Political Polarization as a Social Movement Outcome: 1960s Klan Activism and Its Enduring Impact on Political Realignment in Southern Counties, 1960 to 2000

Rory McVeigh,[a] David Cunningham,[b] and Justin Farrell[c]

Abstract

Radical social movements can exacerbate tensions in local settings while drawing attention to how movement goals align with political party agendas. Short-term movement influence on voting outcomes can endure when orientations toward the movement disrupt social ties, embedding individuals within new discussion networks that reinforce new partisan loyalties. To demonstrate this dynamic, we employ longitudinal data to show that increases in Republican voting, across several different time intervals, were most pronounced in southern counties where the Ku Klux Klan had been active in the 1960s. In an individual-level analysis of voting intent, we show that decades after the Klan declined, racial attitudes map onto party voting among southern voters, but only in counties where the Klan had been active.

Keywords

political polarization, social movements, racism, voting

In the presidential election of 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was swept into office after crushing his opponent with just over 57 percent of the popular vote. Only five states—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, and Delaware—went for Herbert Hoover, the incumbent Republican president. Roosevelt's support was particularly strong in states of the former Confederacy. Indeed, he received over 90 percent of the popular vote in South Carolina (98.0 percent), Mississippi (96.0 percent), Louisiana (92.8 percent), and Georgia (91.6 percent). Seventy-six years later, Barack Obama became the nation's first African American president, defeating his Republican rival John McCain with just under 53 percent of the vote. Like Roosevelt, Obama's electoral prospects were enhanced

[a]University of Notre Dame
[b]Brandeis University
[c]Yale University

Corresponding Author:
Rory McVeigh, 810 Flanner Hall, Department of Sociology, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556
E-mail: rmcveigh@nd.edu

by dissatisfaction among the electorate, as the nation was mired in a deepening economic crisis that began during a Republican president's administration. Unlike Roosevelt, however, Obama was soundly defeated in most southern states. This political reality would make it difficult for him to implement policies to address the economic crisis in the early years of his presidency, as he faced strong resistance from Republican legislators heavily concentrated in the South.

The South's strong ties to the national Republican Party preceded the Obama presidency. In fact, Obama fared better in the South than did John Kerry and Al Gore, the Democratic nominees in 2004 and 2000, respectively. As many scholars have pointed out, realignment of southern voting patterns in national politics, which transformed the South from a Democratic to a Republican stronghold, was in part driven by a backlash resulting from the national Democratic Party's support for African American civil rights in the 1960s and beyond (Beck 1977; Black 2004; Carmines and Stimson 1989). Violent and non-violent resistance to the civil rights agenda from white segregationists in the South—reflected in the emergence or resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan, Citizens' Councils, State Sovereignty Commissions, and strong support for the third-party presidential bid of George Wallace—drew attention to how white southerners, as well as many white Americans outside the South, resented progressive change that they deemed threatening to their own racial and class interests and values.

In this article, we aim to shed additional light on party realignment in southern states. We do so by considering whether mobilization of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1960s had an enduring impact on presidential voting outcomes in southern counties. While the substantive significance of this question carries considerable weight, we engage in this work because of its broader implications. Given the vitriol that currently characterizes party politics in the United States, and given the strong geographic patterning of party voting, it is not surprising that political pundits, scholars, and

ordinary citizens engage in discussions of "two Americas," "culture wars," and "red states" versus "blue states," as they perceive that people in the United States are becoming polarized to such an extent that it poses a serious threat to national unity (Frank 2004; Gelman 2008; Hunter 1991). Contrary to these perceptions, however, research shows that Americans are not, in fact, becoming increasingly polarized on a broad range of issues (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; McAdam and Kloos 2014). For example, and pertinent to our research, overt expressions of racial prejudice, once common among white U.S. citizens inside and outside the South, are now much less likely to be expressed in survey responses (Griffin and Hargis 2008; Quillian 2006; Schuman 1997). While regional differences persist, racial attitudes have become less polarized over time, even in the face of durable structural and more subtle barriers to racial equality (Bonilla-Silva 2014; Jackman 1994; Omi and Winant 1994).

One form of polarization that has, in fact, grown is that between adherents of the two major political parties (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005). Voters' preferences across a broad range of issues have increasingly become aligned with their party's positions. Ideological homogeneity across issue clusters among voters *within* parties thus results in an ideological gulf *between* parties (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; DiMaggio et al. 1996). Little attention, however, has been given to the mechanisms that produced this outcome. A focus on party realignment in the South offers a unique opportunity to study how voter preferences on a particular issue, such as opposition to civil rights, can become aligned with party voting. Loyalty to the Democratic Party ran deep among white southern voters for well over a century prior to the 1960s, but within just a few election cycles, most southern states were solidly in the Republican camp.[1] Yet not all southern communities embraced the GOP to the same degree, and not all white voters abandoned the Democratic Party. By examining this internal heterogeneity of southern communities and southern voters, we hope to

gain a deeper understanding of the sources of political polarization. Our investigation, we believe, can also increase our understanding of how racial privilege can be sustained in a nation where an increasing number of citizens feel they are living in a "color-blind" society (Bonilla-Silva 2014).

Theoretical approaches to the study of social movement consequences provide us with a jumping-off point for examining the Klan's influence on voting. Yet we must extend social movement theory to address some of the more general questions related to political polarization. In addition to asking whether a social movement can influence a particular voting outcome, we address questions about how a movement can produce enduring effects—effects that continue to shape social behavior long after the movement itself has declined. Answers to these questions, as we will show, offer insight into how U.S. politics have become more polarized while people in the United States have not.

POLITICAL POLARIZATION AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT OUTCOME

Much of the research on social movement outcomes identifies attributes of social movement organizations or features of the political context that increase the likelihood a movement will achieve its stated goals. There is still much to be learned, however, about *unintended* consequences of mobilization and the ways movements can contribute to cultural change (Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999). As Amenta and colleagues (2010) note, a failed social movement can produce significant social change, while a movement that achieves its goals may have only a minimal impact on society at large. In our case, the Ku Klux Klan failed in its efforts to defend Jim Crow segregation in the South, and its membership plummeted in the late 1960s (Chalmers 1987; Cunningham 2013; Wade 1987). Yet the Klan, as we will argue, contributed to the racialization of national politics and, in

that sense, its influence has long outlived the movement's heyday of resistance to black civil rights.

In short, we argue that KKK activism raised the salience of conflicting interests in the civil rights struggle and exacerbated deep divisions among community members in local settings. It encouraged white voters to prioritize the defense of white supremacy when making voting decisions, upending long-standing Democratic Party allegiances and favoring Republicans over Democrats in presidential elections. Polarization in local contexts resulting from Klan activism, in turn, helped ensure that voting realignment would be lasting rather than temporary. If we are correct, we should find that southern counties where the Klan was active in the 1960s experienced greater increases in Republican voting in the immediate aftermath of the movement's peak resistance to civil rights advances, compared to southern counties where the Klan did not have a presence. These increases in Republican voting should sustain over time, even when controlling for other changes that took place in these counties. Finally, we expect that even decades after the initial conflict, the extent to which southern voters' views on segregation map onto their voting behavior will depend on whether the Klan had been active in the county in which they reside.

Consequences of Mobilization

Research on social movement outcomes shows that many of the factors that contribute to the emergence of social movements, such as a favorable political context, strong and resourceful organizational infrastructure, and coherent and effective framing of grievances, can also increase the likelihood that a movement achieves its goals (Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein 1994; Cress and Snow 2000; Goldstone 1980; McAdam 1982; McCammon et al. 2007). Building on the resource mobilization and political process traditions, for example, Andrews (2001) emphasizes the importance of developing a strong

organizational infrastructure that can prompt political elites to grant concessions in response to potential threats posed by a formidable movement. By this same logic, an organizational presence in a particular local setting should make it more likely a movement will affect the community, even in ways that may not be fully intended or may not be a primary goal of the movement.

The political context in which movements operate can also shape outcomes. Amenta and colleagues (1994) offer a political mediation theory, specifying an interaction between organizational strength and political opportunities. To force social change, the argument goes, a movement must be organizationally strong enough to be taken seriously and also benefit from the presence of political incentives for authorities to grant concessions. When it comes to voting outcomes, movement activism may signal an opportunity to political officeholders and candidates, who will consider the strategic benefits of making concessions to the movement to attract votes (see Burstein and Linton 2002).

Movements, in turn, can play a role in helping constituents recognize these types of appeals. Greater exposure to a movement, by virtue of activism in one's local community, should facilitate this linkage of movement grievances and candidate outreach. Exposure by itself, however, is insufficient. Cress and Snow (2000) argue that framing processes are important not only for movement mobilization but also in shaping movement outcomes. To attract support, movement activists typically offer a diagnosis of the problems they are seeking to address as well as a prognosis (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986). In our case, we would not expect movement influence on voting behavior if Klan leaders failed to provide clear guidance about the relationship between voting and movement goals (see McVeigh 2009; Redding 1992; Schwartz 1976).

Enduring Effects

Based on the preceding discussion, there is reason to expect that social movements can influence particular voting outcomes in local settings, because members of a community where a movement is active have greater exposure to the movement, raising the salience of movement grievances in the broader political arena. This exposure can help potential voters recognize how movement grievances are aligned with political candidates' positions. Yet this argument would lead us to expect only a short-term effect. If we expect, as we do, that a social movement's influence can outlive the movement's presence, we must identify mechanisms that sustain a movement's influence over time.

