Co-opted Space and Resistance in Modern Brazil
By Gwen Unger

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We are pleased to present to you the third annual issue of the Washington University International Review. This journal is a compilation of undergraduate research organized under the theme of Protest in International and Area Studies.

Editorial Board
Jordan Kelly  Andrew Nathan
Lena Kelly   Emily Tulloch
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Acknowledgements
Our editorial board would like to acknowledge those who made this publication possible. First, we thank Professor Shefali Chandra for her role as our mentor and advisor. The editing process was successful in large part due to her guidance and support. We would also like to thank Sara Baker, whose expertise was vital in the organization and execution of both this journal and the accompanying conference. Finally, we would like to express gratitude to the authors themselves for all of their hard work and flexibility during the editing process over the last few months.

Stone Prize for Excellence in International Studies Research
In honor of Dr. Priscilla Stone, a lead architect of the International and Area Studies program at Washington University, our editorial board has awarded Monica Meeks the Stone Prize for Excellence in International Studies Research. A cash prize of five hundred dollars is awarded annually to the best journal article of the year.
Dear Reader,

This volume of Washington University’s International Review explores the idea of “protest” as it has evolved over time, continually adapting new forms of expression and communication. Forms of protest span a large spectrum; from individual to collective, local to global, peaceful to violent. They can take on a variety of forms, from massive public demonstrations that make headlines to quiet written declarations that express the voice of an individual. Each protest is unique, but the desired outcome is consistent: to create lasting change for both masses and minorities on a systemic level. Yet, questions still remain as to why. What ignites people to cry out in one circumstance when they willingly remain silent in another? What pushes a people to the brink? And in hindsight, how does one evaluate a protest’s impact? By studying protest through an interdisciplinary and international lens, as this journal does, one can begin to understand the forces that shape protest and the role of protest in cultivating societal change.

Often the first aspect of a protest that one thinks of is its location. In her piece, “Co-opted Space and Resistance in Modern Brazil,” Gwen Unger considers the significance of the power structures present within a given space in relation to resistance. She explains that the space in which people choose to enact protest is largely dependent upon the unspoken power dynamics present in the space. Gwen provides an insightful analysis of how, because of a space’s inherent power dynamics, the act of seeking domination of space by a given population is a form of resistance in and of itself. By gaining control of, or at least by invading, a given space, a people seek to gain the attention of those in power in order to spark change.

Protest need not always be marked explicitly with signs and street demonstrations. In his piece “Rap, Space, and Resistance in the United States and Chile,” author Zachary Latimore explores how marginalized populations in both the United States and Chile have taken to rap music to express their vexation with their respective places in society. Drawing parallels between the lyrical rap content of these two countries, Latimore exposes how these rap artists protest the dominating hegemonic discourse of the wealthy, using rap to subvert the power structure and reassert themselves into society.

Some protests utilize art as a mode of educating, empowering and bolstering support for a cause. In her piece, “Art in Defense of the Revolution: Political Poster Propaganda and the Anti-Contra War Campaign in Nicaragua,” Nay’Chelle Harris explores the role of art in one such protest. Harris analyzes the ways in which the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FLSN) carefully crafts and disseminates its poster art campaign, drawing on examples from Mexico and Cuba, in order to garner domestic and international support for the anti-Contra war movement. She argues that it is art’s ability to simultaneously appeal to and connect with multiple populations that makes it such a powerful tool for change in this context.
Ben Gottesdiener’s “Russia’s Political Weapon: Natural Gas” examines the current and pressing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, highlighting its importance in regard to the European Union’s (EU) dependency on Russian oil. What does it mean globally that Russia has energy-based leverage over the EU? Gottesdiener draws attention to the dangers posed when energy is used as a political weapon. Drawing parallels to the U.S. Oil Embargo Crisis of 1973, the essay investigates what happens when national protests expand to the international sphere.

Protests are dynamic. Over time, the goals, modes of action and strength of any given protest movement can change drastically. In her piece, “Women’s Social Movements in Morocco: A History of Analysis of Events Pre and Post Arab Spring,” author Annalisa Triola examines the continuous transformations undergone by the Moroccan women’s rights movement from the 1970s to the years following the Arab Spring. Triola intricately illustrates the development of the women’s rights movement from an undertaking enacted only by several disjointed groups of activists to an integral entity of society composed of dozens of strong organizations and parliamentarians with political influence. Additionally, she analyzes the impact this movement has made on Moroccan society and the public’s understanding of protest and presents ideas about the future of the movement.

In “Toulouse: A Medico-Social Protest Against French Xenophobia,” Monica Meeks explores the positive results of persistent rebellion against the xenophobic attitudes that plague the majority of France. Using personal research on medico-social clinics in the Toulousain region, a haven from most French xenophobic tendencies, Meeks considers the intersection of immigration, poverty, and health care. Her analysis of two specific doctors and the supplemental health care they provide to minority populations shows how Toulouse is successfully subverting France’s xenophobia, fighting for immigrant solidarity and a more egalitarian society.

After examining the intersection of these pieces, we invite the reader to reconsider the conventional understanding of protest. These essays explore the different trajectories by which protests can manifest themselves. All are powerful and all show the capacity of humanity to spark change.

Sincerely,
The WUIR Board
Gwen Unger is a senior/alumni majoring in Latin American Studies and minoring in Studio Art. She spent the spring of 2013 in Rio de Janeiro, studying Brazilian Portuguese, culture and music at the Pontifica Universidade Catolica. With an avid interest in art and a background as a studio artist, Gwen hopes to work in Development for an art museum after graduation and eventually pursue a Masters in Arts Administration with a focus in Latin American Art.

Zachary Latimore hails from Clear Lake Texas and studies Comparative Literature and Spanish. His study of rap music and its global impacts reflects his larger interest in how different cultures function and interact with each other in society. He enjoys riding bikes and writing, and his first collection of short stories, The Matheson Chronicles, is currently being shopped to publishers.

Nay’Chelle Harris is a senior double majoring in International & Area Studies/Latin American Studies and History, and minoring in Spanish. During the fall of 2012 she spent a semester learning about revolution and civil society in Nicaragua, where she conducted an independent research project on public perceptions of the current Sandinista government’s propaganda. This experience, combined with a personal interest in graphic design and poster art, has greatly influenced her article in this year’s journal. Her study of Nicaragua has also illuminated an interest in political and revolutionary propaganda that extends beyond the Contra War context. After graduation she will take a year or two off of school before applying to graduate programs that will allow her to further explore Latin American graphic history.

Rachel Goldstein is a senior majoring in Environmental Biology and minoring in Environmental Engineering and Spanish. She has been involved in environmental activism at Washington University, serving as president of Green Action and launching Fossil Free WashU, a fossil fuel divestment campaign. Her submissions are on behalf of Material Monster, a student art and activist collective that seeks to connect environmental issues to social justice through art, of which she is on the executive board. Following graduation, she has a fellowship with Green Corp, an environmental organizing and advocacy group working on issues in the United States.

Ben Gottesdiener is a senior at Washington University in St. Louis. He is majoring in political science with concentrations in international relations and American politics. Ben has been published in the Columbia Journal of Politics and the Washington University Political Review on the topics of energy and international relations. Upon graduation, he will be working at Bank of America Merrill Lynch in Equity Research.

Annalisa Triola is a recent graduate of the University of Denver, earning her degree in International Security and Political Science in June of 2013. She is currently working towards her master’s degree at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies. Her areas of specialty include the Middle East, human rights, and social movements. She spent fall of 2012 studying in Rabat, Morocco and fall of 2013 working in Tunis, Tunisia. She hopes to pursue a career in field research at an NGO or research institute, aiding in policy creation, after graduation.

Monica Meeks is a senior majoring in International Area Studies and French. She spent her junior year studying abroad in Toulouse, France, where she dedicated much of her time studying migration in France, particularly migration from North Africa. After working in a Toulouse health clinic for low-income patients in the spring of 2013, she decided to write her senior thesis about the intersection of immigration and health care in France. After graduation, Monica plans to pursue a career where she can address social justice in one of its many forms (the specifics of that goal are yet to be determined.)
Jordan Kelly is a senior majoring in International and Area Studies: Sustainable Development and minoring in Public Health. She spent the fall of 2012 studying abroad in Morocco where she studied Arabic and human rights, particularly the origins of and public discourse around the country’s rape legislation. After graduation, Jordan hopes to travel and create meaningful social change at a multinational non-profit organization.

Lena Kelly is a senior pursuing a double-major in International and Area Studies (sustainable development) and Spanish, with a minor in Psychology. She recently spent six months living in Santiago, Chile where she studied Spanish and Global Health at a local university. She loves adventure travel and spent time backpacking throughout Patagonia. After graduation, Lena hopes to devote her time addressing social justice issues.

Neha Nair is a senior majoring in IAS Development Studies and minoring in legal studies and art. She grew up as a “third culture kid” in Southeast Asia and India, which sparked her interest in international studies. She spent the spring of her junior year studying history in Paris and interned at the Department of State’s Bureau of Public Affairs where she worked with foreign press. After graduation, she hopes to pursue a career in international affairs.

Andrew Nathan is a senior majoring in International and Area Studies and minoring in finance. During a leave of absence in between his freshman and sophomore years, he spent time in both Spain and Bolivia honing his Spanish language capabilities and found an academic interest in the complex processes of economic development, most notably the role played by grassroots NGOs and other forms of entrepreneurship. Looking forward, Andrew hopes to land his dream job, something combining socially responsible business and economic development.

Emily Tulloch is a senior majoring in International and Area Studies and African and African American studies with a minor in psychology. In the summer of 2011, she spent time in Oyugis, Kenya working with the non-profit organization Hearts 4 Kenya to implement sustainable agriculture at schools as well as improve several school and orphanage facilities. Following graduation, she hopes to attend law school and pursue a career in human rights or immigration law.
Co-opted Space and Resistance in Modern Brazil

The Giant has woken up.

As future site for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 World Olympics, Brazil, has recently undergone various policy changes, development projects and social changes. The world watches as a “third-world” country with first-world economic power attempts to organize itself into a locus for global investment, tourism and influence. People are excited about the World Cup: soccer fans worldwide ready themselves to buy tickets and attend the most important soccer tournament in the world. But Brazilians are not so happy. What the government hails as a beacon of hope, modernization and progress is only exacerbating the inequalities and failings of Brazilian society. Every Brazilian abroad is asked if they are going to the World Cup; they are tired of the lack of understanding the rest of the world has for their situation. The World Cup is not the great equalizer it claims to be – it is in fact a great in-equalizer – one that has sparked overwhelming social outcry among the Brazilian povo (people).

Why are brasileiros frustrated? Why are they not ecstatic that their country was chosen to host such famous events that will bring immense foreign investment into their country? Well, because in reality the “investments” coming from the World Cup are simply international conglomerates funneling money into the hands of the private Brazilian elite. Furthermore, the government is funding millions of dollars into development programs while civic services like healthcare, education and housing are far below an acceptable, livable standard. As shown by the Pan-American games of 2007 in Rio de Janeiro, these mega-events direct public money to the development of sports arenas that leave “little behind in the way of social programs or functional urban spaces” and instead leave “communities worse off than before” with the “unequal geographic and social distribution of public monies.” Supposedly bringing investment into poor areas known as favelas, which are a commonplace figure in Rio de Janeiro, in reality these events simply create problems due to their overuse of public money and manipulations of space, which in many ways decrease the public space available to the non-elite.

During the summer of 2013, with the advent of the Copa das Confederações (FIFA Confederations Cup) and the influx of tourism, the local governments in various municipalities raised public transportation fares. This increase caused an overwhelming uproar amongst the Brazilian people: frustrated with a government that consistently places global trends and demands over the needs of its own citizens, they became ready to demand the rights they expected from their government. Many people in the United States and the rest of the west did not understand this response- the increase in transportation costs was just twenty centavos, the equivalent of less than ten cents- so why were the people so up in arms? In reality, those twenty centavos are a symbol of the Brazilian government’s nonchalant perspective on inflation and its lack of understanding as to how significant a daily cost of twenty centavos is for the povo. Public transportation in Brazil is frustrating, complicated, inefficient and also a part of most people’s every day in which they go to and from work. I argue that in Brazil there is a cultural history of resistance within the political structure in which citizens have resisted the state and the “hegemonic norm” through their domination and commandeering of space. Brazilians contributed to this history the summer of 2013 when they demanded the inalienable rights they have viewed their government as neglecting. I will draw upon theories by Jones, Lefebvre and Scott to develop this original argument.

Though resistance encompasses various situations and ideas, in this paper I will define resistance as being, at its core, actions against structures of power. There is much debate as to what defines an act as resistance. One well-known resistance theorist, James Scott, asserts that resistance is a paramount part of daily life and it persists “whether or not there are mass movements or rebellions and without which mass movements and rebellions cannot

be understood.” Daily, almost barely recognizable resistance is what lays the groundwork for greater resistance movements. Resistance lays entrenched in hegemonic structures and inherently works within them, complicating the relationship between resistance and power. The very nature of the state necessitates resistance, its “rationality of the state, of its techniques, plans and programmes, provokes opposition. The violence of power is answered by the violence of subversion.” A struggle need not be completely counter-hegemonic or targeting the entire state to be resistance, if countering the state resistance does exist.

As a country and culture Brazil has a history of resistance to structures of power within the system. John Gledhill’s volume *New Approaches to Resistance* demonstrates this history with various accounts of religious and cultural resistance of the *povo* to colonial structures of power, especially within Candomblé (a religion syncretized from Catholicism, African rituals and Indigenous traditions) and Quilombos (historically societies of freed and runaway slaves that have since transformed into cultural Afro-Brazilian communities). Both Candomblé and Quilombo are institutions through which individuals can resist structures of power through the creation of alternative identities. For example, in Salvador’s neighborhood of Bairro da Paz “residents developed their self-image as people who ‘resist’ through struggles to affirm less stigmatized identities.” Residents resist structures of power through their transformation of identity from marginalized to fully active citizen in community organizations (usually connected to Candomblé). Similar to Candomblé groups, quilombo culture in Brazil has also been a forum for creating alternate identities. Quilombos represent “situations that inverted the social order, associated with other terms such as reveling, disorder, confusion, fighting, street riots, and shacks or shanties,” Quilombos bring the peripheral and the marginalized into the normal, into the social order in their recognition by the Brazilian state as a cultural community and organization.

Some of the main causes of the protests in Brazilian cities are increased living costs and decreased quality of life, specifically in relation to an increase in transportation fares and the displacement and demolition of *favela* communities (to make way for mega-event developments). The protests “are the result of years and years of depending on chaotic and expensive transportation,” said Érica de Oliveira, a student participant in the protests, when interviewed by a reporter from the New York Times. Working class people and students are ever tired of rising transportation costs alongside rising inflation and no increases in wages or equalizing of living costs. Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff and her political party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores, “have been promising lots of things for many years, but it doesn’t go beyond that,” and people are fed up. “[T]hey don’t…understand what is really happening here, but it’s been many years and we are thirsty. We want everything, and we want it now” (Jennifer Novaes interviewed by the New York Times).

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Co-opted Space and Resistance in Modern Brazil

of education, healthcare and infrastructure in order to funnel funds into developing stadiums and living residencies that will only serve foreign visitors and eventually become empty wastelands, the *povo* began to resist. Most citizens believe that Brazil “shouldn’t be spending public money on stadiums. We don’t want the Cup. We want education, hospitals, [and] a better life for our children” (Camila, interviewed by the Nation).[^8] It is not the *povo* who want the World Cup, it is only those who hope to transform Brazil into a western ideal of “modernity.”

An interesting aspect of the protests this summer was the lack of media coverage of the events. *O Globo*, the nation’s premier news source, is notoriously conservative and refrained from giving the protests any objective reporting. Though the international media allotted much coverage to the protests in Brazil, national news outlets, suspiciously, remained practically silent. Brazilians, recognizing this silence and understanding the importance of the media in rallying others toward their cause, took action into their own hands by recording resistance events in photo and video form, as well as through social media. The protests themselves began to be largely organized over Facebook, which enabled scores of people from different walks of life to participate and share their experiences. One such video, “Rebelião Popular,” shows one of the first organized protests and its escalation from a peaceful demonstration to a chaotic attempt to enforce order over subversive resistance.

