THE STOIC INVENTION OF COSMOPOLITAN POLITICS

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According to ancient Stoics, a polis is a place, a system of human beings, or both of these things, and it is a system of human beings—not just a loose collection—because it is put in order by law. But Stoics do not mean by 'law' the decree of a duly constituted authority. They define 'law' as "right reason," which provides "the standard of right wrong, prescribing to naturally political animals the things that ought to be done and proscribing the things that ought not." In point of fact, they think that no extant

1 This essay is only a lightly revised version of the programmatic lecture I delivered at the conference. Its first two thirds, which sketch an account of the Chrysippean Stoic's attachment to a cosmopolitan way of life, receive fuller development and defense in Brown (forthcoming), and the last third is more provocation than settled argument. I hope that the many people who have helped me will not be offended if I single out for special thanks Elizabeth Asmis, Pauline Kleingeld, and Martha Nussbaum; their criticisms and encouragement over many years have been invaluable to me. I also thank the organizers and the other conferees in Frankfurt for an excellent experience, and the editors of the proceedings for their patience.

2 Stobaeus II 7.11i 103,17-20 Wachsmuth. Cf. Arius ap. Eusebius SVF 2.528. Note that the city is here defined in terms of human beings, and not just in terms of citizens. ('SVF' here and throughout refers to von Arnim 1903-1905. Most of the Stoic texts I cite can be found translated in vol. 1 of Long and Sedley 1986 or in Inwood and Gerson 1997, but the translations here are mine.)

3 Clement SVF 3.327.

4 For the formulaic definition, see Stobaeus II 7.11d 96,10-12 and 7.11i 102,4-6; Cicero, Leg. I 18; Diogenes Laertius VII 88; and Alexander, De fato 207,5-21 Bruns. The slightly more elaborate expression I offer here is from the opening of Chrysippus' On Law, as quoted by Marcian 1 (SVF 3.314).
system of human beings is put in order by right reason, and so they grant the title 'polis' to no ordinary human community. But according to the Stoics, the cosmos as a whole is put in order by right reason, and it is a place where human beings live. So the cosmos as a whole does satisfy the definition of 'polis'.

This is the Stoic doctrine of the cosmopolis. Because it rests on normative ideals that far outstrip what ordinary practice manages to satisfy, one might well assume that the Stoic who strives to live as a citizen of the cosmopolis would have to turn away from ordinary politics. On this assumption, "living as a citizen of the cosmos" would be nothing more than a metaphor for living in agreement with the right reason that pervades nature—just a metaphor for living a good human life as Stoicism understands it. Seneca interprets the doctrine of the cosmopolis in this way when he insists, in De Otio, that the original Greek Stoics justified a life of withdrawal from political engagement on the grounds that no extant city satisfies the Stoic standards of a true political community.

5 Cicero, Acad II 136-137; Diogenianus ap. Eusebius SVF 3.324 (citing Chrysippus in particular); Philodemus, Stoic 20.4-6; Plutarch, Stoic rep 1033ef; and cf. Dio Chrysostom, Or XXXVI 20. The denial is not entirely original: see Plato, Rep 422e and Pol 293e.
6 Aurius ap. Eusebius SVF 2.528; Cicero, Nat D II 78 and 154; Cicero, Fin III 64; Cicero, Parad 18; Clement SVF 3.327; and Plutarch, Comm not 1065e.
7 Seneca's argument (not just in De Otio, especially at 8.1, but also in Ep 68.2) has unfortunately been taken at face value: see, for a few examples, Brunt, "Stoicism and the Principate," 17, Devine, "Stoicism on the Best Regime," 326, and Vander Waerdt, "Zeno's Republic," 293n85.
But Seneca is doing some special pleading. As his addressee in *On Leisure* (*De Otio*) knows, the Greek Stoics encouraged ordinary political engagement. Diogenes Laertius reports, "They [viz., the Stoics] say that the sage will participate in politics, if nothing prevents him—so says Chrysippus in the first book of *On Lives."*

