Abstract

The crisis in Syria has reached a level that requires rethinking its possible resolution. Recent efforts ranging from French operational and Saudi light arms support for the Free Syrian Army to Iranian operational and Russian military support for the Assad regime have not resolved the crisis. In fact, they have only worsened it by fueling the flames of sectarian hatred resulting in a bloody stalemate on the ground. A new kind of intervention is therefore necessary. While the suggestion of a NATO military intervention has been en vogue in some circles, this action would substantially worsen the crisis and lead to further resentment against the West. A more humble but effective action would be a robust UN intervention in the form of peacekeepers placed along the Syrian border in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The purpose would be to create safe havens for all Syrians, not insure victory of one side or the other. The goal would be to stop the current human rights violations and prevent the current humanitarian crisis from worsening, not fan the flames of violence. The justification would be the “responsibility to protect” doctrine, not might-makes-right. The hope would be to create a window for a negotiated settlement and not give in to more fighting with no end in sight. Despite recent tarnishes to the UN’s veneer, it should therefore play an active role in resolving the Syrian crisis.
It is now necessary for the outside world to intervene in the crisis in Syria. The state of affairs there has now effectively crossed a line in which not acting will be worse than acting. Simply put, there is too much at stake to not to do something more than is already being done. Such is the current cry heard around the world. However, ever since the pro-democratic uprisings in Syria turned into a civil war last year, regional intervention has been occurring. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been providing light arms for the rebels while Iran and Iraq have been supplying fighters and logistics to the Syrian state. International intervention has also been going on for some time. Russia continues to send military weapons for the Assad regime while Britain and France provide operational support to the Free Syrian Army. Since the current configuration of power in Syria has led to a draw even as the death toll and carnage mounts with no obvious end in sight, the question is not whether to intervene but what kind of intervention will be effective. Clearly, the most recent kind has not been. This fact raises two strategic questions: who or what body should intervene in some new way, and what should the goal of such intervention be? While there has been much talk of late that the United States should do more to help the Free Syrian Army oust President Bashar al-Assad, or even that NATO intervene militarily to do it for them, these options will only worsen the violence and further embroil both in a region where neither are welcome. Indeed, such intervention will only do more harm than good for all in the long run.

So what is the best kind of intervention at this time? A moderate but effective solution is for the United Nations to install a sizeable and armed peacekeeping force along the borders of Syria. The purpose of such a force would not be to take sides in the civil war, but to create safe zones that provide a modicum of security for all Syrians. The goal of this kind of intervention would not be to determine a victor but to protect human rights and prevent further humanitarian
crisis. The justification would be the “responsibility to protect” doctrine and the hope would be to create a window for a negotiated settlement. Despite severe tarnishes to the UN’s veneer, it should play an active role in resolving the Syrian crisis.

Critics and skeptics of the UN will surely hoot and howl about this kind of intervention, claiming the UN is feckless and that such intervention will not prevent further killing. Even inside the UN, members of the permanent five of the Security Council such as Russia have blocked efforts to use the UN to resolve hard problems like Syria. This kind of skepticism has deep roots in the Cold War experience when both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. believed, much to the chagrin of former colonized states in the Global South, that each was responsible for solving them in a bi-polarized world. Once the Cold War ended, though, that balance of power altered, opening up possibilities for the Security Council and the Secretary-General whose role during these years expanded, giving the office more power than it had had in the previous 45 years. Skepticism also grows out of more recent UN peacekeeping failures in the immediate post-Cold War Years. Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia are but three obvious cases. Nonetheless, there have been successful cases in both during the Cold War and afterward that indicate the UN has been and can continue to be decisive and effective at helping to resolve major security dilemmas. It should not be left out of the resolution to the Syrian crisis now.