In the video, crowds of people march and walk, while some stand and chant. There is jumping, marching, yelling, roaring, and singing, and music playing from both speakers and instruments being played in the crowd. The environment is, in essence, *Carnaval*-esque: a reminder of the yearly month long party held all over Brazil but most strongly in Rio de Janeiro. Not only is there singing and marching while people hold signs over their heads, but hordes of individuals samba, dancing in groups or on their own. The signs carried have a range of slogans on them, some even in English, attempting to reach the international media and the foreign tourists visiting for the Copa, trying to help them understand the perspective of the *povo* on the World Cup. Soon however, the video turns south, as the police enter the movements, beginning their crusade to instill order over the otherwise peaceful protestors. In struggles “the police constitute the first line of attack...against the politics of resistance emerging from marginalized communities.”[^9] Not only do the police march through the crowds, they also throw cans of tear gas to disperse the crowds of people. Individuals walking home or to the subway or bus from work attempt to cover their noses and mouths from the gas debilitating them. Not even involved in the protests themselves, these individuals are directly affected by the police reaction to the protestors. Meanwhile, protestors are taken away one by one by police officers in full body gear while shots can be heard and roaring fires are seen in the background. The video looks like a war scene, army versus army, the protestors hiding themselves in groups behind construction signs while the police walk in hordes towards them, arbitrarily picking people out of crowds. Even the media is not exempt – policemen harass reporters taping their actions – where is the free press of a “progressive” nation here (“Rebelião Popular” 2013)?

Along with physical protests in the streets of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, resistance in Brazil has risen through social media outlets, especially Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. Brazilians are using their Facebook pages to share coverage of the protests from alternative media sources and even to plan and organize the protests themselves. Musicians and important public figures in Brazilian entertainment are also joining in, posting statuses and tweeting their support of the protests. On top of the creation of Facebook groups, pages and communities, protestors are also using websites that provide platforms for petitions, blogs providing citizen coverage of every step and message threads for various individuals to bounce ideas off each other. For example, to show opposition toward the relocation of *favela* residents from their demolished homes (demolished to make way for Olympic housing and stadiums), activists have created an online petition against forced evacuations that


anyone can sign. Social media is revolutionizing resistance in the contemporary world, changing the way people can interact, not only with each other, but also with the state itself.

Space is a crucial concept when analyzing resistance as actions against structure of power. In reading theories from Scott, Gledhill, the Comaroffs and others, I have found in many instances that resistance is in fact a contestation of space. While space is a universal “thing,” it is, in effect, a very abstract concept. To clarify this concept, I look to Gareth Jones’ analysis of Henri Lefebvre’s theories of space. Lefebvre defines space as a “socially informed concept in which social relations are reproduced (gender, ‘race’), invented (myths, stereotypes), identity constructed (‘who you are depends on where you are’), and power exercised or opposed.” In essence, Lefebvre’s theory is that “(social) space is a (social) product,” constructed and influenced by the complexities of geography, politics and morality. As Jones continues (citing Soja and Hooper), space is “embedded with politics and ideology, both real and imagined, which afford space with a contextualization of power.” Space is an embodiment of power through which people resist in their attempts to attain and to occupy, to move from the space of the marginal to the space of the powerful.

Lefebvre’s theory of space furthermore expresses that what is powerful about space is its domination and ownership. “In itself space has no power. Rather, space reflects social domination, through the domination of space,” which can be achieved by any movement, organization, or people. In relation to this, I introduce dual concepts of empty space and conquered space. Empty space is what exists before the co-optations and contestation of space: it is “empty” because it is stratified, divided into elite and marginalized spaces subordinate to systems of power. The state attempts to maintain empty space in order to maintain control over social action, because “[p]ower operates through the creation of ‘governable spaces.’” Empty space is empty because it is not equal, it does not reflect the abundance of action, of engagement, of living necessary in social space. “[S]ocial space ‘incorporates’ social actions, the actions of subjects both individual and collective who are born and who die, who suffer and who act.” The struggle to dominate, to actively participate in this social space, is what I refer to as conquering space - conquered space is effectively inhabited and occupied by social action.

Candomblé and Quilombo, though typically thought of as being movements, are also examples of spaces of negotiation- spaces of resistance. Candomblé and Quilombo culture create neutral spaces in which to build an alternative self-image and identity of resistance. As noted by Parész in Gledhill’s volume, “Candomblé has simultaneously acted as a space of subversive dissidence and as a vehicle for the negotiation of new spaces in the wider social order.” As a space of “subversive dissidence,” Candomblé demonstrates the possibility of conquered space – the taking over of empty space and rituals of power through negotiations of alterity and the hegemonic norm. Especially in the city, conquered space is seen in the social actions performed in the public (spaces available to everyone for action). In the urban environment, “space is deeply implicated in and shaped by the way social hierarchies actualize themselves in a given historical moment.” In Rio de Janeiro, a city with such stratified populations, with inequalities so stark and so visible in geographical, social and political landscapes, social space emerges in great strength, especially within the marginalized areas of the favelas. Similarly, in other parts of Brazil, like Bahia, marginalized communities create the alternative identities necessary to create social

15 Lefebvre 1991: 33
17 Vargas 2006: 59
space, and conquer it too.

Both Candomblé and quilombos have become *spaces of negotiation* in which Brazilians can create alternate identities. This negotiation of identity not only contests power structures but also creates power in itself through its manipulation and conquering of space. The articulation of “counterhegemonic discourses or alternative spaces of identity” within existing power structures is what affords power to resistance movements. The alternative space becomes a conquered social space, dominating and defeating the empty. “[D]omination of public space is the most obvious manifestation of attempts to control the city” according to Jones. All forms of resistance, from the most overt and recognizable like protests and marches, to the “everyday forms of resistance” as explained by Scott are contestations of space in their own ways. Cultural and religious organizations create spaces of negotiation, which give power to the marginalized through their appropriation of identity and contestation over public spaces.

Like Candomblé has created spaces of negotiation, so too have other cultural movements and organizations. Specifically in Brazil, music has been another space in which to create alternative identities, especially hip-hop, as demonstrated by ethnomusicologist Derek Pardue’s research on hip-hoppers in São Paulo. He explains success in hip-hop as “conquistando espaço,” (conquering space) and two well-known anthropologists specializing in Brazil, Idelber Avelar and Christopher Dunn, add to this in their explanation of “rap as a way of articulating social and political aspirations.” Hip-hop is a form of practicing citizenship and dominating social spaces through lyrics and performance, which transforms empty space into conquered space. Thus, empty space becomes truly public space, not necessarily within the geographic sphere, but also in the creative and political sphere. Jones examines this as a “new political form” that “called upon a range of different voices and discourses, and articulated them in new political spaces and through multiple claims to representation through space such as film, novels, poetry, street theatre, murals.” Brazilian cultural communities and organizations demonstrate a *territorial* framework in which space is constantly negotiated, contested and exchanged. They create a “new” space of alternate identity within the existing power framework.

As music demonstrates a form of practicing conquered space, *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro and the *periferia* in São Paulo are marginalized areas from which a lot of musical and cultural resistance emerges. “In such spaces the socially and spatially racialized relation of subordination vis-à-vis the greater society is often – some would claim constantly via infrapolitics – contested.” Favelas and other marginalized spaces in Brazil present the opportunity to contest the domination of space, and consequently the hegemonic norm. For example, in Jacarezinho, a *favela* in Rio, gates and security cameras, normally only found near the apartment buildings of the wealthy, were installed by the *favela* council. These “gates and cameras constituted a frontal challenge to the normalized representations, privileges, and power structures that define Brazil’s profoundly racialized social inequalities.” The appropriation of symbols of wealth and securitization (control) of space enabled the *favela* community as a whole to contest their identity as a marginalized space. Through their actions, “the *favela* activists revealed an alternative sense of urban social geography: from the perspective of those claiming autonomy and citizenship.” The manipulation of identity into an alternative space is the tool through which residents of Jacarezinho contest their subordination and subservient status. “*Favelas* are the historical and spatial product of [the] racialized and institutionalized exclusion.”

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18 Parés 2012: loc 1893
23 Vargas 2006: 59.
24 Vargas 2006: 51.
entrenched and embedded in Brazilian society. The only way to alleviate this exclusion of the marginalized in the state is to reinterpret their identities and to bring their contestation into the public space.

A huge impact of the World Cup and Olympics developments on the favela communities is the demolition and removal of buildings in favela neighborhoods to make way for new structures. To remove these buildings the city is evicting and “relocating” favela residents. In this process, houses are marked with numbers and residents are told they have one month to evacuate- but where do they have to go? How can they get there? What frustrates the affected residents is the government’s lack of transparency - residents receive no information or solicitations for input on how the projects should best operate. A YouTube video called “World Cup 2014: WHO WINS THE MATCH” demonstrates the extent of the damage these demolitions are causing in its footage of residents protesting and interviews with affected citizens. The protests shown in the video echo the protests shown in “Rebelião Popular”: people are marching peacefully in their own neighborhoods and the police tear through the crowds in full gear in the same fashion as those in the protest in Rio. Protestors chant “O povo esta na rua, justiça culpa sua!” (the people are in the streets, justice is your responsibility!) encouraging others to join in and demand answers and action from the state. “Why doesn’t Dilma come to see that?” one man asks, echoing the frustrations most Brazilians have with the president’s empty promises made simply to assuage the public.

The video goes on to present statistics on the number of people forcefully evicted from their homes in the largest Brazilian cities, as well as quotes from international organizations condemning the eviction practices as unjust. In one such quote UN special rapporteur on adequate housing Rachel Rolnik says, “with the current lack of dialogue, negotiation and genuine participation in the design and implementation of World Cup and Olympic Games projects, the authorities at all levels should put a stop to planned evictions until dialogue and negotiation can be ensured.” The parallels with the UN’s concerns and the concerns of the residents are pivotal: negotiation and participation. Residents are not against the upcoming mega-events or the projects related to them, they are against the lack of input the state has allowed them to contribute. “Não somos contra a obra, mas estamos contra o jeito que está sendo feito,” (We aren’t against the works in any way, but we are against the way they are being done) says one man. Other favela inhabitants express similar concerns with the lack of information given: how will they be compensated? Will they be relocated? Where and how will they be relocated? The current system in which houses are marked (seemingly arbitrarily) and inhabitants are expected to evacuate within one month without receiving information as to where they are to be “relocated” or if in fact they will be relocated, is unjust.

“E que é que vou fazer?” is the main question of favela residents: What is it that I can do? Most never see the better housing they have been promised by the state and thus become extremely frustrated. Instead they find themselves in subpar living arrangements, assembled in a haphazard manner, and are often worse off than they were before eviction. Many have lost all faith in the Brazilian state and one man explains the country as “um pais que abandona seu povo para cuidar duma copa do mundo que e cô apenas da FIFA,” (a country that abandons its people to take care of a world cup that is only FIFA’s). Although they have been assured of better housing, those residents who have been relocated have experienced the subpar living arrangements put together in a slapdash and haphazard manner. These marginalized populations are not solely seeking “the improvement of living conditions in the ‘marginalized local space.’ More importantly, they are interested in creating spaces of power to negotiate their status in civil society. “Communities of resistance are witness to the simultaneous creation of political subjects in civil society.” Resistance is melding of the marginalized local space into the greater public space, to create a fully engaged, conquered space. Domination of space is the passing of contestation and

26 Vargas 2006: 60
30 Jones 1994: 5.
resistance into the public.

An example of bringing contestation to the public space in the current climate of protests in Brazil is an event known as “Farofaço” that occurred in December 2013 on the beach of Ipanema in Rio de Janeiro. Organized through Facebook, “Farofaço” is another example of how social media is completely transforming the way people resist. “Farofaço” was organized by residents from the favela Complexo de Alemão and residents of the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro – populations viewed by the Rio elite as backwards and inferior. By bringing homemade food (because food sold on the beach is sold only to gringos) and lying on the beach, participants declared enjoyment of this space a right for all Rio residents, not simply the elite. This event was initiated in response to two government actions: increasing security measures on Rio’s beaches in order to protect foreign tourists visiting for the mega-events and removing bus stops near the beach for those buses coming from Complexo de Alemão and the suburbs. “Farofaço” is a slang term that stereotypes people from favelas and suburbs as backwards, dirty and inferior to people from the “better” parts of the city. The Facebook event not only reinterpreted a negative stereotype in its creation of an alternate identity, but also took over space that is hailed as public but in reality serves as empty space. The event’s slogan says it all: “Nós vamos invadir nossa praia!” (We are going to invade our beach!) – the event participants invaded perceived empty space and re-appropriated it into the public. In theory, beaches in Rio de Janeiro are great equalizers because they are free to use and available to everyone. They are intended to be places where people from different social positions can congregate, relax and recreate. For instance, it should not be unusual to see a favela resident lying down on a towel near a rich man from Leblon, both enjoying the same space. Yet in reality, Rio’s beaches are another place in which marginalized populations face great subjugation and prejudice from other citizens. “Farfaco” was successful because it challenged the use of the beach of Ipanema, transforming it from empty to conquered space.

Another great equalizer of Brazilian society is futebol (soccer). Anyone can play soccer, whether you live at the top of a favela or in a gated building next to the beach (living close to the beach is a sign of wealth in Brazil). The stadium is the tool through which soccer performs its role as equalizer. Gaffney explains in his article “Mega-events and socio-political dynamics in Rio de Janeiro” that stadiums were used in Rio de Janeiro (as well as in other major cities in Latin America, like Buenos Aires) to create perceptions of national pride and devotion. Especially in Rio de Janeiro, the Maracanã stadium became a symbol of nationalism, particularly during Getulio Vargas’ era in control as a populist leader in the 1930s-1940s. In that time, Maracana and other stadiums in Brazil contained both seating and a standing section, known as the geral, which was cemented and closest to the field. The geral was “the ‘populist heart’ of the stadium” as it was a functional and symbolic space that allowed for the inclusion of all social sectors in public life because of the low ticket prices.” Unfortunately, in renovations for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, Maracanã has undergone many changes that remove the populist, nationalist aspects of the stadium (including the geral), transforming it from a public equalizer to another empty space of uncontested domination.

Under the current plan that began because of the mega-events, Maracana is ultimately to become a privatized stadium no longer controlled by the public. Brazilians are outraged by this: Maracanã is not only a symbol of Brazil and its national pride, but also a forum in which people from all communities and classes can come together. This issue has also been addressed through social media, with a slogan of “Maracanã é nosso” – Maracanã is ours. The movement has made posters, Facebook pages, t-shirts and videos, like “O Maraca É Nosso.” In this video musician and cultural figure Chico Buarque de Hollanda discusses his opinions of the privatization of Maracanã and his support for the “Maracanã é nosso” movement. “Eu acho que é um espaço público que deve permanecer público e não se privatizar,” he says (I think that [Maracanã] is a public space that should remain public and should not be privatized). He elaborates by asserting that “a gente deve lutar para que para que espaço se permanece um es-

paço popular, espaço público. Maracanã é nosso, Maracanã não está a venda,” (people should fight for the space to remain a popular space, a public space. Maracanã is ours, Maracanã is not for sale). Just as Buarque believes they should, Brazilians are becoming involved in issues affecting their public space by fighting privatization (and in that sense the emptying) of the stadium. They are contesting the removal of the public in space – contesting the removal of conquered space and its imminent transformation into empty space.

As I have explained with the examples of protests organized through social media in Rio de Janeiro since summer 2013, conquering space is in fact resistance. Since space is saturated with power, or rather is an embodiment or occupation of power, resistance as actions against power structures is in fact resistance over space. People are able to resist the occupation of space in their re-appropriation of public spaces, especially those that are empty and unequal, and reclaim those spaces for their own. Thus, the domination of space is equivalent to resistance, or rather resistance is the domination of space. Space is the power that people resist to attain and to occupy, to move from the space of the marginal to the space of the powerful. Resistance in this instance is the creation of alternative identities in marginalized spaces in order to elude the status of “marginalized.” The protests and use of social media in Brazil demonstrate the creation of new alternative spaces of identity that conquer the empty, governable (and controlled) spaces of the hegemonic norm. A new alternative space is created in the melding of both conquered empty space and marginal space into a new, negotiated space. The appropriation of “public spaces” in Rio de Janeiro demonstrates the strength of the power and the resistance saturated in space—a successful resistance movement will appropriate this space dominated by another power and in this act gain recognition from the conflicting power.