We assume that significant changes in behavior, such as breaking an alliance with a political party when voting for president, are most likely to be sustained in the presence of social reinforcement (Myers and Lamm 1976). It is here that polarization in local settings can play an important role. Individuals often possess only a limited knowledge of issue positions held by political parties and candidates, and they often have a flawed perception of the extent to which their own views on a particular issue are shared by others (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964). Luker (1984:137), for example, describes how individuals who became anti-abortion activists viewed the *Roe v. Wade* ruling as a "bolt from the blue." It was unimaginable to them, based on the information available through their discussion networks, that abortion could be legalized and that many people in the United States actually supported legalization. Kuran (1995) notes how revolutions can catch the world by surprise because the level of discontent with a given regime becomes apparent only after the fact. Similarly, other researchers note how a "spiral of silence" can lead individuals to falsely perceive that a minority opinion is actually in the majority, if proponents of the minority viewpoint are highly vocal while those in the majority do not communicate their opinions to others (Granovetter and Soong 1988; Noelle-Neumann 1993).

Building on this work, Baldassarri and Bearman (2007) call attention to how particular issues that temporarily receive a great deal

of attention in the media and discussion networks—what they call "takeoff issues"—can produce notable shuffling of social relations and interaction patterns. Under normal circumstances, individuals often perceive polarization in the broader environment, sensing that views held by their close associates are distinct from those held by other groups in society. This occurs because they tend to engage with others who are similar to them and to select discussion partners and topics in ways that avoid disagreement and conflict (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). An individual, for example, may discuss politics with person A, who shares her political views, but discuss music with person B, who shares her taste in music but not necessarily her political views. This method of dissonance reduction produces relatively stable patterns of social relations as well as an exaggerated sense of the overall ideological homogeneity within one's own friendship networks.

A takeoff issue, however, can shake up these stable relationships. Intense public discussion and debate around a controversial topic can force discussions with alters that reveal conflicting attitudes and values on a highly salient topic. This, in turn, can lead to a restructuring of social relations (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007). A social movement, particularly one that is highly visible, controversial, confrontational, and violent, can produce or even become a takeoff issue within local communities. While such movements may become topics of discussion even outside the communities where they are active, a local presence increases the likelihood they will become intense topics of debate and discussion. Social movements, therefore, may not simply influence individual opinions in the short term—they can also embed people within new social relations that hinge upon support or opposition to a movement and its goals. By aligning themselves with or against a political party or program, such movements can contribute to party polarization, as individuals increasingly establish relationships with others who share both their attitude toward the movement and their party identity.

People come to see themselves as Republicans in opposition to Democrats or vice versa, and this new identity is reinforced by engaging in new discussion networks with individuals who share their party identification.

Even after a movement has left the scene or is no longer serving as a takeoff issue, these associated relationship patterns can remain intact for years and even generations. Party identification can act as a lens through which individuals interpret a broad range of issues, and over time, voters accommodate their stances on particular issues—issues on which they do not have deeply held opinions—to the positions advanced by their party (Aldrich 2011; Campbell et al. 1960). In this way, a process of dissonance reduction once again leads to solidification of discussion patterns that locks individuals into a new set of insiders and outsiders—allies and enemies. Even after actors' feelings toward a social movement have softened or changed over time, the restructuring of social relationships can ensure a movement's influence on voting endures. Party identification can be passed from generation to generation (Campbell et al. 1960; Sears et al. 1980), and new entrants to a community are exposed to a pre-existing structure of social ties in which individuals sharply divide along party lines.

In short, we expect that social movements—particularly radical and confrontational movements—can influence voting outcomes in the short term by calling attention to links between movement goals and positions taken by political candidates. Furthermore, by virtue of restructuring social relations in local settings and creating new lines of polarization, a movement's influence can outlive its own presence. With these ideas in mind, the next section considers the role played by the Ku Klux Klan in the party realignment of southern counties.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: HOW THE KLAN MATTERED

The civil rights-era KKK's direct influence on the political process peaked during the

mid-1960s. While the Klan was disorganized, factionalized, and small following the *Brown v. Board* school desegregation decision in the 1950s, its fortunes changed sharply beginning in 1961, when a number of self-styled Klan outfits consolidated under the Robert Shelton-led United Klans of America (UKA).[2] Shelton and his state-level lieutenants—dubbed Grand Dragons—aggressively organized Klan chapters (or "klaverns") throughout the South (Chalmers 2003; Cunningham 2013). By 1966, the UKA had established more than 350 klaverns, holding an estimated 30,000 members (U.S. House of Representatives 1966, 1967). Klan recruiters organized nightly rallies to capitalize on widespread white resentment of civil rights activism and the perceived threat posed by the anticipated and eventual dismantling of Jim Crow segregation in the South. Efforts to implement school desegregation plans, as well as passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, allowed Klan recruiters to communicate a sense of urgency as they sought to attract members and support. Consequently, the movement had its greatest appeal among white working-class southerners vulnerable to economic competition from African Americans (Cunningham 2013; Cunningham and Phillips 2007; Luders 2010).

The KKK and Party Politics

In line with prior scholarship that emphasizes the importance of an organizational infrastructure in producing movement outcomes (e.g., Andrews 2004), we expect that shifts from Democratic to Republican voting were most pronounced in communities where the Klan had an organizational presence. Certainly, the Klan had supporters and sympathizers in most southern communities in the mid-1960s, but the movement's presence should have helped loosen long-standing political loyalties, reorient local relations around fluctuating party positions, and thus consolidate support for wholesale shifts in political alliances.

To understand how the civil rights-era Klan shaped voting patterns in enduring ways, we emphasize the KKK's orientation to institutional politics, its role as a takeoff issue among residents of southern communities where it coalesced, and the contours of party politics in the South. Certainly, generating support for specific Republican presidential candidates or the Republican Party in general was not a primary goal of the Klan. Yet the movement was, in large part, a militant reaction to the civil rights agenda—an agenda ultimately embraced by the national Democratic Party. As a result, while the Klan was perhaps best known for its violent tactics in the 1960s, the movement did invest significant energy in attempting to influence voting outcomes. Indeed, when Klan leader James Venable was asked about the movement's violent orientation, he responded, "The Klan's deadly weapon will become block-voting and the ballot box" (Kelley 1961).

Other Klan leaders spoke of the importance of turning out votes among individuals sympathetic to their cause as a means of countering increased voting by African Americans (Luders 2010). Klan leader Robert Shelton made this strategy clear, exclaiming that "we want to show a greater bloc vote to the politician than the Negro has" (Associated Press 1962). Similarly, UKA North Carolina Grand Dragon Bob Jones repeatedly called for his supporters to use "ballots over bullets" to "form a voting bloc to defeat any nigger-loving politician that runs for office" (Clay 1966). Jones's call was telling, as he not only sought to counter the voting efforts of African Americans and liberals, but also to support "good white men" in office, regardless of their party affiliation (quoted in Cunningham 2013:113).

This emphasis on evaluating and supporting candidates based on their "authentic whiteness"—that is, their commitment to maintaining racial segregation—rather than their party ties signaled a significant departure in the South, which had solidly supported the Democratic Party since the Civil War. Such allegiances reflected the enduring association of Republicans with the "Party of Lincoln" and

Reconstruction, as well as significant southern working-class support for progressive Democratic economic policy. Equally crucial was the fact that the very idea of uncompromising party loyalty was wedded to the logic of white supremacy. Consolidated support for a single party ensured white political dominance: even if black citizens voted in larger numbers and as a bloc, the "white vote" would never be split between two parties. Thus, party loyalty had long been closely intertwined with the maintenance of Jim Crow (McMillen 1990).

The Klan's emphasis on ideological purity in the face of civil rights challenges, and its leaders' corresponding calls to support only candidates not beholden to black votes and black interests, represented a forceful early effort to break down unquestioning support for this "Solid South" status quo. Such efforts occurred alongside profound shifts in major party platforms. As late as 1958, Republican legislators were pronouncedly more liberal than Democrats in their racial views. Such party differences were stark within the South, of course, but also held nationally, with 90 percent of northern Republican senators considered racial liberals. Nationally, 91 percent of GOP senators—versus only 44 percent of their Democratic counterparts—identified as liberal on race issues in 1958 (Carmines and Stimson 1989). During the 1960s, however, Democratic presidents Kennedy and Johnson pushed for civil rights legislation, while national Republican candidates shifted away from their prior support of civil rights. Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign reflected the most visible early manifestation of this shifting racial demography (McAdam and Kloos 2014), and Klan members advocated for Goldwater's Republican candidacy in 1964 while incessantly criticizing Democratic incumbents' intensifying support for civil rights. The UKA's large-scale effort to mobilize its members to stump en masse for George Wallace's reactionary third-party campaign in 1968 not only cemented this break with the Democratic establishment, but it created a precedent—and an infrastructure—for direct engagement with electoral campaigns (Cunningham 2013).

The KKK's rhetoric routinely and fervently emphasized voting appeals. At nearly all of its nightly rallies throughout the mid-1960s, Klan speakers underscored the message that, as one member put it, "if you don't believe in mixing races, we want to vote out all of these [Negro] lovers that we have in office . . . start voting people in office that will be white men" (U.S. House of Representatives 1966:2896). Such messages were heard directly by a wide swath of the local population; it was not unusual for rallies to attract more than a thousand spectators, the majority of whom were sympathizers or curious onlookers rather than formal KKK members (Chalmers 1987; Cunningham 2013; Luders 2010). Less directly, but ultimately more powerfully, the intense debate that surrounded the group meant the Klan's message affected residents who did not even attend rallies. Even where the Klan's message had mass appeal, the organization's presence and the violent means through which it frequently sought to reinforce its segregationist aims earned it lightening-rod status in many local communities. As Cunningham (2013) notes, in KKK hotbeds like eastern North Carolina, local newspapers carried multiple articles each week debating the Klan's legality and the group's moral and political legitimacy. Ministerial associations and other civic bodies regularly condemned the Klan's presence and its penchant for cloaking terroristic threats within patriotic and Christian frameworks, and state officials spoke out strongly against Klan violence. Such intensive debate and discussion placed disproportionate emphasis on a fractious political element, ensuring the KKK itself served as a takeoff issue. This dynamic enhanced the salience of the group's political message and created a basis for embedding individuals in relations polarized along lines of support or opposition to the movement and its goals.

