Self-Fulfilling Credit Cycles*

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Abstract

In U.S. data 1981–2012, unsecured firm credit moves procyclically and tends to lead GDP, while secured firm credit is at best acyclical. In this paper we develop a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model in which unsecured firm credit arises from self-enforcing borrowing constraints preventing an efficient capital allocation among heterogeneous firms. Capital from less productive firms is lent to more productive ones in the form of credit secured by collateral and also as unsecured credit based on reputation which is a forward-looking variable. We argue that self-fulfilling beliefs over future credit conditions naturally generate endogenously persistent business cycle dynamics. A dynamic complementarity between current and future borrowing limits permits uncorrelated sunspot shocks to trigger persistent aggregate fluctuations in debt, factor productivity and output. We show that sunspot shocks are quantitatively important, accounting for a substantial part of the volatility in firm credit and output.

JEL classification: D92, E32
Keywords: Unsecured firm credit; Credit cycles; Sunspots

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1 Introduction

Over the past two decades, important advances in macroeconomic research illustrated how financial market conditions can play a key role in business cycle fluctuations. Starting with seminal contributions of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), much of this research shows how frictions in financial markets can amplify and propagate disruptions to macroeconomic fundamentals, such as shocks to total factor productivity (TFP) or to monetary policy.\(^1\) More recently, and to some extent motivated by the events of the last financial crisis, several theoretical and quantitative contributions argue that shocks to the financial sector itself may not only lead to severe macroeconomic consequences but can also contribute significantly to business cycle movements. For example, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) develop a model with stochastic collateral constraints which they identify as residuals from aggregate time series of firm debt and collateral capital. Estimating a joint stochastic process for TFP and borrowing constraints, they find that both variables are highly autocorrelated and that financial shocks play an important role in business cycle fluctuations.\(^2\) But what drives these shocks to financial conditions and to aggregate productivity? And what makes their responses so highly persistent?

This paper argues that unsecured firm credit is of key importance for answering these questions. We first document new facts about secured versus unsecured firm credit. Most strikingly, for the U.S. economy over the period 1981–2012, we find that unsecured debt is strongly procyclical, with some tendency to lead GDP, while secured debt is at best acyclical, thus not contributing to the well-documented procyclicality of total debt. This finding provides some challenge for business-cycle theories based on the conventional view of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) that collateralized debt amplifies and even generates the business cycle. When credit is secured by collateral, a credit boom is associated with not only a higher leverage ratio but also a higher value of the collateralized assets. Conversely, an economic slump is associated with deleveraging and a decrease in the value of collateral. This suggests that secured debt, such as the mortgage debt, should be strongly correlated with GDP. But this is not what we find; to the contrary, based on firm-level data from Compustat and on aggregate data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board, we show that it is the unsecured part of firm credit which strongly comoves with output.

\(^1\)For recent surveys, see Quadrini (2011) and Brunnermeier et al. (2012).

\(^2\)Other examples of financial shocks are Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) who introduce shocks to asset resaleability, Gertler and Karadi (2011) who consider shocks to the asset quality of financial intermediaries, and Christiano et al. (2010) who use risk shocks originating in the financial sector. These papers also impose or estimate highly persistent shock processes.
To examine the macroeconomic role of unsecured firm debt, we develop and analyze a parsimonious dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and limited credit enforcement. In the model, credit constraints and TFP are endogenous variables. Constraints on unsecured credit depend on the value that borrowers attach to future credit market conditions which is a forward-looking variable. TFP depends on the reallocation of existing capital among heterogeneous firms which, among others, depends on current credit constraints. When these constraints bind, they slow down capital reallocation between firms and push aggregate factor productivity below its frontier. We show that this model exhibits a very natural equilibrium indeterminacy which gives rise to endogenous cycles driven by self-fulfilling beliefs in credit market conditions (sunspot shocks). In particular, a one-time sunspot shock triggers an endogenous and persistent response of endogenous borrowing constraints and of TFP.

The model is a standard stochastic growth model which comprises a large number of firms facing idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In each period, productive firms wish to borrow from their less productive counterparts. Besides possibly borrowing against collateral, the firms exchange unsecured credit which rests on reputation. Building upon Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Kehoe and Levine (1993), we assume that a defaulting borrower is excluded from future credit for a stochastic number of periods. As in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), endogenous forward-looking credit limits prevent default. These credit limits depend on the value that a borrower attaches to a good reputation which itself depends on future credit market conditions. An important contribution of this paper is the tractability of our framework which permits us to derive a number of insightful analytical results in Section 3. With standard and convenient specifications of preferences and technology, we characterize any equilibrium by one backward-looking and one forward-looking equation (Proposition 1). With this characterization, we prove that unsecured credit cannot support first-best allocations, thereby extending related findings of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) to a growth model with idiosyncratic productivity (Proposition 2). We then prove the existence of multiple stationary equilibria for a range of parameter configurations (Proposition 3). While there is always an equilibrium without unsecured credit, there can also exist one or two stationary equilibria with a positive volume of unsecured credit. One of these equilibria supports an efficient allocation of capital between firms, and another one features a misallocation of capital. The latter equilibrium is the one that provides the most interesting insights, since unsecured credit is traded and yet factor productivity falls short of the efficient technology frontier. We show that

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3Much of the literature on limited enforceability of unsecured credit does not allow for such simple representations and therefore resorts to rather sophisticated computational techniques (see e.g. Kehoe and Perri (2002), Krueger and Perri (2006) and Marcet and Marimon (2011)).

4The other, determinate steady states of this model either do not sustain unsecured credit (and hence
this equilibrium is always locally indeterminate, and hence permits the existence of sunspot cycles fluctuating around the stationary equilibrium (Proposition 4). Moreover, output and credit respond persistently to a one-time sunspot shock.

In Section 4 we calibrate this model to the U.S. economy. While sunspot shocks are the main driving force for fluctuations in unsecured credit, we also introduce fundamental shocks to collateral and to aggregate technology. This allows us to analyze to which extent different financial shocks, separately affecting secured and unsecured credit, as well as independent aggregate productivity shocks, contribute to the observed movements in output and factor productivity in the recent business-cycle episodes. We find that sunspot shocks generate a significant share of total output volatility. We further demonstrate that an uncorrelated sunspot process generates highly persistent responses of key macroeconomic variables, with autocorrelation coefficients matching their empirical counterparts reasonably well. Similarly persistent responses are neither generated by fundamental financial shocks to collateral, nor by aggregate technology shocks. In fact, the estimated shock process requires a high autocorrelation of the shock series itself to match the data. Thus, the propagation of expectational shocks is an inherent feature of the endogenous model dynamics of unsecured credit.

Intuitively, the explanation for sunspot cycles and persistence is a dynamic complementarity in endogenous constraints on unsecured credit. Borrowers’ incentives to default depend on their expectations of future credit market conditions, which in turn influence current credit constraints. If borrowers expect a credit tightening over the next few periods, their current default incentives become larger which triggers a tightening of current credit. This insight also explains why a one-time expectational shock must be followed by a long-lasting response of credit market conditions (and thus of macroeconomic outcomes): if market participants expect that a credit boom (or a credit slump) will die out quickly, these expectations could not be powerful enough to generate a sizable credit boom (or slump) today.

Another way to understand the role of expectations is that unsecured credit is like a bubble sustained by self-fulfilling beliefs, as has been argued by Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009). Transitions from a “good” macroeconomic outcome with plenty of unsecured credit to a “bad” outcome with low volumes of unsecured credit can be triggered by widespread skepticism about the ability of financial markets to continue the provision of unsecured credit at the volume needed to support socially desirable outcomes, which is similar to the collapse of a speculative bubble.5 The emergence and the bursting of rational bubbles in financially constrained economies resemble similar dynamics as in a Kiyotaki–Moore–type model with binding collateral constraints) or they have an efficient allocation of capital (and hence exhibit the same business cycle properties as a frictionless model).

5 Although we use a similar enforcement mechanism as Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009), the existence of
has received attention in a number of recent contributions, e.g. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Kocherlakota (2009), Farhi and Tirole (2011) and Miao and Wang (2012). One difficulty with many of the existing macroeconomic models with bubbles is that the no-bubble equilibrium is an attracting steady state, so that they can only account for the bursting of bubbles but not for their buildup. Although there are no bubbles in our model, its equilibrium dynamics account for recurrent episodes of credit booms and busts which are solely driven by self-fulfilling beliefs. In a recent contribution, Martin and Ventura (2012) construct a model with permanent stochastic bubbles and they discuss the economy’s response to belief shocks (investor sentiments), like we do. But in their model bubbles arise in an overlapping generations model with two-period lived investors for similar reasons as in Tirole (1985), whereas we consider a standard business cycle model with infinitely–lived households that permits a quantitative application.

Our work is also related to a literature on sunspot cycles arising from financial frictions. In an early contribution, Woodford (1986) shows that a simple borrowing constraint makes infinitely-lived agents behave like two-period-lived overlapping generations, so that endogenous cycles can occur with sufficiently strong income effects or with increasing returns in production (see e.g. Behabib and Farmer (1999) for a survey). Harrison and Weder (2010) introduce a production externality in a Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) model and show that sunspots emerge for reasonable values of returns to scale. Other recent contributions find equilibrium multiplicity and indeterminacy in endowment economies with limited credit enforcement under specific assumptions about trading arrangements (Gu and Wright (2011)) and on the enforcement technology (Azariadis and Kaas (2012b)). Perri and Quadrini (2011) develop a two-country model with financial frictions and show that self-fulfilling expectations of asset values may be responsible for the international synchronization of credit tightening.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we document empirical evidence about secured and unsecured firm credit in the U.S. economy. Section 3, we lay out the model framework, we characterize all equilibria by a forward-looking equation in the reputation values of borrowers, and we derive our main results on equilibrium multiplicity, multiple equilibria does not hinge on this specification. In fact, multiple equilibria with different levels of unsecured credit would also emerge if we used the stronger enforcement of Kehoe and Levine (1993) (i.e. two-sided market exclusion of defaulters in perpetuity).

Although earlier work on indeterminacy has shown that sunspot shocks can induce persistent macroeconomic responses (e.g. Farmer and Guo (1994)), the adjustment dynamics are typically sensitive to the particular specifications of technologies and preferences. In our model, persistent responses arise necessarily due to the dynamic complementarity in endogenous credit constraints.

Azariadis and Kaas (2012a) consider a multi-sector endogenous growth model with limited enforcement and also document equilibrium multiplicity due to a similar dynamic complementarity in credit constraints.
indeterminacy and sunspot cycles. In Section 4 we conduct a quantitative analysis to explore the separate impacts of sunspot shocks and fundamental shocks on business cycle dynamics. Section 5 concludes.

2 Unsecured versus Secured Firm Debt

This section summarizes evidence about firms’ debt structure and its cyclical properties. We explore different firm-level data sets, covering distinct firm types, and we relate our findings to evidence obtained from the Flow of Funds Accounts. In line with previous literature, we show that unsecured debt constitutes a substantial part of firms’ debt and is typically lower for samples including smaller firms. Time-series variation, whenever available, further indicates that unsecured debt plays a much stronger role for aggregate output dynamics than debt secured by collateral. We first describe the data and the variables measuring unsecured and secured debt and then report business cycle features.

2.1 Firm-Level Data

We start with the publicly traded U.S. firms covered by Compustat for the period 1981–2012 for which Compustat provides the item “dm: debt mortgages and other secured debt”. In line with Giambona and Golec (2012), we use this item to measure secured debt and we attribute the residual to unsecured debt. The unsecured debt share is then defined as the ratio between unsecured debt and total debt. To clean the data, we remove financial firms and utilities, and we also remove those firm-year observations where total debt is negative, where item “dm” is missing or where “dm” exceeds total debt. Since Compustat aggregates can easily be biased by the effect of the largest firms in the sample (cf. Covas and den Haan (2011), we also consider subsamples where we remove the largest 1% or 5% of the firms by their assets size. To see the impact of the largest firms for unsecured borrowing, Figure 1 shows the series of the unsecured debt share for the three samples obtained from Compustat. The role of the largest firms is quite important for the level of the unsecured debt share, although much less for the time variation. The very biggest firms are likely to have better access to bond markets and hence

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8This connects to a recent corporate finance literature examining heterogeneity in the debt structure across firms (e.g. Rauh and Sufi (2010), Giambona and Golec (2012) and Colla et al. (2013)), though not addressing business cycles.