Are the Stoics contradicting themselves? Do they recommend a course of actions that is inconsistent with their ideals? Yes, charges Plutarch at the start of his polemic *On Stoic Self-Contradictions* (*De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*). But I argue here that there is no inconsistency. I focus on Chrysippus, the great Greek Stoic who is the focus of Seneca's inference, Diogenes Laertius' report, and Plutarch's polemic. On my account, Chrysippus consistently believes that to live as a citizen of the cosmos, one should also engage in ordinary politics (where one can). Indeed, I suggest that by conceiving of how a citizen of the world can engage in ordinary politics, Chrysippus effectively invents the ideal of cosmopolitan politics.

I proceed in three stages. First, I summarize the reasoning by which Chrysippus maintains that someone who lives as a citizen of the world should engage in ordinary politics (if he or she can). Then I consider how such a person engages in politics in a more than metaphorically

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8 Cf. *De Otio* 1.4.
9 Diogenes Laertius VII 121.
10 I also allow myself to attribute to Chrysippus some doctrines that are reported not explicitly for him but only for "the Stoics." I say more to justify these attributions in *Stoic Cosmopolitanism*. 
cosmopolitan way. Finally, I examine how this account of cosmopolitanism in politics amounts to the invention of cosmopolitan politics.

The Stoic in Politics

According to Diogenes Laertius' report, quoted above, Chrysippus maintained that one should engage in politics if circumstances permit. I reconstruct his reason why in five broad steps.

First, Chrysippus maintains that the goal of life—that for the sake of which one should do everything that one does—\textsuperscript{11} is to live in agreement with nature. To be in agreement with nature is just to have perfectly natural impulses and judgments. This is not to be a noble savage, however. On Chrysippus' view, human beings are prone to corruption, both because some things appear to us to be other than they really are and because our fellows who have made mistakes can mislead us.\textsuperscript{12} So living in agreement with nature is a special achievement, requiring careful, philosophical training.

Chrysippus further characterizes this goal in two illuminating ways. First, he calls living in agreement with nature living virtuously, since Stoics identify virtue as a disposition in agreement with nature.\textsuperscript{13} They also

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\textsuperscript{11} Stobaeus II 7.3b 46,5-7. \\
\textsuperscript{12} Diogenes Laertius VII 89, with the evidence collected at SVF 3.229-236. Cf. Cicero, \textit{Tusc.} III 2-3. \\
\textsuperscript{13} Diogenes Laertius VII 89. Cf. Stobaeus II 7.5b1 60,7-8.
\end{flushleft}
identify virtue as knowledge, and knowledge as a cognition or system of cognitions that is "stable, firm, and unshakeable by reason or argument." Since knowing something requires standing by it "unshakeably" in a dialectical encounter (such as Socratic examination), it requires that a knower can defend what he knows with sound inferences. This also requires that he make no logical mistakes in his inferences and that he have no false beliefs (from which he might be led to shake a true one). So cognitions are made unshakeable by being placed in a perfectly coherent network of cognitions. Living in agreement with nature, with naturally perfect impulses and judgments, then turns out to be living with perfectly coherent set of impulses and judgments. So when Chrysippus says that virtue requires doing such-and-such in such-and-such circumstances, he means that human beings cannot be psychologically coherent except by doing such-and-such in such-and-such circumstances.

But Chrysippus is not content with a subjective characterization of living in agreement with nature, nor does he think that we can or should agree merely with our human nature. He also insists that virtuous
agreement must extend to cosmic nature.\textsuperscript{17} So it seems that one who lives in agreement with nature recognizes normative authority not in the customs and laws of one's local community but in the order of nature. At least, this supposition explains why Chrysippus and the Stoics identify law, which traditionally articulates the demands of justice, not with any local conventions but with the right reason that organizes nature, and why they identify the polis not with any extant community of human beings but with the cosmos. In this way, the initial insistence that one should live as in agreement with nature already includes the thought that one should live as a citizen of the cosmos. But this thought is not yet robust cosmopolitanism, because the content of a life lived in agreement with nature is as yet unclear. For all that the first step in this Chrysippean argument asserts, Stoic world-citizenship is just a metaphor for Stoic agreement with nature.

