to appear sympathetic. It also, though, contains inherent assumptions of the women’s supposed superiority and the Egyptians’ primitive natures. This implicit superiority is embedded in the language they employ, and is, as a result, quite integrated within their texts.

A second example of “natural sympathy” is apparent in the three women’s reactions to the poverty and suffering they encountered in their travels. They were clearly affected by certain scenes and experiences: “this poverty wrings my heart,” writes Duff Gordon,17 and were quick to sympathize with “all the misgovernment and oppression [the Egyptians] suffer.”18 In fact, these women go so far as to disparage perceived European involvement in Egyptian affairs, as expressed by Duff Gordon when she writes, “I care less about opening up the trade with the Soodan... than I should like to see person and property safe.”19 Martineau likewise challenges conceptions of European superiority, expressing, “I have seen more emaciated, and stunted, and depressed men, women and children in a single walk in England than I observed from end to end of the land of Egypt.”20 In these moments, the women not only acknowledge the negative ramifications of rapid “Europeanization,” but question the productivity of “modernization” projects within Europe. This seems to be an extreme expression of their progressiveness and open-mindedness towards Egypt and their own country. Once again, though, we see the language in which they express these ideas change these criticisms back into affirmations of imperial superiority.

Although they occasionally granted that Egyptian cities were less poor or dirty than certain European cities, they never questioned their Western model of industry, the building of “European style” buildings, and the increased secularization in Egypt. Egypt is most highly praised when its cities emulate European ones21 or “appropriate” industries develop.22 In this vision of progress, Egypt is measured by the extent to which it imitates the British Empire, not only in economic development but in language, education and religious sentiment. Thus, their seemingly negative depictions of European cities belay an implicit assumption of rightness in the European model of social progress. Considered in this light, snide comments like Duff Gordon’s characterization of Cairo’s streets as “sweet as roses compared to those of the ‘Centre of Civilization,’”23 are more of a shaming of those places by comparison to the under-developed Egypt than an assertion of Egyptian superiority. In this, it is clear that despite some indications to the contrary, these women were unable to fully remove themselves from their imperial methods of understanding foreign cultures, invariably leading to accounts colored with supposed superiority.

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15 Duff Gordon, Letters from Egypt, 1863-1865, 85.
17 Duff Gordon, Letters from Egypt, 1863-1865, 19.
18 Martineau, Eastern Life, Past and Present, 9, 21.
19 Duff Gordon, Letters from Egypt, 1863-1865, 104.
20 Martineau, Eastern Life, Past and Present, 8-9.
21 Roberts, Notes of an Overland Journey through France and Egypt, 72.
22 Martineau, Eastern Life, Past and Present, 48.
Language of Aesthetics

The women’s second major discourse used to synthesize their experiences in Egypt into their personal works was through a lens of landscape and aesthetics. This language originated partly from typical European emphasis on the “picturesque” when describing Eastern cultures, and partly from traditional expectations of women’s interests. Of the culturally appropriate topics available to their writing, the visual experiences of panoramas, natural features, and landscapes featured heavily.24 These cultural expectations dovetailed what would have been a supposedly natural subject for women to discuss, as most well-educated English women had some degree of artistic training, and were accustomed to understanding their surroundings in such terms. This training allowed them remove a visual viewpoint from societal and political issues, at times leading to unhindered praise and admiration of beauty that did not necessarily align with their cultural values. While these visual descriptions often portrayed Egypt in a positive light, they veered into overlooking, objectifying or sentimentalizing the Egyptians involved. Much like the “natural sympathy” described above, this narrative method initially allowed them to access their very foreign surroundings, but ultimately limited their ability to relate to them.

Their focus on the aesthetics of Egypt allowed these women to literally “take a second look” at aspects of the country that were initially unlikeable. For example, Martineau wrote that the “angularity” that seemed to be “the prime law of beauty,” in Egyptian architecture could be difficult to appreciate at first glance, but she nevertheless found herself “immediately falling into sympathy with this taste,”25 an experience, she later noted, that was not shared by all travelers. Similarly, Duff Gordon initially struggled to admire houses that had “neither paint, whitewash, plaster, bricks, nor windows, nor any visible roofs,” but upon further observation found “the impression of wretchedness wears off, and one sees how picturesque they are.”26 This occasionally evolved into outright admiration, as when Martineau wrote of one site, “I can not believe that anything else so majestic as this Pair has been conceived of by the imagination of Art. Nothing even in nature certainly ever affected me so unspeakably.”27 They were willing to alter their understanding of beauty and acknowledge another equally legitimate form of it. Their appreciation of visual beauty gave them an acceptable way to voice admiration of the country and its inhabitants. However, as with the language of natural sympathy, this viewpoint sometimes led to imperialistic rhetoric.

The first illustration of dominance produced by visual language is the sentimentality developed by treating people as visual elements of the landscape. “Such a lovely scene, all sweetness and plenty!”28 wrote Duff Gordon, “the harvest here is the most exquisite pastoral you can conceive.”29

In a lengthier example, Martineau wrote:

“As we sat on deck under our awning this evening, the scene was striking; the brilliant moonlight resting on the quiet groves, but contending in the shore with the yellow glow from the west, which gilded the objects there; and especially the boat-building near the water’s edge; the crews forming picturesque groups.”30

These pastorals created a quaint and easily consumable foreignness – one that was much more relatable. Such depictions slid easily into portrayals of life in Egypt as a simpler, purer, and ul-

24 Logan, Harriet Martineau, Victorian Imperialism, and the Civilizing Mission, 188.
25 Martineau, Eastern Life, Past and Present, 10-11.
26 Duff Gordon, Letters from Egypt, 1863-1865, 37.
27 Martineau, Eastern Life, Past and Present, 83.
28 Duff Gordon, Letters from Egypt, 1863-1865, 68.
29 Duff Gordon, Letters from Egypt, 1863-1865, 246.
timately primitive existence in comparison to those of Europeans. This is more problematic considering that at other points in the texts, they portray rural life in Egypt as anything but ideal. Described in these terms, people lost the personalities granted to them in other sections of text, and the writers detached themselves from problematic poverty, hunger or sickness. In the sentimental understanding of the country, these women were able to experience and admire Egyptian life from a safe distance, without having to acknowledge the complications of all human life.

A final problematic outcome of the aesthetic language used in these texts arises with the stripping of agency and personality from the Egyptians the women encountered. Martineau provided a typical example of this during her journey up the Nile:

“T...
In addition, the use of historical conceptions of Egypt primitize the contemporary country, resulting in an implicit justification for European control over it. Martineau’s tendency to depict the modern Egypt as infringing on the ancient depicts contemporary Egypt as lesser or diminished. The “present obtrudes itself before the past,” she wrote, and at a later point called modern constructions “blemishes” on the ancient scenes. Martineau thus stripped contemporary Egypt of the grandeur allocated to the ancient country, presenting the two as generally unrelated to one other. Duff Gordon, taking this a step further, denied modernity altogether, writing, “The Copts are evidently the ancient Egyptians,” and describing her “favorite” crew member as someone that seemed to have “stepped out of a hieroglyphical drawing.” In presenting Egypt in this ahistorical way, she denied the country and its people forward progress, preferring instead to insist on the country’s stagnant primitiveness.

By ignoring modern Egyptian culture, these women provided themselves with an opportunity to assert English superiority. At one point, after she expressed a desire for more ruins to be uncovered, Martineau expressed, “We are not worthy yet of this great unveiling: and the inhabitants are not, from their ignorance, trustworthy as spectators.” In other places, dismay over the neglect or outright destruction of ancient buildings and artifacts contained a subtler suggestion that Egyptians cannot sufficiently appreciate their own culture, and are thus unworthy of it. By presenting themselves as knowledgeable about ancient Egyptian culture, and depicting the modern Egyptians as inferior to it, these women claimed the right to interpret the country as their own. This expression of superiority implied the English knew more about Egypt than Egyptians themselves, and were thus superior.

In addition to the influence of historical accounts, the women’s views of Egypt were also shaped by literature related to the East, especially The Arabian Nights Entertainment. Arabian Nights was a collection of folk tales from Asia and North Africa, first published in English in the early 1700s. Its stories of djinns, magic lamps and exotic royalty quickly seized European imaginations and played a central role in developing Western conceptions of, and interest in, Egyptian culture. This, being likely the Europeans’ first widespread exposure to Eastern culture, was perhaps their most deeply rooted influence in understanding Egypt. Roberts claimed she “commenced reading the Arabian Nights’ Entertainment at the age of five years” and consistently returned to it since then. Duff Gordon often saw scenes through the lens of this text, at points describing many things as “the real Arabian Nights.” In addition to Arabian Nights, the women over the course of their travel also mentioned the Crusades, the Bible, and various Greek travel authors. Like the historical method of understanding Egypt, these early influences also shaped how these women perceived the country and its inhabitants.