The Klan's position that racial ideology should trump party loyalty both presaged and contributed to the massive de-alignment of white southern voters from the national Democratic Party in the later 1960s. When, in

1980, George Wallace's former campaign manager famously explained his backing of Ronald Reagan's candidacy by arguing that "we're looking for a conservative individual for President, and we don't care what party he runs on" (quoted in Black and Black 2002:218), he was reiterating a position that KKK leaders had advanced ad nauseum 15 years earlier. As such, the Klan's impact on its supporters' *orientation* to institutional politics—solidified by its steady promotion of a rationale for breaking down unquestioning party alignments as well as its contribution to increasingly polarized relational patterns that reshaped partisan identities—provided a basis for altered patterns of party support that endured long beyond the life of the civil rights-era KKK itself.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: DATA AND METHODS

To assess the enduring impact of 1960s Klan activism on Republican voting, we draw on longitudinal data for southern U.S. counties. Counties have historically been especially meaningful political units in southern politics, and KKK klaverns organized and operated at the county level (Andrews 2004; Cunningham and Phillips 2007). We collected data for five separate time points, each corresponding to a decennial year (1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000). We matched these time points with voting outcomes of five presidential elections. In each case, we recorded the percentage of votes cast for the Republican candidate in the election corresponding with, or immediately following, the decennial year. For the 1960 time period, we included the percent of votes that went to Richard Nixon when he opposed the Democratic victor, John Kennedy. The second time period captures the percent of votes that went to Nixon when he defeated George McGovern in 1972. The third period measures the percent of votes for Ronald Reagan in 1980 when he defeated Jimmy Carter. Period four measures the vote for George H. W. Bush in 1992 when he lost to Bill Clinton. Finally, period five captures the vote for George W.

Bush when he was elected over Al Gore in 2000.

The key test of our argument involves determining whether southern counties that experienced Klan activism showed greater increases over time in Republican voting than did counties without Klan activism, even after controlling for effects of the Goldwater and Wallace votes and other changes in these counties that could potentially relate to voting change. To address this central question, we utilize a fixed-effects design. Here, we take advantage of the fact that we have measures of voting, and measures of all our covariates, for a time period immediately *before* the Klan's mass civil rights-era resurgence (which, again, began in 1961 with the formation of the UKA),[3] as well as measures for four subsequent time periods. The fixed-effects design explicitly models the change that occurs *within* counties over time rather than analyzing variation *across* counties at one point in time. The results of our fixed-effects model are identical to those that would be obtained if we pooled data for the different time periods and manually inserted a dichotomous variable for every county included in the analysis. One important advantage of the fixed-effects model is that it controls for all constant, but unobserved and unmeasured, differences across our cases (Allison 1994). Because we are estimating change within counties over time, an omitted variable is only problematic if it is time-variant.

To assess the endurance of any Klan influence on Republican voting, we estimate models of varying time spans. First, we examine change within counties from 1960 to 1972, with Klan activism treated as an event that intervened between the two periods. Subsequently, we examine change from 1960 to 1980, from 1960 to 1992, and from 1960 to 2000. In each model, we also include a dichotomous variable for the latter time period to ensure that our estimates are not simply reflecting changes in Republican voting in the four later time periods that may have had nothing to do with Klan activism in the 1960s. These measures also control for

varying popularity of the specific candidates in each election year. In 1972, for example, Richard Nixon defeated his opponent in a landslide, whereas in other years the races were more competitive. In 1992, a third-party candidate, Ross Perot, captured a significant number of votes that might have otherwise gone to the Republican candidate. We are interested in assessing the Klan's influence on Republican voting net of the candidate's overall popularity with southern voters in any particular election.

We limit our analysis to counties within states where the Klan made a concentrated effort to recruit members during the 1960s: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia (U.S. House of Representatives 1966). We constructed several of our independent variables using a dataset developed by Messner and colleagues (2000) as part of their National Consortium on Violence Research (NCOVR) project. The dataset includes several county-level measures for our 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 time periods. We extended the dataset to include the 2000 time period and also used other data sources (described below) to add additional variables. To account for numerous changes in boundaries for counties and county equivalents in Virginia, we followed a strategy developed by Messner and colleagues (2000), aggregating data for counties that experienced a boundary change to form 11 geographic units, or county clusters, out of 28 counties that experienced boundary changes. Our analysis includes a total of 878 county units over five time periods.

Variables

We constructed our measure of Klan activism using a census of Klan units compiled in advance of the House Committee on Un-American Activities hearings on the Ku Klux Klan (U.S. House of Representatives 1967). The growth of the KKK in the early 1960s under Robert Shelton's leadership, along with the violent nature of the organization,

prompted the FBI to launch a new COINTEL program to investigate "white hate groups" (Cunningham 2004). Although it is certainly possible that the FBI missed some Klan organizations, these data reflect an extraordinarily comprehensive intelligence-gathering process based on field investigations and subpoenaed bank records. As Cunningham and Phillips (2007) note, the committee report estimates their error rate is less than 10 percent. While measurement error is of concern, we think its impact should be minimal in this case, because any Klan organization that failed to come to the FBI's attention was probably not active enough or visible enough to have a significant impact on voting within the county where it was located.

We constructed a dichotomous variable indicating whether the Klan had an organization established within a county during the time period under which the census was undertaken (1964 to 1966). All counties have a value of zero for the 1960 time period; counties that experienced Klan activism in the mid-1960s are coded 1 for all other time periods, signifying the county experienced Klan activism in the 1960s. We focus on Shelton's UKA, the largest and most stable of all Klan organizations, to avoid giving weight to a small number of ephemeral self-proclaimed organizations that contained few actual members. We do merge our UKA data, however, with parallel Klan organizations in the states of Florida (United Florida KKK), Mississippi (White Knights of the KKK), and Louisiana (Original Knights of the KKK). These organizations were well established, with considerable documented membership overlap with the UKA (see Cunningham and Phillips 2007).

Figure 1 presents the geographic distribution of Klan organizations. The figure shows the Klan was particularly strong during this time period within the Carolinas. In fact, 67 percent of North Carolina counties had at least one Klan organization, as did 63 percent of South Carolina counties. The Klan was also well represented among Mississippi counties (64.6 percent) and Louisiana parishes (50 percent). The map suggests there

Figure 1. Southern Counties with Klan Chapters (in Black), 1964 to 1966
Data source: House Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, 1967.

was substantial geographic clustering of Klan mobilization in the 1960s, and this clustering holds some implications for our analysis. Cabarrus County, North Carolina, for example, did not have a Klan organization but was completely surrounded by counties that did. The likelihood that residents of this county were exposed to the Klan's influence should be much higher than would be the case for residents in a non-Klan county in western Arkansas that was spatially distant from counties with Klan organizations. To account for this clustering, we constructed another dichotomous variable coded 1 if a county did not have a Klan organization but was adjacent to a county that did. All other counties are coded as 0.[4]

Control Variables

We control for several other features of southern counties that could be related to voting outcomes and Klan activism. Perhaps most important is a control for the 1968 Wallace vote. To that end, we used Congressional Quarterly's series *America Votes* (Scammon

1970) to obtain a measure of the percent of votes cast for George Wallace in his third-party presidential challenge. As noted earlier, Wallace appealed to many of the same types of racial resentments that invigorated the Klan's base of support. Indeed, Wallace once reflected on his use of racism to launch his political career, observing that "I started off talking about schools and highways and prisons and taxes—and I couldn't make them listen. . . . Then I began talking about niggers—and they stomped the floor" (quoted in Carter 1995:109). We also include a measure of the percent of votes cast for Republican Barry Goldwater in 1964. Goldwater's conservatism and his strong defense of states' rights held great appeal for white segregationists. Although he was soundly defeated in the national election, Goldwater enjoyed strong support in many southern states. While the Wallace and Goldwater campaigns played important roles in breaking ties between white segregationists and the Democratic Party, we expect to find that the Klan had an independent effect on party realignment in the South.

Because many northerners moved to the South during the latter part of the twentieth century (see Tolnay 2003), it is especially important to control for population change and changes in racial distributions. We control for the natural log of counties' total population as well as the log of population density. In our longitudinal analyses, we control only for population because the area of our county units remains constant over time. We consider two measures related to white boundary maintenance and racial competition in southern counties. The first is the percent of the county population that is African American. Because the vast majority of African Americans vote Democratic, proportional increases in African Americans within a county should reduce Republican voting. We also used *America Votes* to calculate a measure of the total number of votes cast in each election under consideration. Due to severe skewness of the variable, we used a logarithmic transformation. This variable is particularly important in our longitudinal analyses, because an increase in the total number of votes cast in presidential elections reflects, to a great extent, full enfranchisement of black southerners after passage of the Voting Rights Act. In later time periods it also captures differences in voter turnout during different election cycles.