To conclude, I have shown how the current social and political landscape in Brazil has been fostered by a history of resistance within structures of power. The resistance in Brazil today through protests and various social media outlets demonstrates the occupation of space as re-appropriation of the public and contestations of the hegemonic norm. Brazilians are tired of the “status quo” of Brazilian politics: of the nonchalant view of economic issues the government holds (in their attempts to join first-world economies), of the policies that demonstrate the state’s preferential treatment of foreign tourists and investments and of developments of stadiums to the “FIFA standard” while hospitals, schools and nearly half of the city’s neighborhoods are far below this standard. The Brazilian struggle has broached the world stage – people have marched not only in major Brazilian cities, but also in New York City. A sign carried at the New York City march summed the frustrated citizens’ sentiment up well: “Olympics: $33 billion. World Cup: $26 billion. Minimum Wage R$674. Do you still think it’s about 20 cents?”

Tired of so much public money spent on mega-events that will benefit international consumers and international corporations more than the local people and businesses surrounding them, Brazilians are taking a stand. Protestors have adopted the national slogan, Ordem e Progresso (Order and Progress) and re-appropriated it into one they feel is more apropos for the current state of Brazil: Em Progresso (In Progress). The povo are standing up. They are contesting the state and the hegemonic norm by conquering public space and creating new negotiated spaces of alternative identity.
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Rap, Space, and Resistance in the United States and Chile

Rap music was born in the South Bronx neighborhood of New York City in the mid-1970’s. It is one of the four elements of hip hop, the other three being graffiti, breakdancing, and DJ-ing, all of which responded in their own way to the urban conditions of the post-industrial age that cities were entering during this time period. Since its inception in this highly localized context, rap music has grown into a global cultural phenomenon, with every country having its own, local hip hop scene. All the while it has remained a constant target of criticism: the controversy that surrounds rap music ranges from its misogynistic attitudes toward women to its glorification of drugs, guns, and violence. Despite this, rap continues to grow and expand into other cultural realms such as fashion, film, and television. Even so, rap has found a way to remain both urban and local. In no other medium are the biggest stars instantly identifiable with their home cities—Jay-Z and New York, for example, or Outkast and Atlanta. This paper is an investigation of rap’s representations of spaces both in the U.S. and in one country it has reached, Chile. Considering both traditions within a Gramscian model of hegemony allows one to conceptualize rap’s power of protest as an organic product of the urban environments in which it was born. To understand rap, however, one must first understand the specific context of its origins.

The American city experienced rapid and wide-ranging changes during the post-World War II period. These changes came as a result of migration, economic changes, and new transportation technologies. Increasing mechanization of farm processes resulted in the Great Migration, the movement of many poor Black and Hispanic rural workers into northern cities. At the same time, many cities were experiencing shifts in their economies from manufacturing to information processing. These jobs required higher levels of education that newly-arrived migrants or laid-off factory workers did not have. The G.I. Bill helped many returning soldiers acquire the education and skills necessary to compete for these jobs, but racist practices, especially in the South, prevented many veterans of color from accessing these benefits.

In 1956, the Federal Aid Highway Act was signed and highways were soon being built across the country. Besides the destruction and fracturing highways caused when built through poor- and working-class communities, they also moved jobs out of the city, fostering the development of suburban areas. These suburbs sprang up quickly with the help of the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), which provided attractive mortgages for those wishing to own their own home. The FHA also practiced explicitly racist policies such as redlining, in which they refused loans based on the racial makeup of an area. Suburban communities also worked to keep minorities out, often through the use of protective covenants, which were pacts by homeowners’ associations to not sell property to minorities. With inner-city industry gone and with the suburbs flourishing, the post-industrial city was born. The post-industrial city was characterized by both the consistent underemployment for the poor inhabitants who could not afford to escape as well as the wealthy suburbs that withdrew their tax dollars from the city, preferring to incorporate themselves into independent cities and contract out services at reduced prices.

In short, the situation in post-industrial cities at the end of the 1970’s was dire to say the least. Nevertheless, from such a gritty setting, new art forms giving a voice to those in the inner cities who had been silenced would soon emerge. Jamaican-born Kool DJ Herc was the first DJ to isolate the “break beats” of old funk and disco songs,

1 Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare. New York: Pantheon, 1990, 131
2 Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action was White, (New York, W.W. Norton, 2005), 123-4
3 Tricia Rose, in her landmark study of rap Black Noise, recounts the forced relocation of 170,000 inhabitants from New York neighborhoods that had been designated “slums” by Robert Moses in order to clear way for his public works projects (31). This example is only one of many that can still be seen across U.S. cities today.
looping these drum beats to form a new style of dance music. It wasn’t long before MC’s (Master of Ceremonies) began to rap over these beats. In fact, the song generally recognized as the “first” recorded rap song, Sugarhill Gang’s “Rapper’s Delight,” consisted of little more than a slew of MC’s boasting about their verbal skills or flashy lifestyles. As hip hop continued to expand, rap would come to outshine breakdancing, graffiti, and DJ-ing. It would also grow out of its party-oriented origins to become a potent political voice.

1982 brought one of the most defining rap songs of the genre’s history, Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five’s “The Message.” Over DJ Grandmaster Flash’s funky beat, comprised of layers of sampled songs and noises, MC Melle Mel of the Furious Five famously describes their hometown of the South Bronx: “Broken glass everywhere/ People pissin’ on the stairs, you know they just don’t care/ I can’t take the smell, can’t take the noise/ Got no money to move out, I guess I got no choice.”

Every verse ends with the chorus “It’s like a jungle sometimes/ It makes me wonder/ How I keep from going under.” Grandmaster Flash’s song was the first major song to carry a serious message and even spawned an entire wing of socially conscious rap, “Message Rap,” so named for the song. It wouldn’t be long before this marriage of rap and attention to social issues would reach its zenith.

In 1988, the rap group Public Enemy became the ideological leader of rap music when it released *It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back*. It was not Public Enemy’s first album, but it was their first album to achieve commercial success. The group’s main rapper, Chuck D, harnessed rap’s potential for protest to fire shots in every direction, criticizing police profiling, drug use, and the recording industry while simultaneously proclaiming a message of Afrocentricity to counter the systematic racism he exposed in his lyrics. “They tell lies in the books/ That you’re readin’” raps Chuck D on the song “Prophets of Rage,” continuing with “It’s knowledge of yourself/ That you’re needin’/ Like Vessey or Prosser/ We have a reason why/ To debate the hate/ That’s why we’re born to die.” Public Enemy forcefully asserts that traditional sources of information cannot be trusted and points out the absence of slave revolt leaders such as Denmark Vessey or Gabriel Prosser from history textbooks. Public Enemy “fights the power” that they see woven into all institutions, be it education, police forces, the entertainment industry, or the government.

Nearly at the same time that Public Enemy was rapping a message of Black Nationalism, a young group of rappers from Los Angeles burst onto the national rap scene. They were N.W.A., and they shook up the rap game in more ways than one. Firstly, they challenged New York for the title of the capital of hip hop. Los Angeles was a post-industrial city in every sense of the word; its suburbs, highways, and shopping malls with military-grade security contrasted starkly with the forgotten inner city areas such as Compton. N.W.A. sought to change this. Amidst the same context in which the Rodney King riots and the crack epidemic occurred, on top of widening inequality and deteriorating city services, the group released *Straight Outta Compton*, which is widely considered one of the first gangsta rap albums. Its emphasis on criminality was a stark shift from Public Enemy’s message, but so was its emphasis on the local. The album and title track bear the name of the rappers’ hometown and they make numerous references to the city in their

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5 Glover 1982
8 Denmark Vessey (accessed November 2013); available from [www.pbs.org/Slave Gabriel Prosser’s Thwarted Revolt Happened on this Day in 1800](https://www.pbs.org) (accessed November 2013); available from [www.newsone.com](https://www.newsone.com)
9 N*gga Wit Attitude
songs. Indeed, while gangsta rap is generally characterized by its criminality, it also brought a new focus to the “hood,” especially when compared to message rappers such as Public Enemy, who tended to address the entire Black Nation in their songs. At the end of the 1980’s, when cities were collapsing under parasitic suburbs, economic downturns, and the crack epidemic, gangsta rap brought attention to the desperate urban conditions afflicting those trapped in the inner cities. The focus on the extreme local had always been important in rap, but whereas Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five lamented the squalid conditions of the post-industrial city, gangsta rap found empowerment through the glorification of drug dealing, violence, and crumbling infrastructure that characterized them. For all its flaws, gangsta rap provided “an alternative to merely being victimized by societal ills.”

Public Enemy and N.W.A. would achieve international success and undoubtedly influenced the first Chilean rappers, but rap was not the first element of hip hop to become popular in Chile. As in other countries, breakdancing arrived earlier to Chile, primarily through breakdance-centered films such as Beatstreet and Breakdance. When these films arrived in Chile, the brutal and oppressive dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet had been ruling the country for over a decade. The presidency of the Marxist Salvador Allende had been erased after the bloody coup of 1973 and a neoliberal free market economy had been implemented. These policies included the reduction of social services and privatization of many national industries. As in the U.S., these policies had a spatial effect, although the Pinochet regime had perhaps a more direct hand in this process. It deregulated the real estate market and forcibly removed poor inhabitants of wealthier districts to the poorer outskirts of the city. Santiago in the mid 1980’s therefore resembled an inverse Los Angeles, with the wealthy getting wealthier at the center of the city and the poor relegated to the edges. The effects of marginalization, however, were very similar.

The deregulation of the Chilean economy and Pinochet’s relaxation of censorship toward the end of his reign would allow films like Beat Street and Breakdance to arrive to Chile around 1984. Soon after, young groups of breakdancers had formed in the poor outskirts of Santiago. These young dancers actively embraced hip hop as a new form of expression that appealed more to them than traditional music and dances, as they could easily identify with the messages of marginalization, police abuse, and poverty in the lyrics of artists such as N.W.A. and Public Enemy. By the beginning of the 1990’s the first Chilean rap groups had formed.

In 1991, just one year after Chile returned to democracy, the group Panteras Negras (Black Panthers) released Chile’s first rap album. Taking their name from the African American organization from the United States, Panteras Negras combined the political awareness of Public Enemy with N.W.A.’s emphasis on street culture. Over spare, basic beats, Panteras Negras rapped about their marginal status and adopted an aggressive posture in defense of “those from below.” Their song “Desde la basura” (“From the Trash”) emphasizes this allegiance to the marginalized of society: “Panteras Negras today are singing/ Singing from the trash/ To shout to you their truth/ To shout to you their truth...”

12 Ibid. 210-211
13 Ronin Ro, Gangsta: Merchandizing Rhymes of Violence (New York: St Martin’s, 1996), 6
14 Rainer Quitzow, “Hip Hop in Chile: Far From NYC” (B.A. thesis, New York University, 2001)
16 Clarissa Hardy, La ciudad escindida: Los problemas nacionales y la Región Metropolitana (Sociedad Editora e Impresora Alborada S.A., 1989) , 37
17 Quitzow 17
18 John Tomlinson, “‘Watching Dallas’: the imperialist text and audience research.” from Cultural Imperialism. (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1991), 45-50
19 Colectivo Teleanalisis, Estrellas en la Esquina, 1986
Today with sounds from the street/ Showing our situation/ So that everyone who listens knows/ That we’re from a poor settlement.”  

The group adopts trash as a symbol of their marginalized status, subverting its connotative meanings. They also take it upon themselves to become a voice for the suburban poor, showing their understanding of rap’s function as a political tool as much as a form of entertainment.

A few years later, Chile’s first commercial rap success would arrive with the group Tiro de Gracia (Mercy Shot) and their debut album *Ser Humano*. Tiro de Gracia’s style was a wide departure from Panteras Negras. Over a variety of samples ranging from reggae to jazz, Tiro de Gracia rapped about alienation and confusion in post-dictatorial Chile. Whereas Panteras Negras rapped from the streets and embraced their origins there, Tiro de Gracia evinced “placelessness,” roaming Santiago and observing what they viewed as the dehumanizing effects of Chile’s new free market economy. This is not to say that Tiro de Gracia aligned itself with the political left. Instead, like many rock bands of the time, they took an a-political or even anti-political stance. In the song “Sombras Chinescas” (“Hand Shadows”) the young MCs unequivocally state, “talking about politics is to go in with politicians/ talking about corruption corrupts/ talking about marginalization is to marginalize” (Salazar). The group often referred to the citizens of Santiago as animals and to the city itself as a zoo, and while they are certainly more aligned with the poor and marginalized population, they avoided traditional left/right binaries in their political outlook, preferring an approach more centered on human interaction and relationships, an increasingly difficult task in the face of the dehumanizing market.

The formative years of rap music in the United States and Chile thus traced, we turn our attention to the modern day. Recently, rap music in the U.S. has been dominated by the latest star from Compton, Kendrick Lamar. Lamar’s 2012 album *Good Kid m.A.A.d. City*, which narrates Lamar’s childhood on the streets of Los Angeles, achieved commercial success and critical acclaim. In many ways it continues the gangsta rap tradition, locating itself firmly in the birthplace of gangsta rap, Compton, and featuring many producers and rappers from the gangsta rap tradition. However, whereas gangsta rap empowered the ‘hood through gang criminality and emphasizing the forgotten inner-cities, Lamar tests the limits of this type of discourse. Throughout the album, Lamar engages fully with the violence and sexuality of the gangsta tradition, but always suspiciously; he balances verses of aggression with victimization, reveling in the moment with meditations on the future. Lamar understands—and lives—gangsta rap’s emphasis on the local as a response to the fracturing effects of the post-industrial city. However, he is also testament to the negative side of these methods of empowerment.

Nowhere is this underscored more than in the song “Good Kid.” “Good Kid” relates Lamar’s struggles to survive on the streets between the opposing forces of gangs and the police. “But what am I supposed to do when the topic is red or blue/And you understand that I ain’t, but know I’m accustomed to” Lamar raps about being targeted by gangs (red and blue being the colors of the Bloods and Crips), who recognize him enough to “Step on my neck and get blood on your Nike checks.” The next verse recounts Lamar’s parallel relationship with the police. Whereas the gangs see Lamar as easy prey for gangbangering, the police see in him only another gangbanger: “But what am I supposed to do with the blinking of red and blue/ Flash from the top of your roof and your dog has to say woof/ And you ask, ‘Lift up your shirt’ cause you wonder if a tattoo/ Of affiliation can…put me through/ Gang files.” The police encounter mimics the confrontation with the gang members, as the police “Step on his neck as

21 “Panteras Negras hoy están cantando/ cantando desde la basura/ Para gritarles su verdad/ Hoy con sonidos de la calle/ Mostrando nuestra situación/ Que sepan todos los que escuchen/ Que somos de una población” (Meneses)


23 Original lyrics in Spanish, this and following translations are my own

24 Juan Salazar, “Clavo y Martillo” in *Ser Humano* (EMI Odeon Chilena S.A., 1997)


26 Lamar 2012
hard as your bullet proof vest," and Lamar remains caught between the gangs and the police of Compton, an ally of neither and a target of both.

Meanwhile, in Chile, rappers such as Portavoz (Spokesman) also talk about their cities. Portavoz continues Chilean rap’s tradition of political criticism and social commentary, combining street-level awareness with intellectual commentary. In “El otro Chile,” (“The other Chile”) from Portavoz’s 2012 album *I Write Rap with the R of Revolution*, the Chilean MC exposes the hidden Chileans “that don’t go out in the social pages of El Mercurio”\(^{27}\). Don’t have statues and main streets/ And aren’t big characters in the damned official histories.”\(^{28}\) The other Chile, for Portavoz, is that of the lower classes—the one constantly threatened by the dominating and gentrifying tendencies of the upper classes. He raps of “the groceries and various markets/ That break when the supermarket invades the neighborhood” and states that “Your national talk/ is just that, talk/ Because reality is different/ We live in a segregated society/ The comfortable class wanted it so.”\(^{29}\) While he does expound the virtues of the lower classes, Portavoz does not simply praise them. He recognizes that the other Chile is also the Chile “that preys on the corner of the ghetto/ Where there are fewer schools than liquor stores,” and for that reason Portavoz asserts that the unseen side of Chile is “the Chile of my consequences, of my pains, and of my joys.”\(^{30}\) Portavoz’s message, which is bolstered by his command of perceptive and intelligent viewpoints, is much broader than Kendrick Lamar’s, whose songs rest on intense first-person narratives. This wider perspective allows Portavoz to group all of the lower classes together in contestation to the upper classes. Lamar, on the other hand, finds himself trapped between police and gang profiling. Both, however, locate themselves in the street and, like almost all rap before them, give voice to the marginalized spaces of their societies. Be they the forgotten inner-cities -for Kendrick Lamar- or the suburbs -for Portavoz- they are both the ghetto.