For such plan to have a modicum of success, it must overcome several notable obstacles. The first is the hard reality on the ground. President Assad remains in control of the Syrian government, but he is not in control of the entire country, and something like anarchy has already set in on the ground in major pockets of Syria. Clearly, much to blame lies with his regime. Some statistics help drive home the point. Recent credible figures put the dead at 25,000. 1.5 million Syrians have been displaced internally, 1.2 million of those from the Syrian army’s
destruction of one-third of Homs, Syria’s third largest city. In addition to those displaced, many more have fled abroad. The UN’s number of 150,000 counts only those that have officially applied for refugee status, but based on reports of Syrians arriving in Jordan and Turkey, the total number of refugees exceeds 325,000 and is likely to go much higher.\(^1\) It might be fair to say, then, that crisis in Syria has now surpassed similar crises from the 1990s in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Sri Lanka, and that Assad regime has now wreaked more devastation across Syria than occurred in Grozny, Jaffna, and Sarajevo.\(^2\) Indeed, this past summer, the Assad regime started shelling neighborhoods and whole cities once loyal to it, using airplanes to drop so-called “TNT barrels,” each containing hundreds of kilograms worth of explosives. It also unleashed the Shabbiha, the relatively autonomous militia that commits gruesome massacres, such as the killing of 400 people in Daraya on August 27\(^{th}\). In fact, somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 people were killed in August, the highest for any month yet.\(^3\)

Naturally the regime is not the only side to have committed atrocities. The co-called Free Syrian Army (FSA), which is much less of unified army with a central command structure with trained troops as it is a hodgepodge of disaffected Syrians who have taken up arms, rag-tag mercenaries, former low-level Syrian conscripts, and a few officers with military training, has also behaved poorly. One of the more recent episodes is the killing of five Alawite officers outside of a Damascus police station.\(^4\) There are also credible reports that elements of Al-Qaeda have arrived in Syria, hoping to kidnap the rebel’s pro-democracy mission and convert it to a fight for a Sunni-led Arab caliphate based on fundamentalist Islamic interpretations of Sharia law.\(^5\) These are heavily armed and battled hardened jihadist fighters that are being supplied by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, indicating that the ruling Sunnis in those states have an interest in seeing the Alawite Assad regime overturned.\(^6\) It is similarly known that Iran not only provided Syrian
police with riot gear and paramilitary training during the pro-democracy demonstrations last year,⁷ but also has sent members of its elite Revolutionary Guard units to fight with the Syrian army against the rebels.⁸ Iraq is also sending Shi’a fighters to Damascus help protect the regime.⁹ Finally, Hezbollah, the Shi’a Islamic militant group and political party based in southern Lebanon and supported by both Iran and Syria, has likely sent fighters from its paramilitary wing to the region as well.¹⁰ Clearly, the country is not just engulfed in a civil war, but is quickly becoming a sectarian battleground of many forces and countries inside and outside of Syria indicating that it is now a powder keg on the verge of exploding totally and irrevocably. This grim reality can be contrasted with the surreal statement President Assad made on August 29 on Addounia TV, the pro-regime media station, that “Syria will return to the Syria before the crisis.”¹¹ Clearly, this is not going to happen. Things are going to get worse before they get better, especially if the situation is allowed to continue under its own inertia.

The situation thus requires a new kind of intervention. The question is of what kind? A military intervention under the auspices of NATO is one possibility being discussed as of late. Certainly such intervention could be justified by Article Five of NATO which states that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”¹² The repeated mortar firings into Turkey from Syria, which by now can no longer be believed to be “accidental,” would certainly fall under this provision (Turkey is a NATO member). In fact, this situation has led to a rare invoking of NATO’s Article Four which states “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”¹³ Turkey’s recent military interception of a Syrian passenger plane en route from Russia to Damascus, allegedly containing Russian made munitions and military gear for the Syrian regime,
which is a violation of international aviation law, could be interpreted as Turkey’s response that it feels the conditions of Article Four have been met. If so, Turkey would be within their legal bounds to request NATO strikes against Syria. So there is a case to be made for NATO intervention.

But a NATO military intervention in Syria would be a grave mistake. This is not because of the thorny issues surrounding the viability of such an attack, especially to what extent it is possible to render the Syrian air force impotent or that of placing sufficient number of NATO troops on the ground to defeat the Syrian regular army without significant casualties.