9In Appendix A, we also consider series for which all firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels in order to remove the effects of outliers. We find that all results are robust to this adjustment.

10While the effect of the largest firms is also important for total debt growth, it is not important for its cyclicality, as we show in the Appendix.
borrow substantially more unsecured. Removing the largest 1% (5%) of firms, however, cuts out 45% (75%) of the aggregate firm debt in the sample. Interestingly, in the years prior to the financial crisis of 2007-08, the unsecured debt share fell substantially, as firms expanded their mortgage borrowing relatively faster than other types of debt, with some reversal after 2008.

Figure 1: The share of unsecured debt in total debt for firms in Compustat and in Capital IQ.

While Compustat covers public firms, the vast majority of U.S. firms is privately owned. To complement the above evidence, we also explore two data sets so as to obtain debt structure information for private firms. We first look at firms included in the database of Capital IQ which is an affiliate of Standard and Poor’s that produces the Compustat database but covers a broader set of firms. Since coverage by Capital IQ is comprehensive only from 2002 onwards, we report these statistics for the period 2002–2012. We clean the data in the same way as above and consider aggregates for the full sample (without financials and utilities) and for the sample without the 1% (5%) of the largest firms. Similar to the Compustat definition, we use Capital IQ item “SEC: Secured Debt” and the residual “DLC+DLTT-SEC” to measure unsecured debt. The resulting unsecured debt shares show a similar cyclical pattern as those from Compustat during the same period. For visual clarity, Figure 1 only includes the series with the largest 1% of firms removed. We note that including larger firms or removing the top 5% of firms has similar effects as in Compustat, though it does not affect the U–shaped cyclical pattern in the graph. Relative to the corresponding series in Compustat, firms in Capital IQ
borrow more secured in all years, which is possibly explained by the fact that these firms have a lower market transparency and hence less access to bond markets.\textsuperscript{11}

It worth to emphasize that even the private firms included in the Capital IQ database are relatively large firms with some access to capital markets, so they are also not fully representative for the U.S. business sector. To obtain evidence on the debt structure of small firms, we utilize the data collected in the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) conducted by the Federal Reserve Board in 2003. Earlier surveys, conducted in the years 1987, 1993 and 1998, do not contain comparably comprehensive information on collateral requirements, so that we cannot obtain evidence across time. Firms in this survey report their balances in different debt categories (and within each category for up to three financial institutions). For each loan, they report whether collateral is required and which type of collateral is used (real estate, equipment and others). We aggregate across firms for each debt category and measure as secured debt all the loans for which collateral is required, while unsecured debt comprises credit card balances and all loans without reported collateral requirements. We minimally clean the data by only removing observations with zero or negative assets or equity. Table 1 shows the results of this analysis. While mortgages and credit lines constitute the largest debt categories of small firms, accounting for almost three quarters of the total, significant fractions of the other three loan categories are unsecured. This results in an unsecured debt share of 19.3 percent for firms in the SSBF.\textsuperscript{12}

The evidence presented in Figure 1 and in Table 1 suggests that the unsecured debt share varies between 0.2 (for the smallest firms) and 0.73 (for Compustat firms excluding the largest 1%).\textsuperscript{13}

To obtain an aggregate measure of unsecured debt, we can further utilize the information in the Flow of Funds Accounts in which firm debt is categorized into several broad categories. About 95% of all credit market liabilities of non-financial firms are either attributed to mortgages (31%), loans (31%) or corporate bonds (33%). Among the non-mortgage loans in Table 1,

\textsuperscript{11}Firms in our Capital IQ sample are actually bigger than Compustat firms. In the period 2002-2012, the average asset size of Compustat firms in the full (bottom 99%; bottom 95%) samples are 2,602 (1,230; 550) Mio. Dollars, whereas Capital IQ firms in the full (bottom 99%; bottom 95%) samples have average asset size 3,391 (2,028; 1,142). In total, there are about twice as many observations in Compustat than in Capital IQ in each year.

\textsuperscript{12}Because collateral requirement is a dummy variable, only a fraction of these loans might actually be secured by collateral. This measure of unsecured credit should therefore be regarded as a lower bound.

\textsuperscript{13}Note that the latter number is consistent with those found in two other studies about the debt structure of Compustat firms. Rauh and Sufi (2010) examine the financial footnotes of 305 randomly sampled non-financial firms in Compustat. Based on different measures, their unsecured debt share (defined as senior unsecured plus subordinated debt relative to total debt) is 70.3%. Giambona and Golec (2012) look at the distribution of unsecured debt shares for Compustat firms, reporting mean (median) values of 0.63 (0.75).
Table 1: Secured and unsecured debt in the Survey of Small Business Finances (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Debt category</th>
<th>Share of debt</th>
<th>Secured by real estate/equipment</th>
<th>Secured by other collateral</th>
<th>Unsecured debt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credit cards</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines of credit</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgages</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicle loans</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment loans</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other loans</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All numbers are debt percentages.

29.5% are unsecured, which is likely a higher share for bigger firms. With corporate bonds attributed to unsecured debt and mortgages to secured debt, we end up with an unsecured debt share of at least 44%. In the calibration part of this paper we target this share at the value 0.5 and include some sensitivity analysis for higher and lower values.

### 2.2 Business Cycle Features

#### 2.2.1 Compustat

We consider the time series from Compustat, deflate them by the price index for business value added, and linearly detrend the real series. Table 2 reports the volatility of secured and unsecured debt (relative to output) as well as the contemporaneous correlations with output. Secured debt is weakly negatively correlated with GDP in the full sample, it becomes zero and weakly positive once we exclude the top 1% or 5% firms. In sharp contrast, unsecured debt is always strongly positively correlated with GDP. Thus, the well-known procyclicality of total firm credit is driven by the independent role of unsecured debt. Both secured and unsecured debt are about three to four times as volatile as output.

Figure 2 graphs the correlations between current GDP and lagged (future) real debt levels. The top panel pertains to the full sample, the middle panel to the sample without the largest 1% of firms, and the bottom panel to the sample without the largest 5% of firms. Regardless of the sample, unsecured debt (i) is positively correlated with GDP, (ii) leads GDP significantly

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14 We use a linear trend to capture the low-frequency movements in credit and output that are quite significant over the period 1981–2012.
Table 2: Relative Volatility and Comovement with Output (Compustat)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Relative Volatility</th>
<th>Correlation with GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>full w/o top 1% w/o top 5%</td>
<td>full w/o top 1% w/o top 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secured</td>
<td>3.61 3.39 2.76</td>
<td>-0.15 -0.05 0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsecured</td>
<td>4.19 3.73 4.43</td>
<td>0.70 0.70 0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

by at least one year (the peak correlation is about 0.75 at one year lead). In sharp contrast, secured debt is (i) uncorrelated or negatively correlated with GDP, and (ii) tends to lag GDP even when the contemporaneous correlation is weakly positive (bottom panel).

![Figure 2: Correlations between $y_t$ and $d_{t+j}$ for $j \in [-4, 4]$ (left unsecured, right secured). The top (middle, bottom) graphs are for the full (bottom 99%, bottom 95%) Compustat samples.](image)

To obtain some indication about causality, we conduct a Granger causality test to explore if secured or unsecured debt contain superior information to help predict output. To do so, we
estimate equation

\[ y_t = \alpha + \beta_1 y_{t-1} + \beta_2 y_{t-2} + \gamma d^u_{t-1} + \tau d^s_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \]

by OLS, where \(d^u_t\) and \(d^s_t\) are secured and unsecured debt and \(y_t\) is real GDP. We note that including two lags of GDP is good enough for the best fit in terms of \(R^2\) which is equal to 0.835 when only lagged GDP is included as independent variables. We then add one-period lagged debt as independent variables into the regression. We find that the coefficient on unsecured debt is (weakly) significantly positive in all sample series, whereas that on secured debt is negative but (insignificantly) different from zero. We thus conclude that unsecured debt helps predict future GDP movements, while this is not the case for secured debt. This result suggests that in the Great Moderation period (including the recent financial crisis period), the so-called “credit cycle” and its intimate relation to the business cycle is not driven by movements in secured debt and the associated value of collateral, which much of the existing macro-finance literature often attribute to as the culprit of aggregate booms and busts. In Appendix A we complement these findings by a SVAR analysis showing how shocks to unsecured credit affect output significantly whereas shocks to secured credit do not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(R^2)</th>
<th>Unsecured debt</th>
<th>Secured debt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample</td>
<td>0.845</td>
<td>0.025***</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w/o top 1%</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.075***</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w/o top 5%</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>0.093***</td>
<td>-0.071***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** *** (***) indicates significance at the 5% (10%) level.

### 2.2.2 Flow of Funds Accounts

One potential weakness of applying evidence from Compustat in a macroeconomic context is that it only contains information about publicly-traded firms. Aggregate data from the Flow of Funds Accounts, though covering the full non-financial business sector, are not completely informative regarding the distinction between secured and unsecured debt, as they only break the firms’ credit market liabilities in several broad categories. Nonetheless, when we use those categories as proxies for secured and unsecured debt components, we confirm the main insights obtained above.
Since mortgages can be easily classified as secured debt, while corporate bonds add to unsecured debt, we use those series as proxies for these two debt categories.\textsuperscript{15} While Table 4 indicates that corporate bonds are less volatile than the measure for unsecured debt obtained from Compustat data in Table 2, the contemporaneous correlations confirm our previous findings. While mortgages are acyclical, corporate bonds as a proxy for unsecured debt is strongly procyclical.\textsuperscript{16}

Table 4: Relative Volatility and Comovement with Output (Flow of Funds, 1981–2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Relative Volatility</th>
<th>Correlation with GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortgages</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate bonds</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We also obtain similar findings about lead-lag relations as for the Compustat series; see Figure 3 for the lead-lag correlations for the annualized series. Corporate bonds are strongly correlated with output, with a peak correlation of 0.6 at a one-year lead, while mortgages show much weaker cyclicality, lagging GDP by about two years.

Figure 3: Lead-lag correlations between output and corporate bonds (left) and mortgages (right).

We briefly remark that those findings do not apply to the period before 1980 where the role of debt structure over the business cycle seems to be quite different. In fact in the period 1952-1980, mortgages appear to be strongly correlated with output, which is more consistent with

\textsuperscript{15}As Table 1 suggests, there are significant fractions of both secured and unsecured (non-mortgage) loans, so we do not attribute loans in the Flow of Funds Accounts to either proxy series.

\textsuperscript{16}The table is based on quarterly data, deflated and detrended in the same way as for the Compustat series.
conventional macro-finance theories where the value of collateral determines firms’ borrowing capacity over the cycle. At the same time, corporate bonds show a weaker (yet positive) correlation with output. Although we do not have more precise measures for secured and unsecured credit prior to 1981, this observation suggests that there is a structural break around this time, induced by regulatory changes that had a major impact on firms’ debt policies.

3 A Model of Unsecured Firm Credit

In this section we develop a business-cycle model in which unsecured credit is traded between heterogeneous firms facing idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Self-enforcing borrowing limits ensure that no firm opts for default in equilibrium. For expositional reasons, we present the model as simple as possible. Particularly, we abstract from any secured credit, we keep the labor supply fixed, and idiosyncratic productivity shocks are i.i.d. All three assumptions will be relaxed in the next section. Tractability and the theoretical findings are preserved in these extensions, as we show in the Appendix.