With the spatial discourse of rap music in both countries thus established, it is useful to place both within a unifying theoretical framework to understand rap’s relationship to the larger societies which they critique. One such useful framework is the theory of hegemony as elaborated by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci moved Marxism away from the strict economic determinism espoused by Karl Marx by recognizing that power is exercised in more ways than just the arrangement of the means of production. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony can be described as a function of the economic, the state, and civil society.\(^{31}\) The economic refers to the mode of production and the state refers to political society, the combination of coercive institutions such as the police as well as state bureaucracies.\(^{32}\) Civil society denotes institutions outside the state, such as the media.\(^{33}\) These boundaries are not necessarily static, educational institutions; for example, they can shift between state-run or independent. Political society exercises power through coercion, dominance through the courts or by police. As Gramsci observed, however, this type of power is unstable. Preferable to such domination is to acquire the consent of the ruled, which can be achieved through the cultural sphere- civil society- with hegemony. Hegemony is the dissemination of the values of the ruling class through civil society in order to conceal its own dominance. When the values of the dominant class become the values of all classes, hegemony is achieved and these classes consent to being ruled instead of being coerced into ruling by the threat of violence from political society.\(^{34}\) This does not mean that the institutions of political society are forgotten. Instead, as many have observed, the threat of violence of these

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27 A principal Chilean newspaper
29 Portavoz 2012
30 Ibid.
31 Gramsci never rigorously defined his concept of hegemony but instead outlined it in his various writings. This definition comes from Robert Bocock’s *Hegemony* (Chichester: Tavistock Publications, 1986) 33.
32 Ibid. 33
33 Ibid. 33
institutions underpins hegemony, for example when police forces physically engage protestors.\textsuperscript{35}

Hegemony, however, is not uncontestable. As many have pointed out, because hegemony is the effort of one class to make its ideology the ideology of the very classes that it dominates, there will always be points at which the lived reality of the lower classes will clash with the ideology espoused by hegemony.\textsuperscript{36} Gramsci recognized this and for this reason gave much more importance to popular culture than previous Marxist theorists. It is in this way that rap fits into the Gramscian concept of hegemony, as a potentially powerful medium for counter-hegemonic discourses. The policies enacted by the United States government after the Second World War reflected the hegemony of the white middle and upper-middle classes, a fact which is reflected in the flourishing of the suburbs at this time. The forgotten inner cities, meanwhile, became the domain of poor minorities, marginalized spaces for marginalized classes. Rap music, however, re-asserted the voice of the city. Artists like Grandmaster Flash exposed the horrendous conditions of the post-industrial cities that the mainstream preferred to ignore. As the neoliberal line of the Reagan administration asserted that success was available to all and that the poor remained so because of moral defects such as laziness,\textsuperscript{37} artists such as Public Enemy answered with raps attacking racism in both civil and political society. Additionally, as conditions in the city worsened, artists such as N.W.A. introduced a harder brand of rap that exerted the extreme local and their dominance over it. It is in this context that phrases such as “king of the streets” can be understood as privileging a space that hegemonizing forces would prefer to ignore. Kendrick Lamar presents a more nuanced stance towards the gangsta mentality and in doing so, gives a new fold to the idea of hegemony. As “Good Kid” shows, the counter-hegemony of the gangsta lifestyle has its own limits and has further marginalized those who would prefer to avoid it, with the result that they are caught between the political institutions of the dominant society and the equally violent ones of the counter-hegemonic forces that it has spawned.

In Chile, though the post-industrial city was not identical to that of the United States, the spatial marginalization reflected the marginalization of the lower classes equally. Artists such as Panteras Negras recognized the utility of rap to describe these spaces in which traditional popular modes of expression no longer seemed appropriate. In the sharp political division of post-dictatorial Chile, Tiro de Gracia boldly rejected all politics and espoused a doctrine of human contact. Portavoz returns to the hardcore politics of Panteras Negras, recognizing his role as a voice of the lower classes and often structuring his discourse as “us versus them”—the marginalized versus the dominant upper classes. Portavoz rarely acknowledges the same complexities that Kendrick Lamar explores, preferring to stick with the image of a unified lower class in resistance to the dominant classes. In this way, Chilean rap can be seen as more than just a product of cultural imperialism, as Chilean artists have not simply created Spanish-language versions of U.S. artists. On the contrary, they have used rap to express their own situation and their own worldview. Interestingly, in exerting its own dominance over Chilean markets, the U.S. media, a key player in the production and dissemination of hegemony, also introduced a musical form that would become a form of resistance.

In conclusion, rap music can be read as a counter-hegemonic medium in both the United States and Chile. The lower classes of both countries found themselves marginalized by hegemonic neoliberal policies, policies that resulted in spatial marginalization as well. In response, these classes subverted the hierarchy implied by the dominant ideology that privileged the suburbs—in the case of the U.S.—and the city center—in the case of Chile—by glorifying the streets. Indeed, rap as a musical form is a subversion of the hegemonic media, as rappers often sample popular songs and then rap over them, exerting their own dominance over the music. Hegemony, which by definition tries to make itself invisible to portray itself as natural and correct, can be exposed when rap subverts its

\textsuperscript{35} Steve Jones, \textit{Antonio Gramsci} (New York: Routledge, 2006) 50
\textsuperscript{36} Aman, 204-5
\textsuperscript{37} See the chapter “Interpretations of Poverty in the Postindustrial City” from Michale B. Katz’s \textit{The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare} (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989)
ideologies. While hegemonic discourses would portray the richer parts of cities as having intrinsic qualities that allow them to develop that way, rap’s rejection of these spaces and its embrace of the “undesirable” parts of the city show that in fact, the privileging of U.S. suburbs or Chilean city centers is simply a result of the dominant class’s ideological preference.
Bibliography


Discography


Art in Defense of the Revolution

Political Poster Propaganda and the Anti-Contra War Campaign in Nicaragua

Following soon after the Fall of Saigon in 1975, the Nicaraguan revolution captivated the American left because it told a compelling yet familiar story: the struggle between a small Third World nation defending its right to self-determination and a global power intent on defending its own regional interests steeped in Cold War calculations. Inspired by constant media coverage and aided by a proliferation of activist networks, many sympathetic Americans allied themselves with the burgeoning U.S.-Nicaragua solidarity movement in order to stop what they viewed as rampant America interventionism. During the Contra War of the 1980s, the Reagan administration portrayed these solidarity efforts as the actions of “naïve dupes of astute communist manipulators” unable or unwilling to see the true nature that lay underneath the ruling FLSN’s (Sandinista National Liberation Front) “revolutionary” façade.

Victims of overcorrection, some scholars have tried to disprove Reagan’s myth by inaccurately portraying the movement as an either entirely domestic U.S. crusade or a binationally focused movement that scarcely collaborated with local activists in Nicaragua. Though some have attempted to balance the two by focusing on anti-Contra War activism as a “transnational social movement” dependent on intimate U.S. and Nicaraguan cooperation, the ways in which U.S. intervention was contested by Nicaraguans within their country’s borders is an area suitable for further exploration. This paper will examine how political posters were used by the FSLN as a way to combat U.S. intervention in Nicaragua through garnering domestic support for the war effort in addition to increasing solidarity from the international community.

The FSLN’s poster art campaign was an attempt to not only shape international and domestic understandings of the Contra War, but to also mobilize people in defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Using visual sources as historical documents offers a novel way to approach anti-war activism, but it also comes with its own set of problems, the most apparent being the issue of measuring reception and interpretation. Examining the content or intent of an image does not necessarily come with the assumption that it had a “measurable or predictable effect” on its target audience. To the contrary, the Sandinista’s election loss in 1990 proved that there was some level of disconnect between government propaganda efforts and public confidence.

This ambiguity, however, should not lead one to disregard the utility of these posters as historical documents. Their significance lies not necessarily in the way they were received, but what they reveal about how and why the FSLN decided to use public art as a way to resist the counterrevolution. In order to uncover how these images were created and their intended effect, the paper begins by establishing the historical context within which they emerged by briefly summarizing Nicaraguan history up to the Contra War. From there it presents a survey of two influential precursors to the Nicaraguan propaganda campaign, the Muralist movement in postrevolutionary Mexico during the first half of the twentieth century, and Cuba’s poster art movement during the early days of its revolution. Finally, it will discuss how these influences were appropriated by the Nicaraguan government, which drew from previous examples and applied them to their own situation.

1 Héctor Perla Jr., “Heirs of Sandino: The Nicaraguan Revolution and the U.S.-Nicaragua Solidarity Movement,” Latin American Perspectives 36, no. 6 (Nov. 2009), 86.
2 Ibid., 82.
4 “The Nicaraguan Revolution and the U.S.-Nicaragua Solidarity Movement,” 82.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT

From the time it became an independent republic in 1838 to the electoral defeat of the Sandinista party in 1990, Nicaragua became well acquainted with internal conflict. In the years immediately following independence, rivalries between Conservative elites in the city of Granada and Liberal elites in the city of León had often sent the country into bouts of civil war. Hoping to defeat the Conservatives once and for all in 1855, the Liberals invited American filibuster William Walker to aid them in their cause. Once the fighting was over, however, Walker declared himself president of Nicaragua. Liberals and Conservatives, along with other Central American nations, were forced to cooperate in order to expel Walker from the country, finally succeeding two years later. The utter failure of the Liberals’ attempt to seize power led to thirty years of Conservative rule that ended with the ascendance of the Liberal president and dictator José Santos Zelaya in 1893.

Zelaya’s ultimate downfall in 1909 was the result of his opposition to American imperial ambitions in Latin America, and more specifically Central America. His fall also ushered in the beginning of Nicaragua’s second wave of American occupation, this time by the U.S. Marines, who installed a U.S. friendly “puppet government” in 1910. From 1912 to 1929, minus a one year hiatus in 1925, the U.S. Marines occupied Nicaragua with the purpose of maintaining a stable pro-U.S. government in a country that was at the center of its Central American sphere of influence, though the officially stated reason was the protection of American financial investments.

Between 1927 and 1933, seeds were sown for two of the most important moments in twentieth century Nicaragua – the 45 year long Somoza dictatorship and the revolutionary movement that would later overthrow it. During this period emerged Augusto C. Sandino, a staunch liberal born of a common-law marriage between an indigenous woman and a moderately well-to-do landowner. Influenced by some of the ideologies of the Mexican Revolution and his personal opposition to the American occupation in Nicaragua, Sandino joined the Liberal rebellion against the Marines in 1926. He continued the crusade in 1927 after others laid down their arms in a U.S. sponsored peace-settlement, turning what had been a partisan conflict against U.S. troops and their Conservative allies into a campaign for national liberation. Sandino hoped to not only expel American troops from the country but to also change Nicaragua’s political landscape, advocating for land reform and the creation of a popularly based political system. However, he was far more oriented towards direct action and organization than abstract political theory, and over the course of the anti-U.S. campaign developed an effective set of tactics that were later utilized during the FSLN rebellion 50 years later.

In 1933 the United States finally agreed to sign a peace agreement with Sandino’s forces and leave Nicaragua. As their successor, the U.S. Marines chose Anastasio Somoza García, an ambitious politician who was willing to serve as a pawn for U.S. interests in Nicaragua, as the new director of Nicaragua’s National Guard. During negotiations in 1934, Sandino was kidnapped and executed on the orders of Somoza García, an event that marked the beginning of a 45 year dictatorship that passed from Somoza García to his two sons. The Somoza’s close political ties with the United States was an integral source of their power, as well as their ability to brazenly pilfer Nicaragua’s resources without recourse.

7 Ibid., loc. 483.
8 Ibid., loc. 523.
9 Ibid., loc. 524.
In 1961, a new opposition guerrilla movement named the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), was established in honor of the legacy of Augusto Sandino. Initially unsuccessful after suffering multiple setbacks and a split into three different factions, support for the FSLN swelled during the presidency of Somoza’s youngest son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Following a series of scandals, including the alleged coordination of the assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, a popular anti-Somoza newspaper editor, the Sandinistas were flooded with newly converted supporters. Due to this influx of support, and the reunion of the “three tendencies,” the revolution finally succeeded in 1979, when the FSLN carried out its final offensive, seizing Managua and winning the unconditional surrender of the National Guard and the national government.  

Not surprisingly, the U.S. was displeased with the revolution’s success. During the first year of the new Sandinista government, the FSLN enjoyed relatively peaceful relations with the United States as the Carter administration offered Nicaragua economic aid as a way to encourage them to orient their policies toward Washington’s interests. This was also a period in which the FSLN consolidated power by expanding its popular base, modernizing the Sandinista armed forces, and pursuing ambitious social programs like a literacy campaign that lowered the illiteracy rate from 50.4 percent to 12.9 percent over five months.  

Following the election of Ronald Reagan, U.S. attitudes towards Nicaragua became increasingly hostile. Considering the Sandinista government to be a real world “application of the domino theory,” Reagan was intent on squashing the Sandinista regime by any means necessary in order to prevent the United States from becoming “the last domino” to fall to Marxism. This pressure was applied through military and economic support for the Contra warriors (anti-Sandinista counterrevolutionaries), while also leveling high economic sanctions against the FSLN. In 1990 the United States got its wish when war weary Nicaraguans chose the National Opposition Union coalition over the Sandinistas in a presidential election that would mark the end of the first Sandinista regime. However, although the FSLN ultimately lost this drawn out struggle for power, the years of the Contra War were marked by a robust propaganda apparatus where political posters and other forms of public art were used to rally Nicaraguans and foreigners in support of the revolution.

**MEXICAN MURALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY**

The idea of using public art in the interest of revolutionary goals dates as far back as the French and American revolutions. In postrevolutionary Mexico, however, this practice took on a new dimension as the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) used the promotion of public art as a way to construct national identity. Following the deeply divisive Mexican Revolution, the leaders of the ruling PRI were faced with the task of creating national cohesion among groups that had recently been at war with one another. In order to bridge the gap between peasants, the middle class, militant rebels, and other disparate groups with conflicting interests, the government used art and culture as a way to help people imagine themselves as part of a united “revolutionary family.” Public art, in this case murals, was used as an easily understood yet symbolic way to create an imagined national community through images. Murals by more staunchly pro-revolution artists like Diego Rivera often contained familiar symbols that would have been recognizable and interpretable by multiple levels of Mexican society, notably peasants who were overwhelmingly illiterate. The Sandinista government would use similar tactics with its political posters, employing specifically Nicaraguan colloquial phrases in its slogans and using commonly understood images like the red and black (“la rojinegra”) of the FSLN party flag or the the blue and white stripes of the Nicaraguan national flag.
Murals, like Rivera’s *Our Bread* \(^{15}\) were public education tools that taught people how Mexicans were supposed to look, and what type of person a proper revolutionary Mexican should be. This tactic was informed by a belief that in order to develop a national identity and sense of solidarity, people needed to know who their fellow citizens were. Literally in the case of *Our Bread*, and more figuratively in other pieces, murals also taught people that “every” member of Mexican society had something to contribute to the revolutionary family. In *Our Bread*, women, for example, showed their commitment to creating a modern revolutionary Mexico by fulfilling traditional gender roles and embracing the “indigeneity” of Mexico’s “postrevolutionary mestizo\(^{16}\) modernism.” \(^{17}\)

The PRI also subsidized public works projects, funded national schools of art, and sent their most prized artists abroad for commissions in other countries, tactics the Sandinistas also employed in order to “[codify, protect, and disseminate] national culture.” \(^{18}\) Art, as Mexican muralists believed, existed to be at the service of the people. From the point of view of a government attempting to consolidate power and establish political legitimacy, art in service of the people was useful for their goals of creating civic consciousness and instilling national identity with the state and a revolutionary identity with the governing party. Sixty years later the Sandinistas would appropriate the Mexican Revolutionary idea of using art as a means of public education for the more immediate goal of creating a revolutionary national identity, one that would compel its citizens to rally in support of the Nicaraguan Revolution.