This is not to say that the first step is trivial. We might disagree with it by saying that one should not live in agreement with nature but should somehow rise above the merely natural. Or we might allow that one should live in agreement with nature but insist that one should agree with merely human and not cosmic nature. Or we might follow Chrysippus so far as to accept that one should live in agreement with cosmic nature and deny that this makes the cosmic nature a source of normativity as opposed to local

\textsuperscript{17} Diogenes Laertius VII 89.
conventions. Chrysippus' first step is a giant leap even though it does not get him a robust notion of cosmopolitanism.

For the second step, Chrysippus maintains that agreeing with nature—that is, virtue—includes beneficence—that is, the virtue of helping other human beings. The Stoics consider beneficence a species of justice, which is the cardinal social virtue, and they argue that one comes to be just by coming to find other human beings akin to one. To anyone inclined to doubt that human beings find it natural to benefit others, the Stoics point to the work of parental love.

Perhaps few would be so inclined. Yet Chrysippus takes a third step and carries the scope of beneficence further than many in the ancient world, at least, did. It was quite common to insist that beneficence should extend beyond family and intimates to compatriots or even to fellow Greeks. The thesis that humans are naturally political, which Chrysippus endorsed, entails, among other things, that humans achieve their own good by yoking their pursuit of it to their compatriots' similar pursuit. But it was also common to insist that one does not have robust duties to help foreigners.

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18 Porphyry, Abst III 19 (SVF 1.197); Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1038b; and Cicero, Fin III 62.
19 Cicero, Fin III 62.
20 See, e.g., the first sentence of Chrysippus, On Law, as quoted by Marcian 1.
21 See Cicero, Off I 51-52, where Cicero's example of acceptably benefiting a foreigner (without sacrificing anything of value), helping to show a lost stranger the way, is a favorite of the Peripatetics (see Stobaeus II 7.13 121,4-5, and cf. Aristotle, EN VIII 1 1155a21-22). Interestingly, the Stoic Seneca scorns exactly this as unworthy of the name 'beneficence' (Ben IV 29.2-3).
He maintained not only that beneficence requires benefiting our family and intimates but that it requires benefiting human beings as such, whether citizen or foreigner. So here Chrysippus' cosmopolitanism becomes more than metaphor, as he acknowledges some obligation to help human beings as such. What remains unclear, at this point in the argument, is how much such help is required, under what circumstances, and how.

Fourth, Chrysippus and the Stoics maintain that genuinely helping another human being requires restraining her vice and promoting her virtue. The principal insight driving this claim, borrowed from Plato's *Euthydemus*, is that abilities and advantages other than virtue do not really help one unless one is able to use them and use them wisely. In fact, they can hurt: if someone is handsome, rich, and strong, but foolish, then he is apt to get into more trouble than he would were he ugly, poor, and weak.

But there are multiple ways of restraining vice and promoting virtue. Consider, for example, how Seneca admits that "in benefits, I am necessarily defeated by Socrates, necessarily defeated by Diogenes, who marched naked through the middle of the Macedonians' treasures, treading upon the

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22 The plainest evidence for this commitment comes from the attack on Stoic justice in the Anonymous commentary on Plato's *Theaetetus*, since the author assumes that the Stoics require that we find even "the furthest Mysian" dear (*In Thet* 5.24-32). Support for attributing the commitment to Chrysippus also comes from how well it explains other things he says, such as his insistence that one should prefer to engage in politics (see the next section, below).

wealth of a king."\textsuperscript{24} Given that Diogenes and Socrates did not take up the ordinary political life (although Socrates apparently thought of himself as doing the work of politics),\textsuperscript{25} Seneca's admission allows that benefiting others does not strictly require political engagement. But the Stoics insist that what is appropriate depends upon the circumstances, and they allow that one's own talents matter to the circumstances.\textsuperscript{26} Not everyone can be a Socrates or Diogenes.