We include two measures related to levels of economic prosperity in southern counties: the natural log of median family income and the percent of the civilian labor force that is unemployed. Net of other variables, we would expect higher levels of Republican voting to be associated with higher median income and lower unemployment in a county. Relatively conservative economic policies promoted by Republican candidates would be most appealing in more prosperous counties (Gelman 2008; Lassiter 2006). We include controls for college education (the percent of individuals 25 years and older who have a degree), the percent of homes that are owner-occupied, and the median age in the county. Finally, we recognize that Klan activism was at least in part a reaction to the threat posed by African American civil rights organization. In our cross-sectional analyses,[5] we include a dichotomous measure coded 1 for counties that had at least one NAACP branch during the time period in which the Klan was active.[6]

Individual-Level Analysis

Our longitudinal county-level analysis allows us to determine whether counties that experienced Klan activism showed greater increases in Republican voting than did counties that did not experience activism. We expect the Klan's presence influenced not only its members' behavior, but also others who were at greatest risk of exposure to the KKK's ideas and activities by virtue of residing in a county where the Klan was active. Klan activism, we argue, played an important role in linking grievances held by proponents of segregation to voting behavior, thus disrupting long-established voting patterns where the Democratic Party had previously catered to opponents of black civil rights. To increase confidence in our argument, we supplement our county analysis with an individual-level analysis. We utilize data obtained through the Southern Focus Poll (Center for the Study of the American South 1992), administered from March 9 to April 16, 1992. The survey utilized a random-digit dialing sample targeting households with telephones in southern states. This particular poll has several advantages in light of our research goals. Because the poll focused on southern voters, we are able to obtain a sample of 505 respondents from the 10 southern states included in our analysis. Moreover, 1992 was an election year more than two decades after the peak of Klan activism in the South, and respondents were asked whether they planned to vote for the Republican or Democratic candidate in the November elections. Importantly, we are able to use two measures that reflect respondents' attitudes about civil rights that are highly relevant to the Klan's agenda. These data also allow us to place respondents within their county of residence. Therefore, we can determine whether the fit between civil rights attitudes and

voting preference is, as we would expect, stronger in counties that experienced Klan activism in the 1960s.

For a measure of voting preference, respondents were asked whether they thought they would be voting for the Democratic or the Republican candidate in November. Given the timing of the survey, this question captures respondents who could say with confidence that they would vote for the Republican candidate, even before the party nominees had been selected. A plurality of respondents (41 percent) indicated they would be voting Republican; 30.3 percent indicated an intention to vote Democratic. For our analysis, we created a dichotomous dependent variable with respondents expressing intent to vote Republican coded 1 and all others coded 0.[7]

As noted earlier, we are particularly interested in how respondents' views on integration and civil rights map onto their voting preferences. Respondents were asked whether they were in favor of "integration of the races, strict segregation, or something in-between." By 1992, when the survey was administered, only 3.8 percent of respondents said they favored strict segregation. A substantial amount, though, did signal some reservations, with 37.4 percent saying they favored something in-between and 2.6 percent indicating they were unsure or did not know. We created a dichotomous variable to capture the contrast between the 56.2 percent who said they favor integration and all other respondents. Respondents who did not indicate support for full racial integration are coded 1 and those who did are coded 0. Respondents were also asked if they agree with the following statement: "The South would be a lot better off if it had won the War Between the States." Because Klansmen in the 1960s drew inspiration from the original Ku Klux Klan that emerged in the South in the aftermath of the Civil War and, like that first Klan, organized in defense of white supremacy, this question provides insight into our core concern. We measured responses as an ordinal variable with respondents who strongly agree (6.9 percent) coded 7, agree (4.8 percent) coded 6,

slightly agree (5.5 percent) coded 5, not sure (15.6 percent) coded 4, slightly disagree (10.1 percent) coded 3, disagree (17.4) coded 2, and strongly disagree (39.6 percent) coded 1.

While we are primarily interested in how these orientations toward race relations map onto voting behavior, we include several control variables that may also be related to voting preferences. We include a dichotomous measure of racial identity, with respondents who identify as white (84.4 percent) coded 1 and other respondents coded 0. We also control for respondents' age, whether they are female, whether they are married, and their years of schooling. For a measure of church attendance, respondents are coded 1 if they attend church at least once a week (50.5 percent) and 0 otherwise. We control for attitude toward the economy with a survey item that asked respondents if they think their family income will be higher, the same, or lower, six months into the future. Individuals who responded "higher" (35 percent) are coded 1 and other responses are coded 0. We include a measure of whether a respondent lived in a southern state at the age of 16 (69.8 percent), and a measure of whether the respondent self-identifies as a "Southerner" (73.5 percent). We include a measure of political ideology through an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 7, with respondents who said that when it comes to politics they consider themselves a "strong conservative" (18 percent) coded 7 and those who view themselves as a "strong liberal" (6.9 percent) coded 1. Finally, respondents were asked if they viewed the Confederate flag as a symbol of racial conflict or of southern pride. Those who responded "southern pride" (71.7 percent) are coded 1 and all other respondents are coded 0.

FINDINGS

County-Level Analyses

Before assessing the influence of Klan activism on changes in voting patterns, we first briefly examine the lay of the land leading up to the Klan's resurgence in the 1960s. Here,

we treat our Klan measure as the dependent variable to identify county attributes conducive to the formation of Klan organizations. We control for state-level differences to isolate the effects of county attributes. Our independent variables for these analyses reflect measures of county attributes in 1960. As can be seen in the first column of Table 1, we find that Klan organizations were more likely to form in counties with larger populations, higher rates of homeownership, and higher percentages of African Americans. The latter finding, particularly, is consistent with prior research that draws on competition and threat arguments (Blalock 1967; Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1992), characterizing Klan activism as a conservative reaction to the threat posed by African Americans in the midst of a struggle over civil rights (Cunningham and Phillips 2007; Luders 2010).

In the second set of results presented in Table 1, we include the Republican vote in 1960 as a predictor of Klan activism. Note that after controlling for the 1960 vote, the coefficient for median income remains negative but becomes statistically significant. Also consistent with threat or competition arguments, this reflects how the Klan was particularly appealing in less prosperous counties where competitive pressure would be highest. Perhaps most important for our purposes, however, the findings also draw attention to a movement–party mismatch. The Klan was most likely to form in Democratic counties, reflecting the long-standing affinity between southern Democratic voting and the goals of white supremacy. Yet during this time period, as discussed earlier, the national Democratic Party was increasingly aligning with the black civil rights struggle.

In the face of this mismatch, the campaigns of Republican Barry Goldwater in 1964 and third-party independent candidate George Wallace in 1968 attracted support from many white voters who had previously voted Democratic but favored Goldwater's and Wallace's conservatism on civil rights. As discussed earlier, the Klan played an active role in encouraging white southerners to prioritize white supremacy over party loyalty. As Table 2 shows, after controlling for state-level differences and many county attributes related to voting outcomes, Klan presence is related to a significantly higher percentage of votes cast for Goldwater and Wallace. Because Goldwater ran as a Republican, it is not surprising that the Republican vote in 1960 significantly predicts the vote for Goldwater in 1964. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than might be expected (a 1 percent increase in the Republican vote in 1960 produces only a .54 percent predicted increase in the vote for Goldwater). Clearly, much more than prior patterns of party voting lie behind the variation in the vote for Goldwater. We see that Goldwater tended to fare better in counties with low population density, lower levels of unemployment, and lower median age. Goldwater, unlike Nixon four years earlier, picked up stronger support in counties with high percentages of African Americans. Given the barriers to voting still in place in the South for blacks in 1964, prior to passage of the Voting Rights Act, this finding reflects high support among white voters in counties where the perceived threat posed by African Americans to white interests was greatest. Again, after controlling for other influences, we find that the vote for Goldwater was, on average, 2 percent higher in counties where the Klan was organized. In the second column, we add our measure capturing adjacency to Klan counties for counties that did not have a Klan organization. The coefficient for our Klan variable is strengthened when we control for this spatial effect, but the measure of adjacency is not, itself, a significant predictor of the Goldwater vote.

Table 2 also shows that four years later, George Wallace—a former Democratic Alabama governor running as a third-party candidate—drew strong support in counties that were heavily Democratic in 1960. Like Goldwater, Wallace drew stronger support in sparsely populated counties. He also tended to do well in counties with low unemployment, lower percentages of college graduates, and higher median incomes. With

Table 1. Presence of Klan Organizations in Southern Counties, 1964 to 1966

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	Odds Ratio
Percent Republican, 1960			−.028***	.972
			(.008)	
Total population (log)	.985***	2.678	1.042***	2.836
	(.264)		(.269)	
Population density (log)	−.098	.907	−.059	.943
	(.182)		(.187)	
Percent African American	.040***	1.041	.039***	1.040
	(.008)		(.008)	
Total votes cast (log)	.253	1.288	.288	1.335
	(.214)		(.218)	
Median family income (log)	−.888	.412	−1.043*	.352
	(.517)		(.525)	
Unemployment	−.057	.945	−.052	.949
	(.053)		(.054)	
Percent college degree	.030	1.030	.055	1.057
	(.046)		(.047)	
Percent homes owner-occupied	.045***	1.046	.050***	1.052
	(.014)		(.014)	
Median age	.045	1.046	.059	1.061
	(.031)		(.032)	
NAACP chapter	.217	1.243	.135	1.145
	(.242)		(.244)	
Alabama (omitted)				
Arkansas	−1.340*	.262	−1.330*	.264
	(.545)		(.549)	
Florida	−.103	.902	.126	1.135
	(.472)		(.474)	
Georgia	.475	1.608	.358	1.431
	(.212)		(.383)	
Louisiana	.604	1.829	.404	1.498
	(.456)		(.420)	
Mississippi	1.335***	3.800	.967*	2.629
	(.390)		(.403)	
North Carolina	1.518***	4.564	1.711***	5.533
	(.433)		(.445)	
South Carolina	.862	2.368	1.241**	3.458
	(.456)		(.473)	
Tennessee	−1.049*	.350	−.807	.446
	(.507)		(.514)	
Virginia	−.560	.571	−.148	.862
	(.473)		(.489)	
Number of observations	878		878	
Log likelihood	−402.3		−396.3	

Note: Logistic regression estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).