3.1 The Setup

The model has a continuum $i \in [0,1]$ of firms, each owned by a representative owner, and a unit mass of workers. At any time $t$, all agents maximize expected discounted utility

$$E_t(1 - \beta) \sum_{\tau \geq t} \beta^{\tau - t} \ln(c_{\tau})$$

over future consumption streams. Workers supply one unit of labor per period and have no capital endowment. Firm owners hold capital and have no labor endowment. They produce a consumption and investment good $y_t$ using capital $k_t'$ and labor $\ell_t$ with a common constant-returns technology $y_t = (k_t')^\alpha (A \ell_t)^{1-\alpha}$. Aggregate labor efficiency $A$ is constant for now, which will be relaxed in Section 4.

Firms differ in their ability to operate capital investment $k_t$. Some firms are able to enhance their invested capital according to $k_t' = a^p k_t$; they are labeled “productive”. The remaining, “unproductive” firms deplete some of their capital investment such that $k_t' = a^u k_t$. We assume that $a^p > 1 > a^u$ and write $\gamma \equiv a^u/a^p$ for the relative productivity gap. Productivity realizations are independent across agents and uncorrelated across time; firms are productive with probability $\pi$ and unproductive with probability $1 - \pi$. Thus, a fraction $\pi$ of the aggregate

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17 This specification is similar to the (aggregate) shocks to capital quality considered by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and is used for tractability reasons (see footnote 22 below).
capital stock $K_t$ is owned by productive firms in any period. Uncorrelated productivity simplifies the model considerably; it also precludes endogenous propagation of shocks due to sluggish adjustments in the net worth of borrowers (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989)). At the end of a period, all capital depreciates at common rate $\delta$.

Timing within each period is as follows. First firm owners learn the productivity of their business, they borrow and lend in a centralized credit market at gross interest rate $R_t$, and they hire labor in a centralized labor market at wage $w_t$. Second production takes place. Third, firm owners redeem their debt; they consume and save equity for the next period.

In the credit market, productive firms borrow capital from unproductive ones. All credit is unsecured and is only available to borrowers with a clean credit history. If a borrower decides to default in some period, the credit record deteriorates and the firm owner is banned from unsecured credit for a while. Defaulters are still allowed to stay in business; hence they are able to produce or to lend their assets to other firms. Each period after default, the firm owner’s credit record is cleared with probability $\psi$ in which case full access to credit markets is regained.

Since no shocks arrive during a credit contract (that is, debt is redeemed at the end of the period before the next productivity shock is realized), there exist default–deterring credit limits, defined similarly as in the pure–exchange model of Alvarez and Jermann (2000). These limits are the highest values of credit that prevent default. With permanent market exclusion ($\psi = 0$), this enforcement technology corresponds to the one discussed by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) who assume that defaulters are excluded from future credit but are still allowed to save. Unsecured borrowing is founded on a producer’s desire to maintain a clean credit record and hence continued access to future unsecured credit. Below we prove that credit constraints are necessarily binding in equilibrium (see Proposition 2).

By assumption, workers have no access to credit. Further, as we see below, the loan yield $R$ satisfies $R < 1/\beta$ in any stationary equilibrium, and hence also in any stochastic equilibrium near the steady state. Thus, workers are borrowing constrained and do not want to save; they simply consume their wage income in every period.

Let $\theta_t$ denote the constraint on a borrower’s debt–equity ratio in period $t$. This value is common for all borrowers with a clean credit record and is endogenously determined in equilibrium to prevent default. A productive firm owner entering the period with equity $e_t$ can borrow up to $b_t = \theta_t e_t$ and invest $k_t = e_t + b_t$. An unproductive firm owner lends out capital, so $b_t \leq 0$, and investment is $k_t = e_t + b_t \leq e_t$. The budget constraint for a firm owner with capital

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18 See Appendix D for an extension to a framework with correlated productivity shocks.

19 In the next section and in Appendix C, we relax this assumption by also allowing borrowers to borrow secured by providing collateral assets.
productivity \( a^* \in \{a^p, a^u\} \) reads as
\[
c_t + e_{t+1} = (a^* k_t)^\alpha (\lambda t)^{1-\alpha} + (1 - \delta)a^* k_t - w_t \ell_t - R_t b_t.
\] (2)

We are now ready to define equilibrium.

**Definition:** For each realization of idiosyncratic productivities, a competitive equilibrium is a list of consumption, savings, and production plans for all firm owners, \((c^i_t, e^i_t, b^i_t, k^i_t, \ell^i_t)_{i \in [0,1]}\), consumption of workers, \(c^w_t = w_t\), factor prices for labor and capital \((w_t, R_t)\), and debt-equity constraints \(\theta_t\), such that in every period \(t \geq 0\):

(i) \((c^i_t, e^i_t, b^i_t, k^i_t, \ell^i_t)\) maximizes firm owner \(i\)'s expected discounted utility (1) subject to budget constraints (2) and credit constraints \(b^i_t \leq \theta_t e^i_t\).

(ii) Markets for labor and capital clear;
\[
\int_0^1 \ell^i_t \; di = 1, \quad \int_0^1 b^i_t \; di = 0.
\]

(iii) If \(b^i_t \leq \theta e^i_t\) is binding in problem (i), firm owner \(i\) is exactly indifferent between debt redemption and default in period \(t\), where default entails exclusion from credit for a stochastic number of periods with readmission probability \(\psi\) in each period following default.

### 3.2 Equilibrium Characterization

Since firms hire labor so as to equate the marginal product to the real wage, all productive (unproductive) firms have identical capital–labor ratios; these are linked by a no–arbitrage condition implied by perfect labor mobility:
\[
\frac{k^p_t}{\ell^p_t} = \gamma \frac{k^u_t}{\ell^u_t}.
\] (3)

With binding credit constraints, a fraction \(z_t \equiv \min[1, \pi(1 + \theta_t)]\) of the aggregate capital stock \(K_t\) is operated by productive firms. It follows from (3) and labor market clearing that
\[
\frac{k^p_t}{\ell^p_t} = \frac{a_t K_t}{a^p} \leq K_t < \frac{a_t K_t}{a^u} = \frac{k^u_t}{\ell^u_t},
\]
where \(a_t \equiv a^p z_t + a^u (1 - z_t)\) is the average capital productivity. The gross return on capital for a firm with capital productivity \(a^* \in \{a^u, a^p\}\) is then \(R^s_t \equiv a^*[1 - \delta + \alpha A^1 - \alpha (a_t K_t)^{\alpha - 1}]\) (see Appendix B for a detailed derivation).

\[\text{In period } t = 0, \text{ there is some given initial equity distribution } (e^i_{0t})_{i \in [0,1]}\].
In any equilibrium, the gross interest rate cannot exceed the capital return of productive firms $R_t^p$ and it cannot fall below the capital return of unproductive firms $R_t^u$. Thus it is convenient to write $R_t = \rho_t R_t^p$ with $\rho_t \in [\gamma, 1]$. When $\rho_t < 1$, borrowers are credit constrained. In this case the leveraged equity return $\tilde{R}_t \equiv [1 + \theta_t(1 - \rho_t)]R_t^p$ exceeds the capital return $R_t^p$. Unproductive firms, on the other hand, lend out all their capital when $\rho_t > \gamma$; they only invest in their own inferior technology if $\rho_t = \gamma$. Therefore, credit market equilibrium is equivalent to the complementary-slackness conditions

$$\rho_t \geq \gamma , \quad \pi(1 + \theta_t) \leq 1 .$$

With this notation, the firm owner’s budget constraints (2) simplify to $e_{t+1} + c_t = \tilde{R}_t e_t$, when the firm is productive in $t$, and to $e_{t+1} + c_t = R_t e_t$ when the firm is unproductive. From logarithmic utility follows that every firm owner consumes a fraction $(1 - \beta)$ of wealth and saves the rest.

To derive the endogenous credit limits, let $V_t(W)$ denote the continuation value of a firm owner with a clean credit record who has wealth $W$ at the end of period $t$, prior to deciding consumption and saving. These values satisfy the recursive equation

$$V_t(W) = (1 - \beta) \ln[(1 - \beta)W] + \beta \pi E_t V_{t+1}(\tilde{R}_{t+1}W) + \beta(1 - \pi) E_t V_{t+1}(R_{t+1}W) .$$

The first term in this equation represents utility from consuming $(1 - \beta)W$ in the current period. For the next period $t+1$, the firm owner saves equity $\beta W$ which earns leveraged return $\tilde{R}_{t+1}$ with probability $\pi$ and return $R_{t+1}$ with probability $1 - \pi$. It follows that continuation values take the form $V_t(W) = \ln(W) + V_t$ where $V_t$ is independent of wealth, satisfying the recursive relation

$$V_t = (1 - \beta) \ln(1 - \beta) + \beta \ln \beta + \beta E_t [\pi \ln \tilde{R}_{t+1} + (1 - \pi) \ln(R_{t+1}) + V_{t+1}] .$$

For a firm owner with default flag and no access to credit, the continuation value is $V_t^d(W) = \ln(W) + V_t^d$, where $V_t^d$ satisfies, analogously to equation (5), the recursion

$$V_t^d = (1 - \beta) \ln(1 - \beta) + \beta \ln \beta + \beta E_t [\pi \ln(R_{t+1}^p) + (1 - \pi) \ln(R_{t+1}) + V_{t+1}^d + \psi(V_{t+1} - V_{t+1}^d)] .$$

This firm owner is banned from unsecured credit in period $t+1$ so that the equity return is $R_{t+1}^p$ with probability $\pi$ and $R_{t+1}$ with probability $1 - \pi$. At the end of period $t+1$, the credit record clears with probability $\psi$ in which case continuation utility increases from $V_{t+1}^d$ to $V_{t+1}$.

\[^{21}\text{In the absence of sunspot shocks (as the only source of aggregate uncertainty in this section), the expectations operator } E_t \text{ could be dropped from this and from subsequent recursive equations.}\]
If a borrower has a clean credit record and enters period $t$ with equity $e_t$, the debt-equity constraint $\theta_t$ makes him exactly indifferent between default and debt redemption if

$$\ln \left[ \tilde{R}_t e_t \right] + V_t = \ln \left[ R^p_t (1 + \theta_t) e_t \right] + V^d_t.$$  

Here the right-hand side is the continuation value after default: the firm owner invests $(1+\theta_t)e_t$, earns return $R^p_t$ and does not redeem debt. The left-hand side is the continuation value under solvency, where the equity return is $\tilde{R}_t e_t$. Defining $v_t \equiv V_t - V_t^d \geq 0$ as the “value of reputation”, this equation can be solved for the default-deterring constraint on the debt-equity ratio

$$\theta_t = \frac{e_v - 1}{1 - e_v(1 - \rho_t)}. \quad (7)$$

This constraint is increasing in the reputation value $v_t$: a greater expected payoff from access to unsecured credit makes debt redemption more valuable, which relaxes the self-enforcing debt limit. In the extreme case when the reputation value is zero, unsecured credit cannot be sustained so that $\theta_t = 0$.

Using (5) and (6), reputation values satisfy the recursive identity

$$v_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \pi \ln \left( \frac{\tilde{R}_{t+1}}{R^p_{t+1}} \right) + (1 - \psi) v_{t+1} \right] = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \pi \ln \left( \frac{\rho_{t+1}}{1 - e^{v_{t+1}}(1 - \rho_{t+1})} \right) + (1 - \psi) v_{t+1} \right]. \quad (8)$$

We summarize this equilibrium characterization as follows.