Still, as Seneca's admission might suggest, the Stoic wants to benefit more people rather than fewer, other things being equal.\textsuperscript{27} So, as the Stoic considers what career to take up—should she be fortunate enough to have a choice—she will consider which career would allow her to best help others. And at this point the fifth step in Chrysippus' reconstructed argument emerges: one should prefer a political career because politics is the business of improving lives by restraining vice and promoting virtue. The rest of Diogenes Laertius' report quoted earlier testifies, "They [viz., the Stoics] say that the sage will participate in politics, if nothing prevents him—so says Chrysippus in the first book of \textit{On Lives}—for they say that he will restrain

\textsuperscript{24} Seneca, \textit{Ben} V 4.3.
\textsuperscript{25} Plato, \textit{Gorgias} 521d, with Shaw, "Socrates and the True Political Craft."
\textsuperscript{26} This allowance is explicit in the "\textit{personae}-theory" of Panaetius (passed on by Cicero, \textit{Off I} 93-151), which reverberates through the work of later Stoics such as Seneca and Epictetus. But it is plausible that this merely makes explicit what was already implicit in Chrysippean Stoicism. This explains the divergent responses early Stoics gave to opportunities for political engagement without attributing hypocrisy to them. See Brown, \textit{Stoic Cosmopolitanism}, §7.8.
\textsuperscript{27} Cicero, \textit{Fin} III 65.
vice and promote virtue."\textsuperscript{28} Politics offers the chance to lead by example (or advise those who do) and to shape laws that condition behavior, and because it has these powers, it is generally preferable to engage in politics.

The Stoic as a Cosmopolitan in Politics

Thus far, Chrysippean reasoning explains why a Stoic living in agreement with nature, as a citizen of the cosmos, will generally prefer to engage in politics. Moreover, the reasoning turns on the Stoic's cosmopolitan commitment to helping human beings as such, and the more the better. It does not, however, follow that the Stoic wants to use politics in a cosmopolitan way. In fact, Chrysippus appears to have believed that all effective politics is necessarily local.

This emerges from the importance of circumstance to advice, and the importance of advice to promoting virtue and restraining vice. We know more about these commitments from Seneca (especially in \textit{Letters} 94 and 95) than we do from Chrysippus, whose work on the "paraenetic" part of philosophy concerned with moral education is more than usually lost to us, but Chrysippus' defense of the founding Stoic Zeno's \textit{Republic} testifies to his

\textsuperscript{28} Diogenes Laertius VII 121.
commitment to face-to-face moral education as the crux of politics. 29 For Zeno maintained that in an ideal city, in which every adult human being is virtuous, there would be no need for law-courts or temples or gymnasia, standard institutions of the Greek polis. In fact, in an ideal city, erotic love plays the central role of maintaining the concord of the city by motivating the virtuous adults to educate the young and thus perpetuate the virtue of the citizenry. 30 With erotic love driving the moral education that politics is supposed to provide and without traditional political institutions and practices, Zeno's idealized politics must work locally.

But if Chrysippean politics is local, then how is it cosmopolitan? It certainly does not embrace the kind of imperialism that Cicero defended, much less a world-state. 31 Perhaps, one might be tempted to suppose, Chrysippus' cosmopolitanism is, after all, metaphorical or at best limited to special kinds of beneficent actions outside of political engagement.

One should resist this temptation. There are two important ways in which the Chrysippean Stoic's commitment to helping others through local

29 Chrysippus defended the authenticity of Zeno's Republic (Diogenes Laertius VII 34), and he defended its most controversial proposals, including its defense of incest (Sextus, PH III 245-246 = M XI 191-192 and Diogenes Laertius VII 188).