Table 2. Klan Activism and the Vote for Goldwater and Wallace

Independent Variables	Goldwater 1964			Wallace 1968	
Klan chapter	2.002*	2.738**	2.389**	1.600*	2.762**
	(.848)	(1.067)	(.806)	(.736)	(.926)
Bordering Klan county		1.045			1.644*
		(.920)			(.796)
Percent Goldwater, 1964				.394***	.392***
				(.030)	(.030)
Percent Republican, 1960	.541***	.539***	−.551***	−.764***	−.765***
	(.029)	(.029)	(.027)	(.030)	(.029)
Total population (log)	.399	.341	.219	.061	−.029
	(.922)	(.924)	(.877)	(.799)	(.798)
Population density (log)	−1.457**	−1.437**	−3.199***	−2.625***	−2.596***
	(.519)	(.519)	(.493)	(.451)	(.451)
Percent African American	.221***	.217***	−.106***	−.193***	−.200***
	(.029)	(.029)	(.027)	(.026)	(.026)
Total votes cast (log)	−.331	−.334	−1.302	−1.171	−1.176
	(.816)	(.816)	(.776)	(.707)	(.705)
Median family income (log)	−.789	−.880	9.574***	9.885***	9.741***
	(1.857)	(1.859)	(1.766)	(1.608)	(.165)
Unemployment	−.585**	−.572**	−.781***	−.551***	−.532***
	(.189)	(.190)	(.180)	(.165)	(.165)
Percent college degree	−.309	−.295	−1.103***	−.982***	−.961***
	(.174)	(.174)	(.165)	(.151)	(.151)
Percent homes owner-occupied	.026	.023	−.022	−.032	−.037
	(.050)	(.051)	(.048)	(.044)	(.044)
Median age	−.254*	−.250*	.044	.144	.151
	(.112)	(.112)	(.106)	(.097)	(.097)
NAACP chapter	−2.333*	−2.325*	1.189	2.109*	2.115*
	(.957)	(.957)	(.910)	(.832)	(.830)
Alabama (omitted)					
Arkansas	−27.391***	−27.045***	−28.540***	−17.747***	−17.268***
	(1.773)	(1.799)	(1.686)	(1.736)	(1.748)
Florida	−17.558***	−17.543***	−21.357***	−14.438***	−14.456***
	(1.860)	(1.859)	(1.768)	(1.692)	(1.689)
Georgia	−11.303***	−11.401***	−22.584***	−18.130***	−18.300***
	(1.535)	(1.538)	(1.460)	(1.371)	(1.371)
Louisiana	−3.609*	−3.666*	−19.053***	−17.631***	−17.730***
	(1.804)	(1.805)	(1.715)	(1.566)	(1.563)
Mississippi	22.575***	22.451***	−12.244***	−21.140***	−21.282***
	(1.734)	(1.737)	(1.648)	(1.643)	(1.641)
North Carolina	−29.842***	−29.919***	−33.746***	−21.987***	−22.178***
	(1.782)	(1.783)	(1.694)	(1.778)	(1.777)
South Carolina	−19.596***	−19.615***	−28.637***	−20.915***	−20.991***
	(2.021)	(2.021)	(1.922)	(1.844)	(1.840)
Tennessee	−30.060***	−29.844***	−27.493***	−15.648***	−15.380***
	(1.738)	(1.748)	(1.652)	(1.748)	(1.749)
Virginia	−26.228)	−25.906***	−38.414***	−28.078***	−27.633***
	(1.841)	(1.862)	(1.750)	(1.772)	(1.782)
Number of observations	878	878	878	878	878
R-square	.722	.722	.757	.799	.800

Note: OLS regression estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

substantially higher turnout among African American voters after passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, our measure of percent African American is negatively related to the Wallace vote. Importantly for our purposes, Klan presence is a strong positive predictor of the Wallace vote. This effect is diminished when we control for the Goldwater vote in 1964 (see column 4, Table 2) but remains statistically significant. In the final column of Table 2, we add our measure of adjacency to Klan counties. Once again, we see that including this control for spatial proximity increases the magnitude of the coefficient for our Klan variable (from 1.60 to 2.76). In this case, the variable measuring proximity to the Klan is a significant predictor of the Wallace vote. Having a Klan chapter in a county produces a stronger effect, but non-Klan counties adjacent to Klan counties also show significantly higher support for the Wallace candidacy.

The preceding analyses shed light on the Klan's relationship to presidential voting in a key period in the realignment of southern voting. As the Democratic Party became increasingly aligned with the cause of black civil rights, disgruntled white southerners started to question their long-standing loyalty to the party, and many crossed party lines to vote for Goldwater in 1964 and Wallace in 1968. By the early 1970s, it had become increasingly clear that the national Republican Party was more in line with the interests of those opposed to civil rights than was the Democratic Party. In the next set of analyses, we employ a fixed-effects design that examines the change in voting that occurred *within* counties over time, while taking into account how our covariates also changed over time. Did counties that had active Klan organizations in the 1960s experience greater increases in Republican voting over time compared to counties that did not have a Klan organization? Results presented in Table 3 indicate they did.

For each time span, we first present results without the Klan variable and then with the Klan variable. In a third model, we add the control for adjacency to Klan counties, reflecting the likelihood that individuals residing in a county that did not have a Klan

organization might have been influenced by Klan activity in neighboring counties.

When considering the change in Republican voting from 1960 to 1972, our results indicate that after controlling for other changes occurring within counties, the average increase in Republican voting in Klan counties was just over 2 percent higher than was the case in counties without a Klan organization. Although the magnitude of the difference is not dramatic, when aggregated across hundreds of southern counties, the Klan influence reflects a rather substantial number of votes. The estimated Klan effect holds even after we control for the votes for Goldwater and Wallace. The Wallace vote, not surprisingly, is very strongly related to increases in Republican voting. The coefficient for the Goldwater vote, on the other hand, is negative. It is important to keep in mind that the Goldwater vote would be positive and significantly related to increases in Republican voting if we failed to control for the Wallace vote. Certainly, many southerners who voted for Goldwater in 1964 turned to Wallace in 1968. These voters, in turn, tended to move to the Republican Party in 1972. In the third model, we see that the coefficient for our Klan variable is strengthened when we include a control for spatial proximity. The measure of adjacency, however, is not itself significant.

Among the control variables, we find that our measure of total votes cast has a negative effect on Republican increase. This most likely reflects the sharp increase in votes among black southerners in the aftermath of the Voting Rights Act. Notably, however, the variable falls short of statistical significance after controlling for spatial proximity. Republicans also gained votes in counties where there were increases in homeownership and where increases in unemployment were minimal (or in some cases where unemployment declined).

As can be seen in the four different time intervals examined in Table 3, the estimated Klan effect does not diminish over time. In fact, when we expand the time spans under consideration, the coefficient for our Klan variable is significant at the .001 level, and

Table 3. Change in Percent Voting Republican for President within Southern Counties over Varying Time Intervals

Independent Variable	1960 to 1972		1960 to 1980		1960 to 1992		1960 to 2000	
Klan chapter, 1964 to 1966	2.053* (.835)	3.095** (1.016)	3.701*** (.687)	3.893*** (.845)	4.890*** (.769)	6.474*** (.936)	3.434*** (.841)	5.224*** (1.015)
Bordering Klan county		1.805 (1.007)		.326 (.836)		2.737** (.931)		3.121** (1.004)
Goldwater vote, 1964	−.047 (.028)	−.063* (.029)	−.011 (.023)	−.013 (.023)	−.045 (.025)	−.057* (.025)	−.116*** (.026)	−.124*** (.026)
Wallace vote, 1968	.824*** (.025)	.817*** (.025)	.442*** (.020)	.442*** (.020)	.603*** (.023)	.596*** (.023)	.769*** (.025)	.759*** (.025)
Total population (logged)	5.178 (2.879)	4.704 (2.901)	1.013 (1.534)	.930 (1.549)	−1.327 (1.439)	−2.001 (1.451)	.857 (.528)	.794 (.525)
Percent African American	−.177 (.167)	−.151 (.167)	−.176* (.078)	−.177* (.078)	−.135* (.066)	−.139* (.066)	−.226*** (.052)	−.217*** (.052)
Total votes cast (logged)	−3.173* (1.527)	−2.939 (1.526)	2.685* (1.173)	2.728* (1.179)	3.517** (1.194)	3.755** (1.192)	−1.130 (.996)	−1.412 (.983)
Median family income	4.770 (3.187)	4.533 (3.189)	5.833*** (2.054)	5.813** (2.055)	−.718 (2.074)	−.649 (2.065)	3.303 (2.023)	3.658 (2.016)
Unemployment	−.648*** (.190)	−.641*** (.190)	−.936*** (.144)	−.934*** (.145)	−.325* (.151)	−.349* (.151)	−.504*** (.143)	−.555*** (.143)
Percent college degree	−.268* (.104)	−.194 (.113)	−.064 (.072)	−.060 (.073)	−.007 (.051)	.007 (.051)	.211** (.071)	.212** (.071)
Percent homes owner-occupied	.322** (.104)	.298** (.105)	−.109* (.055)	−.111* (.055)	.160** (.054)	.140** (.054)	.069 (.061)	.061 (.061)
Median age	.292 (.210)	.257 (.209)	.157 (.126)	.150 (.128)	.112 (.120)	.071 (.120)	.185 (.114)	.159 (.114)
Number of observations	1,756	1,756	1,756	1,756	1,756	1,756	1,756	1,756
R-square	.911	.912	.617	.617	.595	.599	.774	.776

Note: Fixed-effects estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dichotomous variables for the latter time period of each interval are included as controls.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

the magnitude of the coefficients are substantially stronger when compared to the shorter 1960 to 1972 time span. Net of other variables, the increase in Republican voting was, on average, 3.701 percent higher in Klan counties compared to non-Klan counties when considering the change from the 1960 vote for Nixon to the 1980 vote for Reagan. The estimated Klan effect is particularly strong when considering the change from the 1960 Republican vote to the 1992 vote for George H. W. Bush (4.890 percent). When examining change over four decades, from 1960 to 2000, Klan counties show an average 3.434 percent greater increase in Republican voting compared to non-Klan counties.