**Proposition 1** Any solution $(\rho_t, \theta_t, v_t)_{t \geq 0}$ to the system of equations (4), (7) and (8) gives rise to a competitive equilibrium with interest rates $R_t = \rho_t R^p_t$ with $R^p_t = a^p[1 - \delta + \alpha A^{1-\alpha}(a_t K_t)^{\alpha-1}]$ and $a_t = a^u + (a^p - a^u) \cdot \min[1, \pi(1 + \theta_t)]$. The capital stock evolves according to

$$K_{t+1} = \beta \left[ (1 - \delta) + \alpha A^{1-\alpha}(a_t K_t)^{\alpha-1} \right] a_t K_t. \quad (9)$$

An implication of this proposition is that any equilibrium follows two dynamic equations, the backward-looking dynamics of aggregate capital (equation (9)) and the forward-looking dynamics of reputation values, equation (8) or, equivalently, equation (10) below. Due to our modeling of the idiosyncratic productivity process, the latter identity is independent of the aggregate state $K_t$, and hence permits a particularly simple analysis of stationary and non-stationary equilibria.\(^{22}\)

\(^{22}\)On the one hand, reputation values are independent of aggregate capital since all returns are multiples of $1 - \delta + \alpha(A/(a_t K_t))^{1-\alpha}$ which is due to our specification of capital productivity shocks, $k_t' = a^s k_t$ for $s = u, p$. On the other hand, if productivity shocks were autocorrelated, equation (10) has two lags and the capital distribution enters as an additional state variable; see Appendix D.
Using Proposition 1, we obtain two immediate results. First, there always exists an equilibrium where $v_t = 0$, $\theta_t = 0$ and $\rho_t = \gamma$ in all periods, so that unsecured credit is not enforceable. Intuitively, if no unsecured credit is available in future periods, there is no value to reputation, and hence any borrower prefers to default on current unsecured credit so that constraints must be zero. Second, we show that constraints on unsecured credit are necessarily binding. This is in line with earlier results by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) who show that the first best cannot be implemented by limited enforcement mechanisms which ban defaulting agents from future borrowing but not from future lending. It differs decisively from environments with two–sided exclusion, as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000), where first-best allocations can be sustained with unsecured credit under certain circumstances.23 The intuition for this result is as follows. If borrowers were unconstrained, the interest rate would coincide with the borrowers’ capital return. Hence there is no leverage gain, so that access to credit has no value. In turn, every borrower would default on an unsecured loan, no matter how small. We summarize this finding in

**Proposition 2** Any equilibrium features binding borrowing constraints.

It follows immediately that the equilibrium interest rate is smaller than the workers’ marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, so that workers are indeed credit constrained (in steady state).

**Corollary 1** In any steady state equilibrium, $R < 1/\beta$.

### 3.3 Multiplicity and Cycles

Although borrowers must be constrained, the credit market may nonetheless be able to allocate capital efficiently. In particular, when the reputation value $v_t$ is sufficiently large, credit constraints relax and the interest rate may exceed the capital return of unproductive firms who then lend out all their capital to more productive firms. Formally, when $v_t$ exceeds the threshold value

$$\tau \equiv \ln \left[\frac{1}{1 - \gamma(1 - \pi)}\right] > 0,$$

23In endowment economies with permanent exclusion of defaulters, it is well known that perfect risk sharing can be implemented if the discount factor is sufficiently large, if risk aversion is sufficiently strong or if the endowment gap between agents is large enough (see e.g. Kehoe and Levine (2001) and Azariadis and Kaas (2007)). Azariadis and Kaas (2012b) show that the role of the discount factor changes decisively if market exclusion is temporary. We remark that the multiplicity results established in the following do not change under permanent exclusion of defaulters.
the equilibrium conditions (4) and (7) are solved by \( \theta_t = (1 - \pi)/\pi \) and \( \rho_t = [1 - e^{-v_t}]/(1 - \pi) > \gamma \). Conversely, when \( v_t \) falls short of \( \overline{v} \), credit constraints tighten, the interest rate equals the capital return of unproductive firms \((\rho_t = \gamma)\), who are then indifferent between lending out capital or investing in their own technology, so that some capital is inefficiently allocated. We can use this insight to rewrite the forward-looking equation (8) as

\[
v_t = E_t f(v_{t+1}) ,
\]

with

\[
f(v) \equiv \begin{cases} 
\beta(1 - \psi)v + \beta\pi \ln \left[ \frac{1 - e^{\gamma}}{1 - \gamma} \right], & \text{if } v \in [0, \overline{v}] , \\
\beta(1 - \pi - \psi)v + \beta\pi \ln(1/\pi), & \text{if } v \in [\overline{v}, v_{\max}] .
\end{cases}
\]

Here \( v = v_{\max} = \ln(1/\pi) \) is the reputation value where the interest rate reaches \( \rho = 1 \) and borrowers are unconstrained. It is straightforward to verify that \( f \) is strictly increasing if \( \pi + \psi < 1 \), convex in \( v < \overline{v} \), and it satisfies \( f(0) = 0 \) and \( f(v_{\max}) < v_{\max} \). This reconfirms that the absence of unsecured credit \((v = 0)\) is a stationary equilibrium. Depending on economic fundamentals, there can also exist one or two steady states exhibiting positive trading of unsecured credit. Figure 4(a) shows a situation in which function \( f \) has three intersections with the 45-degree line: \( v = 0, v^* \in (0, \overline{v}) \) and \( v^{**} \in (\overline{v}, v_{\max}) \). The steady states at \( v = 0 \) and at \( v^* \) have an inefficient capital allocation, whereas capital is efficiently allocated at \( v^{**} > \overline{v} \). Figure 4(b) shows a possibility with only two steady states, at \( v = 0 \) and at \( v^{**} > \overline{v} \). A third possibility (not shown in the Figure) is that \( v = 0 \) is the unique steady state so that unsecured credit is not enforceable. The following proposition describes how the set of stationary equilibria changes as the productivity ratio \( \gamma = a^u/a^p \) varies.

**Proposition 3** For all parameter values \((\beta, \pi, \psi, \gamma)\) there exists a stationary equilibrium without unsecured credit and with inefficient capital allocation. In addition, there are threshold values \( \gamma_0 < \gamma_1 < 1 \) of the productivity ratio such that:

(a) For \( \gamma \in (\gamma_0, \gamma_1) \), there are two stationary equilibria with unsecured credit: one at \( v^* \in (0, \overline{v}) \) with inefficient capital allocation and one at \( v^{**} \in (\overline{v}, v_{\max}) \) with efficient capital allocation.

(b) For \( \gamma \leq \gamma_0 \), there exists a unique stationary equilibrium with unsecured credit and efficient capital allocation at the reputation value \( v^{**} \in (\overline{v}, v_{\max}) \).

(c) For \( \gamma > \gamma_1 \), there is no stationary equilibrium with unsecured credit.
Figure 4: Steady states at $v = 0, v^*, v^{**}$.

For small enough idiosyncratic productivity fluctuations ($\gamma > \gamma_1$), unsecured credit is not enforceable because firm owners value participation in credit markets too little. For larger idiosyncratic shocks, exclusion from future credit is a sufficiently strong threat so that unsecured credit is enforceable. With big enough shocks, the unique steady state with unsecured credit has an efficient factor allocation, while for intermediate values of $\gamma$, a third equilibrium with unsecured credit and some misallocation emerges.

The explanation for equilibrium multiplicity is a dynamic complementarity between endogenous credit constraints which are directly linked to reputation values. Borrowers’ expectations of future credit market conditions affect their incentives to default which in turn determine current credit constraints. If future constraints are tight, the payoff of a clean credit record is modest so that access to unsecured credit has low value. In turn, current default-deterring credit limits must be small. Conversely, if borrowers expect future credit markets to work well, a clean credit record has high value, and this relaxes current constraints.

As Figure 4 shows, multiplicity follows from a specific non-linearity between expected and current reputation values. To understand this non-linearity, it is important to highlight the different impact of market expectations on borrowing constraints and on interest rates. In the inefficient regime $v \leq \overline{v}$, improvements in credit market expectations relax credit constraints without changes in the interest rate which leads to particularly large gains from participation and hence to a strong impact on the current value of reputation. Conversely, if $v > \overline{v}$, beliefs in better credit conditions also raise the interest rate which dampens the positive effect and
hence mitigates the increase in the current reputation value. Even when unsecured credit is available and possibly supports efficient allocations of capital, that efficiency rests upon the confidence of market participants in future credit market conditions. When market participants expect credit constraints to tighten rapidly, the value of reputation shrinks over time which triggers a self-fulfilling collapse of the market for unsecured credit. For instance, if $\gamma < \gamma_0$, the steady state at $v^{**}$ is determinate and the one at $v = 0$ is indeterminate (see Figure 4(b)). That is, there exists an infinity of non-stationary equilibria $v_t = f(v_{t+1}) \to 0$ where the value of reputation vanishes asymptotically. These equilibria are mathematically similar to the bubble-bursting equilibria in overlapping-generation models or in Kocherlakota (2009). If $\gamma \in (\gamma_0, \gamma_1)$, the two steady states at $v = 0$ and at $v^{**}$ are determinate, whereas the one at $v^*$ is indeterminate. In that situation, a self-fulfilling collapse of the credit market would be described by an equilibrium with $v_t \to v^*$ where a positive level of unsecured credit is still sustained in the limit.

In both these events, a one-time belief shock can lead to a permanent collapse of the credit market. But in the latter case, indeterminacy also permits stochastic business cycle dynamics driven by self-fulfilling beliefs (sunspots). Sunspot fluctuations vanish asymptotically if $\gamma < \gamma_0$, but they give rise to permanent volatility around the indeterminate steady state $v^*$ if $\gamma \in (\gamma_0, \gamma_1)$.

**Proposition 4** Suppose that $\gamma \in (\gamma_0, \gamma_1)$ as defined in Proposition 3. Then there exist sunspot cycles featuring permanent fluctuations in credit, output and total factor productivity.

The dynamic complementarity between endogenous credit constraints not only gives rise to expectations-driven business cycles, it also generates an endogenous propagation mechanism: because of $f'(v^*) > 1$, a one-time expectational shock in period $t$ triggers a persistent adjustment dynamics of reputation values $v_k$ (and thus of credit constraints, investment and output) in subsequent periods $k > t$. Intuitively, a self-fulfilling credit boom (slump) in period $t$ can only emerge if the boom (slump) lasts for several periods.

**Corollary 2** A one-time sunspot shock $\varepsilon_t > 0$ ($\varepsilon_t < 0$) in period $t$ induces a persistent positive (negative) response of firm credit and output.

In the next section, we return to this finding by demonstrating how the autocorrelated response of credit and output depend on model parameters.

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24To see this formally, consider any sequence of random variables $\varepsilon_{t+1} \in (-v_t, v^{**} - v_t)$, $t \geq 1$, satisfying $E_t(\varepsilon_{t+1}) = 0$, and define the stochastic process $v_{t+1} = f^{-1}(v_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}) \in (0, v^{**})$ which solves equation (10).
4 Quantitative Analysis

The previous section showed that this model can capture volatility of unsecured credit and output driven by expectational shocks, with potentially sluggish responses. In this section we calibrate an extended model to the U.S. economy in order to investigate the contribution of sunspot shocks relative to fundamental shocks to the financial and to the real sector.

4.1 Model Extension

We extend the model in two directions. First, we include variable labor supply, modifying workers’ period utility to \( \ln(C_t - \frac{p_{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi}L_t^{\varphi/(1+\varphi)}) \) with Frisch elasticity \( \varphi \). Second, we allow firms to also borrow secured by providing collateral. Specifically, we assume that fraction \( \lambda_t \) of a firm’s assets serves as collateral and can be pledged to creditors. As this option is available to all firms, the relevant outside option of a defaulter is the exclusion from unsecured credit while retaining access to collateralized credit. As before, all credit is within the period and no default occurs in equilibrium, which implies that secured and unsecured credit carry the same interest rate \( R_t \). Besides sunspot shocks, we allow for shocks to \( \lambda_t \) and to aggregate technology \( A_t \). The first type of shock directly affects secured credit and can be related to financial shocks on collateral constraints, such as those in Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Technology shocks help to account for those movements in output which are not generated by the endogenous response of aggregate capital productivity due to shifts in credit.