**CUBAN POSTER ART**

Still euphoric from the triumph of the 1959 revolution over the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, the heyday of Cuban poster art spanned from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. During this period Cuban artists, much like their Mexican predecessors, used public art as a way to instill national pride as well as a revolutionary culture and identity among its citizens. Artists worked in conjunction with the state to produce “a conscious application of art in the service of social improvement”\(^{19}\) not just with regard to posters, but with other art forms like film and music. Early revolutionary Cuba also shared key similarities with the early Sandinista government, such as an eagerness to consolidate their revolution through centralized state apparatuses, and a government that actively supported the promotion of socialist social programs and public arts projects. Cuba, however, was not the first revolutionary movement to understand the power of political posters. What distinguished Cubans from their predecessors was their focus on avant-garde graphic design and a heterogeneity of style, two characteristics that would also define the aesthetics of Sandinista posters later in the century. \(^{20}\)

Most Cuban posters were produced under three government agencies: the Cuban Institute of Cinematic Art and Industry (ICAIC), the Editora Política, and the Organization in Solidarity with the People of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAAL). Most important for understanding the development of Nicaraguan mass media are ICAIC and OSPAAAL. The ICAIC’s importance comes from its early adoption of the silk screening method, which allowed it to become the primary source of an identifiable Cuban style of poster art after the revolution. OSPAAAL played a key role in the development of Sandinista political posters because of the transnational nature of its operations. Founded in Havana in 1966, OSPAAAL was conceived during a tricontinental conference of delegates from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America with the purpose of promoting socialism and communism in...
the Third World. Popularizing a new form of Cuban “art of solidarity” through the international distribution of its *Tricontinental* magazine, artists throughout the world, including Nicaragua, became acquainted with the Cuban aesthetic through the posters OSPAAAL included in its magazine.

More directly, OSPAAAL artists made and produced posters in support of the FSLN in *Tricontinental* both during and after the triumph of the Nicaraguan revolution, in addition to direct contact with the country through fairs and exhibitions. The relationship between Nicaragua and OSPAAAL was one of cooperation instead of tutelage, however, although direct collaboration with the FSLN waned throughout the 1980s until the campaign was finally abandoned with the defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990. Throughout this period artists like OSPAAAL’s Rafael Enríquez Vega considered themselves to be lending their technical skills to people who were “fighters, not artists,” but still wanted to use political posters as a way to rally people towards their cause. Over time, Nicaragua’s domestic production matured to the point where they were able to produce pieces on their own.

Themes and techniques used in Cuban art and propaganda posters also influenced the content of Nicaraguan media production. Due to the fact that Cuba is an island country highly dependent on foreign imports, frugality was a recurring theme in public campaigns as waste reduction and resource sustainability were promoted as ways of supporting the nation as it suffered the effects of U.S. economic embargo. Similarly, agriculture, the basis of Cuba’s export economy, gained a prominent role in public campaigns. Posters “equated economic self-sufficiency with the military sacrifice of the revolution,” with one 1971 poster using the phrase “as in Vietnam” to inspire rural sugar and tobacco farmers to emulate the “tenacity, organization, and discipline” of those fighting against the U.S. in the Vietnam War. The Sandinistas used similar messages in their attempts to gather people behind the more quotidian ways they could support the revolution against the “Yankee invasion,” especially as Nicaragua was sent into desperate poverty due to American economic sanctions. Many posters contained images of rural peasants farming or harvesting food for the benefit of the country and the revolution.

Education was another recurring theme in Cuban posters, due to the government’s high success rate in decreasing illiteracy and providing universal access to school. While the armed struggle may have ended for most Cubans, an important part of Cuba’s poster art campaign was emphasizing the connection between education and revolutionary militance. One 1972 poster featured a book morphed into an AK-47 underneath a slogan that read, “Education: A Weapon Against the Enemy,” and another featured the face of a young person declaring their desire to study to become a teacher. The Sandinistas used much of the same imagery in their posters, equating educational success, especially though their literacy crusade, with advancing the goals of the revolution. Nicaragua’s rich literary tradition was also emphasized, with many posters containing the image of Rubén Darío, an influential poet in Latin American literature.

International solidarity was another central component of Cuban poster art. Most solidarity themed posters focused on contemporary issues like the Vietnam War or the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Over time, Nicaragua’s domestic production matured to the point where they were able to produce pieces on their own.

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22 Ibid.
23 See appendix 1
24 *La revolución es un libro y uu hombre libre*, 30.
25 Ibid., 31.
26 See appendix 2.1
27 See appendix 2.2
28 *Cuban Poster Art*, 37.
29 See appendices 4.6 and 4.7
30 See appendix 2.3
31 See Appendix 2.4
32 See appendix 4.1
States. Posters often declared Cuba’s public support and symbolic solidarity with these movements, such as an OSPAAAL poster made in commemoration of the assassination of Black Panther Party leader George Jackson. Other posters were more theoretical, critiquing “American imperialism.” One example is another OSPAAAL poster that distorted the classic Uncle Sam image in order to encourage people to support the Cuban cause. Some common themes of Cuban solidarity posters like the honoring of martyrs and criticizing U.S. intervention made their way to Nicaragua, where Carlos Fonseca, founder of the FSLN, and Augusto Sandino were prominently featured on posters produced by multiple branches of the government.

DEFENDING THE REVOLUTION: NICARAGUAN POLITICAL POSTERS

Both subtly and overtly influenced by public arts movements in Mexico and Cuba, Nicaraguan poster art was promoted as not only existing for the good of the people, but for the good of the revolution. The Department of Propaganda and Political Education (DEPEP) internalized Minister of Culture Ernesto Cardenal’s words, “Culture is the revolution, and the revolution is culture,” as a guiding praxis for the propaganda aspect of the anti-war effort. Part of this practice included using posters as a way to advertise attempts to reconcile with discontented Nicaraguans in the center of the country and along the Atlantic coast, where many viewed the Sandinista rebellion as another example of internal colonialism at the hands Spanish speaking Nicaraguans.

One example of this appeasement was a revision of National Literacy Crusade posters after indigenous and afro-descendent people on the Atlantic Coast found it culturally insensitive that they were being taught how to read and write in Spanish as opposed their native languages. As an attempt to repair the situation and create a more inclusive image of the revolutionary community, literacy brigade posters were redesigned and printed in English as well Miskito, Sumu, and Rama, the most widely used indigenous languages in Nicaragua. DEPEP also made posters specifically targeted to the black Creole population on the southern Atlantic coast by producing posters in English that featured black people along with mestizos. Others were inclusive of indigenous communities, with one poster featuring a young dark-skinned (and therefore likely indigenous) girl being exalted as a representation of the nation.

Integrating indigenous and Afro-descendent Nicaraguans into Sandinista poster campaigns was critical because they were among the groups most vocally opposed to the FSLN. Though they initially considered the Sandinista government a welcome change from the Somoza dictatorship, some, like the Miskito on the northern part of the Atlantic coast, came to resent the Sandinistas. Episodes of forced migration and an insistence on assimilating costeños (people who live on the Atlantic coast) into preexisting mestizo political networks on the Pacific side of the country fostered distrust between Miskitos and the FSLN. Later disputes over Miskito land claims further alienated them from the revolutionary government and pushed them to mount an armed (though not Contra related) insurgency against the Sandinistas. Publicity campaigns, like the previously mentioned culturally sensitive literacy brigade posters, were one way of symbolizing Sandinista attempts to reconcile with marginalized

33 See appendix 2.5
34 See appendix 2.6
36 The Atlantic coast is an autonomous region on the eastern coast of Nicaragua that was a British protectorate rather than a Spanish colony like the western and central parts of the country. As a result, most people speak indigenous languages or English Creole as their first language instead of Spanish.
37 See appendix 4.2
39 Ibid., 233.
groups and integrate them into the larger revolutionary family.

In its posters, the FSLN also depicted the Contra War as a purely U.S. backed invasion, choosing to not acknowledge the domestic grievances of anti-Sandinista fighters like the Miskito. Posters carried phrases like “No to U.S. Intervention,” or caricatures and phrases meant to rally people around the idea that they were personally defending their land and their country against American invasion. One such poster featured an exaggeratedly drawn peasant holding a machete and a gun saying, “This land is my land and no yankee will take it away from me!” Images of martyrs like Carlos Fonseca and Augusto Sandino were also used to mobilize domestic support for the revolution, suggesting that defending Nicaragua against the Contras and the U.S. was how citizens could preserve the legacy of the nation’s two most prominent heroes.INTERNationally, the FSLN made a concerted effort to foster support for the revolution, often collaborating with foreigners in order to broadcast their message to audiences who lay outside their borders. FSLN officials understood that international support was necessary not only for boosting morale, but also as an “integral part of [a] multifaceted strategy to... overcome [material resource] shortages.” Numerous posters were printed for use by solidarity groups throughout Europe and North America in multiple languages, most commonly English, Spanish, and German. Posters meant for international consumption often contained slogans expressing solidarity with Nicaragua’s struggle, containing phrases such as “Nicaragua will win,” “Free Homeland or Death,” or “Solidarity with Nicaragua.” In addition to European and North American partnerships, the FSLN also made an effort to reach out to other Latin American progressives in order to build reciprocal solidarity, since a number of international posters were made in Latin American countries that were embroiled in their own battles against U.S. supported military aggression.

The FSLN also expanded its international reach through its partnership with OSPAAAL, which distributed pro-Sandinista posters across the world in its Transcontinental magazine. The international solidarity movement’s importance in the FSLN’s anti-war mobilization effort cannot be understated because it allowed the Sandinistas to publicize their cause on an global scale. That publicity, as they understood, provided them with a human, material, political, and symbolic capacity for resistance against the Contras that they would not have been capable of achieving on their own.

CONCLUSION

Drawing from historic and contemporary sources of inspiration, the FSLN crafted a anti-Contra War poster campaign that mobilized an audience of both domestic and international consumers. In order to walk the line between appealing to these audiences, the Sandinistas were forced to teeter between contesting U.S. interventionist policies, nurturing a sense of national and revolutionary pride, and acknowledging the ways in which they had disenfranchised minorities within their own borders. Finding this balance was essential because it allowed them to reconcile with the people whom they had oppressed without jeopardizing the “revolutionary mystique” that gave the FSLN credibility and broad support within Nicaragua and globally.

To construct these sometimes contradictory images they utilized strategies developed by the Cuban and Mexican governments decades prior. In its content, the Nicaraguan campaign resembled the Cuban poster art movement, especially in its themes of international solidarity and honoring fallen national heroes.

40 See appendix 4.3
41 See appendix 1
43 See appendix 4.4
44 See appendix 4.5
45 See appendix 4.5
46 “The Nicaraguan Revolution and the U.S.-Nicaragua Solidarity Movement,” 86.
Though partnerships with groups like OSPAAAL and other solidarity networks around the world gave the FSLN international credibility and pragmatic advantages it would not have been able to achieve on its own, it was ultimately the national climate that determined the outcome of the Contra War. As a result, this exploration of how U.S. intervention was contested by Nicaraguans within their country’s borders offers insight into how the war was fought not only militarily but ideologically, and how these domestic conditions in conjunction with international ones helped determine its outcome.
Art in Defense of the Revolution

Bibliography


Appendix 1: Examples of OSPAAAL posters made for the FSLN

1. “Commander Carlos Fonseca all of Nicaragua says to you: ‘present,'” (1986)\(^1\)
2. 1983
3. “Sandino lives,” 1985
4. 1987

\(^1\) Carlos Fonseca was a teacher and librarian and was one of the founding members of the FSLN. He was killed before the revolution’s triumph and is considered both a national hero and a hero of the revolution.
Appendix 2: Examples of Cuban posters

1. “Only that which is necessary,” 1981
3. “I Am Going to Study to Be a Teacher,” 1971
5. 1971
6. 1980
Appendix 3: Example of a Mexican Mural (1928)
Appendix 4: Examples of Nicaraguan Poster Art

1. Jornada de la Independencia Cultural “Ruben Dario”
2. Estoy Enamorado de una chavala de 4 años
3. Esta Tierra es Mi Tierra: No me la quitarán!
4. Eine Schule für Nicaragua
5. V Jornada de la Defensa y la Producción
6. Un solo ejercito en la defensa y la producción
7. “No somos aves para vivir del aire, no somos peces para vivir del mar, somos hombres para vivir de la tierra.”

Art in Defense of the Revolution
1. “Day of Cultural Independence, ‘Rubén Darío,’” – “Through the fatal pages of history, our land is made of vigor and glory, our land is made for humanity.” 1984. Image of Rubén Darío (left) and August Sandino (right). Two national heroes in Nicaraguan history.

2. “I’m in love with a girl who’s four years old – The Revolution is a young girl with heart,” 1983.

3. A German poster asking for solidarity with Nicaragua by helping build a school in the city of Masaya

4. “This is my land and no yankee will take it from me!”

5. Latin American Solidarity posters from Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama. “País desconocido” means “country unknown”


7. “We are not birds that live off of the air, We are not fish that live off of the sea. We are men who live off of the land.” 1979.
In early 2013, the Fossil Free campaign at Washington University in St. Louis put out a survey to assess students’ opinions about divesting the endowment from fossil fuel companies. We noticed a trend in the “Issues You Care About” section of the survey. Students overwhelmingly cared most about social justice issues, yet seldom associated social justice issues with climate change. Groups of WUSTL environmentalists and artists researched and illustrated specific instances of the struggle for environmental justice worldwide, while a team of architecture students designed the exhibition. Weekly meetings throughout the semester facilitated budget revisions, design review, discussions about depicting distant communities in art, and textual and artistic critique. The resulting exhibition, Climate Change: Stories for Social Justice, was displayed on the Women’s Building Lawn on Danforth Campus from April 28th to May 11th 2013 and September 15th to September 21st 2013.
The goal of this project is to tell a story of the intrinsic, indissoluble relationship between human rights and fossil fuel consumption and extraction. We hope these stories may remind viewers of environmental justice violations occurring in their own backyards. In the spirit of those communities standing up across the planet for the security of their homes and families, we garner responsibility to take immediate local and global action. The project is ongoing and welcomes new collaboration.
Coal Mining & Child Labor [Meghalaya, India]
By Michelle Nahmad and Bree Swenson

In Meghalaya, India, “rat hole” coal mining degrades the once lush natural habitat and pollutes the air and soil. Unscientific mining practices acidify surrounding waters, causing even more harm. But what sets apart these coal mines from others worldwide is the practice of using child labor. Because regulations are lax and unenforced, around 70,000 children under the age of sixteen work in about 500 mines state-wide. Children are valuable workers because they are small enough to fit into the tiny “rat holes” of the mines which access the coal beneath.

Coal is the main industry in Meghalaya and often provides the only opportunity for children to find employment. Some children are trafficked in from Nepal and Bangladesh, and local children are obligated to work in order to pay for their schooling and earn money for their families in the hopes of a better future. But these mines are extremely dangerous places for anyone, let alone a child, to call a workplace. Daily exposure to coal mining drastically increases risk of chronic illness such as heart, lung and kidney disease. Years of unregulated drilling cause mines to be very unstable, and prone to collapse at any moment. “Of course I feel scared but what can I do?” said Surya Limu. “I need money, how else can I stay alive?” He claims to be 17, but is thought to be much younger. Young mine worker Gopal Rai added a sobering comment: “When I leave home for work I have no idea if I will come back alive.”
For the past 38 years, I’ve spent my days as a fisherman on this peaceful island. But over the course of my life, I’ve noticed steady changes in the daily scenery.

Shores creep closer to the edge of the village, and docks once far above the water now barely touch its surface. Over the course of my life, I have come to a realization.

Our island will not stay inhabitable for much longer.

In my dreams, I often find myself trapped, unable to move, as a pool of water steadily rises around me.

Fly with my daughter, my village… I can only help but wonder if, in a matter of decades, they will even have a place to live.

As I continue to fish, I follow the news, and hope that the demands of my nation...

...will not fall on deaf ears.
Disappearing Islands [Maldives]
By Andrew Kay, Rachel Goldstein, and Sophi Veltrop

Maldives is an archipelago of 1,100 small islands west of India. It is the third most endangered nation due to flooding from climate change, as a rise of just three feet would render the entire country uninhabitable. The economy is primarily dependent on fishing and marine products. Increases in ocean temperatures stress coral reef ecosystems, which in turn affect fisheries and the livelihood of Maldivians. Saltwater intrusion affects agricultural yields and access to drinking water. As atmospheric temperatures rise, mosquitoes extend their ranges and spread diseases such as dengue and Chikungunya fever.