30 See especially Athenaeus SVF 1.263 and Diogenes Laertius VII 129 with Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City.

31 Some scholars, misled by Plutarch, Al For 329ab, have thought that Zeno's Republic advocated a world-state. (See Tarn, "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind" and Alexander the Great, 2:399-449; Devine, "Stoicism on the Best Regime;" and Dawson, Cities of the Gods, 175.) But the evidence for the Republic clearly imagines a world of multiple, independent cities without any special political institutions linking them (though they do share an ideology, a point to which I return below). (See especially Diogenes Laertius VII 32-33, with Stobaeus IV 1.88 27,13-14.)
political engagement is a cosmopolitan commitment to helping human beings as such. First, when Chrysippus explains how one should prefer to engage in politics, he imagines engaging in politics abroad, as Plutarch reports:

But Chrysippus himself in the first book of On Lives says that the sage will voluntarily assume kingship and make money from it, and if he is not able to be king, he will live with a king and will serve a king, a king like Idanthrysus the Scythian or Leucon the Pontian. . . . "For," he says, "while holding to these things [viz., common conceptions? cf. Sextus, M XI 22] let us again examine the fact that he will serve and live with princes, since we have maintained this too for reasons much like the very considerations which have caused some not even to suspect it." And after a little: "And not only with those who have made some progress by being engaged in disciplinary activities and certain habits, for example at the courts of Leucon and Idanthrysos." 32

The kind of political engagement Chrysippus here describes—serving as an advisor at court—requires no special citizenship and is open to foreigners. His examples of appropriate courts to serve were far from Athens, where he himself was lecturing and writing. So the Chrysippean Stoic is not just to consider whether and how she might best help human beings in her own

local community but whether and how she might best help human beings by emigrating. To recommend the political life while also urging that one should help human beings as such wherever one can best do it is plainly cosmopolitan.

Not only is Chrysippus' advice about where one might engage in politics cosmopolitan, so too is his advice about the ends of politics. These ends, to restrain vice and promote virtue, aim to cultivate harmony and peace within the local community where one is engaged and without. Zeno's Republic again makes this plain, for it imagines a world of multiple cities in which an ideal city makes no provisions for military defense. Zeno says nothing of why that might be imaginable if all the cities were not similarly virtuous. Chrysippus' program envisions a way in which we might make progress toward this imaginable ideal: if multiple Stoics who are making progress toward living in agreement with nature engage in politics wherever they can best help a community, they can restrain vice and promote virtue in multiple communities. There is a kind of ideological imperialism in Chrysippus' program that encourages the development of similar evaluative commitments in multiple communities, and this counts as one of the most lastingly influential kinds of cosmopolitan politics.

The Stoic's Cosmopolitan Politics
So far, I have argued that Stoic cosmopolitanism is neither a mere metaphor nor a contradiction of Stoic commitment to local politics. But this is still quite far short of saying that the Stoics invented cosmopolitan politics. One might well question whether the Stoics' cosmopolitan attachment to local politics is really cosmopolitan politics, and even if it is, one might well wonder whether it is an invention of cosmopolitan politics.

The first of these problems rests on a distinction between ethics and politics. One might accept that the Stoics offer cosmopolitan ethics, a case for helping human beings as such, but deny that they offer cosmopolitan politics. On this view, commitment to cosmopolitan politics might require refiguring political institutions to make them more "international."