In Appendix C, we solve this extended model in which the debt-equity constraint (7) becomes

\[
\theta_t = \frac{e^v_t - 1 + \lambda_t}{1 - \lambda_t - e^v_t(1 - \rho_t)} .
\]  
(11)

Firm debt therefore contains a secured component \( \theta_s^t = \frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_t - \rho_t} \leq \theta_t \). The share of unsecured credit to equity is then \( \theta_u^t = \theta_t - \theta_s^t \). We also generalize (10) to a forward-looking equation

\[
v_t = E_t f(v_{t+1}, \lambda_{t+1}) .
\]  
(12)

Therefore, we obtain a similar dichotomy as before: the credit-market equilibrium is independent of the capital stock, of labor market variables or technology shocks.\footnote{While this property is useful to characterize equilibrium and to provide intuition for the main relationships, it is by no means essential for our theory. Alternative formulations of the collateral constraint, for example, would give rise to an equation \( v_t = E_t f(v_{t+1}, \lambda_{t+1}, K_{t+1}, A_{t+1}) \), so that technology shocks feed (positively) into the credit market.} We also confirm
that any steady state with unsecured credit and some misallocation of capital is indeterminate so that self-fulfilling expectational shocks drive the dynamics of unsecured credit. Note again that only the indeterminate steady state equilibrium allows for unsecured credit and inefficient capital allocations (Proposition 3). The other two determinate steady states of this model either feature efficient factor allocations or do not sustain unsecured credit. Hence their business-cycle properties would either resemble those of a standard frictionless model or those of an economy with collateral-based credit constraints.

4.2 Calibration

We calibrate this model to the U.S. economy, choosing parameters such that the indeterminate steady state equilibrium matches suitable long-run properties. The calibration targets correspond to statistics obtained for the U.S. business sector in the period 1981–2012. We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency and set $\delta$, $\alpha$ and $\beta$ in a standard fashion to match plausible values of capital depreciation, factor income shares and the capital-output ratio of 5.95. The Frisch elasticity is set to $\varphi = 1$. We normalize average capital productivity in steady state to $a = 1$, as well as steady-state labor efficiency to $A = 1$. We set the exclusion parameter $\psi = 0.025$ so that an average firm owner has difficulty obtaining unsecured credit for a period of 10 years after default. We choose the remaining parameters $\pi$, $\lambda$ and $a^u$ to match the following three targets: (1) Credit to non-financial firms is 0.82 of annual GDP; (2) the debt-equity ratio of constrained firms is set to $\theta = 3$; (3) unsecured credit is 50 percent of total firm credit. Given that this model has a two-point distribution of firm productivity (and hence of debt-equity ratios), the choice of target (2) is somewhat arbitrary. As a robustness check, we also calibrate the model with $\theta = 2$ and report the findings in Appendix E.

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26 Of course, there could also be fundamental shocks which affect unsecured credit independently of secured credit. For example, any shock that changes the default value would take an impact on $\theta^u$.

27 Different from our model, collateral-based credit constraints may also be forward-looking as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) if collateral prices are endogenous, which may contribute to the amplification and propagation of shocks. Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) and Kocherlakota (2000) argue, however, that it is difficult to generate quantitatively significant amplification this way.

28 For example, if a firm owner files for bankruptcy according to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy remains on the credit record for a period of 10 years (see e.g. Chatterjee et al. (2007)).

29 The normalization $a = a^u + \pi(1 + \theta)(a^p - a^u) = 1$ then yields parameter $a^p$.

30 (1) Credit market liabilities of non-financial business are 0.82 of annual GDP (average over 1981-2012, Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board, Z.1 Table L.101). (2) Debt-equity ratios below 3 are usually required to qualify for commercial loans (see Herranz et al. (2009)). Further, in the SSBF (Capital IQ, Compustat), the mean debt-equity ratio is 3.04 (3.15, 2.43). Regarding target (3), see the discussion at the end of subsection 2.1.

31 Departing from Table 5, this requires $a^u = 0.936$, $a^p = 1.013$, $\pi = 0.276$ and $\lambda = 0.462$. 

22
are listed in Table 5. This model parameterization produces reasonable statistics along a few other dimensions. One of them is a plausible cross-firm dispersion of total factor productivity (TFP). With firm-level output equal to \( y^i = (a^i - 1)k^i + (A\ell^i)^{1-\alpha}(a^i k^i)^\alpha \), we calculate a standard deviation of log TFP equal to 0.3, close to the within-industry average 0.39 reported in Bartelsman et al. (2013).\textsuperscript{32}

<table>
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<th>Parameter</th>
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<td>1.023</td>
<td>Highest productivity</td>
<td>Normalization ( a = 1 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3 Persistence of sunspot shocks

In the absence of shocks to \( \lambda \), the log-linearized dynamics of the credit-to-capital ratio follows

\[
\hat{\theta}_{t+1} = \frac{1}{\varphi_2} \hat{\theta}_t + d_1 \epsilon^s_{t+1},
\]

where coefficients \( d_1, \varphi_2 \) are specified in Appendix C and \( \epsilon^s_{t+1} \) is a sunspot shock. In particular, we find that the auto-correlation coefficient is

\[
\frac{1}{\varphi_2} = \frac{1}{\beta(1-\psi) + \beta\pi(1+\theta)\frac{a^p-a^u}{a^u}},
\]

which equals 0.984 for the calibrated model parameters. To obtain a data analogue, we use the time series of the credit-to-capital ratio from the Flow of Funds Accounts to measure \( \hat{\theta}_t \) and we estimate a quarterly auto-correlation coefficient of 0.99. If the model is calibrated with \( \theta = 2 \), the coefficient becomes a bit larger (0.987), but it seems not too sensitive to the choice of \( \theta \).

\textsuperscript{32}To calculate firm-level TFP \( z^i \), write \( z^i(k^i)^{\alpha}(\ell^i)^{1-\alpha} = y^i \), and use the labor demands of Appendix C to obtain (in steady state) \( z^i = (a^i)^\alpha + \frac{K}{(a^i)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}} \).
4.4 Multiple shocks

4.4.1 Identification

Given this calibration of steady-state values, we identify sunspot shocks, as well as fundamental financial shocks (collateral parameter $\hat{\lambda}_t$) and technology shocks (labor efficiency parameter $\hat{A}_t$) as follows (see Appendix C for details). Again, the credit-to-capital ratio from the Flow of Funds Accounts identifies $\hat{\theta}_t$. We take the mortgages-to-capital ratio as a proxy for the unsecured-credit-to-capital ratio to measure $\hat{\theta}_s^t$. This we can use to identify both $\hat{\lambda}_t$ (shocks to secured credit) and sunspot shocks $\varepsilon_s^t$ which are shocks altering the unsecured component of credit as captured in the reputation value $\hat{v}_t$. Labor efficiency $\hat{A}_t$ is identified so as to match the cyclical component of output. All three shocks together therefore generate the output dynamics of the data and we can measure how each of them contributes to the total volatility and how it accounts for output movements in specific episodes.

Note first that the three identified shocks can be correlated with each other. Because of this, we first show that even if we attribute all correlations to $(\hat{A}_t, \hat{\lambda}_t)$ shocks by ordering the sunspot shock as the last variable in a SVAR, sunspot shocks are still important in explaining output fluctuations. We conduct the analysis in two different ways.

4.4.2 SVAR Analysis

We run the following unrestricted SVAR with TFP ($\hat{A}_t$), collateral value ($\hat{\lambda}_t$), and unsecured credit (reputation value $\hat{v}_t$):

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
\hat{A}_t \\
\hat{\lambda}_t \\
\hat{v}_t
\end{pmatrix} =
B
\begin{pmatrix}
\hat{A}_{t-1} \\
\hat{\lambda}_{t-1} \\
\hat{v}_{t-1}
\end{pmatrix} +
\begin{pmatrix}
e_{1t} \\
e_{2t} \\
e_{3t}
\end{pmatrix}
$$

with coefficient matrix $B$. We apply the Choleski decomposition such that $e_t = (e_{1t}, e_{2t}, e_{3t})'$ = $C(\varepsilon_{1t}, \varepsilon_{2t}, \varepsilon_{3t})'$ with lower triangular matrix $C$, and we call $\varepsilon_{3t}$ the sunspot shock. This identification method is equivalent to regressing $e_{3t}$ on $\{e_{2t}, e_{1t}\}$, using the residual as our sunspot shock.

In our model, output $\hat{Y}_t$ is generated by contemporaneous and lagged values of the three variables ($\hat{A}, \hat{\lambda}, \hat{v}$). However, it seems that a linear combination of contemporaneous variables gives a very good approximation of $\hat{Y}_t$ (see Figure 5). Adding additional lags does not improve the fit significantly. To recover the contributions of each shock to output dynamics, we simply assume that $\hat{Y}_t$ is a linear combination of the three variables in the VAR.

Notice that $\hat{A}_t$ in our VAR will pick up anything left unexplained by financial shocks (shocks to collateral $\hat{\lambda}$ and to unsecured credit $\hat{v}$). Hence we attribute all correlations to TFP shocks.
and no correlations in the residual vector $e_t$ to sunspot shocks. In other words, we may be attributing too much influence to secured-credit shocks and TFP shocks, thus providing a lower bound on the contribution of sunspot shocks. Put differently, if the purified sunspot shock appears to be important, then it is even more important if we had attributed some of the correlations among $e_t$ to the sunspot shocks. Hence our identification method goes against our null hypothesis that sunspots matter.

Figure 6 shows the time series decomposition of output into the three components associated with the three identified shocks $(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_3)$, where the blue dashed line in each window represents the data output and the pink solid line represents the predicted output if only one single shock is active. The lower right graph puts all three shocks together, so that the dynamics of output is fully explained. TFP (shock 1) explains the 2009 recession episode quite well. This result holds regardless how we order the VAR variables. Secured credit (shock 2) contributes significantly to the 1990’s credit expansion. Sunspot shocks $\varepsilon_3$ explain the broad business cycle features of output quite well (lower-left window) even though we have attributed all the

Figure 5: Actual output $\hat{Y}_t$ (dashed line) and predicted output (solid line) by $\overline{Y}_t = b \times [\hat{A}_t; \hat{\lambda}_t; \hat{\nu}_t]'$. 
correlations of the three shocks to TFP and to secured-credit shocks.

For a correlation analysis, we write the output series as $\hat{Y}_t = \hat{Y}_{1t} + \hat{Y}_{2t} + \hat{Y}_{3t}$, where each component is contributed from each of the three shocks respectively. We compute the following correlations $\text{corr}(\hat{Y}_{it}, \hat{Y}_t)$ for $i = 1, 2, 3$. Figure 7 shows that the part of output driven by sunspots (shock 3) is highly correlated with the data output, whereas the TFP shock is not significantly correlated. This result is consistent with the top-left graph in Figure 6.

We can also decompose the total variance of output into the three components. We find that sunspot shocks explain about 40%-50% of total output variations.

We can also decompose the total variance of output (more specifically, the power spectrum)
into the three components, with each contributed separately from the three identified shocks. We find that TFP shocks explain 55% of the output variance, $\lambda$-shocks explains 0.09%, and sunspot shocks explain the remaining 35%. Even though TFP shocks do not seem to be highly correlated with output, they still have enough variation to account for the bulk of output variance. Furthermore, even though the $\lambda$-shocks are highly correlated with output, the series does not have much high-frequency variation, hence does not contribute much to output fluctuations.

4.5 Alternative Specification

Since output is not perfectly co-linear with $[\hat{A}_t, \hat{\lambda}_t, \hat{v}_t]$, we consider a VAR with output included and ordered the last:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\hat{A}_t \\
\hat{\lambda}_t \\
\hat{v}_t \\
\hat{Y}_t
\end{pmatrix} = B 
\begin{pmatrix}
\hat{A}_{t-1} \\
\hat{\lambda}_{t-1} \\
\hat{v}_{t-1} \\
\hat{A}_{t-1}
\end{pmatrix} + 
\begin{pmatrix}
e_{1t} \\
e_{2t} \\
e_{3t} \\
e_{4t}
\end{pmatrix},
\]

We apply the Choleski decomposition such that $e_t = (e_{1t}, e_{2t}, e_{3t}, e_{4t})' = C(\varepsilon_{1t}, \varepsilon_{2t}, \varepsilon_{3t}, \varepsilon_{4t})'$ with lower triangular matrix $C$. In this case, if a linear combination of the three shock variables $[\hat{A}, \hat{\lambda}, \hat{v}]$ cannot perfectly explain output, then the residual will be picked up by the fourth...
shock $\varepsilon_{4t}$. But if the variance of $\varepsilon_{4t}$ is small enough, then our results will not be affected by adding output. A nice feature of this new VAR system is that we can directly decompose output into the four shocks without suffering the same approximation errors in the previous three-variable VAR.