Also noteworthy, we find that the measure of adjacency to Klan counties significantly predicts increased Republican voting in the two longer time spans. As would be expected, however, the estimated effect is weaker than is the case when the Klan was actually present in the county. Perhaps even more notable, the coefficient estimates for the effect of Klan activism within a county become substantially stronger when our models account for spatial proximity. These findings suggest that geographic clustering of Klan activism facilitated the endurance of the Klan's influence over time.[8]

Among the control variables, we find that estimated effects of increases in total votes cast depend on which time span is being considered. Early growth in black voters may have initially benefited Democrats, but it was later offset by increased turnout among northern transplants and social conservatives who grew increasingly energized by Republican positions. We consistently see rising unemployment working against Republican gains. Also important, we find that changes in racial composition are associated with change in Republican voting, with Republicans making greatest gains in counties where the black population comprised a declining share of the overall population.

These findings support our argument about how a radical and highly visible social movement such as the Ku Klux Klan can have an enduring impact on voting outcomes. Even

after controlling for votes for Goldwater and Wallace, Klan counties show greater movement toward the Republican Party than do non-Klan counties, and after the movement declined, its influence on presidential voting endured. The Klan, as our analyses suggest, played a key role in disrupting traditional voting alliances and linking opponents of segregation to the Republican Party, as the GOP's nominees took more conservative stances on civil rights than did their Democratic opponents.

We are not arguing that the civil rights-era Klan exerted continual influence on voting outcomes even after its collapse in the late 1960s. Instead, we assert that its actions in the 1960s helped dislodge voters from preexisting party loyalties and contributed to a restructuring of network ties that would reinforce the link between segregationist preferences and Republican voting over time. To a great extent, the long-term influence of 1960s Klan activism on Republican voting was mediated by intervening voting behavior. Table A1 in the Appendix shows results of our analyses when we re-estimate the models with the votes for Republican candidates for all intervening elections included. As expected, the coefficient for the Klan variable is reduced substantially when controlling for the intervening voting outcomes, although the Klan variable does remain statistically significant for each time span. The variable measuring adjacency to a Klan county is no longer significant when controlling for intervening elections, suggesting that effects of proximity to a Klan county are mediated entirely through subsequent voting. Because the Klan declined rapidly in the late 1960s, we also expect that the endurance of the Klan effect should depend on the extent to which it influenced voting outcomes in the immediate aftermath of its 1960s resurgence. To check this assumption, Table A1 includes an interaction between the measure of Klan activism and the vote for Republican Richard Nixon in 1972. For each time span under consideration, the interaction is highly significant, indicating the Klan effect on voting was most likely to endure in counties that showed

strong support for Nixon in 1972, whereas it did not endure in counties where southern voters showed weak support for Nixon.

Individual Analysis

To gain a better understanding of *how* the Klan's presence in a county produced an *enduring* increase in Republican voting, we now turn our attention to the individual data taken from the 1992 Southern Focus Poll. Again, we are interested in how the Klan's presence polarized communities in ways that aligned individuals with parties according to their orientations toward black civil rights. In the first model of Table 4, we include only our individual-level variables and our measure of whether the Klan was present in a county in the 1960s. Here, we see that income and conservative ideology are key determinants of voting preference. The more respondents lean toward conservatism on the liberal to conservative measure, the more likely they are to indicate intent to vote Republican. Higher income is also strongly related to Republican voting. Age is negatively related to the Republican vote, most likely reflecting the extent to which older voters reached voting age in an era when suffrage was severely restricted for black southerners and the Democratic Party dominated among white southerners. Along these same lines, respondents who were living in the South at age 16 are also significantly less likely to indicate an intention to vote Republican.

These results also show that individuals residing in counties where the Klan was active are not significantly different in their voting preference than those who live in non-Klan counties. This should be expected, however, because we anticipate that effects of Klan activism on individual voting depend on an individual's orientation toward civil rights. If, as we argued earlier, the Klan polarized communities, we would expect that orientations toward civil rights and the Klan's overall goals of defending white privilege would map onto voting preferences in ways that they do not in counties where the Klan did not have a presence. Note that in our first model in Table 4, neither the measure of segregation preference nor the variable measuring views on the Civil War predict voting preference. Yet, as Model 2 shows, the estimated effect of the segregation variable on voting preference depends on whether a respondent resides in a Klan county. To facilitate interpretation of the interaction, we calculated predicted probabilities of voting Republican with different combinations of the two variables. Net of other variables, for individuals who do not favor full integration, the probability of voting Republican is .294 in non-Klan counties whereas it is .414 in Klan counties. For individuals residing in Klan counties, the probability of voting Republican is .339 for respondents who favor full integration, whereas it is .414 for those who do not favor integration.

In the next column, we see that the interaction between residence in a Klan county and attitude about the Civil War is also positive and significant. When we calculate predicted probabilities we find that, for respondents in former Klan counties, the probability of voting Republican is .545 for respondents who strongly agree with the statement that the South would be better off if it had won the Civil War. For respondents who hold the same attitude about the Civil War but live in a non-Klan county, however, the predicted probability of voting Republican is only .257.[9]

To increase confidence that these important findings cannot be attributed to other county attributes that are correlated with former Klan activism, we add the county-level covariates included in our previous analyses. As the results in columns 4 and 5 show, including the other county controls has little impact on our key coefficients of interest. Finally, column 6 shows that the interaction effects discussed earlier remain statistically significant even when we consider both interactions simultaneously.[10]

CONCLUSIONS

Results of the preceding analyses confirm our expectation that counties that experienced

Table 4. Southern Voters' Intent to Vote Republican, 1992

	1	2	3	4	5	6
White	.595	.544	.578	.600	.641	.585
	(.539)	(.519)	(.534)	(.632)	(.634)	(.627)
Age	−.019***	−.022***	−.019***	−.021***	−.019***	−.021***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Female	−.065	−.058	−.012	−.079	−.033	−.034
	(.143)	(.160)	(.148)	(.158)	(.147)	(.158)
Income	.263***	.264***	.267***	.269***	.269***	.272***
	(.073)	(.068)	(.074)	(.062)	(.070)	(.064)
Years of schooling	−.070	−.098	−.091	−.135	−.132	−.146
	(.139)	(.139)	(.145)	(.160)	(.168)	(.163)
Weekly church attendance	.218	.253	.229	.276	.260	.281
	(.293)	(.284)	(.305)	(.279)	(.303)	(.163)
Improving family economic situation	.185	.181	.204	.204	.227	.220
	(.285)	(.281)	(.286)	(.289)	(.294)	(.285)
Married	−.174	−.159	−.178	−.101	−.110	−.100
	(.190)	(.196)	(.218)	(.208)	(.234)	(.234)
Lived in South at age 16	−.598*	−.653*	−.641*	−.758*	−.724*	−.785*
	(.302)	(.293)	(.294)	(.343)	(.334)	(.344)
Self-identified southerner	.537	..584	.562	.594	.567	.600
	(.350)	(.343)	(.351)	(.323)	(.322)	(.320)
Confederate flag southern pride	.226	.216	.226	.250	.259	.248
	(.241)	(.255)	(.256)	(.285)	(.284)	(.289)
Conservative ideology	.371***	.382***	.385***	.393***	.397***	.404***
	(.051)	(.047)	(.051)	(.046)	(.051)	(.047)
Not in favor of full integration	−.208	−.771**	−.189	−.802**	−.181	−.710**
	(.350)	(.255)	(.367)	(.274)	(.362)	(.258)
South better if it won Civil War	.012	.013	−.150*	.020	−.138*	−.118*
	(.046)	(.050)	(.060)	(.046)	(.057)	(.050)
Klan chapter, 1960s	−.085	−.562	−.932*	−.610	−.943*	−1.258*
	(.218)	(.334)	(.375)	(.381)	(.419)	(.516)
Klan x Not in favor of integration		1.088*		1.134*		.984*
		(.476)		(.503)		(.471)
Klan x South better if won Civil War			.311***		.296***	.260***
			(.085)		(.081)	(.076)
Percent Goldwater, 1964				.009	.010	.008
				(.008)	(.008)	(.008)
Percent Wallace, 1968				.002	.001	.002
				(.007)	(.006)	(.006)
Percent Republican, 1960				.008	.006	.008
				(.012)	(.011)	(.012)
Total population (log), 1990				−.327***	−.321***	−.345***
				(.067)	(.072)	(.066)
Population density (log), 1990				.156*	.208*	.209**
				(.075)	(.080)	(.074)
Percent African American, 1990				−.011	−.010	−.012
				(.010)	(.009)	(.010)
Total votes cast (log), 1992				.206***	.175***	.204***
				(.060)	(.046)	(.052)

(continued)

Table 4. *(continued)*

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Median family income, 1990				−1.130	−1.098	−1.224
				(1.047)	(1.029)	(1.088)
Unemployment, 1990				.017	.013	.016
				(.092)	(.084)	(.089)
Percent college degree, 1990				.016	.015	.013
				(.011)	(.011)	(.010)
Percent homeowners, 1990				−.010	−.008	−.008
				(.018)	(.016)	(.017)
Median age, 1990				−.061	−.053	−.062
				(.035)	(.032)	(.035)
NAACP chapter, 1960				.463*	.478*	.438*
				(.220)	(.215)	(.213)
Number of observations	505	505	505	505	505	505
Log likelihood	−291.1	−287.7	−286.9	−280.9	280.7	−278.2

Note: Logistic regression estimates. Standard errors are calculated using the robust cluster command in Stata to account for clustering by county.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Klan activism showed greater increases over time in Republican voting than did counties where the Klan did not establish a chapter. This result holds strong, even when we control for broad popular support for segregationist politics, reflected in votes for Barry Goldwater in 1964 and George Wallace in 1968. Furthermore, we find that the effect of Klan activism endured long after the movement's decline.