These writers’ resulting expectations of the East provided for them a predisposition to romanticize their experiences. They were eager to find the characters of Arabian Nights in every interaction. This paradigm is particularly apparent in their attributions of typical Arab “characteristics.” They wrote about the “Oriental dignity,” the “Oriental pomp,” and the “perfect grace,” of those they encounter. Quite early in her voyage Martineau felt comfortable identifying “the pathetic expression of the Arab countenance, with a strong sense, and on occasion, of an abundance of fire,” a description that Duff Gordon also conceded. It is fairly evident these women had formed an idea of the “Arab character” before entering the country and intended to stand by it. The romanticization of

40 Martineau, Eastern Life, Past and Present, 88.
41 Duff Gordon, Letters from Egypt, 1863-1865, 60.
42 Duff Gordon, Letters from Egypt, 1863-1865, 28.
43 Martineau, 61.
44 Roberts, Notes of an Overland Journey through France and Egypt, 133.
46 Martineau, Eastern Life, Past and Present, 28.
the country coupled with the implicit assumption that they understood something about the Egyptian way of life that the Egyptians themselves did not become a tool with which to assert dominance. This assertion of dominance is compounded when the women emphasize Egyptian lack of civilization. Duff Gordon makes this point most bluntly, writing, “if any one tries to make you believe any nonsense about ‘civilization’ in Egypt, laugh at it. The real life and the real people are exactly as described in that most veracious of books, the ‘Thousand and One Nights.’” Martineau and Roberts also drew similar conclusions through commenting on dress and custom and pointing out the “primitive,” yet entertaining, character of Egyptian singing and dancing. In these instances the writers demonstrate a level of affection for people and culture, but one tied to amusement and completely devoid of respect. Once again, such descriptions produced a sort of ownership of the country. At one point, Duff Gordon wrote, “How I wish you were here to enjoy all this, - so new, so beautiful, and yet so familiar!” This attitude, which provided the foundation for the recurring self-centeredness these women exhibited, is a typical example demonstrating their perceived superiority and sense of imperial dominance over the country.

Conclusion

Despite the frequent imperial rhetoric, the texts examined in this paper do represent a tension between a genuine inclination towards open-mindedness and a cultural bias underlying of Martineau, Roberts, and Duff Gordon’s understanding of Egypt. It is worth remembering that these women’s journals were not clearly organized. Instead, the rhetoric is so integrated with the narrative that sections demonstrate open-mindedness and human connection to Egyptians are often immediately followed by sections of explicit imperial language. However, the moments of open-mindedness are much more difficult to categorize and label, having more to do with personal relationships, small gestures of politeness, and fundamental intention.

Although intention can be difficult to delineate in these texts, given that these women very much felt themselves a part of a culture superior to that of Egypt, it is possible in certain comments to glimpse their genuine intent to be objective and empathetic observers. As discussed previously, these women were willing to revise their own opinions and reject traditional colonial discourse, even in the threat of having their work dismissed. Martineau perhaps most succinctly explains this position when she wrote:

“I can only testify, without hope of being believed that it is not so; instead of ugliness, I found beauty; instead of the grotesque, I found the solemn: and where I looked for rudeness… I found the sense of the soul more effectually reached than by works which are the result of centuries of experience and experiment.”

Although she was speaking specifically about Egyptian art here, this passage seems to characterize, very generally, all three women’s experiences in the country. They arrived in Egypt expecting poverty, pollution, and primitiveness, and found progressive cities founded upon an impressive, deep-rooted culture. Instead of ignoring those contradictions, they attempted to reconsider and modify their opinions. Of course, the manner in which they expressed these opinions often resulted in them asserting their own superiority, but nevertheless, their intention to understand Egypt was much deeper than that of the average British colonialist.

The tension between empathetic intention and imperial expression makes it difficult to argue the texts lean one way or the other. The journals contain empathy, desire for human connection, discourses of superiority, and personal revelation in varying measures. As part of a broader imperial

47 Duff Gordon, Letters from Egypt, 1863-1865, 80.
48 Martineau, Eastern Life, Past and Present, 34.
49 Martineau, Eastern Life, Past and Present, 85.
story, the conflict between open-mindedness and superiority does seem to anticipate a colonial problem that arose in the nineteenth-century British rule and is still present, in varying forms, in imperial relationships today; that is, how does an enlightened nation justify denying its colonial subjects the very rights it holds sacred? In these documents, Martineau, Roberts, and Duff Gordon offered a telling prelude to Egypt’s upcoming decades under colonial control, when such predispositions of imperialist vision would dominate and inform the actions of those in power.
Works Cited


Abstract: This study seeks to investigate the relationships between tourists, the tourism industry and two indigenous Mapuche communities near the popular vacation destination of San Martín de los Andes, located in the province of Neuquén in Argentinean Patagonia. Historically, these Mapuche communities have had a difficult and complex relationship with the tourism industry of San Martín de los Andes due to repeated human rights violations, discrimination, and marginalization on the part of this disproportionately powerful industry, which enjoys a large degree of protection and support from the Argentinean government. However, in recent years attempts to foster mutually beneficial and culturally respectful forms of tourism in the Mapuche communities have arisen at the level of the city’s institutions and also within the communities themselves. The aims of this investigation are twofold; by interviewing public officials and business owners, I attempt to gauge the focus and key attractions of tourism in and around the city and determine how the Mapuche communities are portrayed in relation to these touristic attractions. I also conducted interviews and participant observations in two nearby Mapuche communities, Chiuquilihuin and Curruruquinca, with the goal of understanding how community members adapt to and control the presence of tourists in their communities and how they are affected by the actions and assumptions of the mass tourism industry in San Martín de los Andes. I found that, although cooperation and respect between the institutions of the city and the Mapuche communities is growing, the objectives and interests of the two groups are still quite different; thus, the institutions assert their asymmetrical power over the Mapuche communities when it is necessary to protect their interests. Tourism, although it has the potential to exacerbate this imbalance of power, can also be used by the communities as an economic and cultural tool to produce and revitalize a distinctly Mapuche identity and to distinguish Mapuche ways of life from the dominant culture. By asserting their influence over sectors of the tourism industry, the Mapuche communities gain control and agency over how they present themselves to the rest of the world, allowing them more autonomy and stronger, more unified cultural identities.
Introduction

“Mapuche men and women want to share our way of life with you through this artisan product, made with materials given to us by nature. This product reflects the memory and millennial wealth of our ancestors, and rescues and strengthens our roots and the value of a culture that is alive.” --- Message explaining the crafts for sale at the artisan workshop in Chiuquilihuín, Neuquén, Argentina

The Mapuche community of Chiuquilihuín, located off a dusty, isolated strip of highway about an hour’s drive north of the tourist haven of San Martín de los Andes in Argentina’s Patagonia region, is invisible from the road; nonetheless, the community is actively soliciting visitors. Near the turnoff onto the dirt road that leads up into the hills towards the community, a small, hand-painted wooden sign alerts would-be visitors and curious passersby that the community’s artisan workshop is offering Mapuche crafts for sale. Chiuquilihuín’s workshop is unique among the Mapuche communities in the area. It features a robust artisan education program as well as an elaborate permanent workshop and craft showroom, all of which set it apart from the many temporary posts and stands located along the roads in Neuquén where vendors attempt to sell a few woven or wooden crafts to motorists and backpackers. During my two research trips to the community in October and November of 2011, I observed that the Mapuche weavers exercised a high degree of control over the production and sale of their crafts as well as over the experiences of non-Mapuche visitors to the workshop. In Curruruinca, another Mapuche community that is located directly next to the city of San Martín de los Andes within the limits of Lanín National Park, I observed the efforts of community members to assert a similar level of control over the outsiders entering the community to buy crafts and to enjoy the beauty of the National Park. After suffering from years of marginalization and alienation by the government and institutions of San Martín de los Andes, as well as from widespread prejudice in mainstream society, it appears that the Mapuche are now using their growing control over the local craft industry as a means to resist stereotypes and to communicate and defend their own values and ways of life to the dominant culture.

This growth in the indigenous craft industry is not a unique phenomenon; indigenous populations across Latin America (and indeed, across the world), from the Kaqchikel Maya of Guatemala to the Guarani of Brazil, produce and sell indigenous crafts for non-indigenous buyers. In this paper, I seek to investigate the motivations and causes behind the rapid development of the indigenous craft industry during the second half of the twentieth century as well as how involvement in the indigenous craft industry affects the structures of indigenous communities. Indigenous actors have developed craft industries as a potential economic and cultural solution to the persistent patterns of social marginalization, economic pressures, cultural differences, and asymmetrical institutional policies that have, until recently, severely limited the life possibilities of indigenous peoples living within the structures of dominant, Western culture. Yet the forms of craft production, the goals of the craft-producing communities, and the levels of success the artisans enjoy (as well as how success is defined) vary widely from case to case.

I began my research with several broad research questions in mind. First, I ask how indigenous craft producers, specifically the Mapuche of San Martín de los Andes, Argentina, negotiate their identities as indigenous peoples through the production and sale of “traditional” artisan goods. Furthermore, I consider the nature of the interactions between the market practices and economic benefits of producing indigenous artisan crafts and the cultural meanings contained in these objects. Finally, I ask how these indigenous groups construct popular perceptions of themselves through the objects that they sell, the manners in which they market these crafts, and the effects of the develop-
I conclude that in San Martín de los Andes, indigenous artisans have ultimately accumulated not only economic gains but also cultural benefits from producing, marketing, and selling their crafts. By emphasizing elements of their indigenous identities through art, the Mapuche craftsmen of Chiuquihuín have succeeded in recuperating previously forgotten elements of their cultural identity as well as inventing new “traditions” that, despite being partially or totally fabricated for tourists, can contribute to the unity and unique character of the community and hold real meaning within the local culture. Though navigation of the market system can be at times problematic for indigenous artisans, the fact remains that when non-indigenous demand for artifacts of an indigenous culture increases, that culture is less likely to disappear. No longer invisible and relegated to the very margins of dominant society, successful indigenous craft producers acquire a measure of agency to control how their communities and ways of life are perceived by the dominant culture. In this manner, indigenous artisans achieve the ability to counteract widespread societal oppression and to assert their own identities through the objects that they create.