Instead the argument ignores five crucial factors that would surely make such a mission a failure. First, a NATO attack on Syria would only serve to further widen the conflict into a much broader sectarian war, not contain the violence to Syria, likely drawing in Turkey, Iran, Jordan, and Iraq, and thereby lead to a Middle Eastern war for which there is no stomach or need. Second, it would lead to substantially more deaths of both Syrians and NATO forces, and surely there is no stomach for this in the West. Third, there would be no foreseeable exit, leading to yet another long and protracted war with no obvious benefit, for which the West neither desires nor can afford. Fourth, a Western-led military strike would most assuredly inflame Muslim public opinion and alienate some countries in the region, namely, Iran, which might see such intervention as the first step toward attacking it, and perhaps even Iraq, whose government is run by Shi’a but which remains so unstable that the ethnic conflict there would be further inflamed. This point is particularly poignant since the likelihood of a US-led NATO force would be perceived by many in the international community as a third US war in a Muslim country. Finally, it would lead to further aggression against the US by terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the region to double-down on the effort to attack US embassies and the like, thus
running counter to US policy in the Global War On Terrorism that seeks to contain and erode Al-Qaeda. For all these reasons, then, a NATO led invasion of Syria is not the answer to the crisis there. Indeed, it would substantially widen and worsen it—the exact opposite result of what is needed.

If a NATO military intervention is not the answer, what is? A moderate but effective response is to install UN peacekeeping units in Syria. The purpose would be to create safe zones around Syria’s borders to the north, east, and south. These would not be no-fly zones enforced through airpower or safety corridors close to the fighting. This possibility was suggested last year by many credible strategists, but the violence has spread too much to make this solution viable. By contrast, UN peacekeepers could help create stability along the borders of Syria in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, where is there is ample space for them, where all Syrians who seek refuge from the fighting can safely cohabitate temporarily, and where the UN can establish refugee camps to provide for them until other measures can be found. Over time, they can create a de-militarized zone between the FSA and the Syrian Army along the main road that runs from Aleppo in the North to Damascus in the South, where most of the fighting has occurred. The point would to be to avoid taking sides in the conflict, as mandated by the UN Charter, and to prevent as many deaths as possible. The FSA may or may not be victorious in the long run, and the Assad regime will likely fall at one point, but for now, the solution must be a peacekeeping one.

To console critics and skeptics alike that such a plan can work, there is ample historical evidence from the distant and recent past. Two examples stand out from the Cold War when the world order was configured quite differently but which apply nonetheless. The first was the peacekeeping operation in the 1956 Suez affair known as the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF 1) in which peacekeepers were inserted along the Egyptian-Israeli border and around the Gaza Strip, acting as a physical barrier between the two countries’ troops. While it is true that such action was not a civil war as is the case in Syria today, but a more traditional conflict between two states, it did help stabilize the situation. The second was the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964, which was a civil war between the Greek-Cypriot majority and the Turkish-Cypriot minority. There, the UN Security Council secured a cease-fire and then established a demilitarized zone a few kilometers wide dividing the two sides along a 180-kilometer line, staffed with UN peacekeepers that has, for the most part, kept the peace ever since.\(^\text{15}\)

There are more recent historical examples as well. The most pertinent one is that of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Building on the original 1978 mission that involved 2,000 peacekeepers, the mission was expanded in 2009 to 15,000 peacekeepers. They have created a safe zone along the Lebanon-Israel border in which the only armed personnel currently allowed are UN peacekeepers or members of the Lebanese Army; those from Israel, Hezbollah, and Syria are not permitted. Most accounts of this mission agree that UNIFIL has successfully deterred additional violence along the border, and have allowed it to pursue the other parts of its mission: the delivery of humanitarian assistance to wounded and ailing civilians, and the safe return of refugees and displaced Lebanese.\(^\text{16}\) This case is not meant to suggest that success is imminent. The historical record during and after the Cold War is littered with failed UN peacekeeping missions, stretching from the Congo in 1960 to the Darfur region of Sudan today. They are also not offered as “models.” As Paul Kennedy has aptly shown in magisterial account of the UN, *The Parliament of Man* (2006), the historical record clearly shows there is no “one size fits all” model, and trying to construct and apply one has shown to be
nothing but folly. The more pragmatic one is to learn from all the UN peacekeeping missions to find what works in certain situations to see if they can be adapted, and to invent new ones as new cases arise. Regardless, clearly there are positive indications that the UN can act in robust and effective ways to curtail violence and reassert peace in conflict zones involving civil war.