The results are broadly similar to those obtained above. Figure 8 shows that the first three shocks together can explain more than 99.9% of output variations (lower right graph entitled “all shocks”). In addition, the contribution of sunspot shocks (shock 3) is very similar to what we saw before. Again, TFP shocks (top left graph) appear to be important for the financial crisis, while shocks to secured credit (shock 2) are not very important overall.

![Figure 8: Decomposition of output in the four-variable VAR: TFP (shock 1), secured credit (shock 2), sunspots (shock 3).](image)

Using spectral analysis, the total contribution of TFP shocks to output variance is 46.2%, that
from $\lambda_t$ shocks is 9.3%, and that from sunspot shocks is 44.5%, leaving only a tiny fraction of 0.05% to the fourth shock $\varepsilon_{4t}$.

5 Conclusions

Two enduring characteristics of the business cycle are the high autocorrelations of credit and output time series, and the strong cross-correlation between those two statistics. Understanding these correlations, without the help of persistent shocks to the productivity of financial intermediaries and of final goods producers, has been a long-standing goal of macroeconomic research and the motivation for the seminal contributions mentioned in the first paragraph of the introduction to this paper. Is it possible that cycles in credit, TFP and output are not the work of persistent productivity shocks that afflict all sectors of the economy simultaneously? Could these cycles instead come from small and temporary shocks to anticipated credit conditions?

This paper gives an affirmative answer to both questions within an economy in which part of the credit firms require to finance investment is secured by collateral, and the remainder is based on reputation. Unsecured credit improves debt limits, facilitates capital reallocation and helps aggregate productivity, provided that borrowers expect plentiful unsecured credit in the future. Favorable expectations of future debt limits increase the value of remaining solvent and on good terms with one’s lenders. Widespread doubts, on the other hand, about future credit will lead to long-lasting credit tightening with severe macroeconomic consequences. It is this dynamic complementarity of current with future lending that connects macroeconomic performance over time and endows one-time expectational impulses with long lasting responses. A calibrated version of our economy, despite its apparent simplicity, matches well with observed features of the joint stochastic process governing U.S output, firm credit and investment and illustrates the endogenous propagation of self-fulfilling belief shocks.

References


Appendix A: Further Empirical Findings

A.1 Winsorized Data

In Section 2 we consider aggregate series for different samples from Compustat and from Capital IQ. To account for the possible impact of outliers, we also consider aggregate series where all firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Again we compare samples containing all firms with those where the largest 1% or the largest 5% of firms are removed. Figure 9 shows the series of the unsecured debt share for the different samples.
obtained from Compustat and also for the one from Capital IQ (without the largest 1% of firms). As in Figure 1 we see that the effect of the largest firms if important for the level of the unsecured debt share, but not much for the cyclicality.\textsuperscript{33} The cyclical pattern of the Capital IQ series during 2002-2012 is also similar as for the non-winsorized series.

![Figure 9: The share of unsecured debt in total debt for firms in Compustat and in Capital IQ (winsorized data).](image)

Table 6 confirms the main insights about business-cycle features of secured and unsecured debt (again deflated and linearly detrended). As in Table 2, both secured and unsecured debt are three to four times as volatile as GDP, and unsecured debt shows a much greater procyclicality than secured debt which is now weakly positively correlated with GDP for all three sample series.

### A.2 The Impact of the Largest Firms

As Figure 1 shows, the largest firms have a strong effect on the unsecured debt share, although much less on the cyclical features of this share. Regarding the series of secured and unsecured debt, Figure 10 shows that their cyclical components are also very similar in the three sample series.

\textsuperscript{33}While the effect of the largest firms is also important for total debt growth, it is not important for its cyclicality, as we show in the Appendix.
Table 6: Relative Volatility and Comovement with Output (Compustat, winsorized data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Relative Volatility</th>
<th>Correlation with GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>full</td>
<td>w/o top 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secured</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsecured</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compustat samples, and they are further in line with the respective Capital IQ series in the overlapping sample period.

Figure 10: Secured and unsecured debt for Compustat (full sample, without 1% and 5% of largest firms) and Capital IQ (without 1% largest firms). All series are linearly detrended and are based on non-winsorized data.

While cycles are similar, debt growth varies decisively when the largest firms are removed from the sample, as is shown in Table 7. Apparently, the largest firms in the Compustat sample accumulated more debt than smaller firms, and this difference is particularly strong for unsecured debt which grew only by 1% for the bottom 95% of firms relative to 3.6% for the full sample.

A.3 SVAR analysis

We complement the business-cycle observations in Section 2 by a SVAR analysis to analyze impulse responses to different debt shocks. Constrained by our short sample, we use a two-variable VAR, assuming that shocks to debt have no contemporaneous impact on output.
Table 7: Average annual debt growth (Compustat, 1981-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Debt growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>full  w/o top 1%  w/o top 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secured</td>
<td>3.9      3.8  2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsecured</td>
<td>3.6      2.8  1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings shown in Figure 11 are consistent with those above. Shocks to unsecured debt account for significant impulse responses of output, while shocks to secured debt generate no significant output response. A variance decomposition further shows that shocks to unsecured debt explain about 35%-45% of the output variance, whereas shocks to secured debt can only account for 0%-10%.

Figure 11: Impulse responses of output and debt to shocks to secured credit (top) and unsecured credit (bottom).
Appendix B: Proofs

Derivation of capital return $R^*_s$:
Consider a firm of type $s \in \{p, u\}$ with capital $k^*_s$. It employs $\ell^*_s$ workers so that the marginal product of labor equals the real wage:

$$(1 - \alpha) A \left( \frac{a^s k^*_s}{A \ell^*_s} \right) ^\alpha = w_t .$$

It follows for all firms

$$a^p \frac{K^p}{\ell^*_t} = a^u \frac{K^u}{\ell^*_t} \equiv c_t ,$$

where $c_t$ is independent of firm type. Let $L^s_t$ denote aggregate employment of type-$s$ firms. Thus,

$$L^p_t = \frac{a^p}{c_t} z_t K_t , \quad L^u_t = \frac{a^u}{c_t} (1 - z_t) K_t ,$$

where $z_t = \min(1, \pi(1 + \theta))$ is the share of capital operated by productive firms. Then labor market clearing $L^p_t + L^u_t = 1$ implies that

$$c_t = a_t K_t$$

and $w_t = (1 - \alpha) A^{1-\alpha} (a_t K_t)^{\alpha}$,

with $a_t = z_t a^p + (1 - z_t) a^u$. Therefore, firm $s$ employs $\ell^*_s = \frac{a^s}{a_t K_t} - k^*_t$ workers, and its gross output net of labor costs is

$$(a^s k^*_t)^{\alpha} \left( A \ell^*_t \right)^{1-\alpha} + (1 - \delta) a^s k^*_t - w_t \ell^*_t = a^s k^*_t \left[ \left( \frac{A}{a_t K_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} + 1 - \delta - \frac{w_t}{a_t K_t} \right] = a^s k^*_t \left[ \alpha \left( \frac{A}{a_t K_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} + 1 - \delta \right] .$$

This shows that $R^*_t = a^s \left[ 1 - \delta - \alpha (A/(a_t K_t))^{1-\alpha} \right]$ is the capital return of a type-$s$ firm.

Proof of Proposition 2: If borrowers were unconstrained in all periods, unproductive firms lend out all their capital to productive firms who borrow $(1 - \pi) K_t$ in the aggregate, and the interest rate equals the capital return of productive firms, $R^p_t = R^p_t$. It follows that there are no gains from leverage so that $\tilde{R}_t = R^p_t = R_t$, $\rho_t = 1$ for all $t \geq 0$, and the only solution to equation (8) is $v_t = 0$ for all $t$. But then it follows from equation (7) that debt-equity constraints are $\theta_t = 0$, a contradiction to equation (4). 

Proof of Corollary 1: In steady state, $K_{t+1} = K_t$ implies that $1/\beta = a(R^p/a^p)$ where $a = a^u + (a^p - a^u) \min(1, \pi(1 + \theta))$ is average capital productivity. From Proposition 2, any steady state has binding credit constraints, so that $R = \rho R^p < R^p$. Then either $\rho = \gamma = a^u/a^p$ implies $R = R^u = a^u (R^p/a^p) < a (R^p/a^p)$, or $\rho > \gamma$ and (4) implies $\pi(1 + \theta) = 1$, so that $a = a^p$ and again $R < a (R^p/a^p)$. In any case, $R < 1/\beta$ follows. 

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Proof of Proposition 3: Because of \( f(v_{\text{max}}) < v_{\text{max}} \) and continuity, a solution \( f(v) = v \in (\overline{v}, v_{\text{max}}) \) exists iff \( f(\overline{v}) > \overline{v} \). This condition is
\[
[1 - \gamma(1 - \pi)]^{1+\Phi} > \pi^\Phi,
\]
with \( \Phi = \beta \pi/(1 - \beta(1 - \psi)) \). The LHS in (13) is decreasing in \( \gamma \), LHS < RHS at \( \gamma = 1 \), and LHS > RHS at \( \gamma = 0 \). Therefore there exists a solution \( \gamma_1 \in (0, 1) \) where LHS = RHS. It follows that the steady state \( v^{**} \in (\overline{v}, v_{\text{max}}) \) exists if \( \gamma < \gamma_1 \).

Since \( f \) is strictly convex in \( v \in (0, v_{\text{max}}) \), a steady state \( v^* \in (0, \overline{v}) \) exists if \( \gamma < \gamma_1 \) (implying \( f(\overline{v}) > \overline{v} \)) and if \( f'(0) < 1 \). The latter condition is equivalent to \( \gamma > \gamma_0 \equiv \frac{\Phi}{\Phi+1} \). This completes the proof. \( \square \)

Appendix C: Extended Model and Log-Linearization

We first derive the dynamic equilibrium equations, for arbitrary stochastic processes for labor efficiency \( A_t \) and for the collateral share \( \lambda_t \). Then we log-linearize the model at the indeterminate steady state.

**Labor market equilibrium**

Labor demand of firm \( i \) is
\[
\ell_i^t = a_i^t k_i^t \left( \frac{(1 - \alpha)A_i^t}{w_t} \right)^{1/\alpha},
\]
so that aggregate labor demand is \( L_i^t = a_i^t K_t \left( \frac{(1 - \alpha)A_i^t}{w_t} \right)^{1/\alpha} \) with average capital productivity
\[
a_t = a^u + \min(1, \pi(1 + \theta_t))(a^p - a^u). \tag{14}
\]
With labor supply \( L_t = w_t^p \), the market-clearing wage is
\[
w_t = (1 - \alpha)^{-1/(1+\phi)} (a_t K_t)^{-\alpha/(1+\phi)} A_t^{1/(1+\phi)}.
\]
This yields the equilibrium labor-to-capital ratio in efficiency units
\[
\frac{A_t L_t}{a_t K_t} = (1 - \alpha)^{1/(1+\phi)} (a_t K_t)^{-\alpha/(1+\phi)} A_t^{1/(1+\phi)}.
\]

**Credit market equilibrium**

The return on capital for firm \( i = p, u \) is
\[
(a_i^t k_i^t)^\alpha (A_i^t \ell_i^t)^{1-\alpha} + a_i^t (1 - \delta) k_i^t - w_t \ell_i^t = a_i^t [1 - \delta + r_t] k_i^t \equiv R_i^t k_i^t,
\]

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where
\[ r_t \equiv \alpha \left( \frac{A_t L_t}{a_t K_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} \] (15)

is the average capital return. A productive firm that borrows \( \theta_t \) per unit of equity has leveraged equity return
\[ \tilde{R}_t \equiv R^p_t + \theta_t (R^p_t - R_t) . \]

A firm without access to unsecured credit can still borrow secured, such that the debt does not exceed the value of collateral assets which equal share \( \lambda_t \) of end-of-period wealth. Thus, the debt-equity constraint for secured borrowing \( \theta^s_t \) is determined from
\[ R_t \theta^s_t = \lambda_t R^p_t (1 + \theta^s_t) , \] so that
\[ \theta^s_t = \frac{\lambda_t}{R^p_t - \lambda_t} . \] (16)

As in Section 3, the continuation utility of a borrower with a clean credit record can be written \( \ln(W) + V_t \) with end-of-period wealth \( W \). Similarly, \( \ln(W) + V^d_t \) is the continuation utility of a borrower with a default flag. Then a borrower with equity \( e \) decides not to default at the end of the period if
\[ \ln[\tilde{R}_te] + V_t \geq \ln[(1 + \theta_t)R^p_t (1 - \lambda_t)e] + V^d_t . \]

With \( v_t = V_t - V^d_t \), the default-deterring debt-equity ratio follows from this equation as
\[ \theta_t = \frac{\lambda_t + e^{v_t} - 1}{1 - \lambda_t - (1 - R^p_t) e^{v_t}} . \] (17)

Clearly, \( \theta_t \) increases in both the collateral share \( \lambda_t \) and in the reputation value \( v_t \). Moreover, \( \theta_t = \theta^s_t \) if \( v_t = 0 \).