Review of Previous Scholarship and Theoretical Overview

As this investigation will incorporate scholarship from multiple disciplines, I will divide this section into two parts. The first will introduce broad theories about craft production and tourism, while the second will describe the specific interactions between powerful institutions (government and representatives of the tourism industry) and indigenous Mapuche artisans and craft sellers in and around San Martín de los Andes. In addition to a review of past scholarship, I will also include a short historical summary of the interactions between state actors and indigenous communities in the Mapuche context. I will also address the manner in which indigenous producers approach the exchange of material goods and how indigenous economic systems and ideals have interacted with dominant, market-based economic systems.

A Portrait of Indigenous Craft Buyers

The buyers of indigenous crafts vary considerably. In the Mapuche context, tourism researchers Marcelo Impemba and Graciela Maragliano (2005) claim that the majority of the buyers of indigenous crafts are tourists visiting the region around San Martín de los Andes to experience the natural beauty of Lanín National Park and the famous Cerro Chapelco ski resort. However, resellers such as Artesanías Neuquinas are beginning to offer crafts for sale in Buenos Aires and other Argentine cities (though wholesalers in general are rare and most buyers interact directly with the craft producers). As I conducted my research in San Martín de los Andes, I met many young, relatively wealthy tourists from Buenos Aires and other urban areas, as well as visitors from Italy, Spain, Denmark, Australia, and other countries. While the amenities for visitors in and around San Martín de los Andes are upscale and luxurious, Impemba and Maragliano emphasize the desire of these visitors to participate in “outdoors activities with an element of calculated risk, which are often advertised as ‘adventure’ activities” such as horseback riding and zip lining (2005: 4). Limited engagement with Mapuche community members through craft sales in Chiuquihuín, Trompul, Quila Quina, and other sites therefore fits with the tourists’ desire to experience a “touch of the exotic” (Impemba and Maragliano 2005: 4).
The Search for Authenticity

Authenticity, or a perception of authenticity, is highly valued by tourists and buyers of indigenous crafts who seek out specific markers of genuineness in the goods they consume. Christine Ballengee-Morris, an anthropologist who studies Guarani craft producers in Brazil, argues that many tourists reject as inauthentic any good, experience, or display that appears to have been produced expressly for the benefit of tourists (Ballengee-Morris 2002: 241). MacCannell (1976) theorizes that this preoccupation with authenticity is a product of the feelings of “alienation, fragmentation, and superficiality” that pervade modern Western culture, which in turn motivate tourists to “reconnect with the pristine, the primitive, the natural, that which is as yet untouched by modernity” (Stronza 2001: 265). For these researchers, tourism and the consumption of indigenous crafts represent an escape from the tourists’ perceived superficiality of modern life towards something defined as meaningful or “authentic.” The ascription of meaning to specific goods or experiences through tourism reflects the values of the culture from which the tourists originate. As Stronza describes, the “act of seeing [certain “must-see” attractions] in person and then sharing the experience with others through photographs, souvenirs, and stories allows tourists to reassemble the disparate pieces of their otherwise fragmented lives,” but any reminder that the good was produced explicitly for non-indigenous buyers ruins the illusion (2001: 266). While most indigenous producers do tailor their products to the demands of non-indigenous buyers, they must not make it obvious.

Despite the numerous academic theories concerning the concept of authenticity, the definition of authenticity is rather vague. Two possible definitions included in Ballengee-Morris’ analysis are “that which has not changed” and “life as it was (in the past)” (Ballengee-Morris 2002: 241). Both emphasize the atemporal, apolitical qualities that tourists ascribe to the concept of authenticity. Paradoxically, the agreed-upon symbols that tourists use to denote authenticity often originate in the Western, non-indigenous imagination. Brian Spooner situates this fixation with the concept of authenticity specifically within industrial and postindustrial society. He states the Western cultural preoccupation with the authentic arose due to “the appearance of mechanically produced clone-commodities” and that Western buyers “began to distinguish between the social meaning of handicrafts and that of mechanical production, as well as between uniqueness and easy replaceability” (Appadurai 1986: 226). This definition of authenticity, judged by the values of Western culture, often does not allow for innovation in artisan goods. Contemporary, changing, innovative products are seen as inauthentic because they do not fit with established, often primitive stereotypes about indigenous culture (Ballengee-Morris 2002: 241). Ballengee-Morris claims that the ability of powerful outsiders to determine what is authentic and what is not “sterilizes” the culture as it eliminates the complexities that tourists do not want to see (2002: 241). Therefore, in the opinions of many researchers, the Western search for authenticity in non-Western artisan goods devalues and decontextualizes these crafts and the societies that produce them.

Though Ballengee-Morris, Spooner, and others emphasize the role of tourists and outsiders in driving indigenous craft producers to produce culturally inauthentic handicrafts, some researchers view the production of crafts for tourists as potentially economically and culturally beneficial for the producers. Stronza cites Deirdre Evans-Pritchard’s 1989 study of Native American artisans and concludes that in some cases,

“[Native American artisans] make up stories about the art, consciously capitalizing on the tourists’ hopes to find meaning and cultural significance in everything they see. This enterprising behavior seems to contradict the notion that locals are passive victims, caught unaware as they lose themselves and their culture to commodification and the intrusive gaze of outsiders. Even in cases where local hosts are changing aspects of their identity or lives to appeal to tourists, they may not necessarily be losing their culture or their ability to judge for themselves what is spurious or genu-
Therefore, tourist demand for specific artisan goods, even if inauthentic, may in some cases serve to empower indigenous artisans economically as well as give them the agency to “highlight or downplay” to outsiders particular elements of their identity while at the same time maintaining a distinction between cultural displays enacted for tourists and, in Stronza’s words, the “backstage rituals and symbols” that take place outside of the tourists’ view and hold true meaning within the culture (2001: 273). While the researchers describing the production of inauthentic crafts as harmful to the producers’ cultures tend to view non-Western or indigenous societies in a rather essentialist light, others see indigenous craft producers as opportunists and their cultures as malleable, adaptable, and constantly changing. Researchers still disagree about the short- and long-term effects of the craft industry on local indigenous culture and whether the presence of tourists is harmful for indigenous communities. By examining in detail the cases of Otavalo and San Martín de los Andes, this article will examine these complex interactions between indigenous producers and non-indigenous consumers through the use of concrete examples.

The Outsider’s Gaze

Indigenous handicrafts are not only commodities but also serve to transmit complex messages about the identities of the producers and to mediate the relationship between the indigenous producers and the (largely) non-indigenous consumers. In her article The Anthropology of Tourism, Stronza (2001) expands upon the concept of the “tourist gaze,” which was originally introduced by sociologist John Urry (2001: 271). In this model, tourists exercise power through their expectations about the behavior and appearance of the people at the site of the tourist attraction. In turn, the local people, who are economically dependent on tourist dollars, feel obligated (either consciously or unconsciously) to alter their way of life, either subtly or drastically, so that their reality better coincides with the expectations of the tourists in order to satisfy and attract more tourists (Stronza 2001: 271). This relationship between the dominant culture (that of the tourists) and the subordinate culture (that of the locals), described by Christine Ballengee-Morris, results in the valuation of the subordinate culture through the criteria of the dominant culture (Ballengee-Morris 2002: 238). That is to say, the visitors effectively use their disproportionate economic and cultural power to define which characteristics of the tourism site are true, legitimate, and deserving of their attention (and spending) and which are not. In this way, the people and the environment of the tourist destination continue to adjust to the tastes and the expectations of tourists. Although in some cases this “‘packaging’ of indigenous identity […] by dominant external institutions and actors” may lead to the weakening and dilution of the local culture, this does not always occur (Stephen 1991: 101). Rather, according to Stephen:

“One dimension of [local] identity is produced for consumers of indigenous culture such as tourists, importers, and foreign visitors who purchase indigenous crafts; other dimensions are defined from within indigenous communities and are accessible only to those who are members of the community by virtue of their participation in networks and institutions that form the core of this identity” (1991: 105).

Thus, while Stronza asserts that the “tourist gaze” robs comparatively less powerful indigenous communities of the right to cultural self-determination, Stephen states that the production of crafts for tourist consumption can also define and reproduce elements of indigenous culture that are not accessible to non-indigenous outsiders (1991: 105). Christine Ballengee-Morris’ study of Guar-
aní art in Brazil emphasizes the fact that indigenous craft production can have both local and global meanings; she found that specifically-designated “tourist art” is made using Guaraní production techniques but “uses colors, shapes, and materials determined by the market” whereas a second category of art is crafted with “colors, materials, and usage [which are] determined according to cultural, spiritual purposes. Children are taught the differences between the two types” (2002: 238). Furthermore, Guaraní artisans are open to “adopting a variety of outsiders’ cultural codes and elements” into their own cultural framework (2002: 242). Likewise, the case of the Mapuche weavers in the community of Chiuquilihuin, discussed later in this article, exemplifies similar behaviors. Moreover, Ballengee-Morris concludes, after reviewing a series of cases from across North and South America, that those artisans who refuse to make any concessions whatsoever to the tastes of buyers from outside the culture struggle to compete economically (2002: 239). Therefore, indigenous craft producers usually must alter their materials and designs; paradoxically, they must do so in order to match buyers’ ideas about what is “indigenous” or “authentic.”

Tourism in the Mapuche Context

The broad concepts that I have discussed thus far serve to explore the desires of the buyers of indigenous crafts and to explain the interactions between outsiders and the indigenous communities with which they interact. In the following section, I will explore in greater depth the relations between indigenous Mapuche craft producers and sellers in the regions around San Martín de los Andes, Argentina, and the non-indigenous consumers of Mapuche art and culture. I will begin by giving a short history of the interactions between Mapuche communities and institutions of power (such as the government, craft resellers, and tour operators, among others) in the region. I will also discuss the Mapuche worldview as it relates to tourism and economic activity.