Maldivians have become outspoken about the implications of climate change at an international level. Former President Mohamed Nasheed explained that “if carbon emissions continue at the rate they are climbing today, my nation will be underwater in seven years.” The government has taken serious steps towards building a climate resilient economy and developing a carbon-neutral nation. A multi-donor trust fund provides innovative financing and investments that have proven successful to date. The country has over 200 projects underway at present and hopes that first world nations, which emit the most greenhouse gases by far, will take similarly aggressive measures.

Many small island nations face the threat of rising waters, as well as countries with low-lying coasts such as Bangladesh. Many sections of the United States are particularly susceptible to flooding. The 600-mile shoreline between North Carolina and Boston will experience rising tides at three to four times the global average rate, while California may see a six-inch rise in ocean levels by 2030. “It’s going to be difficult for the U.S. to be a world leader unless they themselves embrace it,” Nasheed believes.
Climate Change: Stories for Social Justice
Shell Oil Pollution [Niger Delta, Nigeria]

By Georgia McCandlish and Sophi Veltrop

Nigeria is home to the world’s third largest delta, which has recently become one of the most oil-polluted places in the world. This unique wetland habitat supports important fish migrations and mangrove forests, currently suffering from oil pollution, transportation and mining. A research team coordinated by the Nigerian Conservation Foundation and supported by international NGOs found that in every year between 1956 and 2006, the amount of oil spilled averaged at about 11 million gallons – the equivalent of the famous Exxon-Valdez oil spill of 1989 in Alaska.

The villages of Goi, Oruma, and Ikot Ada Udo have suffered especially bad spills. Last October, four farmers from these villages took Shell to court to demand that they take responsibility for the pollution. Shell was held liable in January for one of the five claims brought against it. While the prosecutors are upset that Shell was not found guilty on all charges, others say this is a success, as this is the first time Shell has been ordered by the courts paid for damages. “I think this will be a lesson for Shell and they will know not to damage people’s livelihoods,” said Friday Akpan, a man who received reparations from the company after 47 of his fishing ponds were rendered useless due to pollution.

Militancy from groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has been another outlet for anger towards Shell, and succeeded in shutting down half of Nigeria’s oil output until an amnesty in 2009. Nigerians in the area say that Shell reports spillages at far less their actual volume. Shell blames most of the spills on militant resistance, but there has been no independent, neutral investigation on the causes of the spills. Furthermore, the residents are gaining nothing from the extraction, while Shell gets 10% of its revenue from Nigeria, and the Nigerian government makes $10 billion a year from oil. Those who live in the Niger Delta must deal with polluted drinking water, dying fish and crops, forest fires, and constant gas flares that pollute the air. Among many inspiring Nigerian activists, Comrade Sunny Ofehe is notable for starting the Hope for Niger Delta Campaign, which seeks to ensure environmental, economic and social rights for the people of the Niger Delta.
Climate Change: Stories for Social Justice
Typhoon Bopha [Mindanao, southernmost island of the Philippines]

By Nancy Yang and Trevor Leuzinger

In the Philippines, typhoons occur annually from June through November, and typically affect the northeastern islands. On December 4th, Typhoon Bopha hit the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. Over 400 people were killed and thousands left homeless. Storms of that magnitude very rarely hit the country so far south that late in the year. Thus, shifting weather patterns and increased storm severity make disaster relief more difficult to prepare for.

Resilience on the island is a remarkable model for international leadership within the climate conversation. The Philippine Movement for Climate Justice is a coalition of 103 organizations whose collective goal is to ‘lead the joint struggles, campaigns and actions in putting forward the climate justice framework as a fundamental element of solving the climate crisis.’ Their many campaigns include ending coal mining and promoting a renewable energy economy, cutting emissions, and facilitating Philippine adaptation to a hotter planet. One important rally was held on International Human Rights Day outside of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, where activists insisted upon the link between environmental issues and basic human rights. Another rally, called ‘Tour of the Fireflies,’ mobilized thousands of people to ride their bikes. The issue of sustainable transportation is particularly pertinent to the US, as 27% of emissions come from transportation sources.

In addition, the Philippine government has created the Climate Change Commission, a policy-making body that will coordinate and monitor climate action initiatives at a national scale. Naderev Sano, lead negotiator for the Philippines in the UN’s 2012 COP 18 Climate Change Conference, said: “No more delays, no more excuses... Please, let 2012 be remembered as the year the world found the courage to find the will to take responsibility for the future we want. I ask of all of us here, if not us, then who? If not now, then when? If not here, then where?”
Russia’s Political Weapon: Natural Gas

Parallels between the 1973 Oil Embargo and the Russia-Ukraine

From Protest to Global Conflict

On November 21, 2013, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich announced the abandonment of an impending trade deal with the European Union that would have provided the Ukrainian economy with a much-needed boost. Instead, Yanukovich favored closer economic cooperation with Russia. The Ukrainian public did not view this decision by Yanukovich favorably, as the thought of Ukraine returning to the Russian-sphere of the Cold War era haunted many pro-western Ukrainians. By November 30, pro-EU protesters had filled the streets demanding Yanukovich sign the trade agreement with the EU and not retreat back into the economically detrimental Russian sphere of influence. After a brutal crackdown on these protesters by Yanukovich, the movement only gained momentum, and by December 1, 300,000 protesters had filled the streets of Kiev demanding that Yanukovich be ousted. After months of bloody protests, the Ukrainian government finally removed Yanukovich from power on February 22, 2014, and Yanukovich fled to Russia. By the end of February, Russia had begun to slowly get involved in the conflict, gradually moving military forces across the Ukrainian border into the region of Crimea under the guise of better protecting the Russian-speaking population in the region. By March 1, Russia’s military engagement in Ukraine escalated when the Russian parliament authorized President Vladimir Putin’s to use military force against Ukraine. Within the span of five months, a purely domestic series of protests escalated into a potentially global, East-West military conflict.

The European Union and their western allies have been forced to formulate a response to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty from unchecked Russian aggression. There is one major complexity standing in the way of an adequate, forceful, and timely response by the EU: natural gas. Europe is extremely dependent on Russian natural gas, with nearly 30% of all of Europe’s natural gas consumption originating in Russia. Putin has cut off Russia’s supply of natural gas to Europe before, and the possibility of this happening again is very real if the EU response to Russian aggression does not sit well with the Russian President. Thus, Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas wholly alters the EU’s ability to adequately respond to the growing tensions in Ukraine amidst Russian aggression.

Energy independence is a term constantly used by the media, the public, and policymakers alike in the United States over the past half century. The dangers of reliance on foreign energy have been made clear to the United States, especially in the wake of the 1973 oil embargo that crippled the American economy. Those who discuss energy independence are often referring to the risk associated with the United States’ dependence on oil from the consistently unstable Middle East. The risk associated with critical resource dependence however is not just an American problem: it is a global one. The brewing tensions between Russia and Ukraine demonstrate that the dangers of dependence on foreign energy are currently omnipresent in the European Union as well. Approximately 30% of Europe’s natural gas consumption is imported from Russia, and Russia has continually threatened to cut the supply of natural gas to Europe depending on how the EU’s response to the recent buildup of tensions.

The use of energy as a political weapon is not simply a thing of the past. This piece chronicles the parallels between the EU’s reliance on natural gas from Russia, Russia’s ability to abuse this reliance for political gain,

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1 “Ukraine Crisis Timeline,” BBC Europe, March 4, 2014

with the United States’ dependence on foreign energy and how its reliance was exploited by the Arab oil producing states in 1973. I ultimately argue that the risk associated with dependence on foreign energy is a global and current geopolitical problem, not just an American one of the past.

October 17, 1973: The Day Energy Became a Political Weapon

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria, with the support of multiple other Arab states, launched a surprise attack against Israel on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year in Judaism. This would mark the beginning of what would later be known as the Yom Kippur War. In response to this attack, the United States backed the defense of Israel though financial aid and military equipment. The American support helped Israel successfully fend off the attack leaving the Arab states extremely unhappy with the United States and other states that supported Israel [Canada, Japan, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom].

By 1973, American oil production had reached its peak. Furthermore, the nation was significantly dependent on oil from the Middle East, as many of America’s primary oil fields in Texas and Oklahoma, the cornerstone of American energy production over the past century, were maturing and their production was declining. As a result, the epicenter of global oil production had shifted from the United States to the Middle East. In 1973, the United States produced ~nine million barrels of oil per day, but consumed ~fifteen million and half of America’s oil imports came from OPEC member nations. This dependence, however, was never viewed as dangerous. Oil had never before been used as a political weapon, and the supply of oil to the United States up to 1973 was steady, reliable, and secure. The events following the United States’ support of Israel in the Yom Kippur war, however, changed the landscape of geopolitical risk associated with dependence on foreign energy.

On October 16, 1973, OPEC cut production of oil by 70%, skyrocketing the price of oil. The next day, OPEC initiated an embargo on oil exports to the United States and the other nations that had supported Israel: the embargo would last until March of the next year. The price of gasoline in the United States spiked, massive gasoline shortages ensued, and the American economy was nearly crippled. The embargo blindsided the United States. America had relied on a steady supply of oil from the Middle East, and could not rapidly pivot to other sources to mitigate the embargo’s effect. OPEC had true leverage over the United States as a result of American dependence on Middle Eastern oil. For the first time, the Arab oil-producing states set the precedent for using energy as a political weapon against nations who were dependent on their energy. The dangers of critical resource dependence were clear.

Current Parallels to 1973: The European Union’s Dependence on Russian Energy

Understanding the historical precedent of the use of energy as a political weapon is integral to understanding the complexities of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the international response. We must next detail the extent to which the EU is dependent on Russian natural gas. In 2012, the European Union produced 5.7 BTUs [British Thermal Units] of natural gas, and consumed 17.3 BTUs, making it only 33% self-sufficient. Natural gas makes up a sizeable portion of total energy consumption in the EU at ~23%. To make up for the 66% gap between what it produces and what it consumes, the EU imports a large majority of its natural gas from

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4 Energy Information Administration Database <www.EIA.gov>
Russia’s Political Weapon: Natural Gas

Russia. It is estimated that 30% of total EU natural gas consumption comes from Russia. Although this may not seem like such a large amount, the EU's energy infrastructure is designed on efficiently importing natural gas from Russia through pipelines; a pivot away from this to other sources of natural gas or other energy sources would be a significant undertaking and would take significant time and capital. Moreover, certain countries are far more exposed to Russian natural gas than others. According to a 2007 European Commission report, Russian imports of natural gas account for 100% of natural gas consumption in Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania; 98% in Slovakia; 92% in Bulgaria; 78% in the Czech Republic; 76% in Greece; and 60% in Hungary. To put this into perspective, in 1973 the United States was only receiving ~20% of the oil it consumed from OPEC, compared to 100% of natural gas consumption coming from Russia for a number of European countries or ~30% on average for all of Europe.

It is clear that the EU is significantly dependent on Russia for natural gas, but why is this so dangerous? As history has demonstrated, the net oil-exporting nations on which others are reliant have the ability to use this dependence as political leverage to gain an optimal outcome. The world is one of interdependence, so dependence on a foreign nation for a resource is not dangerous in and of itself. Yet, in this case, the dangers of the EU’s reliance on Russian energy are two-fold: (1) energy is a critical resource that no nation can currently live without. Thus, it is not simply the fact that the EU is dependent on Russia for a good or service, it is the fact that this good is a critical resource that without, a nation and its economy cannot function; (2) even if one is reliant on another nation for a critical resource, it is not dangerous unless that nation chooses to abuse that reliance for leverage or as a weapon. Unfortunately for the EU, the potential for this abuse is all too real, as it has been threatened and executed by Russia before.

Russia currently stands in the identical place OPEC stood in 1973, with the political weapon that is energy in hand. Likewise, the EU takes the role of the United States as the vulnerable dependent nation(s) involved in a foreign crisis that threatens their energy supply. Putin has threatened to cut the flow of Russian natural gas to the rest of Europe: if this happens, the EU will virtually be brought to its knees as the United States was in 1973, and it will be unable to pivot to new sources of natural gas before existing built-up inventories are depleted. This is an extremely dangerous situation for the EU to be flirting with. When the United States supported Israel in 1973, energy had never before been used as a political weapon and the dangers were arguably less clear, but today, there is clear precedent of the dangers of such an action.

The EU’s dependence on Russia for natural gas adds a new level of complexity to the conflict. Russia has aggressively moved troops into, and now formally annexed a region of a sovereign nation, but because of its energy-based leverage over the EU, Russia’s aggression must be combated in a very careful and nuanced manner.

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The EU wants to unequivocally support Ukraine against unchecked Russian aggression, but no EU policy makers have been willing to assume the same risk the United States took in 1973, and allow their economies to be potentially crippled by having access to Russian natural gas removed. At the same time, the EU cannot stand to simply appease unprovoked Russian aggression in its backyard for fear of upsetting a stable status quo in the region. The use of energy as a political weapon is once again in play, and severely limits the potential responses by the EU.

Calls for energy independence in Europe are widespread amidst the impending conflict. Many believe that energy independence is solely an American goal because of the demonstrated dangers of the United States’ reliance on unstable Middle Eastern oil. The 1973 oil embargo clearly demonstrated the dangers of dependence for the United States, but more importantly, it set the precedent for the use of energy as a political weapon. The risk to the EU posed by Russia’s use of natural gas as a political weapon is equivalent to the risk posed to the United States in 1973. The parallels between OPEC’s use of energy as a political weapon in 1973 and Russia’s threatened use of energy as a political weapon today are clear. If the tensions in Ukraine escalate into a true military conflict, and Russia decides to cut the supply of natural gas to Europe, the world will clearly see that dependence on foreign energy is not simply an American-centric risk; but a global one.

The protests in Ukraine are ongoing, and the situation seems far from resolved both internationally and domestically. A series of domestic protests against Russian economic influence in Ukraine has led to a potentially dangerous global conflict and ultimately the formal annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea by Russia. Understanding the nuances of Russia’s energy-based leverage over the EU however is imperative to understanding the complexities of the situation and the formulation of a response by the European Union.
Women’s Social Movements in Morocco
A History and Analysis of Events Pre and Post Arab Spring

Introduction

In the early months of 2011, the Arab Spring took hold in Morocco following similar uprisings in Egypt’s Tahrir Square and Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution. On February 20, 2011 thousands of protesters gathered across Morocco’s major cities, demanding reforms like an end to autocracy, more job opportunities and greater compliance with international human and women’s rights norms. The protests led to sweeping constitutional reforms within a matter of months, absent of the upheaval or violence that punctuated the uprisings of other states in the region. Many Moroccan scholars consider the events of February 20th to be a pivotal moment for social movements in the country. The significant role that women’s rights activists and civil society organizations played in organizing this movement cannot be overlooked and is worthy of exploration. In fact, some scholars have even argued that the Moroccan events of the Arab Spring would have never been feasible if not for the Moroccan women’s rights uprisings in the early 2000s.1 This essay examines the women’s movement in Morocco prior to, during, and after the February 20th movement and the Arab Spring, focusing on the movement’s strengths and weaknesses while also assessing the future of the movement and its implications for Morocco as a whole.