As important as historical precedence is for justifying a UN peacekeeping mission in Syria, it alone is not enough. The normative case for a UN intervention in Syria must also be made. Such a case must be based in liberal internationalist principles, but to give them weight, they must be applied pragmatically with an eye on what is possible and what is not. The most pragmatically informed liberal internationalist principle at hand to justify UN intervention in Syria is that of “Responsibility to Protect.” Known as R2P, it was a product of the 2001 report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), confirmed by Nobel Laureate Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his 2001 book “We the Peoples,” and codified by the UN at the 2002 Millennium Summit. R2P holds that human rights can transcend state sovereignty under certain conditions, and moves us away from the view that state sovereignty is an unfettered license for carte blanche state action, and toward the view that states must bear some weight to govern responsibly. R2P manifests three basic tenets: first, that sovereignty is contingent not absolute; second, it shifts the emphasis from the rights of outsiders to the rights of victims; and third, it changes what might be called the “international default setting” for justified UN intervention on humanitarian grounds. Though there have been vocal opponents of R2P, ranging from P5 nations who claimed this limits their power to intervene in their own national interests to developing nations in the Global South who see it as just another cover for First World intervention albeit with a human face rather than a colonial one, the embrace of the
doctrine by the world human rights community has demonstrated its relative acceptance. The normative justification of UN intervention in Syria is thus available to those who look for it. If there ever was a justification of R2P it is surely the current crisis in Syria.

Despite the weight of history and theory, several significant bureaucratic and diplomatic hurdles must be overcome. First, since the UN is not allowed to take sides in civil wars and ethnic conflicts, which the Syrian crisis most assuredly is, there is nothing in the 1945 Charter granting the UN the right or responsibility to intervene in such cases. Indeed, the term “peacekeeping” is not even mentioned in the Charter. Here, again, however, the cases of Suez, Cyprus, and Lebanon, provide ample evidence that the UN can take such actions thus creating ample precedence for a peacekeeping mission. The point, then, is not to install UN peacekeepers in favor of the FSA and against the Assad government, but rather in support of all Syrians who seek refuge from the violence. The Syrian borders with Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey while not totally ideal, nonetheless presents the best practical place to do so at this time.

Second, since enacting UN peacekeeping forces falls under the rubric of the Security Council, approval of the permanent five—the US, Great Britain, France, Russia and China—will be required. Acquiring this is no small task. In fact, it has been the major stumbling block to a more robust UN action in Syria. It thus requires some discussion. Since Russia and China have already made it clear that they are not interested in passing any kind of resolution justifying UN condemnation, even of the Assad government for it gross violations of human rights and egregious behavior, it seems next to impossible that a resolution for peacekeepers could be reached. As any UN watcher knows, the veto power given to the P5 has proven controversial over the decades and at times has been an obstacle to UN efficacy. But it is not an insurmountable one, and given the dire situation in Syria, it is imperative to try.
There are three ways this can be achieved. The first would be to make an end-run on the Security Council by going directly to the General Assembly for an open vote. This radical possibility may appear to be a violation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which grants complete authority over crisis situations involving international security to the Security Council, but in fact it has been done at least once before. In 1950, the General Assembly passed resolution 377A, known more famously as “Uniting for Peace,” which granted itself the authority to meet and discuss possible actions if such action was blocked by a veto in the Security Council while the majority member states desired such action. Backed by the Americans, especially Secretary of State Dean Acheson (for whom the resolution is nicknamed), and designed to circumvent Soviet veto power and its support for the North Korean invasion of South Korea, one scholar of the UN has called this “perhaps the boldest attempt ever to shift power between the UN organs and had great appeal.” Indeed, it led to the creation of the emergency special session concept, which has been used ten times since, in the wake of a deadlocked Security Council. Invoking the ESS, however, even if procedurally successful in the short run would only strain relations at the UN and open up the Charter to further abuse in the long run. Thus, it might be a possible course, but it would not ultimately be a wise one.