But a sharp distinction between cosmopolitan ethics and cosmopolitan politics obscures at least as much as it illuminates. Chrysippus' position has undeniably political ramifications. He encourages Stoics to engage in politics wherever they can best help humans as such, by promoting virtue and restraining vice. This requires and thus encourages the possibility of migration across borders. It also requires and thus encourages the possibility of political engagement by non-citizens or at least by naturalized citizens. (It should not surprise, then, that Stoics were apparently keen to
define the polis in terms of its inhabitants and not merely its citizens (see note 1).\(^{33}\)

One might object that although Chrysippus' program favors these things, it does not do much for them.\(^{34}\) Stoics believe that anyone can live virtuously and thus successfully in any circumstances whatsoever, even as a chattel slave. In fact, they believe that there are no degrees of virtue and success, so a properly philosophical slave would be just as virtuous and just as successful as a wise emperor.\(^{35}\) So the worry is that Stoicism provides no incentive to change unfavorable, even oppressive, institutions. If circumstances do not permit the Stoic to emigrate and promote virtue by engaging in politics abroad, he will simply adapt, and he will be just as virtuous and successful as he would have been in more favorable circumstances. Stoics prefer open borders and a political process that is open to the foreign-born, but because they will live just as well without them, they are only as committed to cosmopolitan politics as the circumstances permit.\(^{36}\)

\(^{33}\) Modern cosmopolitans have sometimes attended to these ideas. Consider Kant on "cosmopolitan law" (with Kleingeld, "Kant's Cosmopolitan Law") and, more recently, Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism.

\(^{34}\) I here adapt a common complaint about Stoic politics, forcefully expressed at the conference by Martha Nussbaum.

\(^{35}\) See Diogenes Laertius VII 127 and Plutarch, Comm. not. 1076a-b.

\(^{36}\) Stoics who actually engaged in politics (such as Sphaerus and Persaeus) were aided by the existence of trans-polis institutions under the successor kingdoms (successor to Alexander the Great). But they need not have favored exactly such institutions, and there is no clear evidence about what Chrysippus thought about, say, the Antigonids.
There is something right about this objection, but it does not succeed in undermining the idea of Stoic politics. First, although Stoics believe that a slave can be just as virtuous and successful as an emperor, they do not consider the two positions equally preferable. There are reasons to prefer being an emperor, including the fact that an emperor can readily help more people than a slave.\textsuperscript{37} Now, Stoics are not unconditionally committed to bringing about conditions they prefer. In fact, they recognize that for a fool, favorable conditions can lead to more trouble than unfavorable ones. Nevertheless, the Stoics do see reason, other things equal, to promote preferred circumstances in which virtuous action can readily help more people.\textsuperscript{38}

Second, whether or not circumstances permit enabling or directly engaging in politics abroad, the Chrysippean Stoic always aims to promote virtue and restrain vice and to encourage this as the aim of politics everywhere. So even if existing institutions are utterly opposed to political engagement abroad, still the Stoic is promoting a way of life that, were it more widely shared, would lead its practitioners to change the institutions to the ones they prefer, the ones that enable political engagement abroad. And if institutions already allow such engagement, then Stoics work to

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\textsuperscript{38} Again, see Cicero, \textit{Fin} III 65.
spread the pursuit of Stoic virtue to multiple cities. Hence, it might not be too grandiose to say that the aim of Stoic politics is "cosmopolitan peace."\(^{39}\)

All of this means that Chrysippean Stoics would, in some times and places, do very little that looks cosmopolitan politics and would, in some others, do much more. Perhaps this makes the Stoics insufficiently committed to politics to deserve to be named "political cosmopolitans."\(^{40}\) I do not want to quibble about the label. I do want to insist, though, that in many circumstances, Stoics will do work that is obviously cosmopolitan and obviously political. Indeed, even the quietest Stoic in the least favorable circumstances is cultivating, and trying to encourage others to cultivate, a way of life that prefers work that is obviously cosmopolitan and obviously political.

Another way to see that Chrysippus' position includes cosmopolitan politics (and not just cosmopolitan ethics) is to contrast it with other professed cosmopolitanisms from antiquity. Diogenes the Cynic, "when he was asked where he came from, would say, 'I am a citizen of the world.'"\(^{41}\) But Diogenes fancied himself "citiless, homeless, deprived of a fatherland,"\(^{42}\) and it is not easy to see where his commitment to world-citizenship goes

\(^{39}\) I am again suggesting a connection between the Stoics and a prominent aim of modern political cosmopolitans (and especially those in the Kantian tradition).