If a borrower decides to default, he is punished by exclusion from unsecured credit, retaining full access to secured credit. With probability \( \psi_t \), the credit record clears, and the borrower can also borrow unsecured. Exactly as in the model without secured borrowing, we derive a forward-looking equation for the reputation value:
\[ v_t = \beta E_t \left\{ \pi \ln \left[ \frac{R^p_{t+1} + \theta_{t+1} (R^p_{t+1} - R_{t+1})}{R^p_{t+1} + \theta_{t+1} (R^p_{t+1} - R_{t+1})} \right] + (1 - \psi) v_{t+1} \right\} . \] (18)

Here the expression in the term \( \ln(.) \) is the excess leverage return that a borrower with a clean credit record enjoys relative to a defaulter who has access to secured borrowing only.

Consider a credit market equilibrium with \( R_t = R^u_t \), so that unproductive firm owners are indifferent between lending and investing in their own technology. In such situations, we have
\[ R_t/R_t^p = a^u/a^p = \gamma, \] so that equations (16), (17) and (18) simplify to

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta_s &= \frac{\lambda_t}{\gamma - \lambda_t}, \\
\theta_t &= \frac{\lambda_t + e^{\nu_t} - 1}{1 - \lambda_t - (1 - \gamma)e^{\nu_t}}, \\
v_t &= E_t \left\{ \beta \pi \ln \left[ \frac{\gamma - \lambda_{t+1}}{1 - \lambda_{t+1} - (1 - \gamma)e^{\nu_{t+1}}} \right] + \beta (1 - \psi) v_{t+1} \right\}.
\end{align*}
\]

**Capital accumulation and output**

The aggregate capital stock evolves according to

\[ K_{t+1} = \beta \left[ (1 - \delta) a_t K_t + \alpha (A_t L_t)^{1 - \alpha} (a_t K_t)^\alpha \right] = \beta a_t K_t [1 - \delta + r_t]. \]

Since \( a^p > 1 > a^u \), productive firms enhance their capital stock by \((a^p - 1)k^p_t\) while unproductive firms deplete capital \((1 - a^u)k^u_t\). In the aggregate, therefore, the term \((a_t - 1)K_t\) (which may be positive or negative outside the steady state) adds to aggregate investment. Total output is

\[ Y_t = (a_t - 1)K_t + (A_t L_t)^{1 - \alpha} (a_t K_t)^\alpha = (a_t - 1)K_t + a_t K_t \frac{r_t}{\alpha}. \]

Consumption and investment are

\[
\begin{align*}
C_t &= w_t L_t + (1 - \beta) a_t K_t [1 - \delta + r_t] = a_t K_t \left[ \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} r_t + (1 - \beta)(1 - \delta + r_t) \right], \\
I_t &= Y_t - C_t.
\end{align*}
\]

**Steady state equilibrium and calibration of parameters**

The main theoretical results of Section 3 can be extended to this more general setup. In particular, credit constraints are binding in equilibrium, provided that the collateral share parameter \( \lambda \) is sufficiently low. Further, an indeterminate steady state with unsecured credit and capital misallocation exists. For a proof of these assertions in a more general framework that also incorporates autocorrelated productivity shocks, see Appendix D. Given the calibration target for \( K/Y \), \( A = a = 1 \) and parameters \( \alpha \) and \( \phi \), we can solve for steady-state values

\[ K = (1 - \alpha)^\phi (K/Y)^{\frac{\alpha + \phi}{1 - \alpha}}, \quad r = \alpha Y/K, \]

as well as for output, consumption and investment. Given calibration targets for the aggregate credit-to-capital ratio \( \pi \theta \) and for the borrowers’ debt-equity ratio \( \theta \), we can solve for \( \pi \).
For any choice of \( a^u \) and \( a^p = a^u + \frac{1-a^u}{\pi(1+\theta)} \), and given the calibration target for the secured-credit-to-capital ratio \( \theta^s \pi \), we obtain \( \lambda \) from \( \theta^s = \lambda/(\gamma - \lambda) \), \( \gamma = a^u/a^p \), and the reputation value in steady state from (20):

\[
v = \ln \left[ \frac{(1 - \lambda)(1 + \theta)}{1 + \theta(1 - \gamma)} \right].
\]

We then choose \( a^u \) so that also equation (21) is satisfied in steady state, namely

\[
v[1 - \beta(1 - \psi)] = \beta \pi \ln \left[ \frac{\gamma - \lambda}{1 - \lambda - (1 - \gamma)e^v} \right].
\]

**Log linearization**

Log-linearize equations (14), (15), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23) to obtain

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{a}_t &= \pi \theta(a^p - a^u) \hat{\theta}_t, \\
\hat{r}_t &= r_1 \hat{A}_t + r_2 [\hat{a}_t + \hat{K}_t], \\
\hat{\theta}_t &= \frac{\gamma}{\gamma - \lambda} \hat{\lambda}_t, \\
\hat{\lambda}_t &= d_1 \hat{\nu}_t + d_2 \hat{\lambda}_t, \\
\hat{\nu}_t &= E_t[\varphi_1 \hat{\lambda}_{t+1} + \varphi_2 \hat{\nu}_{t+1}], \\
\hat{K}_{t+1} &= \hat{K}_t + \hat{a}_t + \frac{r}{1 - \delta + r} \hat{r}_t, \\
\hat{Y}_t &= \hat{K}_t + (1 + K/Y) \hat{a}_t + \hat{r}_t,
\end{align*}
\]

where

\[
\begin{align*}
\varphi_1 &= \beta \pi \frac{(1/\gamma - 1/\lambda)(e^{\nu} - 1)}{1 - \lambda - (1 - \gamma)e^{\nu}} , \\
\varphi_2 &= \beta(1 - \psi) + \frac{\beta \pi (1/\gamma - 1/\lambda)(e^{\nu} - 1)}{1 - \lambda - (1 - \gamma)e^{\nu}}.
\end{align*}
\]

Because \( \varphi_2 > 1 \) at the indeterminate steady state, we obtain from (28) a stationary forward solution with sunspot shocks \( \varepsilon^s_{t+1} \) satisfying \( E_t(\varepsilon^s_{t+1}) = 0 \):

\[
\hat{\nu}_{t+1} = \frac{1}{\varphi_2} \hat{\nu}_t - \frac{\varphi_1}{\varphi_2} \hat{\lambda}_{t+1} + \varepsilon^s_{t+1}.
\]
Identification of shocks
Given series for the credit-to-capital ratio and for the secured-credit-to-capital ratio, we obtain \( \hat{\theta}_t \) and \( \hat{\theta}^s_t \). Then, we can solve for \( \hat{\lambda}_t \) and \( \hat{v}_t \) from (26) and (27). Finally, we choose \( \hat{A}_t \) to match the output series \( \hat{Y}_t \).

Appendix D: Autocorrelated Productivity

This appendix extends the model and the main theoretical results to an autocorrelated idiosyncratic productivity process. Specifically, suppose that productive firms stay productive with probability \( \pi_p \) and become unproductive otherwise, whereas unproductive firms become productive with probability \( \pi_u \) and stay unproductive otherwise. Productivities are positively autocorrelated when \( \pi_p > \pi_u \). The i.i.d. benchmark considered in the main text corresponds to the case \( \pi_p = \pi_u = \pi \). We assume that the collateral share is sufficiently low so as to ensure binding credit constraints and a capital misallocation in the absence of unsecured credit:

\[
\lambda < \frac{\gamma (1 - \pi_p)}{1 - \gamma (\pi_p - \pi_u)} .
\]  

(32)

One major difference to the benchmark model is that the share of capital in the hands of productive firms at the beginning of a period, denoted \( x_t \), is a state variable which adjusts sluggishly over time (see Kiyotaki (1998)) according to

\[
x_{t+1} = \frac{\pi_p \tilde{R}_t x_t + \pi_u R_t (1 - x_t)}{R_t x_t + \tilde{R}_t (1 - x_t)},
\]

(33)

where \( R_t = \rho_t R^p_t \) is the gross interest rate (the equity return of unproductive firms) and \( \tilde{R}_t = [1 + \theta_t (1 - \rho_t)] R^p_t \) is the equity return of productive firms. Given \( x_t \), fraction \( z_t = \min(1, x_t (1 + \theta_t)) \) of capital is operated by productive firms, \( a_t = z_t a^p + (1 - z_t) a^u \) is average capital productivity. Capital market equilibrium boils down to the complementary slackness condition

\[
\rho_t \geq \gamma , \quad x_t (1 + \theta_t) \leq 1.
\]

(34)

To derive the endogenous debt-equity ratio \( \theta_t \), define \( V_t(W) \) (\( V^d_t(W) \)) for the continuation values of a productive firm owner with a clean credit record (with a default flag) who has wealth \( W \) at the end of period \( t \). Similarly, define continuation values for unproductive firm owners as \( U_t(W) \) (\( U^d_t(W) \)). Borrowers with a default flag can still borrow secured, so their equity return is \( \tilde{R}^d_t = [1 + \theta^*_t (1 - \rho_t)] R^p_t \), where \( \theta^*_t \) is the debt-equity limit of secured borrowing, given by (16). Because of logarithmic utility, all firm owners save fraction \( \beta \) of wealth and continuation utilities
can be written in the form $V_t(W) = \ln(W) + V_t$ etc. where $V_t$, $V_t^d$, $U_t$, $U_t^d$ are independent of wealth and satisfy the recursive equations (with constant $C \equiv (1 - \beta) \ln(1 - \beta) + \beta \ln \beta$):

\[
V_t = C + \beta E_t \left[ \pi_p (\ln \tilde{R}_{t+1} + V_{t+1}) + (1 - \pi_p)(\ln R_{t+1} + U_{t+1}) \right],
\]

\[
V_t^d = C + \beta E_t \left[ \pi_p (\ln \tilde{R}_{t+1} + V_{t+1} + \psi(V_{t+1} - V_{t+1}^d)) + (1 - \pi_p)(\ln R_{t+1} + U_{t+1}^d - U_{t+1}^d) \right],
\]

\[
U_t = C + \beta E_t \left[ \pi_u (\ln \tilde{R}_{t+1} + V_{t+1}) + (1 - \pi_u)(\ln R_{t+1} + U_{t+1}) \right],
\]

\[
U_t^d = C + \beta E_t \left[ \pi_u (\ln \tilde{R}_{t+1} + V_{t+1} + \psi(V_{t+1} - V_{t+1}^d)) + (1 - \pi_u)(\ln R_{t+1} + U_{t+1}^d - U_{t+1}^d) \right].
\]

Define $v_t \equiv V_t - V_t^d$ and $u_t \equiv U_t - U_t^d$ as reputation values for productive and unproductive firm owners, satisfying

\[
v_t = \beta E_t \left[ \pi_p \left( \frac{\tilde{R}_{t+1}}{R_{t+1}} + (1 - \psi)v_{t+1} \right) + (1 - \pi_p)(1 - \psi)u_{t+1} \right],
\]

\[
u_t = \beta E_t \left[ \pi_u \left( \frac{\tilde{R}_{t+1}}{R_{t+1}} + (1 - \psi)v_{t+1} \right) + (1 - \pi_u)(1 - \psi)u_{t+1} \right].
\]

These equations can be reduced to one in $v_t$ with two forward lags, generalizing equation (18):

\[
v_t = \beta E_t \left[ \pi_p \ln \frac{\tilde{R}_{t+1}}{R_{t+1}} + (1 - \psi)\pi_p + (1 - \psi)v_{t+1} \right] - \beta^2(1 - \psi)\pi_p - \beta \pi_u] E_t \left[ \ln \frac{\tilde{R}_{t+1}}{R_{t+1}} + (1 - \psi)v_{t+1} \right]. \tag{35}
\]

Default-deterring debt limits are linked to reputation values $v_t$ and to the collateral share $\lambda_t$ according to the same equation (17) as in the model with uncorrelated productivity. This again permits a simple equilibrium characterization as solutions $(\rho_t, \theta_t, v_t, x_t)$ to the system of equations (33), (34), (35) and (17).