The History and Current State of the Mapuche in Neuquén

It is impossible to understand the current state of the Mapuche communities near San Martín de los Andes in the province of Neuquén without a measure of historical and contextual knowledge about the Mapuche people in this region. In this section I briefly explore their history and describe how it affects their relations with consumers of Mapuche culture today.

In his article Comunidades mapuche y expansionismo turístico, anthropologist Marcelo Impemba describes the historical events that have led to the marginalization suffered by the Mapuche today. The end of the 19th century brought about “the Conquest of the Desert, with the establishment of national policies which promoted the development of urban centers and the beginnings of the tourism industry” in Patagonia (Impemba 2008: 2). This military campaign terminated in the forced migration of the Mapuche original peoples southward from the rich pampas they originally inhabited to “marginal lands of little value” (Impemba 2008: 2). The Argentine military justified these brutal relocations by stating that they must relocate the Mapuche in order to “control the border (with Chile)” while simultaneously extending Argentina’s political influence and power (Impemba 2008: 2). The Mapuche were also culturally pushed to the margins; in Neuquén and in Argentina in general, the Mapuche have historically been construed as the non-European, non-mestizo “other” and consequently suffer from invisibility and exclusion from social, political, and economic affairs in the city of San Martín de los Andes (Impemba 2008: 4). In Impemba’s words, the Mapuche are widely viewed as “strangers in their own country” (2008:4).

As a result of policies implemented during and after the Conquest of the Desert, the Mapuche were relegated to rocky lands in the foothills of the Andes that were barely fit for traditional Mapu-
Che economic activities such as cultivation and cattle-raising, while wealthy estancieros occupied the fertile lands on the valley floors. Under the agricultural economic model, the Mapuche were at a severe disadvantage. However, the “paradox and contradiction” described by Impemba is that “in the case of San Martín de los Andes, the passing of the years transformed the city into an important tourism destination, which changed the economic logic that sustained the city and converted the natural beauty [of the region], the land and access to it, into an economic resource” (Impemba 2008: 3). In other words, the same lands that do not support agriculture now enjoy a “privileged and strategic position” for the growing tourism industry (Impemba 2008: 3). As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, the Mapuche handicrafts industry is tightly linked to the mass tourism industry in San Martín de los Andes, as the majority of craft buyers are tourists drawn to the region by its natural attractions.

In addition to severely limiting Mapuche territories, the Argentine state has pursued “a long history of different forms of state intervention” in the Mapuche communities (Impemba and Maragliano 2008: 5). According to Valverde, in Chiuquilihuin “practically every family receives some unemployment subsidy” and “the incidence of individuals receiving pensions and other subsidies is very high” (Valverde 2007: 102-3). This dependence of the Mapuche on powerful institutions assumes many diverse forms, such as subsidies, construction of schools and houses, and craft-selling programs such as Artesanías Neuquinas (which I will discuss later on). These measures, which seem to benefit the Mapuche communities, also lead to a heightened dependence of the Mapuche people on the state, a phenomenon which Impemba and Maragliano call clientelism (2008: 3). According to Impemba, clientelism “enforces the subordination [of the Mapuche] under a veil of supposed tolerance;” clientelist policies discourage Mapuche dissent in order to maintain the power that the government and the tourism industry in San Martín de los Andes enjoy over the neighboring Mapuche communities (Impemba 2008: 4).

Researcher Sebastián Valverde echoes Ballengee-Morris’ findings that indigenous crafts can hold distinct meanings for tourists and for producers in the Mapuche context. In his article about craft production in the Mapuche community of Chiuquilihuin, Valverde rejects the popular notion that cultural displays (such as handicrafts) are, or should be, spontaneous or devoid of political and economic significance. Rather, he describes the production of crafts in Chiuquilihuin as:

“A simultaneously economic and symbolic phenomenon […] which forms a portion of the multiple income sources in the Mapuche communities and at the same time transmits cultural meaning which is rooted in the history of these communities” (Valverde 2007: 97).

According to Valverde the fact that artisans in Chiuquilihuin produce woven and wooden crafts is not solely for tradition’s sake but also reflects the demands of the market and of the tourists who come to the community seeking to buy Mapuche crafts. The crafts obtain their value by nature of being created by Mapuche craftsmen; as authenticity is highly valued by non-indigenous buyers, the same crafts produced by obviously non-Mapuche artisans or by machine would not hold the same value. Therefore, official recognition of the communities as Mapuche communities (as opposed to rural or peasant communities without explicit indigenous identity) is necessary for the communities to successfully market their crafts to tourists (Valverde 2007: 98). In this way, the Mapuche communities rely upon institutions of the dominant culture (the national and provincial governments, NGOs, etc.) to define what is considered “indigenous” or “Mapuche” and therefore determine their ability to solicit buyers for their crafts.
Mapuche Craft Production and Sale

In this section, I will examine the manners in which indigenous Mapuche craft producers and sellers use their indigenous status to market and sell handicrafts. The case of Mapuche weavers and wood carvers near San Martín de los Andes, Argentina, reveals the manners in which Mapuche craftsmen both utilize and reject assistance from governments and other powerful institutions as they use craft production both as an economic strategy and as a means of creating and expressing a uniquely Mapuche identity.

Craft Production in Mapuche Communities Near
San Martín de los Andes, Argentina

San Martín de los Andes is one of the premier tourism destinations in northern Patagonia. Situated on the shores of the beautiful Lake Lácar and at the beginning of the famous scenic Seven Lakes driving route, this city welcomes large numbers of visitors each year. During the warm months Argentinean and international visitors descend upon San Martín de los Andes to pass their summer vacations, admire the natural beauty of Lanín National Park, and enjoy outdoor activities in the fresh mountain air. In the winter, visitors come primarily for the city’s nearby ski resort at Cerro Chapelco, which is well-known throughout the country for its quality and luxury.

In addition to the tourists there exists another important, and much less visible, demographic within and surrounding the city of San Martín de los Andes; the city and the National Park border and overlap with various indigenous Mapuche communities. Due to the natural beauty of Mapuche community lands and an incipient but growing curiosity among a certain class of tourist about the local culture, these Mapuche communities currently face new possibilities and dangers through their interactions with tourists, tour agencies, and other organizations that represent the interests of the tourism industry. In the past, the Mapuche were involved in the tourism industry almost as an afterthought; they provided a momentary diversion in guided tours and excursions which focused upon the many natural wonders of the region. Today, however, the Mapuche are involved in a wide variety of tourism activities, from the preparation of typical Mapuche cuisine to the sale of unique Mapuche artisan goods. In addition, Lanín National Park and the municipal, provincial, and national governments are heavily involved in promoting and controlling tourism centering around the Mapuche people. Each of these entities, of course, has its own agenda. For example, the various levels of government view tourism as a possible means to remedy the entrenched poverty so prevalent in the Mapuche communities. The history of marginalization and oppression of Mapuche communities on the part of the government and powerful institutions such as Lanín National Park have resulted in a persistent lack of trust between Mapuche communities and these powerful institutions and heightened the importance of a growing Mapuche struggle for self-determination and agency in their dealings with the tourism industry and its many supporters.

In the Mapuche communities located in near San Martín de los Andes, the methods of production, display, and sale of artisan goods differ significantly from community to community and, at times, even within a single community. The artisan products fabricated in Mapuche communities are most frequently displayed and offered for sale in the community in which they were produced, in a nearby Mapuche community, or in the vacation city of San Martín de los Andes. In the case of San Martín de los Andes, therefore, the sale of handicrafts is closely linked to the massive tourism industry of the region, since the majority of visitors come to enjoy the ski slopes and the national park’s natural beauty, and any cultural experiences with Mapuche community members are secondary. As Cristina Lazos, the Director of Tourism Planning of the municipality of San Martín de los
Andes, stated in an interview with me, “as a [tourist] attraction, nature carries much more weight than culture […] this is changing somewhat, but tourists generally don’t come specifically to visit a Mapuche community.” In fact, the Mapuche have been historically largely invisible and excluded from participating in civic or commercial life in San Martín de los Andes. Relegated to the margins of society, their presence has been downplayed and at times outright ignored in this polished vacation destination. When their presence has been acknowledged, the Mapuche “others” have been portrayed through the lens of the exotic, as idealized “men in harmony with nature” who are distanced from their sociopolitical context (Impemba 2008: 4). Though institutions such as the government and the national park can and do attempt to manipulate Mapuche craft production in for the indigenous communities’ benefit, the Mapuche craft producers and sellers in turn intentionally use their craft to achieve visibility in non-Mapuche society and to produce an image of their history and culture to combat Western stereotypes. Enterprising Mapuche craft sellers must, therefore, capture the attention of visitors who may or may not be aware of the presence of Mapuche communities in the region.

The artisan goods produced and sold in the Mapuche communities near San Martín de los Andes reflect a strong gendered division of labor; in the community of Chiuquilihuin, the women produce blankets, fajas, shawls, and other goods woven on upright looms, as well as knit socks and caps, while the men carve a wide variety of tools and household products (cups, utensils, platters, boxes, and the like) from wood (Valverde 2007: 103). A woven faja generally sells for around $12 USD, while larger woven blankets and wall hangings can retail at $150 USD and beyond (Valverde 2007: 104). I observed Mapuche sellers stationed on the roadside and at various tourist attractions within Lanín National Park offering homemade food items such as dulce de leche, jam, empanadas and tortas fritas (a type of fried dough). It is important to note that the specific artisan goods offered for sale near San Martín de los Andes are products of recent social, political, and economic circumstances. The case of the Mapuche community of Chiuquilihuin provides an interesting example through which to explore the development of Mapuche craft production.