A second option is to convince Russia and China that it is in their interests to abstain from voting or encourage their absence when the vote occurs. The Korean War, where the Russians did not vote to support the UN-backed US led invasion of Korea, represents a historical case where this happened. However, it is not likely to be repeated since the Russians were embarrassed by their mistake and vowed never to be absent again. Indeed, Russia has since vowed to use the veto as much as possible on principle to show its power in the P5.
The final option is to convince the Russians and the Chinese that supporting UN peacekeepers in Syria is in their best interests. In reality, this is the only viable option that will not lead to abuse of the UN Charter or to open hostilities among P5 nations. Since China’s lone objection to outside intervention of any kind is that such action sets precedence for future similar actions especially in China, it is not willing to back intervention in Syria. But a UN peacekeeping mission that places sufficiently armed troops along the borders of Syria, that is designed to protect all Syrians regardless of ethnic makeup or loyalties, and that is not implemented to choose sides, is easily shown not to be the kind of interference in domestic matters that China offers as its objection. Since Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey can be convinced of the benefit of such peacekeepers along their borders by showing how they will prevent the carnage from further spreading into their nations, it is hard to imagine how China’s objection could stand up.

Russia has likewise argued that outside intervention amounts to a violation of Syria’s national sovereignty. But it clearly has other interests in Syria far beyond those of China that lead it to block UN resolutions on this matter. The first is that Syria is a sovereign nation and the Assad government is by definition the legitimate government—this even as it admits that President Assad has made numerous mistakes and that its army has committed numerous atrocities (though it likes to point out that the FSA has done so as well). As such, the Russians contend the crisis in Syria remains a domestic matter, however much the indiscriminate killing goes on. Second, although Russia has been less vocal about this point, Syria remains a Russian ally. In fact, it is one of its last in the region. While it is not impossible to imagine that Russia will eventually decide to abandon Syria, for now it defends and upholds those relations. Indeed, there is ample historical evidence from the Cold War, where then Soviet policy in the Middle
East was not very effective at pulling the nations of the region into its sphere of influence, that the Russians will hang on to Syria because that course is the only way to maintain its influence in the region. Hardliners in Russia, especially the FSB, still believe that the Middle East is worth fighting for in an imaginarily renewed Cold War with the West. However unlikely such scenario is, it still motivates one line of argument in Russian foreign policy.

The final reason that Russia is not willing to give up on Syria just yet—and this is something that is not official Russian policy but which many Western analysts believe—is that Syria contains a crucial warm water port in Tartus, which the Russians enjoy the privilege of using. It is crucial because it allows them access the Mediterranean while their version of the aircraft carrier that dock at Odessa’s ports on the Black Sea, are not allowed to move through the Bosporus Strait, which Turkey controls. Tartus is the last of the Soviet-era warm water ports, and because of its location in Syria—its last military post south of Turkey—it carries great weight in Russian foreign policy for the region. If the Russians were to join with the other P5 members in approving a UN resolution for peacekeepers, the Assad government would most assuredly deny them that privilege, thus ending the strategic advantage the port provides. It would also make Russia look weak in its own eyes, which is not something Russian leadership is currently prepared to risk.

Despite the apparent difficulty in meeting these concerns, they can be met. First, since the Chinese are likely to vote with the Russians in the P5, the case has to be made to convince Russia that stopping the bloodshed in Syria is now in its interests. The sovereign nation argument can be overcome by showing the Assad regime has ceded all of its responsibility and thereby sacrificed all realistic invoking of its sovereign rights. Moreover, since the conflict in Syria has spilled beyond Syria proper, we are beyond the issue of statehood. This past August in
Lebanon, 16 people were killed and 130 wounded in fighting between pro-and anti-Syrian forces.\textsuperscript{23} And the so-called accidental shelling of Turkey over the past few weeks is currently leading to border disputes that if left unchecked could easily bring elements of the Turkish military into the conflict. Once just an armed uprising and before that a series of non-violent protests, the crisis in Syria is no longer only civil war but is threatening to become a regional conflict. There are also credible reports that Syria’s various religious groups such as the Druze, Shi’a, Ismailis, and Christians, are turning away from the Assad regime.\textsuperscript{24} And there is also the complicated and thorny issue of the Kurds. How long before any or all of these minorities pick up weapons and join the fighting? This state of affairs not only threatens to widen and further complicate an already complex and messy civil war between the Alawites of Assad’s regime and predominately Sunnis of the FSA, but because such ethnic loyalties are spread across Syria’s borders in all directions, the conflict has immense potential to become a much wider regional war that could unleash ethnic hostilities not seen in the region for centuries. Surely such a scenario not only puts the lie to the sovereignty argument but also is something both the Russians and the Chinese understand. Given the right kinds of persuasion, it seems likely they could be convinced to abandon this objection.