It is impossible to discuss women’s social movements in Morocco without mention of the Moudawana, the country’s unique legal code. Since Morocco’s independence from France in the late 1950s, Moroccan law has featured this aforementioned “family code.” The Moudawana details all aspects of family life including, but not limited to, marriage, divorce, children, polygamy, property, and inheritance. These laws impact all stages of a woman’s life and have historically restricted her social and legal autonomy. The Moudawana is based on a variety of Islamic literature including the Qur’an, the Hadiths and other Sunni texts, and is similar to the family codes of many other Muslim nations.2 At its establishment, the Moudawana was a very patriarchal text, regarding women of all ages as minors who required the guardianship of a male tutor.3 For much of Morocco’s history, men have controlled the public sphere, while women were almost exclusively confined to the private sphere and it was unthinkable for them to consider leaving that realm. In the 20th century, however, especially after the Kingdom procured independence from France, Moroccan women began to infiltrate the male-dominated academic and professional settings. Even so, the public sphere continues to be seen as the male domain, and witnessing women assert agency over their lives through public protest remains somewhat jarring for some Moroccans.4

As Moroccan women entered the public sphere, they felt that they must fight to gain agency over their own lives, especially in light of low literacy rates among women and the patriarchal leanings of the Moudawana. The changing demographics and circumstances of Moroccan life prompted many to insist that a new family code more in line with the new realities of a modernizing Morocco be adopted.5 With the exception of some minor changes made by King Hassan II in 1993, the Moudawana had remained largely the same since its creation, until a major reworking of the code took place under the guidance of the new king, Mohamed VI, in 2003 and 2004. Thanks to these recent reforms, Morocco’s family code is now considered one of the most progressive in the Islamic world. However, the

Part I: Pre-Arab Spring 1970s-2011

The road to reform and the true dawn of the women’s movement can be traced back to the 1970s under the reign of King Hassan II, during the tyrannical era known as the “Years of Lead.” During this period the Moroccan people were extremely repressed, as King Hassan II did not tolerate freedom of speech, expression, or the press, and cracked down heavily on those who criticized him and his policies. Those who advocated for democracy, along with the political opponents of the king’s regime, were prone to forced disappearances, torture and imprisonment. Mohamed El-Boukili, a founding member of the Moroccan Association of Human Rights, explains that in the late 1970s activists and concerned citizens around Morocco began forming civil society groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to draw attention to Morocco’s rampant oppression and organize Moroccans who were concerned about their human rights.

Initially, many of these newly formed civil society organizations faced heavy oppression from the state. The king’s intolerance of women’s rights and human rights organizations stood in stark contrast to the newly established Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which had been set forth by the UN in 1981. Fatima Outaleb, a founding member of the Union de L’Action Feminine (UAF), explains that her organization was founded in 1983 following the creation of CEDAW with the intent of organizing women and lobbying decision makers to advance women’s causes in hopes of bringing Morocco’s law into compliance with the international standards laid out in CEDAW. At first, the UAF focused mainly on printing political women’s newspapers and magazines to educate Moroccan women about their rights and encourage them to participate more in civil society and political movements. During the 1980s and early 1990s, women’s issues became a much more prominent topic within the public discourse, due to the permeation of groups like UAF, international legislation like CEDAW and increases in the number of urban, literate and educated Moroccan women. Women’s groups similar to the UAF began holding conferences, symbolic tribunals and various seminars to educate and organize women who were concerned about their rights. This era was deemed the “professionalization” era of the women’s social movement in Morocco, as activists developed these groups into formal associations with offices, governing bodies, official publications and significant funding. Now, many of these NGOs and activists have had formal contact and occasional collaborate with official state institutions, such as the departments of Human Rights, Education, and Justice.

In 1992, the UAF helped to demonstrate the public’s vocal demand for reforms by gathering 1 million signatures on a petition asking for the reform of the Moudawana. Additionally, the Committee of Coordination for the Reform of Moudawana was established to coordinate the efforts of various civil society groups in order to exert pressure on the Moroccan monarchy to comply with international women’s rights norms. Following these actions,

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the women’s movement celebrated the realization of its first major achievements in 1993 when the Moudawana was reformed for the first time and King Hassan II finally ratified CEDAW, more than 10 years after it was drafted by the United Nations. Fatima of the UAF viewed the ratification of CEDAW and the minor Moudawana reforms as the first major victory of the Moroccan women’s movement, but knew the movement would have to continue forward if more improvements were to be made. The reforms were meager at best, and despite Morocco signing onto CEDAW, very little initiative had been taken to attempt to align Moroccan laws and policies with the provisions laid out in CEDAW. Additionally, when King Hassan II signed and ratified the convention, a reservation was added onto the ratification stating that Morocco would not enforce any provision within CEDAW that contradicted existing national or Islamic laws. Women’s and human rights groups in Morocco knew immediately that persuading the government to abandon these reservations would be crucial for the advancement of the status of women.

In 1994, Amnesty International established a Moroccan branch in an effort to improve the state of human rights in the country. This new branch sought specifically to strengthen the women’s rights movement’s campaign by lobbying the Moroccan government to comply with international laws and standards, such as CEDAW. Amnesty’s letter writing campaigns and petitions to the Minister of Justice demanding unprecedented reforms set the tone for a new era of Moroccan social movements. During this time, many established Moroccan women’s associations began receiving attention, collaboration, support and funding from the international community, further cementing their presence in Moroccan political and social discourse. As the 1990s rolled into the turn of the century, a storm began to brew in Morocco: women’s associations and Morocco’s many NGOs started preparing to demand something radical—a new Family Code. The accession of a new monarch to the throne, King Mohamed VI, in 1999 heralded the prospect of a new era of women’s rights and civil society recognized that it was time to act. Moroccan activists believed that the new king, while still holding absolute power, would be more liberal and welcome to change than his deceased father who had heavily repressed human rights activists. Several massive protests in 2000, namely those in Casablanca and Rabat, in combination with critical evaluations of Morocco’s adherence to CEDAW published by the UN in 2003 finally convinced the new king to command the parliament to draft a new Moudawana. The reformed Moudawana was voted on and unanimously passed in 2004. Women’s rights activists in Morocco and the international community heralded the move as a victory for feminist civil society and for all women of Morocco. Mohktar El Harras, a professor of sociology at Morocco’s Mohamed V University, feels that the Moroccan feminists are the most active and dynamic in the Arab world, their tenacity has resulted in what he feels is the most progressive family code in the Arab world. Though conservative and Islamist Moroccans have presented a number of complaints about it, this Moudawana reform is an achievement in and of itself because such a sweeping refashioning of legislation was unprecedented in Morocco’s history.

Major changes to the family code included establishing a minimum age of marriage (18 years of age), confirming that men and women are equal partners in marriage with equal responsibilities, abolishing the requirement of a male legal tutor in marriage, requiring a man to obtain special permission from a judge if he wants to take a second wife, and granting women the right to initiate a divorce and other important advances regarding paterni-
ty, child custody and inheritance law. While the reformed family code is a drastic improvement from preceding versions of the code (and other family codes in the region) and is more compliant with CEDAW than ever before, many activists acknowledge that it is still not enough to guarantee the equality and freedom from discrimination that they have strived for. The reformed family code continues to allow polygamy, which is considered a violation of human rights, and fails to address issues like domestic violence and rape.\(^\text{16}\)

Following the 2004 Moudawana reforms, there was once again a shift in the feminist movement in Morocco. This era is categorized by the greater institutionalization of the women’s movement. David Meyer, a professor of social movement theory at UC Irvine, describes institutionalization as the process of incorporating certain elements, concerns, and ideas of protest and dissident movements into governing structures or legislative practices.\(^\text{17}\) Following the 2004 reforms, special councils and government offices were created to oversee women’s issues. Some key groups from the women’s movement, such as Amnesty Maroc and the UAF, partnered with the government to report their concerns on women’s rights, providing the government with research to better inform Moroccan policymakers and governing bodies on the status of women in Morocco.

An increase in political participation also contributed to further institutionalization. Many women’s NGOs encouraged and enabled women to become educated and to actively participate in parliamentary and local elections. Women became much more involved in their local political affairs, running for local positions and entering town councils.\(^\text{18}\) At the national level, a mandate passed in 2002 that required the Moroccan parliament to maintain a minimum number of female members in order to better serve the modernizing Morocco. Organizations like the UAF began to focus on capacity building for parliamentary candidates in regards to women’s issues so that they would be able to effectively advocate for these issues within the Moroccan government.

Though increasing the number of women active in the Moroccan government is a crucial step towards progress, the parliamentary mandate for a larger number of female parliamentarians does not necessarily constitute the most effective path towards progress. Fatima Outaleb has expressed that there is a serious problem with nepotism in the Moroccan government. For example, when there was a demand for more women to serve in parliament and hold government positions, the wives, sisters and family friends of the male officials were commonly selected, rather than women who were more qualified for the positions. For this reason, the UAF feels that having a core group of highly educated and trained women representatives is more beneficial to women’s rights in Morocco than simply increasing the number of women holding government positions. Additionally, the UAF works to train law enforcement workers around Morocco to be well versed on the Moudawana laws and other legal concerns for women, like human trafficking and the sex trade.\(^\text{19}\)

The greater institutionalization of the women’s movement and continued integration of CEDAW is reflected by the Moroccan government’s increased emphasis on the importance of women to the progress and development of Morocco. In 2002 Yasmina Baddou, State Secretary of The Ministry of Family, Solidarity and Social Affairs at the time, stressed that women and their empowerment are a crucial component of Moroccan economic development.\(^\text{20}\) In Morocco, economic gain and empowerment are viewed as a self-perpetuating cycle: empowered women contribute to the nation’s economy and women with economic opportunities are able to exercise agency

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over their own lives. The economic empowerment of women leads to their greater integration into not only the Moroccan economy, but also the public sphere of everyday Moroccan life, permeating the public discourse with women’s concerns and issues.21

Dr. Mohktar El Harras stated that education is the key to empowering women and guaranteeing their rights in Morocco. In this case, education, includes improving literacy for all, providing basic schooling for rural women for whom it was not available previously, conducting classes that provide marginalized women with marketable skills such as baking and weaving, educating citizens on their government and democracy and educating women about their rights in Morocco and their human rights.22 The Moroccan education system is improving, but many portions of the population are still marginalized. Throughout the 2000s, many NGOs and government ministries shifted their focus and began emphasizing grassroots education to fill in the gaps left behind by government programs. Groups like Global Rights focus on capacity building work in Morocco to improve women’s access to justice and to educate women on their rights as well as to assist NGOs that focus on teaching women marketable skills. Global Rights asserts that women who are economically empowered and educated on their rights will be able to recognize when these rights are being violated and will exercise agency over their own lives to organize themselves and better demand that their rights be upheld.23

Simultaneous to the institutionalization of the women’s movement in the early 2000s was the development of a counter-movement. While the pro-women’s rights demonstrations marched in favor of sweeping reforms to the Moudawana, large counter-protests condemning the call for reform also materialized. These counter-protesters were mostly associated with conservative, Islamist groups such as the Party for Justice and Development (PJD), Morocco’s largest Islamist political party. Many Islamists argued that the 2004 reforms to the family code are not compatible with the Qur’ān. Furthermore, many argue that Morocco should not be concerned with international women’s rights norms because the concept of cultural relativism makes Morocco exempt from certain portions of CEDAW. Critics of the convention argue that Sharia Islamic law often conflicts with specific stipulations of CEDAW such as the treatment of polygamy, which has been practiced in Morocco for centuries24.

Despite the opposition from many Islamists and conservative Moroccans, the women’s movement progressed onward in the years leading up to the 2011 Arab Spring. Many women’s rights NGOs became heavily involved in educating the Moroccan public on the new Moudawana and how it would impact their lives. The UAF coordinated a media campaign, utilizing television, women’s magazines and the radio to educate Moroccans about the family code.25 Meanwhile, Global Rights engaged in an extensive grassroots education project to educate rural, often illiterate, women on their universal human rights, as well as their new rights under the reformed Moudawana26. Due to the greater awareness of women’s rights and the institutionalization of the movement, a number of laws were passed that dealt with some of the issues that the 2004 Moudawana reforms failed to address. The parliament reformed the national labor code to take into account concerns over sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace. In 2007, the citizenship code was also reformed, making it easier for Moroccan women to pass down their citizenship to their children, something that was previously only allowed if they were Muslim and married to a Moroccan man. Additionally, in 2009, the Moroccan legislature finally began to address the problem of

inheritance and property rights of women. Many Moroccan women, especially in rural areas, have been deprived of the right to earn income from ancestral family lands simply because of their gender.\textsuperscript{27} Traditionally the issues of inheritance and property rights have been handled on a case-by-case basis, but women’s NGOs have been urging the parliament to create standardized laws of inheritance.\textsuperscript{28}

While the institutionalization of some components of the women’s movement enabled activists to move towards their desired goals, the Moroccan legislature failed to address several of the movement’s critical demands. In particular, many Moroccan human rights and women’s rights groups were very concerned about the reservations the government had put forward when it committed to CEDAW.\textsuperscript{29} In 2008, many governments across the Arab world, Morocco’s included—were not striving for greater compliance with CEDAW and this prompted certain NGOs to once again take matters into their own hands.

In 2008 Amnesty International staged one of their well-known letter writing campaigns, writing letters to the wives of the heads of states in Middle Eastern and North African nations, encouraging them to improve women’s rights and better adhere with CEDAW. One of those letters was addressed to King Mohammed VI’s wife, Princess Lalla Salma, urging her to ask her husband and the Moroccan parliament to drop the reservations on CEDAW. Morocco was the first nation to respond to these letters and soon after, the king announced that he was planning to drop some of the reservations Morocco had applied to CEDAW during the ratification and signing process.\textsuperscript{30}

The years from 2004 to 2010 were defined by institutionalization and growing empowerment and were calm compared to the environment of protest cultivated prior to the first Moudawana reform. The coming events of the new decade, however, would soon echo back to the era of popular resistance in the early 2000s.

Part II: The Arab Spring

In late 2010 and the early weeks of 2011, the Arab Spring spread like wildfire across the Arab world. Starting in Tunisia, the contagion spread to countries like Egypt and Bahrain, finally arriving in Morocco in February of 2011. The Moroccan manifestation of the Arab Spring, known as the February 20\textsuperscript{th} Movement, began that day when thousands of protestors marched down Rabat’s Mohamed V Avenue to demonstrate in front of the Moroccan parliament building. This protest was echoed by numerous demonstrations in other cities throughout the nation. The protestors demanded everything from an end to autocracy and corruption to greater job opportunities to education and healthcare reform. Protests across the nation continued throughout the year, but the government’s initial responses to the demonstrations were swift. In March of 2011, just weeks after the first Moroccan foray into the Arab Spring, King Mohammed VI took to the airwaves to announce that he had organized a committee to rewrite the Moroccan constitution and propose a potential referendum. In June 2011, the king announced on television that a vote for constitutional reforms would take place on July 1\textsuperscript{st}.\textsuperscript{31}

The reforms of the 2011 constitution are unprecedented in Morocco’s history, touching on aspects of Moroccan politics and culture ranging from redefining the king’s power to protecting indigenous languages of Morocco. Under the new constitution, all citizens are guaranteed freedom of ideas, thought, and artistic expression. Additionally, women are granted civil, political, and social equality with men. Despite the many reforms in the referendum, many human rights organizations and international observers still largely criticize the new consti-

\begin{itemize}
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\item \textsuperscript{29} Mr. Boukili when discussing the obstacles to human rights progress. El Boukili, Mohamed. Interview by author. Personal interview. Rabat, Morocco, November 21, 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Bouabid, Touria. Interview by author. Personal interview. Rabat, Morocco, December 6, 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Rahman, Zamir. “Morocco’s bottom-up movement for reform.” Foreign Policy. December, 2011.
\end{itemize}
Morocco is not much closer to democracy that it was before, and women’s rights activists are concerned that several women’s issues were largely ignored by the reforms. Still, many Moroccan citizens and international observers view the movement as a success because significant reforms were achieved without the upheaval of the current ruling monarchy or extreme violence. While women’s rights were not the main focus of the February 20th demonstrations or of the constitutional reform, women’s activists knew that issues like education and health-care reform are very important to Morocco’s women and will undeniably impact their lives.

Additionally, some feel that such a large organized protest effort, such as the February 20th movement, would have never transpired had it not been for the women’s rights protests in the early 2000s. Mohamed El-Boukili, a director at the Moroccan Association of Human Rights, argues that such a mass demonstration would be unfeasible without the networking of many NGOs and civil society organizations. These groups were able to coordinate their efforts to better organize their members, allowing demonstrators to benefit from each other’s contacts and past experiences. Work organizers, political parties and NGOs came together to form the network known as the Council for the Support of the February 20th Movement (CNAM20), ultimately helping to bring the movement to fruition. Even since the constitutional referendum, CNAM20 is actively trying to further the progress of democracy and social reform in Morocco. El-Boukili notes that the women’s associations were particularly crucial to the success of this network because they have had such a long history in organizing and networking. The knowledge and techniques of Morocco’s women’s organizations became instrumental to the success of the movement. Women make up much of the leadership in CNAM20 and at organizational meetings regarding events, issues, and strategies, women’s rights and concerns are given equal attention as all other matters. Both Mohamed El-Boukili and Mohktar Harras noted the tenacity and passion of the women’s movement seems to have spread to the marchers of the Feb 20th movement.