\(^{40}\) And perhaps it makes them insufficiently opposed to chattel slavery. I mean to consider this objection (and to defend the claim that the Greek Stoics are opposed to slavery) elsewhere.

\(^{41}\) Diogenes Laertius VI 63.

\(^{42}\) Diogenes Laertius VI 38.
beyond this rejection of more local citizenship. Diogenes does purport to help people wherever he goes, but his cosmopolitanism resembles nothing so much as the worldliness of a nomad. Anaxagoras allegedly expressed a kind of world-citizenship differently:

And finally he retired and concerned himself with the investigation of nature without paying any mind to politics. When someone asked, 'Does your fatherland mean nothing to you?,' he replied, 'Hush! My fatherland is very important to me,' as he pointed to the heavens. But this report, even if it is genuine, does not suggest that Anaxagoras was committed to helping humans as such, let alone by means of politics. Rather, Anaxagoras is expressing the worldliness of an intellectual who stands apart from the concerns of local politics. Socrates, according to Stoic and Stoicizing sources, also fancied himself a citizen of the world. Plato makes this claim plausible, since Plato's Socrates is motivated by philanthropia to examine (and so benefit) not just Athenians but foreigners. But even though Socrates thinks of this as real political work, this is a conception of politics that seems to require no transformation of political institutions. So it would be hard to see Socratic examination of foreigners as a clear case of cosmopolitan politics. By contrast, Chrysippus'

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43 Diogenes Laertius II 7.
44 Musonius, fr. 9 [That Exile is no Evil] 42,1-2 Hense = Stobaeus III 40.9 749,2-3; Epictetus, Diss. I 9.1; Cicero, Tusc. V 108; and Plutarch, De Exilio 600f-601a.
45 Philanthropia: Eu. 3d5-9. Examinations benefit examinees: Apol. 36c3-5. Examines anyone: Apol. 23b4-6 and 30a3-5. For discussion, see my "Socrates the Cosmopolitan."
46 Plato, Gorg. 521d6-8.
cosmopolitanism has the explicit aim of at least ultimately engaging in and transforming political institutions.

This contrast between earlier cosmopolitans and Chrysippus also suggests that there is something new about Stoic cosmopolitanism, but there are still two ways of doubting that the Stoics invented cosmopolitan politics. First, one might try to insist that those who made the institutions within which the Stoics worked are the real inventors of the Stoics' cosmopolitan politics. This, as it happens, is difficult to do. Alexander the Great has often received credit, but the idea that Alexander's conquests were motivated by philosophical ideals of human community has not survived scrutiny. Although it would be foolish to deny that the changes Alexander wrought made Stoics' time and place hospitable to their cosmopolitan theorizing, there is no evidence of programmatic calls for cosmopolitan politics before theirs.

Second, one might notice that the Stoic achievement is not so much a new invention but a joining of two old inventions. Others before the Stoics had conceived of advising and advising abroad as important political work, and others before them had conceived of living as a citizen of the world. All the Stoics did was to join these ideas.

47 See esp. Tarn, "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind" and Alexander the Great, 2:399-449.

This, I think, is right in all but its tone. Perhaps this makes intellectual invention out to be too modest, but I would have thought that much intellectual invention proceeds by novel combination of existing ideas. Nor did Chrysippus simply juxtapose an established political practice with a way of looking at one's relation to citizenship. He integrated them into a rich and challenging theory about how we should live. By doing so, he and his fellow Stoics introduced the program and possibilities of cosmopolitan politics, which has spawned a large and vigorous family of controversial ideals. For that, Chrysippus and the Stoics deserve credit.

Sources Cited