The Case of Chiuquilihuin: the Development of an Artisan Workshop

The Mapuche community of Chiuquilihuin is located in the dry Andean foothills, about 80 kilometers northwest of San Martín de los Andes on Route 60. To access the community, one must follow a winding, narrow road up into the hills, as the rich, flat lands nearest to the highway belong to the estancieros (wealthy landowners). The community is far outside the typical tourism circuits of San Martín de los Andes; the landscape near Chiuquilihuin is dry and windblown, and lacks the forested grandeur of Lanín National Park and the lands surrounding Lake Lácar. The residents of Chiuquilihuin engage in a wide variety of economic strategies in order to make a living. According to researcher Carlos R. Peralta, “all of the older inhabitants [of Chiuquilihuin] have a worldview based on an economy of animal husbandry,” but today the residents of Chiuquilihuin supplement the raising of sheep and goats with other economic activities, such as keeping kitchen gardens, working either in temporary or permanent jobs outside of the community, and working in cooperative organizations within the community (such as the artisan workshop, which I will discuss in great detail later on) (2003: 3). The community also receives large quantities of state and provincial assistance; residents receive monthly allotments of packaged food, gas, electricity and firewood from the government and most also collect some monetary assistance in the form of government subsidies and pensions (Peralta 2003: 3). The inhabitants of Chiuquilihuin suffer from scarcity as the population continues to grow and productivity cannot keep up with the ever-increasing demand for resources (Valverde 2007: 100). As a result, the community is constantly searching for alternative forms of in-
come (Peralta 2003: 7). However, despite these difficulties, Chiuquilihuin is comparatively wealthy and its residents enjoy a much better quality of life than inhabitants of neighboring Mapuche communities.

From the 16th to the 18th of November, 2011, I lived with Carolina, a Mapuche resident of Chiuquilihuin and the director of the community’s artisan workshop; as I was paying Carolina to stay in her house, I was technically a tourist. According to local tour guide Miriam Pérez, tourists who stay the night in Chiuquilihuin are very rare; more often, groups will arrange to enter Chiuquilihuin for a few hours to tour the community, interact with its inhabitants, and perhaps sample the local food items, though even these short visits are uncommon and weeks often pass without any visitors at all. The majority of interactions between tourists and Mapuche community members do not take the form of planned visits or tours but rather occur when tourists visit the artisan workshop located off the highway at the entrance to the community. The workshop is a community space specifically intended for the production and sale of handicrafts, most notably weavings and woodcarvings. Like many Mapuche buildings, the workshop is circular (the Mapuche view the cosmos as a circle) and was constructed in 2006 with the support of an Italian NGO. A group of eleven women and girls meets in the workshop each day for two hours learn how to weave fajas with the support of an artisan training program funded by the national government. Carolina is their weaving teacher.

According to Carolina, the women participating in the weaving workshop are not formally employed apart from their involvement in the workshop; they do not earn an income raising animals, cooking, cultivating gardens, and managing their households. The women sell their woven goods on an individual basis, and each collects her own earnings from the pieces she sells. The production and sale of woven goods therefore constitutes an important economic activity for the community. Weaving, however, is not easy work; Carolina stated, “weaving is bad for your vision, it requires a lot of concentration and it hurts my head” and “I want to retire […] because this job makes me very tired, after 15 years [she began to work as a weaving instructor in 1997].” Furthermore, several women participating in the workshop stated that very few tourists visit during the low season. However, it appears that the women of the weaving workshop do a fairly brisk business during the high season (approximately December through February). According to Carolina, during the high season the workshop becomes busy and the women must hurry to produce enough inventory (especially inexpensive knit stockings and caps) to keep up with demand (Valverde 2007: 108). Even during the low season, when I visited, there were few handicrafts on display in the workshop as many had already been sold.

The artisan workshop in Chiuquilihuin is a multipurpose space and a work in progress. Carolina dreams of raising adequate funds to open a restaurant in the workshop, for example, and the specific purpose of the space is constantly being redefined and adapted to the changing needs of the community; it functions as a classroom, a store, a workshop, a showroom, a meeting place, a community center, and more. The handicraft industry in Chiuquilihuin has proven to be similarly adaptable. A Mapuche craftsman from Chiuquilihuin interviewed by Valverde describes the process by which the production and sale of artisan goods began in the Mapuche communities near San Martín de los Andes:

“[…] in Chiuquilihuin, the first crafts that they began to make were wood carvings…from there emerged a person who taught the people of Atreuco, who then taught the people of Aucapán (other nearby Mapuche communities), from what I understand[…]. Today, the strongest crafts in the communities near Junin are weavings and wood carvings. And in Chiuquilihuin we have now begun to learn silversmithing…”(Valverde 2007: 104).
Thus, knowledge of how to produce specific artisan goods varies from community to community, and those artisans who know how to produce a specific good will teach members of other communities. In Chiuquilihuin, the production and sale of handicrafts began in 1998, when, according to a large explanatory poster located in the artisan workshop, a few weavers began to learn how to produce “traditional” woven goods (such as rugs and horse blankets) as well as nontraditional goods such as jackets, sweaters, stockings, caps, backpacks, wallets, and fajas. The workshop participants in Chiuquilihuin emphasized their use of materials from nature. The women use wool from their own sheep and spin the wool into yarn using simple handheld spindles. Artisans in Chiuquilihuin produce dyes from local herbs and collect wood for carving from downed trees and branches found on the surrounding hillsides (though suitable wood is becoming increasingly scarce). The upright looms themselves are fashioned from tree branches. Though the artisans insist upon using natural materials, they do allow for creativity in weaving patterns. Traditionally, Mapuche weavings have served as a means of communication as Mapudungun (the Mapuche language) lacks a writing system; many designs, therefore, are codified and have highly specific meanings. However, according to Carolina, new designs are being invented in Chiuquilihuin’s artisan workshop, many of which are far more representative than the traditional abstract weaving patterns and incorporate elements from outside of Mapuche tradition, such as monkeys, frogs, hearts, and fleur-de-lis.

Carolina’s personal history is closely linked with that of Chiuquilihuin’s handicrafts industry; she has played a critical role in the establishment and success of the artisan workshop. She emphasizes that she did not learn to weave from a weaving teacher but rather learned basic weaving techniques from her mother during her childhood in Atreuco and taught herself everything else she knows. As Carolina relates, “In 1997 INTA offered me a job here in Chiuquilihuin as the weaving instructor, and the salary was good, so I accepted. And everything emerged from there; we have lost so much and this is a revaluation of our culture. Now many women know how to weave, and they teach one another.”

Furthermore, the artisans seek to pass their knowledge on to the next generation; Carolina is training her daughter in weaving techniques so that upon her retirement her daughter can take her place as the weaving instructor. Additionally, several of the weaving workshop participants are very young (one of the most gifted students is only eleven years old and is already selling her work). Thus, it is evident that the production and sale of crafts, in addition to being sources of income for the residents of Chiuquilihuin, are also highly culturally significant.

Through the process of learning how to produce crafts the artisans of Chiuquilihuin do not only gain access to a new form of economic income but also to a tool for creating and projecting a distinctly Mapuche identity. According to anthropologists Marcelo Impemba and Graciela Maragliano, the acts of creating, displaying, and selling handicrafts provide the residents of Chiuquilihuin with the opportunity to:

“[…] transmit their culture and generate an exchange […] breaking with historically specific and socially constructed assumptions and reimagining the Mapuche as capable of self-determination as well as generating mechanisms of affirmation and revaluation of their [indigenous Mapuche] identity” (Impemba and Maragliano 2008: 9).

The manners in which the crafts are displayed in the workshop emphasize the production process and the central role of the artisans in planning and creating the goods. For example, upon entering the workshop a visitor immediately sees many photographs of the artisans at work, as well as a large poster detailing the history of the workshop and artisan activity in Chiuquilihuin. Additionally, the workspace overlaps with the craft showroom, and the looms and partially completed weavings of the artisans are clearly visible to anyone who enters the workshop. The Mapuche artisans have also framed how their crafts are displayed to potential buyers by attaching a tag to each item that explicitly links the products with the community of Chiuquilihuin. The front side of the tag dis-
plays a logo designed by a community member and which incorporates the sacred pine (a symbol of Chiuquilihuin) surrounded by a diamond pattern typical of Mapuche weavings. The backside of the tags carries the following message, written in Spanish:

“Mapuche men and women want to share our way of life with you through this artisan product, made with materials given to us by nature. This product reflects the memory and millennial wealth of our ancestors, and rescues and strengthens our roots and the value of a culture that is alive.”

Thus, the display and presentation of the craft items in the workshop seek to emphasize cultural exchange between Mapuche artisans and non-Mapuche visitors, and directly link the products being sold to a revaluation of the Mapuche past. By displaying their products in this manner, the Mapuche artisans of Chiuquilihuin exert influence over the visitor’s experience and perception of their community and culture, a luxury not available to other Mapuche communities lacking physical workshops that must sell their goods through other channels over which they have less control.