Klan activism loosened entrenched party loyalties and directly contributed to the de-alignment of white voters from the Democratic Party in the 1960s. This initial untethering process was critical to the more durable subsequent realignment with the Republican Party. In a context in which Democratic allegiance had long been synonymous with maintaining the racial status quo—and with a cultural power that still endures in popular conceptions of "yellow dog Democrats" who unquestioningly vote straight Democratic tickets—the Klan's strong calls to parse the "racial integrity" of candidates from all parties constituted a strong push for receptivity to Republican appeals. Because the Klan was highly visible, highly contentious, and violent, it held the potential to polarize communities in a way that facilitated a lasting alignment of racial attitudes and voting behavior. Indeed, we find that in 1992, decades after the Klan's decline, conservative racial attitudes strongly predict southerners' Republican voting, but only in counties where the Klan was organized in the 1960s.

The wedding of the Klan's mainly working-class constituency to the Republican Party was no simple feat in light of the strong appeal that Republican candidates hold for wealthy and upper-middle-class white southerners (Gelman 2008). Certainly, working-class voters could be persuaded over time that Republican economic policies benefit them more than Democratic policies, but we expect these voters would be substantially more receptive to such appeals if they had already broken ties with the Democratic Party because of their positions on civil rights. Voting for Republican candidates placed them into new discussion networks that made it more likely they would come to embrace other Republican priorities. The Klan's role in party realignment thus provides us with an important example of how political polarization can occur in the absence of growing attitudinal polarization within society at large.

Our study should also be of particular interest to scholars studying race relations and

racial inequality in the modern era. Quite a bit of attention has been given to the causes of racial conflict, but relatively few studies investigate how episodes of intergroup conflict can shape the trajectory of future race relations. Research on the consequences of lynching is a notable exception to this claim. For example, recent research shows that higher levels of homicide (Messner, Baller, and Zevenbergen 2005), patterns of enforcement of hate crime laws (King, Messner, and Baller 2009), and use of capital punishment (Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent 2005) can be traced, empirically, to lynching events that occurred as much as 100 years ago. Related to this, McVeigh and Cunningham (2012) recently showed that modern-day increases in homicides in southern counties can also be traced to Klan activism of the 1960s. Our research on Klan activism and voting realignment advances this literature by explaining how conflict occurring even in the distant past can be consequential for a variety of contemporary outcomes.

In their classic study of lynching patterns, Tolnay and Beck (1995) emphasize the extent to which lynching not only involved brutal violence inflicted on individual victims, but also delivered a message to those who might challenge race- and class-based privileges. Lynching polarized southern communities, forcing individuals to choose sides on the question of how far one is willing to go, or how much violence one is willing to tolerate, in defense of racial privilege. Common ground between elite and non-elite white southerners in defense of white supremacy involved subordination of any potential challenge to class-based dominance. Moving forward in time to the 1960s, the Ku Klux Klan did not succeed in defending Jim Crow, but, through its similarly polarizing character, played a role in linking its working-class constituency to a political party that strongly opposes proactive intervention of the federal government to produce greater racial and class-based equality.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Change in Percent Voting Republican Including Controls for Voting in Intervening Elections and an Interaction between Klan Activism and the 1972 Vote

	1960 to 1972	1960 to 1980	1960 to 1980	1960 to 1992	1960 to 1992	1960 to 2000	1960 to 2000
Klan chapter, 1964 to 1966	2.864**	2.093**	2.211**	3.925***	4.142***	1.983*	2.164**
	(.977)	(.771)	(.763)	(.798)	(.792)	(.830)	(.830)
Bordering Klan county	1.614	.054	.281	1.190	1.529	.547	.799
	(.987)	(.832])	(.827)	(.840)	(.830)	(.852)	(.848)
Goldwater vote, 1964	−.039	−.132***	−.132***	−.081*	−.080*	−.052	−.049
	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)	(.033)	(.034)	(.031)	(.031)
Wallace vote, 1968	.752***	.136*	.132*	−.059	−.067	−.039	−.045
	(.054)	(.068)	(.064)	(.061)	(.060)	(.068)	(.068)
Total population (logged)	7.638*	5.800***	5.203**	−.267	−.811	.180	.218
	(3.298)	(1.710)	(1.722)	(1.375)	(1.379)	(.260)	(.274)
Percent African American	−.104	.024	.003	.119	.098	−.073	−.081
	(.153)	(.077)	(.077)	(.065)	(.064)	(.045)	(.045)
Total votes cast (logged)	−4.210*	−2.149	−1.983	−.267	−.825	−4.963***	−5.086***
	(1.709)	(1.168)	(1.187)	(1.126)	(1.139)	(.714)	(.730)
Median family income	4,625	8.893***	8.577***	3.532	3.267	2.928	2.664
	(3.347)	(1.959)	(1.934)	(1.873)	(2.855)	(1.856)	(1.852)
Unemployment	−.660**	−.793***	−.769***	−.185	−.194	−.308*	−.279*
	(.216)	(.136)	(.136)	(.168)	(.165)	(.126)	(.121)
Percent college degree	−.183	−.029	−.046	.016	.007	.095	.108
	(.114)	(.068)	(.068)	(.040)	(.040)	(.056)	(.057)
Percent homes owner-occupied	.293**	.028	.029	.178**	.178***	.081	.089
	(.104)	(.065)	(.065)	(.056)	(.056)	(.065)	(.065)
Median age	.291	.146	.167	.219*	.232*	.110	.133
	(.174)	(.108)	(.112)	(.099)	(.101)	(.087)	(.089)
Percent Nixon 1968	−.091	−.607***	−.600***	−.869***	−.862***	−.835***	−.831***
	(.063)	(.080)	(.043)	(.077)	(.077)	(.083)	(.083)
Percent Nixon 1972		.237**	.173*	.135*	.061	.089	.021
		(.077)	(.077)	(.062)	(.060)	(.063)	(.063)

(continued)

23

Table A1. *(continued)*

	1960 to 1972	1960 to 1980	1960 to 1980	1960 to 1992	1960 to 1992	1960 to 2000	1960 to 2000
Percent Ford 1976		.496***		.390***	.372***	-.332***	-.345***
		(.043)		(.064)	(.063)	(.081)	(.082)
Percent Reagan 1980				-.743***	-.728***	-.509***	-.497***
				(.119)	(.087)	(.100)	(.101)
Percent Reagan 1984				.770***	.769***	1.374***	1.372***
				(.119)	(.119)	(.126)	(.126)
Percent Bush 1988				.293**	.274*	-.630***	-.631***
				(.105)	(.106)	(.135)	(.135)
Percent Bush 1992						.251*	.251*
						(.116)	(.115)
Percent Dole 1996						.638***	.622***
						(.095)	(.095)
Klan x Nixon 1972			.242***		.311***		.277***
			(.072)		(.074)		(.073)
Number of observations	1756	1756	1756	1756	1756	1756	1756
R-square	.912	.681	.686	.693	.701	.856	.859

Note: Fixed-effects estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dichotomous variables for the latter time period of each interval are included as controls.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Acknowledgments

Notes

1. For white southerners, such Democratic loyalties furthered a deep commitment to maintaining white supremacy in the region. When such racial arrangements were threatened, third-party campaigns, such as Strom Thurmond's 1948 States' Rights Party presidential bid, achieved considerable success among voters in the region (Carter 1995; Frederickson 2001). However, the move to the Republican Party during the time period examined here constituted a uniquely durable shift to a major national party.

2. The KKK's rise lagged behind the South's other mass segregationist vehicle, the Citizens' Councils, which emerged following the *Brown* decision and engaged in economic intimidation while maintaining a façade of civic responsibility and moderation (Irons 2010; Luders 2010; McMillen 1971). No reliable Council membership data exists below the state level, but their accommodationist orientation to electoral politics—centered on consolidating white political power through continued black disenfranchisement rather than challenging the South's solidly Democratic base (Crespino 2007; McMillen 1971)—made them a marginal player relative to the KKK in the white resistance movement's influence on party alignments

3. For a more detailed account of the chronology associated with the moribund organizing efforts of various KKK outfits in the 1950s and the Klan's substantial reemergence in the 1960s, see Cunningham (2013: Ch. 1).

4. Because no reliable membership data exist for local units of the various organizations, we decided to construct a dichotomous measure reflecting the presence or absence of at least one Klan organization in a county. We obtain similar results, however, if we instead use the total number of Klan organizations in a county.

5. We do not include this measure in our longitudinal analysis, because establishment of the chapters precedes the 1960 time period and therefore does not reflect a change that occurred between the 1960 time period and later time periods. In preliminary longitudinal analyses, we determined that the estimated effect of Klan activism on Republican voting is not significantly different in counties where the NAACP had an early presence compared to counties that did not have an NAACP chapter.

6. In the absence of comprehensive data on civil rights mobilization that extends beyond a single state, the NAACP—with its dense presence across the region—provides the most robust proxy for civil rights organization generally. We obtained information on the location of NAACP chapters from the Papers of the NAACP, Branch Department Files, Series C (Bracey, Harley, and Meier 2001). We used the 1963 to 1964 directory, except in the case of Alabama, where the organization was prohibited from legally operating during the late 1950s to early 1960s. As most chapters remained active during the ban under a different name, we used the 1953 directory to identify prior locations of Alabama NAACP chapters.

7. By 1992, most white southerners no longer identified with the Democratic Party in national politics. According to our data, only 29 percent of white respondents indicated they affiliate with the Democratic Party in national politics, and 39.8 percent indicated they affiliate with the Republican Party.

8. In separate analyses (not shown), we created four dichotomous variables capturing four possible combinations: (1) no Klan organization in a county and no Klan organization in adjacent counties; (2) no Klan organization in a county, but a Klan organization in an adjacent county; (3) a Klan organization in a county and a Klan organization in adjacent counties; and (4) a Klan organization in a county and no Klan organization in an adjacent county. Across all four time spans, counties with a Klan organization that were also adjacent to other Klan counties were significantly more likely than counties in category 1 to exhibit an increase in Republican voting. We also found that, in the latter two time spans, counties without a Klan organization but adjacent to a Klan county showed a significant increase in Republican voting compared to counties in category 1.