It is straightforward to check that credit constraints are binding if (32) holds, which generalizes Proposition 2. If constraints were slack in all periods, $\rho_t = 1$ and $\tilde{R}_t = \tilde{R}_t^d = \tilde{R}_t$ would imply that $v_t = 0$ in all periods $t$, so that default-deterring debt-equity ratios are $\theta_t = \lambda/(1 - \lambda)$. On the other hand, because of (33), the capital share of productive firm owners would converge to the stationary population share which is $x_t \rightarrow \overline{x}_{FB} \equiv \frac{\pi_p}{\pi_p - \pi_u}$. Capital market equilibrium with non-binding constraints requires however that the debt capacity of borrowers exceeds capital supply of lenders, $\theta_t x_t \geq 1 - x_t$ which boils down to $\lambda \geq (1 - \pi_p)/(1 - \pi_p + \pi_u)$, contradicting condition (32).

Condition (32) furthermore implies that there exists an equilibrium without unsecured credit ($v_t = 0$ for all $t$) where capital is misallocated. In this equilibrium, $\rho_t = \gamma$, $\theta_t = \overline{\theta} \equiv \frac{\lambda}{\lambda - \gamma}$, and
the stationary capital share $\bar{x}$ solves the quadratic
\[
\bar{x} \left[ (1 - \gamma) \bar{x} + \gamma - \lambda \right] = \pi_p (1 - \lambda) \bar{x} + \pi_u (\gamma - \lambda)(1 - \bar{x}),
\]
which has a unique solution $\bar{x} \in (0, 1)$. A credit market equilibrium with misallocated capital at $\rho = \gamma$ requires that $\bar{x} \theta < 1 - \bar{x}$. It is straightforward to verify that this is equivalent to condition (32).

We can generalize Proposition 3 as follows.

**Proposition 5** Suppose that $\pi_p \geq \pi_u$. For all parameter values there exists a stationary equilibrium without unsecured credit and with inefficient capital allocation. Provided that $\lambda$ is sufficiently small, there are threshold values $\gamma_0 < \gamma_1 < 1$ such that:

(a) For $\gamma \in (\gamma_0, \gamma_1)$, there are two stationary equilibria with unsecured credit, one of them with inefficient capital allocation and the other one with efficient capital allocation.

(b) For $\gamma > \gamma_1$, there is no stationary equilibrium with unsecured credit.

(c) For $\gamma \leq \gamma_0$, there exists a unique stationary equilibrium with unsecured credit and efficient capital allocation.

**Proof:** The existence of the equilibrium without unsecured credit has already been established above. Consider first a steady–state equilibrium with an inefficient capital allocation ($\theta x < 1 - x$ and $\rho = \gamma$) and unsecured credit ($v > 0$). Because of $\bar{R}/\bar{R}^d = \frac{\gamma - \lambda}{1 - \lambda - \bar{e}v(1 - \gamma)}$, equation (35) implies in steady state that
\[
e^v = F(e^v) \equiv \left( \frac{\gamma - \lambda}{1 - \lambda - \bar{e}v(1 - \gamma)} \right)^\Phi,
\]
with parameter $\Phi \equiv \frac{\beta \pi_p - \beta^2 (1 - \psi)(\pi_p - \pi_u)}{1 - \beta (1 - \psi) \pi_p + \beta (1 - \psi)^2 (\pi_p - \pi_u)} > 0$. Redefine $\varphi = e^v > 1$ and note that $F$ is increasing and strictly convex with $F(\varphi) \to \infty$ for $\varphi \to (1 - \lambda)/(1 - \gamma) > 1$. We also have that $F(1) = 1$ (which corresponds to the steady state $v = 0$ without unsecured credit).

This implies that equation (36) has a solution $\varphi = e^v > 1$ if and only if $F'(1) < 1$ which is equivalent to $\gamma > \gamma_0 \equiv \frac{\lambda + \Phi}{1 + \Phi}$. The stationary capital share $x$ solves
\[
x = H(x) \equiv \frac{\pi_p [1 + \theta (1 - \gamma)] x + \pi_u \gamma (1 - x)}{[1 + \theta (1 - \gamma)] x + \gamma (1 - x)},
\]
where function $H$ is (weakly) increasing (because of $\pi_p \geq \pi_u$). This equation has a unique solution $x \in (0, 1)$ which satisfies $\theta x < 1 - x$ if and only if $1/(1 + \theta) > H(1/(1 + \theta))$ which is equivalent to
\[
\theta < \frac{1 - \pi_p}{\pi_p (1 - \gamma) + \pi_u \gamma}.
\]
Using $\theta = \frac{\varphi^{-1} + \lambda}{1 - \lambda - \varphi(1 - \gamma)}$, this is equivalent to
\[ \varphi < \varphi^* \equiv \frac{(1 - \lambda)(1 - \gamma(\pi_p - \pi_u))}{1 - \gamma + \pi_u \gamma}. \]
Since $F$ is increasing and convex with $F'(\varphi) > 1$, this holds if and only if $F(\varphi^*) > \varphi^*$, which is equivalent to
\[ [1 - \gamma(1 - \pi_u)]^{1 + \Phi} > (1 - \lambda)^{1 + \Phi} \left( \frac{\varphi^*}{\varphi} \right)^\Phi [\pi_p - \gamma(\pi_p - \pi_u)]^\Phi [1 - \gamma(\pi_p - \pi_u)]. \] (37)
In this inequality, both the LHS and the RHS are decreasing functions of $\gamma$ such that $\text{LHS}(1) < \text{RHS}(1)$ (because of (32)) and $\text{LHS}(\gamma) = \text{RHS}(\gamma)$ at $\gamma \equiv \lambda / (1 - \pi_p + \lambda(\pi_p - \pi_u)) < 1$. Moreover, we have $0 > \text{LHS}'(\gamma) > \text{RHS}'(\gamma)$ if and only if
\[ \lambda[\pi_p - \lambda(\pi_p - \pi_u)](1 - \pi_u)(1 + \Phi) < (1 - \lambda)(1 - \pi_p)\Phi[1 - \pi_u + \lambda(\pi_p - \pi_u)]. \]
This inequality is true if $\lambda$ is sufficiently small, so that we can conclude that there exists $\gamma_1 \in (\gamma, 1)$ such that inequality (37) is satisfied for all $\gamma \in (\gamma, \gamma_1)$. Since also $\gamma_0 \in (\gamma, \gamma_1)$, we conclude that there exists a steady state with inefficient capital allocation and unsecured credit if and only if $\gamma \in (\gamma_0, \gamma_1)$.

Second, consider an equilibrium with unsecured credit and efficient capital allocation, so that $\rho > \gamma$ and $\theta = \frac{e^v - 1 + \lambda}{1 - \lambda - e^v(1 - \rho)}$. The stationary capital share in such an equilibrium is $x = \frac{\pi_p(1 - \rho) + \pi_u \rho}{1 - \rho(\pi_p - \pi_u)}$, and capital market equilibrium requires that $x\theta = 1 - x$. Combining these equations establishes the equilibrium interest rate at given reputation value $v$:
\[ \rho = \frac{e^v - 1 + \lambda}{e^v(1 - \pi_u) - (1 - \lambda)(\pi_p - \pi_u)}. \] (38)
On the other hand, equation (35) yields the stationary reputation value, analogously to (36),
\[ e^v = \left( \frac{\rho - \lambda}{1 - \lambda - e^v(1 - \rho)} \right)^\Phi. \] (39)
Solving (38) for $e^v$ and substitution into (39) yields the following equation for the equilibrium value of $\rho$:
\[ [1 - \rho(1 - \pi_u)]^{1 + \Phi} = (1 - \lambda)^{1 + \Phi} \left( \frac{\rho}{\rho - \lambda} \right)^\Phi [\pi_p - (\pi_p - \pi_u)]^\Phi [1 - \rho(\pi_p - \pi_u)]. \] (40)
In this equation, both sides (functions of $\rho$) are the same as both sides in inequality (37) (functions of $\gamma$). We conclude, again for $\lambda$ sufficiently small, that $\rho = \gamma_1 < 1$ solves equation (40). In turn, for every $\gamma < \gamma_1 = \rho$, a steady-state equilibrium with efficient capital allocation and unsecured credit exists. This completes the proof. \[\square\]
Steady state and log linearization

We can calibrate a steady state equilibrium in the same way as in Appendix C. The log-linearized equations (25), (26), (27), (29) and (30) are the same as before. Because of $a_t = a^u + x_t(1 + \theta_t)(a^p - a^u)$, (24) generalizes to

$$\hat{a}_t = x(a^p - a^u)[\theta\hat{\theta}_t + (1 + \theta)\hat{x}_t].$$

(41)

To generalize (28), write $\frac{\tilde{R}_t}{R_t^d} = \frac{\gamma - \lambda_t}{1 - \lambda_t - (1 - \gamma)ev}$ and log-linearize (35):

$$\hat{v}_t = E_t[\varphi_1\hat{\lambda}_{t+1} + \varphi_2\hat{v}_{t+1} + \varphi_3\hat{\lambda}_{t+2} + \varphi_4\hat{v}_{t+2}],$$

(42)

where

$$\begin{align*}
\varphi_1 &= \frac{\beta \pi_p}{v} \cdot \frac{\lambda(1 - \gamma)(e^v - 1)}{(\gamma - \lambda)(1 - \lambda - (1 - \gamma)e^v)}, \\
\varphi_2 &= \beta(1 - \psi)(\pi_p + 1 - \pi_u) + \beta \pi_p \frac{(1 - \gamma)e^v}{1 - \lambda - (1 - \gamma)e^v}, \\
\varphi_3 &= -\beta^2(1 - \psi)(\pi_p - \pi_u) \cdot \frac{\lambda(1 - \gamma)(e^v - 1)}{(\gamma - \lambda)(1 - \lambda - (1 - \gamma)e^v)}, \\
\varphi_4 &= -\beta^2(1 - \psi)(\pi^p - \pi^u) \left[1 - \psi + \frac{(1 - \gamma)e^v}{1 - \lambda - (1 - \gamma)e^v}\right].
\end{align*}$$

Finally, log linearization of (33) yields

$$\hat{x}_{t+1} = x_1\hat{x}_t + x_2\hat{\theta}_t,$$

(43)

with

$$\begin{align*}
x_1 &= \frac{\pi_p(1 + \theta(1 - \gamma))x - \pi_u\gamma}{\pi_p(1 + \theta(1 - \gamma))x + \pi_u\gamma(1 - x)} - \frac{(1 - \gamma)(1 + \theta)x}{(1 + \theta(1 - \gamma))x + \gamma(1 - x)}, \\
x_2 &= \frac{\pi_p\theta(1 - \gamma)x}{\pi_p(1 + \theta(1 - \gamma))x + \pi_u\gamma(1 - x)} - \frac{\theta(1 - \gamma)x}{(1 + \theta(1 - \gamma))x + \gamma(1 - x)}.
\end{align*}$$