**Government Intervention**

Though communities such as Chiuquilihuin have exerted a great deal of control over the production and sale of their handicrafts, institutions such as the municipal, provincial, and national governments, as well as Lanín National Park, attempt to intervene in the Mapuche craft market for a variety of reasons. In Chiuquilihuin, for example, Carolina’s salary and supplies for running the artisan workshop are provided through an indigenous artisan-training program funded through the national government; each woman enrolled in Carolina’s weaving course is working towards the completion of a certificate that will allow her to produce and sell her own handicrafts in the workshop. Paradoxically, the poorer communities (such as Atreuco and Aucapán, among others) with less-developed infrastructures for craft production face less government intervention in determining the crafts that they can produce or how those crafts are sold. The artisans who sell their crafts along the road and in the campgrounds in the national park face little regulation, for example. Residents of many communities, such as Vera, which is located on Cerro Chapelco outside San Martín de los Andes, no longer remember how to produce crafts, and are in legitimate need of instruction in craft production techniques. Although, as Carolina states, skilled Mapuche artisans are beginning to travel to other communities of their own accord to share their weaving or woodworking knowledge, the role of training the first artisans in a community often falls to instructors associated with government programs (Carolina is one such instructor). Obtaining funding for large operations such as Chiuquilihuin’s workshop requires compromise. According to Carolina, the workshop participants of Chiuquilihuin were offered a choice of indigenous artisan products that they could learn to fabricate; as Carolina describes, “we could choose the craft; we chose [weaving] fajas but silversmithing and other crafts were also available.” Though the handicrafts produced in Chiuquilihuin are presented to tourists as “authentic” and therefore “devoid of sociopolitical context,” it is in fact the national government that is offering to teach would-be Mapuche artisans how to make specific, predetermined indigenous crafts (Bendix 1989: 136). The national government, therefore, is the body that decides which crafts are “indigenous” and therefore appropriate for production and sale in the Mapuche communities. In the interviews conducted by Sebastián Valverde, the artisans of Chiuquilihuin do not seem perturbed by the state’s insistence that they produce and sell specific marketable goods. Rather, the artisans display a willingness to adapt their craft to meet the requirements of government programs while at the same time creatively taking advantage of the government programs to fulfill their own needs and desires.

Though wealthier Mapuche communities such as Chiuquilihuin have the ability to exert high
levels of control over the production and sale of their handicrafts through the artisan workshop, Mapuche communities with fewer resources must use other methods to market and sell their goods. Carolina remarks that Chiuquilihuin, which has “a relatively low level of dependence upon the provincial government,” is unique in that woven and wooden goods are produced and sold in the workshop. Artisans in other communities fabricate the crafts in their homes and then sell them through various channels outside of the community (Valverde 2007: 102-3). A major reseller of Mapuche indigenous crafts is Artesanías Neuquinas, a company operated by the provincial government of Neuquén. According to researcher Sebastián Valverde, Artesanías Neuquinas visits the Mapuche communities and buys handicrafts to sell in the company’s shops, located in various cities in Neuquén as well as in Buenos Aires (2007: 105-6). The company describes its mission as:

“[… ] revitalizing the cultural value that craftwork possesses as an authentic expression of our people and guaranteeing the continuity of craft production in the province of Neuquén by generating a permanent and profitable income source for artisans” (Valverde 2007: 105-6).

Despite such claims, the artisans of Chiuquilihuin are not satisfied with the actions and strategies employed by the company. An anonymous interviewee cited in Valverde’s study of the explains that “Chiuquilihuin will not sell to Artesanías Neuquinas because they pay so little [although today Chiuquilihuin’s artisans still sell to the company from time to time].” Another informant states that “[Artesanías Neuquinas] does not want the artisan to be the protagonist,” and yet another exclaims that “[Artesanías Neuquinas] is the one that set the prices but we are the artisans” (2007: 105-6). Chiuquilihuin’s relative wealth and ability to sell crafts through the workshop have allowed artisans from Chiuquilihuin the freedom to accept or reject Artesanías Neuquinas’ offers. Carolina describes her recent firsthand experience with Artesanías Neuquinas as such:

“A few weeks ago I went to a convention in Buenos Aires where there were artisans from all over Latin America. Artesanías Neuquinas helped us organize the trip and paid for our travel […] we sold next to nothing […] but it was still a very lovely, very good experience because there was a lot of exchange. We learned a lot from the other artisans.”

Carolina’s trip to the convention in Buenos Aires demonstrates another way in which the artisans of Chiuquilihuin use Artesanías Neuquinas to facilitate opportunities that are not necessary for economic survival but allow them to exchange ideas and techniques with other communities and improve the quality of the crafts produced. A study on the efficacy of Artesanías Neuquinas conducted by Balazote and Rotman affirms that a common economic strategy amongst Mapuche craftsmen is to “diversify the commercialization [of their products…] such that Artesanías Neuquinas no longer serves as the only channel of sale and instead just becomes one potential option” (2006: 62). The weavers and wood carvers of Chiuquilihuin, therefore, maintain a high level of control over profits, resources, the quality of their products, and how their community is viewed by non-Mapuche buyers.

**Curruhuinca: Handicraft Sales and Indigenous Authenticity**

The community of Chiuquilihuin is fortunate and unusual in that it has both a physical space for the production and sale of crafts as well as established methods for the transmission of weaving techniques from one generation to the next. Other Mapuche communities in the vicinity of San Martín de los Andes do not have access to comparable resources and must sell their products through other means. It is relatively common for craftsmen from distant Mapuche communities to pack up their wares and travel to Lanín National Park to take advantage of the high concentrations of tourists. The large Mapuche community of Curruhuinca, which encompasses territories on both sides of Lake Lácar, contains a variety of population centers and options for handicraft production and sale. The majority of the community of Curruhuinca is located within Lanín National Park and immediately
adjacent to the city of San Martín de los Andes; therefore, there is a large degree of exchange and interaction between tourists, residents of San Martín de los Andes, representatives of National Parks and the Mapuche community members of Curruhuinca.

During my research process, I visited three population centers and popular tourist destinations within Curruhuinca: Catritre, Quila Quina, and Trompul. In all three locations I observed small-scale, temporary stands and vendors, manned by Mapuche sellers offering such goods as homemade bread and preserves, empanadas, scarves, socks, wooden spoons, and other small food and souvenir items. As Curruhuinca is mostly located on National Park land, the influence of National Parks policy on these small communities is strong as it is in the best interest of the parks service to maintain a high degree of control over the productive activities of inhabitants. Lavalle and Gallardo, employees in the Office of Public Use of Lanín National Park, distinguish between communities that possess titles to their land and are thereby the legal tenants of the land they occupy and those communities that do not. According to Lavalle and Gallardo, only Curruhuinca and one other community, Cayún, possess titles to their land, though Mapuche people without titles are still permitted to live on Parks land. Since 2000, the official policy of National Parks with regards to Mapuche communities has been *comanejo* (co-management), which Lavalle and Gallardo define as:

“[…] a policy, a way of working in which the three fundamental and equal actors are the Neuquén Mapuche Confederation, Lanín National Park, and the [Mapuche] communities […] work together to manage natural resources in a cooperative manner.”

In theory, Parks’ policy of *comanejo* seems to be a solution to the historically unequal distribution of power that has existed between the region’s powerful institutions and Mapuche communities since the Conquest of the Desert. The policy purports to create a forum through which the national park, the central Mapuche organizing body, and the individual Mapuche communities can arrive at mutually beneficial solutions for the conservation of the region’s natural biodiversity. Researchers Raventós and Bionda assert, however, that “behind [*comanejo*’s] protectionist rhetoric are hidden economic, political, and military designs for the occupation and control of these territories, which are considered strategic from a geopolitical perspective” (2003: 5). Though *comanejo* represents a gesture towards true cooperation, it appears that for the time being the historic imbalance of power between Parks and the Mapuche communities stills exists. While Parks is willing to enter into dialogue with the Mapuche people about economic activity and the use of resources, it still holds the ultimate say. Anthropologists Marcelo Impemba and Graciela Maragliano have found this to be true in their fieldwork:

“All traditional activities [raising animals, gathering firewood, cultivating gardens, etc.] are restricted and controlled by Lanín National Park […] the gradual loss of these activities is tolerated and even encouraged due to the *impact* of these activities on the nature reserve” (2008: 4).

Therefore, the high degree of control that Parks exerts over the productive activities that occur within Lanín’s boundaries is justified with environmental and conservationist logic. In the process, however, National Parks dissuades Mapuche communities from practicing traditional forms of economic activity. As an alternative to high impact grazing and cultivation, National Parks “promotes policies of economic conversion of Mapuche community members [and] seeks to gradually replace agricultural activities” with activities that do not alter the landscape (Impemba and Maragliano 2008: 4).

Lanín National Park promotes tourism and the production of artisan goods as economic alternatives to agriculture and animal husbandry; it does so actively, by sponsoring the development of craft and tourism capacities through classes and other means. Miriam Pérez, a tour guide with the travel company Los Alerces Viajes y Turismo in San Martín de los Andes, describes Parks’ role in capacitating Mapuche community members:

“Those who want to have a small craft business […] are always welcomed by Parks because
this will mean that the Mapuche people will dedicate themselves less to agriculture and raising animals.”

As Fernanda Lavalle, the Parks employee, adds, Mapuche communities “[…] need to be trained [to interact with visitors]; it is very difficult for us to impose minimum quality standards, to protect the goods and services they offer.” However, Lavalle and Gallardo make it clear that the national park also hopes to “demonstrate the uniqueness of the communities to visitors.” Lanín National Park’s webpage, for example, praises the “new relationship between the Mapuche people and the National Parks administration” and applauds “the unbreakable link that exists between biological and cultural diversity” in Mapuche society (Lanín National Park, accessed December 5, 2011). Lavalle directly connects the “cultural revaluation” occurring in the Mapuche communities to the efforts of Parks to capacitate Mapuche craftsmen in previously “forgotten” craft techniques under the policy of comanejo. Interestingly, Parks attempts to emphasize the indigenous qualities of the crafts that are sold and encourages Mapuche craftsmen to create “traditional” goods rather than modern interpretations, because “if [the artisans] sell the same things that are available here in San Martín, people won’t be interested in buying them.” Thus, it appears that National Parks is consciously guiding the process of artisan production in Curruhuinca so that the artisan goods produced satisfy tourist demand.