The second and third objections—that Syria is Russia’s last ally in the region, and that it needs its warm water port—are related, but can be met as well. Once the Russians understand that the national sovereignty argument no longer holds sway, the reasons for continuing to maintain good relations with the Assad government will become increasing suspect and problematic for Russia. Indeed, this is already happening. And, as we learned from the Cold War, the Russians are ultimately pragmatists who will make decisions that are best of them first and foremost. But the real point here is that Russia need not be forced to either abandon Assad
or its warm water port for the simple fact that supporting a UN resolution to place peacekeepers on Syria’s borders does not require them to. Indeed, such a resolution would explicitly disallow the UN to take sides; rather it calls for a way to contain the conflict to Syria while reducing the indiscriminate killing. Russia, then, could have its cake and eat it too, and so could China. In these ways, it is possible to convince the members of the P5 to support a UN mission to Syria.

Assuming these diplomatic hurdles could be overcome—and that is admittedly a large assumption—other pertinent concerns remain. For instance, there are major risks and limitations to placing UN peacekeepers on the ground in a war zone. Such an action might lead to a long and costly UN force in the region like so many other UN missions of a similar type that have used R2P to justify intervention in which peacekeepers will be shot at and killed. Would it even work, especially if a cease-fire cannot be brokered? After all, humanitarian missions work best after peace has already been established. That is why it is called peacekeeping. What if the FSA and the Syrian Army keep shooting at one another and the latter continues its indiscriminate killing of civilians? What then? Surely, such a mission would fail.

These are serious objections that must be answered, but they are not ultimately fatal ones. Certainly a cease fire would be preferable to the absence of one. But a cease-fire between the two main warring parties, despite the noble but ultimately failed attempt of special envoy Kofi Annan, is neither unimaginable nor impractical. More creativity is simply needed to make the “good offices” function of the Secretary-General display more teeth. Indeed the “good offices” function is needed now more than ever. Ban Ki Moon, the current Secretary-General, understands that, having recently sent Lakhdar Brahimi, the new international envoy on Syria, to Iran to enlist their help in negotiating a cease-fire in Syria. And each day, Moon speaks out on the worsening state of humanitarian affairs in Syria. The only way to give these negotiations a
chance are to support them with UN peacekeepers on the ground; they provide some weight to the UN’s ability to negotiate a settlement. In other words, the strategy should be to pursue a UN peacekeeping mission *simultaneous* to that of a cease-fire. Only then can a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Syria be found. The R2P doctrine was designed precisely for this kind of crisis and it should be implemented post haste.

Still, one must ask, will it work? Of course, no one can predict the future. But what we do know is that allowing the present situation to continue on its grisly course will most certainly lead to significantly higher deaths, continued internal displacement, vas increase in refugees, gross violations of human rights, and a pending humanitarian disaster that will eventually require UN assistance anyway. Thus, there is widespread agreement that the situation will get much, much worse before getting better.

The crisis in Syria has been cast in terms of having a military solution by ousting or killing President Assad, but since the UN is going to be involved in Syria sooner or later, we should change the narrative away from the military solution and toward a human rights and humanitarian one. The time has come to act now. The longer the world community waits—and it will take time to put a large operational UN troops along Syria’s borders—the more the death toll in Syria will rise and the conflagration there will continue to spread throughout the Middle East, leading to sectarian conflict that would make the current civil war seem tame by comparison. Since that should not be acceptable, the pertinent act is to put UN peacekeepers in Syria.

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4 Ibid.


13 Ibid.


16 On UNIFIL in Lebanon, see Weiss, et al., The United Nations and Changing World Politics, 97-100.

17 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, 111


19 Ibid., 77.

20 Ibid., 37 & 55.


22 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, 56.