9. In exploratory analyses, we obtained similar results when the dependent variable was coded 1 for respondents who said they identify primarily with the national Republican Party and who also indicated an intention to vote Republican in the upcoming election. The interaction effects described earlier seem most applicable to southerners who had, by 1992, already become firmly committed to the Republican Party.

10. The spatial proximity control variable did not have any notable impact on the overall model. In our analyses of individuals' voting intent, we include white and non-white respondents, as the Klan's activism in the 1960s should have helped to clarify shifting positions on national party approaches to civil rights issues for both sets of voters. Dropping the 179 non-white respondents from our sample maintains key findings pertaining to the interaction effects. The only exception is that the interaction between Klan presence and segregation attitude falls just shy of statistical significance ($p = .102$) in the final model.

References

Abramowitz, Alan I. and Kyle L. Saunders. 1998. "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate." *Journal of Politics* 60(3):634–52.

Aldrich, John H. 2011. *Why Parties? A Second Look.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Allison, Paul D. 1994. "Using Panel Data to Estimate the Effects of Events." *Sociological Methods & Research* 23(2):174–99.

Amenta, Edwin, Neal Caren, Elizabeth Chiarello, and Yang Su. 2010. "The Political Consequences of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36:287–307.

Amenta, Edwin, Kathleen Dunleavy, and Mary Bernstein. 1994. "Stolen Thunder? Huey Long's 'Share Our Wealth,' Political Mediation, and the Second New Deal." *American Sociological Review* 59(5):678–702.

Andrews, Kenneth T. 2001. "Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965–1971." *American Sociological Review* 66(1):71–95.

Andrews, Kenneth T. 2004. *Freedom is a Constant Struggle: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and Its Legacy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Associated Press. 1962. "Klan Using Ballots Now, Says Shelton." *The Tuscaloosa News,* June 18, pg. 14.

Baldassarri, Delia and Peter Bearman. 2007. "Dynamics of Political Polarization." *American Sociological Review* 72(5):784–811.

Beck, Paul Allen. 1977. "Partisan Dealignment in the Postwar South." *American Political Science Review* 71(2):477–96.

Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26:611–39.

Black, Earl and Merle Black. 2002. *The Rise of Southern Republicans*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press.

Black, Merle. 2004. "The Transformation of the Southern Democratic Party." *Journal of Politics* 66(4):1001–1017.

Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations*. New York: John Wiley.

Bonacich, Edna. 1972. "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market." *American Sociological Review* 37(5):547–59.

Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2014. *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America,* 4th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Bracey, John H., Jr., Sharon Harley, and Augut Meier. 2001. *Papers of the NAACP: Branch Department Files*. Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America.

Burstein, Paul and April Linton. 2002. "The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns." *Social Forces* 81(2):380–408.

Campbell, Angus, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Carter, Dan T. 1995. *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Center for the Study of the American South. Odum Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 1992. "Southern Focus Poll, Spring 1992," (http:hdl.handle.net/1902.29/D-20173).

Chalmers, David. 1987. *Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan,* 3rd ed. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Chalmers, David. 2003. *Backfire: How the Ku Klux Klan Helped the Civil Rights Movement*. Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Clay, Russell. 1966. "Seawell Blasts Klan." *Raleigh News and Observer,* January 22.

Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." Pp. 202–261 in *Ideology and Discontent,* edited by D. Ernest Apter. New York: Wiley.

Crespino, Joseph. 2007. *In Search of another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Cress, Daniel M. and David A. Snow. 2000. "The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing." *American Journal of Sociology* 105(4):1063–1104.

Cunningham, David. 2004. *There's Something Happening Here: The New Left, the Klan, and FBI Counterintelligence*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cunningham, David. 2013. *Klansville, U.S.A.: The Rise and Fall of the Civil Rights-Era Ku Klux Klan*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cunningham, David and Benjamin T. Phillips. 2007. "Contexts for Mobilization: Spatial Settings and Klan Presence in North Carolina, 1964–1966." *American Journal of Sociology* 113(3):781–814.

DiMaggio, Paul, John Evans, and Bethany Bryson. 1996. "Have Americans' Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?" *American Journal of Sociology* 102(3):690–755.

Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2005. *Culture Wars? The Myth of Polarized America*. New York: Pearson Longman.

Frank, Thomas. 2004. *What's the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America*. New York: Metropolitan Books.

Frederickson, Kari. 2001. *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932–1968*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Gelman, Andrew. 2008. *Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Giugni, Marco, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly. 1999. *How Movements Matter*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Goldstone, Jack. 1980. "The Weakness of Organization: A New Look at Gamson's *The Strategy of Social Protest*." *American Journal of Sociology* 85(5):1017–42.

Granovetter, Mark and Roland Soong. 1988. "Threshold Models of Diversity: Chinese Restaurants, Residential Segregation and the Spiral of Silence." *Sociological Methodology* 10(6):169–94.

Griffin, Larry J. and Peggy G. Hargis. 2008. "Still Distinctive After All These Years: Trends in Racial Attitudes In and Out of the South." *Southern Cultures* 14(3):117–41.

Huckfeldt, Robert and John Sprague. 1995. *Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hunter, James Davison. 1991. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. New York: Basic Books.

Irons, Jenny. 2010. *Reconstituting Whiteness: The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission*. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.

Jackman, Mary. 1994. *The Velvet Glove: Paternalism and Conflict in Gender, Class, and Race Relations*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jacobs, David, Jason T. Carmichael, and Stephanie L. Kent. 2005. "Vigilantism, Current Racial Threat, and Death Sentences." *American Sociological Review* 70(4):656–77.

Kelley, Wayne. 1961. "Klan Feared in Atlanta 'mix'? No, Say Officials, Police Chief." *The Augusta Chronicle,* June 29, pg. 1A.

King, Ryan D., Steven F. Messner, and Robert Baller. 2009. "Contemporary Hate Crimes, Law Enforcement, and the Legacy of Racial Violence." *American Sociological Review* 74:291–315.

Kuran, Timur. 1995. "The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary Surprises." *American Journal of Sociology* 100(6):1528–51.

Lassiter, Matthew D. 2006. *The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Luders, Joseph E. 2010. *The Civil Rights Movement and the Logic of Social Change*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Luker, Kristen. 1984. *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

McAdam, Doug. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, Doug and Karina Kloos. 2014. *Deeply Divided: Racial Politics and Social Movements in Post-War America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

McCammon, Holly J., Harmony D. Newman, Courtney Sanders Muse, and Teresa M. Terrell. 2007. "Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Structures: The Political Successes of the U.S. Women's Jury Movements." *American Sociological Review* 72(5):725–49.

McMillen, Neil R. 1971. *The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954–64*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

McMillen, Neil R. 1990. *Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

McVeigh, Rory. 2009. *The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

McVeigh, Rory and David Cunningham. 2012. "Enduring Consequences of Right-Wing Extremism: Klan Mobilization and Homicides in Southern Counties." *Social Forces* 91(3):843–62.

Messner, Steven F., Robert D. Baller, and Matthew P. Zevenbergen. 2005. "The Legacy of Lynching and Southern Homicides." *American Sociological Review* 70(4):633–55.

Messner, Steven F., Luc Anselin, Darnell F. Hawkins, Glenn Deane, Stewart E. Tolnay, and Robert D. Baller. 2000. *An Atlas of the Spatial Patterning of County-Level Homicide, 1960–1990*. Pittsburgh, PA: National Consortium on Violence Research (NCOVR).

Myers, David G. and Helmut Lamm. 1976. "The Group Polarization Phenomenon." *Psychological Bulletin* 83(4):602–627.

Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. 1993. *The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion, Our Social Skin*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Olzak, Susan. 1992. *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. 1994. *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*. New York: Routledge.

Quillian, Lincoln. 2006. "New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and Discrimination." *Annual Review of Sociology* 32:299–328.

Redding, Kent. 1992. "Failed Populism: Movement-Party Disjuncture in North Carolina, 1890 to 1900." *American Sociological Review* 57(3):340–52.

Scammon, Richard M. 1970. *America Votes 8: A Handbook of Contemporary Election Statistics*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Schuman, Howard. 1997. *Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Schwartz, Michael. 1976. *Radical Protest and Social Structure: The Southern Farmers' Alliance and Cotton Tenancy, 1880–1890*. New York: Academic Press.

Sears, David O., Richard R. Lau, Tom R. Tyler, and Harris M. Allen Jr. 1980. "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting." *American Political Science Review* 74(3):670–84.

Snow, David, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51(4):464–81.

Tolnay, Stewart E. 2003. "The African American 'Great Migration' and Beyond." *Annual Review of Sociology* 29:209–232.

Tolnay, Stewart and E. M. Beck. 1995. *A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882–1930*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities. 1966. *Activities of Ku Klux Klan Organizations in the United States, Parts I–V*. 89th Congress, First Session. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities. 1967. *The Present Day Ku Klux Klan Movement*. 90th Congress, First Session. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Wade, Wyn Craig. 1987. *The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Rory McVeigh is Professor and Chair of the Sociology Department at the University of Notre Dame. He is the editor of *Mobilization,* and Director of the Center for the Study of Social Movements. His research examines structural influences on political conflict. He is the author of *The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National Politics* (Minnesota Press 2009). Current research examines social and political consequences of segregation in the United States.

David Cunningham is Professor and Chair of Sociology and Director of the Social Justice & Social Policy Program at Brandeis University. He is the author of *Klansville, U.S.A.: The Rise and Fall of the Civil Rights-Era Ku Klux Klan* (Oxford University Press 2013). His current research focuses on the causes, consequences, and legacies of racial conflict, with an emphasis on the comparative study of school desegregation trajectories.

Justin Farrell is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Yale University in the School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. His mixed-methods research blends network analysis, machine learning, and traditional qualitative fieldwork to study environment, movements, and culture. His most recent research examines social and moral conflict over Yellowstone, and covert corporate mobilization around climate change denial.