However, despite Parks’ rhetoric of cultural revaluation and co-management of lands and resources, in many cases Lanín National Park effectively silences the voices of the Mapuche communities within its limits. Curiously, the Mapuche “cultural revaluation” described by Lavalle and Gallardo is essentially imposed upon the craftsmen of Curruhuinca from outside, as teaching community members how to make indigenous crafts fits with the larger goals of National Parks. This is not to say that there is no true Mapuche cultural revaluation; many Mapuche community members, including Carolina in Chiuquilihuin, feel that they have strengthened their cultural identity through the process of making and selling crafts. If a resurgence of Mapuche culture and values is occurring, however, it is unlikely to have been brought about by the efforts of the national park as Lavalle and Gallardo claim. The overwhelming role that Lanín National Park plays in directing the craft production activities of Mapuche artisans reflects Christine Ballengee-Morris’ critique of indigenous tourism, in which the power difference between the indigenous and mainstream cultures is so great that the less powerful, indigenous culture comes to be valued through the norms of the dominant culture. Thus, the artisan goods produced in Curruhuinca and in other Mapuche communities come to directly reflect Western demands and expectations about indigenous life” (Ballengee-Morris 2002: 238). Therefore, Parks values the production and sale of traditional Mapuche foods and artisan goods as “traditional activities” and supports these activities by offering training programs (which also alter Mapuche craft production by attempting to “impose minimum quality standards,” for example) because craft production attracts visitors to the Park and does not harm the environment. Other “traditional activities,” such as raising animals and collecting firewood, are suppressed as they go against the goals of Lanín National Park. This double standard does not go unnoticed by the Mapuche craftsmen of Curruhuinca; criticism of comanejo abounds. Miguel Callicur, a tour guide involved in efforts to control tourism to the Mapuche community of Trompul in Curruhuinca, bluntly expresses his anger with Lanín National Park; he states that “Parks continues the mission of the army [in the Conquest of the Desert]; to rob us of our land and our way of life.”

Lanín National Park is not the only entity constraining Mapuche economic activity; wealthy non-Mapuche craft dealers and souvenir sellers can also pose a threat to Mapuche artisans. This tension is evident in Quila Quina, a population center within Curruhuinca that is located about four miles from the city of San Martín de los Andes and is easily reached by a commuter ferry that crosses Lake Lácar from San Martin de los Andes. The community is divided into two parts; large vacation homes, belonging to wealthy urbanites who spend their summers in Quila Quina, are situ-
ated near the dock, while much smaller, more modest homes belonging to members of the Mapuche community are set on steep paths winding up the hillsides. Upon disembarking from the ferry, a visitor is immediately met by a series of permanent stalls advertising “artesanías mapuches” (Mapuche crafts). When I visited, however, the stalls were shuttered, as it was the low season. The few tourists present congregated in the yard of one of the large, well-maintained vacation homes, where a woman who did not appear to be of Mapuche descent was selling crafts and homemade food items from her porch. Weaving tools were arranged around her in such a way as to emphasize the production process, much the same as in the workshop in Chiuquilihuin. A partially-completed weaving was displayed on a large loom, for example, though unlike in Chiuquilihuin explanatory tags and posters were absent. Business seemed profitable; the seller possessed a varied inventory of quality craft products and displayed them in an orderly, professional manner. When I casually asked the craft seller if she is a member of the Curruhuinca Mapuche community, she replied that she is not, though she has lived in Quila Quina for 25 years. It appears, therefore, that a non-indigenous craft seller was able to mimic the products and display typically employed by Mapuche craftsmen in order to co-opt an air of false indigenous authenticity that tourists would find believable, echoing Little’s observation that it is possible to construct an image of being a “real indígena” even if the seller is not truly indigenous at all (Little 2004: 121).

Meanwhile, a handful of Mapuche craftsmen had set up posts to sell their wares along the paths farther from the dock, which many tourists do not reach; one man, selling carved wooden kitchen utensils, remarked that “very few tourists pass by here, especially during the low season.” The products offered by the Mapuche sellers were very similar to those offered by the Quila Quina woman; her prime location likely provides her with an advantage over the indigenous sellers. The general scarcity of tourists in Quila Quina during the low season demands that Mapuche sellers, relegated to the physical margins of the community, must decide each day whether it is worth it to transport their merchandise down to the stalls by the dock or to set up a temporary stall on the high paths where even fewer tourists visit. The non-Mapuche craft seller, by comparison, can afford to open her strategically-located shop every day is not forced to choose between the responsibilities of craft selling and home life. Thus, her artisan business thrives, unlike those of many Mapuche craftsmen.

**Key Issues in Indigenous Craft Production, Display, and Sale**

What can the cases of Mapuche craft production near San Martín de los Andes reveal about the politics, economics, and cultural significance of indigenous craft production and sale? Though the specific details of the cases differ, several salient themes begin to emerge. For one, it is apparent that indigenous craft production is much more than the manufacture of artisan goods by indigenous actors; rather, questions of identity, legitimacy, and authenticity are implicated in each artisan good and the manners in which sales take place. Indigenous artisans must consistently interact with non-Mapuche outsiders, and often the livelihood of the artisan depends upon his or her ability to portray an indigenous identity that tourists are willing to consume. Yet in some cases, such as that of Chiuquilihuin, artisans have attempted to transmit their own, sincere image of their culture and community through their crafts. The question of authenticity is thus deeply integral to the study of indigenous craft production; it is important not only to consider what traits tourists and craft buyers consider authentic but also how the Mapuche community members themselves define authenticity, and how they enact it in their commercial dealings. The case of the Mapuche communities reveals that if a community is able to maintain control over its craft production, it can use the production and sale of these artisan goods to define its own identity and to fight the invisibility and negative stereotypes that it faces. In the next section, I will discuss in further detail the effects of commercialization on the
Mapuche community structure and the meaning of authenticity in marketing an indigenous identity.

Mapuche Craft Production and Community Life

In the cases of San Martín de los Andes, it becomes clear that the indigenous communities in question have in some respects benefitted from engaging in the indigenous crafts industry but in other ways have suffered negative consequences. As Regina Bendix and Christine Ballengee-Morris argue, indigenous engagement in large-scale markets and extensive interaction with non-indigenous outsiders affects the organization of indigenous societies. While my analysis of the two case studies supports this assertion, I disagree with Ballengee-Morris and Bendix in that, in the cases that I observed, the change brought about by craft production and sale does not always necessarily “sterilize” or devalue the indigenous culture, though the presence of tourists and involvement with large, transnational markets does at times threaten the integrity of the local way of life (Ballengee-Morris 2002: 241). Cases such as the artisan workshop in Chiuquihuín clearly demonstrate the potential economic and cultural benefits of producing and selling handicrafts for non-indigenous outsiders. In Chiuquihuín, crafts sold in the workshop represent an income source, a unifying force for the community members, and an assertion of the community’s identity and values. The change that craft production enacts upon the community structures of indigenous producers, therefore, cannot be described as unilaterally beneficial or detrimental. Rather, the potential risks and gains of engaging with the craft production industry are highly variable and dependent upon the economic and cultural context in which the indigenous communities exist.

The Interplay Between the Individual and Society

The phenomenon of indigenous craft production is complex; the seemingly simple transactions between indigenous producers and non-indigenous consumers of indigenous culture involve contact between distinct cultures with a wide historical power disparity, economic change, manipulation of material culture, and questions of indigeneity and authenticity, among other factors. Thus, effects and outcomes of indigenous craft production on indigenous and non-indigenous parties vary widely among distinct cases. How, then, can one conceptualize the causes and consequences of these intercultural interactions?

The concept of agency, introduced and elaborated by French sociologist and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu, serves as a useful framework to explain the interactions between indigenous craftsmen and non-indigenous buyers. In his pivotal Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), Bourdieu distinguishes between habitus and agency, two opposing forces that structure interactions within complex social systems. In all of the cases I have discussed thus far, there exists a clear distinction between the motivations, objectives, and worldview of indigenous artisans and those of buyers of indigenous crafts, who largely originate within the dominant, Eurocentric culture. Therefore, the distinctive patterns of thoughts and deeds enacted by both groups of actors constitute forms of collective action. There exists overarching, common behaviors, values, and assumptions that describe and define the actions of distinct social groups. Bourdieu calls this shared, regulating set of cultural norms and values, both implicit and explicit, habitus. He defines habitus as:

“A socially-constructed system of cognitive and motivating structures, […] the imminant law set down in each agent from his earliest upbringing, […] an understood system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions” (1977: 76, 81-2).

Furthermore, Bourdieu characterizes habitus as “homogenous.” Despite the apparent differ-
ences between individuals within a society, the worldview of each individual within a given society is directly shaped by the norms, beliefs, and behaviors that are possible within the habitus of that culture (1977:80). The habitus and structure of a society determine which actions of an individual agent are regarded as “sensible” or “reasonable” and which are not. Interactions which seem to only involve two individual actors in fact implicate the entire array of cultural beliefs, values, norms, and taboos (all comprised within the concept of the habitus) acquired during the upbringings of both individuals (Bourdieu 1977: 79). These social and cultural “rules,” however, are predominantly implicit; people abide by them subconsciously. Nonetheless, for cultural outsiders, mastering the linguistic and cultural signifiers that allow an individual to function successfully within a certain habitus is a daunting task.

According to Bourdieu, the experience of the individual (defined in Bourdieu as the agent) is deeply dependent upon the structure of the society in which he lives. Therefore, the possible actions of the individual (or agent) are constrained by the uncontrollable structure of the society in which he was raised. The structure comprises such phenomenon as fluctuations of the economy and power relations between and within states, among others. In San Martín de los Andes, the structure and habitus of the dominant culture and the state structure are directly derived from European values and norms. The powerful government and tourism industry institutions and even the tourists themselves share values typical of the dominant Eurocentric worldview. The traditions and values of indigenous communities often provide a contrast to this fairly uniform, Western habitus.

In Bourdieu’s paradigm, the structure and habitus of a society comprise only half of the interactions between individuals and the cultural framework in which they are embedded. Though the habitus constrains the potential actions an individual can take, it implies agency, which according to Emirbayer and Mische (1998) is the “temporarily constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations” (Ratner 2001: 422). Individual actors, therefore, have the ability to react to, and to change, their immediate circumstances. Though the structure of the dominant, non-indigenous culture is much more powerful than that of the Mapuche and Quechua cultures. Anthropologist Michael F. Brown argues that “[w]e must acknowledge the agency of indigenous peoples- their strategic decisions to share ideas and stories and songs with inquisitive outsiders when, in their judgment, circumstances warranted” (1998: 200). Therefore, in analyzing the indigenous craft industry, it is important to realize that indigenous actors have the agency to act and react to the forces of the dominant culture in order to maximize their own benefit.

Many Western researchers fear that “people in host destinations will lose their cultural identity as a result of tourism” because “as people gain economic benefits […] they begin to act and think like tourists, whom they perceive as superior” (Stronza 2001: 270). Researchers ascribing to this perspective tend to portray indigenous culture as endangered and in need of protection. Conversely, another school of researchers believes that tourism can bring about “a renaissance of native cultures or the recreation of ethnicity” (Stronza 2001: 271). Yet culture is dynamic and constantly changing; both of the aforementioned schools of thought view “native culture” as a static, definable entity, which must either be protected or revived. However, Bourdieu’s concept of agency characterizes the relationship between the dominant social structure and individual indigenous agents as not fixed or inert, but continuously evolving. Therefore, Stronza’s assertion that “local hosts may feel empowered by interactions with outsiders to redefine who they are and what aspects of their culture they wish to highlight or downplay” is useful because it acknowledges the agency of indigenous actors to alter their own culture as well as the manner in which they present their culture to non-indigenous visitors and buyers (2001:273).
Agency and Indigenous Actors

In order to illustrate how the concept of agency can help us understand how indigenous communities shape and are shaped by broad social structures, I will describe several examples from San Martín de los Andes in which craft production and tourism produced varying effects. Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital provides a useful framework to explain the mechanisms through which indigenous artisans construct their identities as indigenous peoples, which are transformed into real economic value in the world craft market. Like Impemba, Ballengee-Morris, and other researchers who investigate tourism, Bourdieu argues that, in the eyes of non-indigenous buyers and others seeking to experience “authentic indigenous culture,” there exists a strong divide between the behaviors that are observed in capitalist markets and those that are expected among indigenous artisans. According to Bourdieu:

“[…] the constitution of relatively autonomous areas of practice in which symbolic interests (often described as ‘spiritual’ or ‘cultural’) come to be set up in opposition to strictly economic interests as defined in the field of economic transaction by the tautology ‘business is business’” (1977: 177).

Therefore, tourists and craft buyers do not expect or wish for the sellers of indigenous crafts to visibly cater to the desires of tourists, nor do they wish to be reminded of the capitalist nature of indigenous craft exchange. Rather, a significant portion of the appeal rests in the perception that indigenous crafts have a deeper, spiritual meaning that is more profound than the mundane demands of the market (Stronza 2001: 266).

This illusion, however, is precarious to maintain, as tourists also bring distinct demands and expectations, both implicit and explicit, to their interactions with indigenous artisans, a fact of which the artisans themselves are well aware. In the hamlet of Trompul, located within the Mapuche community of Curruhuinca, local tour guides are advised how to display warm, welcoming body language as it is defined by the dominant culture, though the Mapuche exhibit a different range of body language when among themselves. María, a professional tour guide who grew up in the community, prodded the Mapuche guides to act in a way that would make non-indigenous visitors feel comfortable: “smile, look [the visitors] in the eyes, pay attention to your gestures and body language […] greet them, don’t be shy.” María sought to organize a corps of local, Mapuche tour guides in order to correct the problem of “disorganized” and “irresponsible” guides provided by the National Park and by private tour operators, who “aren’t interested in [the Mapuche] way of life and in many cases don’t have the right information.” Therefore, the Mapuche community of Curruhuinca, which arguably enjoys the least independence and potential for self-determination of any of the cases I have described due to its location within the National Park, enacts agency against the oppressive bureaucracy of the parks system by training indigenous tour guides so that the community members may present themselves to outsiders as they wish to be seen. Non-indigenous visitors to indigenous communities seek an “authentic” experience, but they also wish to feel comfortable and to be able to relate to the residents of the communities. Therefore, the Mapuche artisans of Curruhuinca have adapted and “staged” their crafts, their behavior, and their very bodies enough to make visitors feel at ease, but have simultaneously attempted to hide any evidence of stagecraft from the tourists’ eyes.

Conclusions

Though some commonalities exist between modes of indigenous craft production and sale in the areas surrounding San Martín de los Andes, the fact remains that the study of indigenous artisan activity encompasses a wide variety of phenomena which are dependent upon the local political, economic, and cultural contexts and the relationship of the indigenous community to the transna-
tional economy. Despite the best efforts of indigenous artisans to preserve sectors of their society from outside influence, engagement with the handicraft industry has altered the rhythm of daily life within the Mapuche communities that I have discussed. This change is in some ways drastic and in others subtle, and has produced mixed consequences that are neither uniformly positive nor negative. Clashes between global economic and cultural systems and local values and patterns of exchange have, for better or for worse, brought about cultural shifts within Mapuche societies and have added to the processes of ongoing negotiation with the dominant culture since the days of the Conquest. However, the degree of change that occurs and the ability of indigenous actors to shape this change vary widely depending upon the context. While the Mapuche community of Curruhuinca struggles to assert its identity against the firm control of Lanín National Park, Chiuquilihuin’s relative distance from a city and from institutions of authority, as well as its relative wealth, have allowed the community an unusual degree of success in controlling the experiences of visitors to the artisan workshop and presenting their culture to outsiders as they see fit.

Indigenous craft sellers are strategic. Despite the perceptions of many craft buyers that view these crafts and the people who create them as manifestations of an ancient, unchanging, even mystical indigenous culture, in each case that I have studied indigenous artisans have styled both their crafts and themselves to best appeal to non-indigenous buyers. However, the process of catering to the tastes of outsiders must not be explicit, as tourists value authenticity above all else in their dealings with indigenous communities. Though many researchers view this “tourist gaze” as problematic, as it can lead to the valuation of the less powerful indigenous culture through the norms of the powerful dominant culture, I argue that the change that occurs as a result of tourist pressures is not necessarily negative, as indigenous culture is not static or in need of protection but rather has been evolving, interacting with non-indigenous populations, and adopting new manners of thinking and behaving for generations. Furthermore, indigenous actors have the agency to decide which elements of their culture they wish to share with outsiders and which elements they wish to retain within their own societies. This agency allows Mapuche artisans to strategically interact with outsiders so as to best perpetuate the image of themselves and their values that they wish for outsiders to perceive.

The Mapuche community of Chiuquilihuin has achieved unprecedented levels of cooperation through engagement with the craft industry by establishing a central artisan workshop in which woven and wooden goods are created and sold. Researchers Marcelo Impemba and Graciela MARGIANO (2008) emphasize the social utility of the workshop as a sort of community center for the residents of Chiuquilihuin, who live in geographically dispersed locations and engaged in far less community interaction and mobilization prior to the initiation of the artisan workshop. Indigenous individuals, therefore, have the power and agency to react to the craft industry as they see fit; they should not be seen as passive recipients of a dominant culture that is imposed upon them from the outside but rather as agents acting alongside the dominant culture to benefit from the craft trade as best they can, both collectively as indigenous peoples as well as individually. Though the contact and mixing of institutions belonging to the dominant and indigenous cultures is rarely a smooth process, creative solutions and new cultural adaptations have emerged from the messy and at times conflictive relations that characterize the indigenous craft industry.

The indigenous craft industry constitutes a complex interaction between at times vastly different cultural and economic systems and has the power to reveal deep underlying questions about authenticity and identity in both indigenous and the dominant cultures. The topic of power relations between these asymmetrical actors has been the object of extensive study. While some scholars are quick to condemn the dominant culture for subjugating and oppressing indigenous artisans, there is little emphasis on the ability of these indigenous actors to take advantage of the elements of the dominant culture which they find useful or beneficial. Therefore, the consequences of the indigenous craft industry remain decidedly mixed for both cultures; the widespread perception that selling crafts
to tourists unnecessarily commercializes indigenous cultures are simplistic in that Mapuche ways of life are not sealed off from the rest of society. While Mapuche culture is unique in many ways, members of these cultural groups are free to enter into dialogue with the dominant culture in their countries of origin, with other indigenous groups, and with a diverse array of cultures across the world.
Works Cited


Crafting Identities: Indigenous Artisans and the Politics of the Handicraft Industry