Despite the importance of women within the movement, some scholars worry that women’s rights issues will be left behind as the country shifts its focus away from the Arab Spring and the February 20th Movement. Before the new Moroccan constitution was passed, many activists urged the Council for Constitutional Reform to take gender equality into consideration, asking the Parliament to not let Islamists and religious hardliners use scripture to promote patriarchal practices in the new constitution. The new constitution does indeed establish civil, political, and social equality for women, but otherwise, makes very little specific mention of women or women’s rights.

Part III: Moving on from the Arab Spring

As 2011 came to a close, so did many of the protests and uprisings of the Arab Spring. While the movement is now long over, it has left an undeniable mark on Moroccan daily life. CNAM20, the networking organization that helped organize Morocco’s civil society for the February 20th movement is still very active in staging a myriad of events, from demonstrations to press conferences and concerts. Furthermore, some scholars feel that the February 20th movement reminded women’s rights activists and civil society organizations of the power of protest and that the 2011 constitutional referendum has become living proof of the power that public protest and demonstrations can have over governments. Since the end of the Arab Spring, many Moroccans consider protest to

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be a very important part of modern and democratic life, explaining the daily demonstrations in Morocco’s capital city. Multiple times per week, unemployed degree-holders march in front of the parliament building demanding public employment. The unemployed marchers are joined by other demonstrations, sit-ins and events demanding increased democracy, less corruption and education reform. Among the most active of these groups are women’s rights activists.

Some feel that since much of the commotion surrounding the Arab Spring has died down, women’s activists should now seize the opportunity to put gender equality issues in the spotlight again. The focus for many women’s organizations has shifted to gender violence, including domestic violence and rape, as Morocco’s laws, including the Moudawana, do not address gender violence. Morocco received a great deal of negative international attention in 2012 over Amina Filali, a 16-year-old rape victim who committed suicide after being forced to marry her rapist. A controversial clause of the Moroccan penal code allows rapists to avoid jail time and being held accountable for their actions by marrying their victims. Victims and their families are often encouraged to pursue these marriages because girls who have been “corrupted” by rape can avoid public shame and being ostracized from society by marrying their rapists. The incident highlighted not only the lack of laws that protect victims of sexual assault and gender violence, but also the failure of the law to uphold the Moudawana. In this case, 16-year-old Filali was under the minimum age of marriage, 18 years old, but her parents pressured a judge to grant an exception so their family could avoid being publically shamed by the incident. The girl’s death triggered protests by women’s activists around Morocco, calling the government to reform the penal code and acknowledge gender violence. Some activists framed Filali’s death as a consequence of the “systematic discrimination against young women” through the parliament’s prolonged failure to pass gender violence legislation.

In late 2012, attempting to capitalize on the momentum of the Arab Spring, women’s rights organizations organized a series of protests and events called the “Dignity Spring.” The goal of this movement was to educate and raise awareness of gender violence as well as lobby for legal reforms. It involved demonstrations, sit-ins, television and radio campaigns, social media and press conferences in several Moroccan cities. These are techniques the UAF initially utilized after the passing of the new Moudawana, but adapted for contemporary Moroccan life as social media outlets, such as Facebook and YouTube, have become extremely popular.

In addition to the UAF, Amnesty Maroc has also become increasingly involved in the movement against gender violence. Amnesty has been conducting a “Stop Violence Against Women” campaign since 2004, but magnified its efforts in 2012 by staging a series of special events in Morocco focused on gender violence. This initiative, known as the “16 days of Activism,” included a well-attended sit-in in front of the Moroccan Parliament building in Rabat on November 25, 2012, the International Day Against Violence Against Women. All of the events were organized and conducted with the coordination of many of Morocco’s prominent human rights and women’s NGOs. At the sit-in, Amnesty Maroc volunteers and representatives handed out pamphlets on gender violence, and gathered signatures for petitions from pedestrians. Participants held signs in Arabic, French, English, and Amazigh (Berber), ensuring that everyone passing by would be able to understand the protesters’ message and inform the international community that the Moroccan people are ready for progressive legislation on gender violence. The sit-in quickly attracted a camera crew from Reuters International and a huge crowd of bystanders. Students at the sit-in, both male and female, expressed that they felt that the goals of the sit-in and other gender

41 Bouabid, Touria (Amnesty International), Interview by Author, December 6, 2012.
violence protests were realistic and that these have a far greater chance of being successful than other protests, especially given the passion of the women’s rights activists and their past successes with the Moudawana. In January 2013 it was announced that the Moroccan rape laws would be amended so that the punishment for rape would fall on the rapist rather than the victim and that families would no longer be able to marry off their daughters who have been raped in order to restore the family’s dignity. While many activists are thrilled at the outcome of their effort, there is still a lot of work to be done. The amendments failed to address issues such as spousal rape and many other long standing discrepancies over the outdated and inadequate domestic violence and sexual harassment laws in Morocco’s legal code. Additionally, despite the progress made in recent years, many activists feel that the Moroccan parliament has done very little in the way of continuing to bring Moroccan laws into compliance with CEDAW and remove contradictions with international law.

Part IV: Challenges, Criticism and Outlook for the Future

As previous sections of this essay have discussed, Morocco has come a long way since its independence in the way of women’s rights. Behind that progress has been the continual growth and transformation of the Moroccan women’s movement. Moving forward, the movement faces a number of potential roadblocks. First is the Islamist movement, specifically the Party for Justice and Development (PJD). Following the 2011 parliamentary elections, the PJD won the majority of the seats and is currently the ruling party. Many Islamists, including the PJD, were opposed to the 2004 reforms citing that the new Moudawana contradicts Sharia law. They feel that international standards such as CEDAW should not be applicable to Morocco due to the nation’s unique Islamic history and culture. With the proliferation of conservative Islamists in the parliament, it is easy to see why it might be difficult to get progressive gender equality measures passed.

Aside from the Islamist opponents, the parliament continues to pose problems for the movement. As mentioned in the previous discussion of the UAF’s work in capacity building for parliamentary candidates, there is a large problem with nepotism in the Moroccan parliament and various government bodies. While there has been a focus on increasing the number of women in the parliament, this practice has not always benefited the gender equality and women’s rights movements. Fatima Outaleb explains that approximately 30 women currently serve in the parliament, but only 10 of them are genuinely willing and capable to work passionately for women’s causes. Not all women in legislature have to fight for women’s causes, but having more qualified and passionate parliament members lobbying on behalf of the women’s movement certainly would not hurt the cause. While Fatima Outaleb’s organization works to train potential candidates for government positions and campaign for women’s activists to work in parliament, many members of parliament and government bodies do not share the same fervor about women’s rights or they simply are uneducated on issues of gender equality.

Lastly, in regards to parliament, there is the issue of CEDAW and other international standards. It is very difficult to force nations to comply with international standards. In fact many nations sign these sorts of conventions simply to protect their reputation, even if they have no intention of enforcing them. While some groups, like Global Rights, believe that by educating Moroccans on CEDAW they will be able hold the government accountable, educating every woman and community about CEDAW and other legal rights is a monumental task.

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42 Anonymous demonstrators (Students at Mohamed V University), in discussion with the author, November 25, 2012.
46 Bouabid, Touria (Amnesty International), Interview by Author, December 6, 2012.
Moving away from the physical roadblocks to the progress of the women’s rights movement, there are a number of important criticisms and analyses of the movement that are worth discussing. Some Moroccans doubt the influence of the women’s organizations and feel that major reforms that have been made should be credited to the king rather than the collaborative work of activists. Many Moroccans perceive their young king, Mohamed VI, as a progressive and forward-thinking monarch who is very concerned about the future of his country. His supporters cite his commitment to furthering democracy and development as the true driver behind the Moudawana reform and other adjustments.  

Others doubt the king’s commitment to women’s rights and feel that the only reason he supported the Moudawana reforms and new constitution was to preserve his international reputation. Critics note that the king may have wished to avoid the instability associated with large protest movements, while point to economic motivations, arguing that the monarch likely wanted to avoid the bad press and loss in tourism revenue that follows violent crackdowns and political upheaval. Therefore he enacted swift reforms to placate protesters and save himself from the international embarrassment that other regimes have faced when attempting to deal with protests and uprisings. Mohamed El-Boukili considers this ability to be one of the strengths of protest movements, as they draw unwanted attention and instability to regimes, which may motivate governments to actually consider reforms. As many groups noted after the Arab Spring, the instability and chaos that can be brought on by protest movements can be an effective motivator. If the Moroccan government is reluctant to pursue reforms, many organizations are more than willing to pursue such methods to motivate progress.

Despite the potential advantages of protests, some scholars call into question the long-term viability of this strategy. Many other groups have been inspired by the successes of the Moudawana and Arab Spring protests, but scholars Francesco Cavatorta and Emanuela Dalmasso doubt that the methods of the Moroccan women’s movement and the country’s strong civil society will bring the long-term goal of democracy to the Moroccan people, asserting that liberal reforms do not guarantee further liberalization. Cavatorta and Dalmasso refer to Morocco as a “liberalized autocracy” where liberal reforms are achieved through undemocratic means. They argue that protesting for specific reforms and issues, as opposed to greater democracy, will only lead to the consolidation and confirmation of the king’s supreme power. While the fact that some activists on February 20th denounced the king as a dictator and a tyrant is unprecedented for the current monarchy, many of the loudest voices for democracy and regime change quickly faded after the constitutional reform. Moroccan activists seem to be more interested in lobbying to the authority of the king rather than demanding greater pluralism, which only serves to increase their dependency on his power. Cavatorta and Dalmasso propose that by demanding greater pluralism and increasing the proximity between the legislature and the women’s movement through the greater political participation of activists, Morocco’s women’s movement can help move the country towards democracy.

Looking forward it is difficult to predict the future of the women’s movement: will Morocco ever fully be in compliance with international gender equality laws and conventions? Will the Islamists work with the women’s movement or against it? Will activists continue to rely on the authority of the king or will they instead demand pluralism? In order to move forward from this point, a number of suggestions for the women’s movement should be taken into consideration.

First, Moroccan activists need to reconcile their desire for progressive reforms with Morocco’s deep Islam-
ic heritage and, as such, Islamic law and text must be approached in a new way so as to justify gender equality. Scholar Nouzha Guessous encourages Moroccan legislators to expropriate the holy texts that make up the basis of Morocco family law and gender legislation, so that they can be reinterpreted with the changing realities of Moroccan life in mind. This process, known as “culture-deconstruction-reconstruction,” allows for traditional values and culture to be reconciled with human rights dialogue to change some of the long-held beliefs about Islamic scripture and develop a more hospitable environment for progressive change. Guessous hopes that this may overcome some of the opposition from Islamists.\footnote{Guessous, Nouzha. 2012. “Women’s rights in Muslim societies: Lessons from the Moroccan experience.” \textit{Philosophy & Social Criticism} 38, no. 4/5: 525-533. \textit{Academic Search Complete}, EBSCOhost (accessed April 20, 2013)} As mentioned previously, some doubt the king’s commitment to women’s equality, but his authority may prove helpful in regards to Guessous’ process of culture-deconstruction-reconstruction. As king, Mohammad VI also serves as the “commander of the faithful,” meaning he is the highest religious authority in Morocco and may act as a mediator to reconcile conservative trends with the progressive international women’s rights agenda. In this way he could use his power to persuade his citizens to accept a more liberal interpretation of Islamic texts and Sharia law.\footnote{Belhabib, Soumaya. Interview by author. Email interview. Rabat, Morocco, December 5, 2012.}

Next, while Moroccan civil society has come to see protest as their own form of popular democracy, a greater emphasis on political participation demanding pluralism rather than lobbying the king on specific issues is necessary. Throughout the preceeding decades, the movement has organized protest activities around defined grievances, choosing to pursue liberal reforms through undemocratic methods. As the movement advances forward, they should instead pursue liberal reforms through democratic means by lobbying for greater democratic practice and pluralism. Finally, pursuing greater institutionalization of the movement will help to increase the presence and proximity of activists with policymakers. Well-educated and trained activists who obtain government positions can serve as effective lobbying tools for the women’s movement when sit-ins and protests might otherwise seem disconnected from the parliament and the real decision makers. Some feel that for satisfactory gender equality and women’s rights legislation to become reality, Moroccan women must first define their own reform. A critical part of that process will be the greater integration of activists and women’s organizations into the policy-making process and legislative organs.

The passion and tenacity of Morocco’s women’s rights activists is undeniable. This vigor is obvious when examining literature concerning the women’s movement or the words and actions of the movement’s leaders and organizers. The Moroccan women’s movement is considered the most active and dynamic in the Arab world, which has been proven by their transformation and growth over the past four decades. While their accomplishments are unprecedented and their activities never-ceasing, there remains much work to be done. It can be said with great certainty that on the long road to progress, Moroccan women will never give up.
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Women’s Social Movements in Morocco


Shot.
A man with veiny hands tucked
In his pockets
(where perhaps laid weapons)

Boom. Down.
Hands untucked now
Dust coating his fingernails
Ignorant, unmoved
Warmth flees his skin
Swathed in escalating air

His land collects his blood
Coalescing in the soil
Dirt, roots, buds
Ancestors, neighbors, adversaries
Partitioned wholes
On January 30, 1972, British troops opened fire on a group of Roman Catholic civil rights marchers in Derry, Northern Ireland, an area also known as The Bogside. Thirteen unarmed protestors died, thirteen more were injured. The marchers were only a few of ten thousand protesting the British policy of internment, which denied suspected members of the International Republican Army (IRA) the right to trial in Northern Ireland. The event, known as Bloody Sunday, was a significant moment during the course of the thirty-year period known as “The Troubles,” during which loyalists and republicans violently tried to lay claim to the counties of Northern Ireland.

For a long time, the facts of the violence were contested. The British army asserted they opened fire only after being shot at, while the protestors claimed the British shot first. It was only in 1998 that Tony Blair, British Prime Minister at the time, ordered an investigation into the events of Bloody Sunday that came to be known as the Saville Inquiry. Twelve long years later, on June 15, 2010, the findings of the report caused then Prime Minister David Cameron to apologize for the role that British soldiers had in the death of innocents on Bloody Sunday. Cameron declared, “there is no doubt, there is nothing equivocal, there are no ambiguities. What happened on Bloody Sunday was both unjustified and unjustifiable. It was wrong.”

I penned an earlier version of “Amalgam” during a trip to Ireland with my Freshman Focus Program, “The Literary Culture of Modern Ireland.” This poem marked one of the most poignant moments of my time in Ireland. With peers and professors, I walked down the very street in Derry where Bloody Sunday took place, noting the murals that depicted the traumatic events that occurred there. It wasn’t until later that night, alone in my room, that I began to process the day’s events in writing.

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I. Introduction

Toulouse is not extremely well-known to audiences outside of France. Despite the fact that it is one of the country’s five largest metropolitan areas, academic literature about the city is extremely sparse compared to that of Paris, and even somewhat so compared to Marseille. Nevertheless, the city occupies a unique intersection of populations and ideas that are both characteristic of France as a whole and yet quite different from what one would find in any other of the country’s major cities. Academic literature written in English about Toulouse is particularly lacking. However, when Mohammed Merah, an Islamic extremist resident of the immigrant neighborhood Trois Cocus, killed seven people merely a month before France’s 2012 presidential elections, the world took notice. In order to provide a context for the recent tragedy, Toulouse was, for once, accurately and succinctly described for Anglophone readers. On March 27, 2012, Scott Sayare wrote in the New York Times:

As near to the Spanish border as it is to the Mediterranean, this sunny red-brick city has long been known as a place of welcome and diversity, far removed from the divisive politics of Paris. In contrast to much of the French south, the far right, with its virulent anti-immigrant stance, has little presence here. Nor does radical Islam. Toulouse is by no means without racism, anti-Semitism, crime or the deep social segregation that marks many French cities, but with a culture shaped by successive waves of immigration, it is described by its inhabitants as a place of particular tolerance. Hundreds of thousands of Spaniards fled the Franco dictatorship into France after the Spanish Civil War, and many settled here. So, too, did the pied noirs, the French expelled from newly independent Algeria in 1962, as well as the harkis, the Algerians who had backed the French colonialists, and thousands of Jews.\(^1\)

Although medico-social organizations and holistic approaches to medical care for marginalized patients certainly exist throughout France, Toulouse appears to have a particularly strong infrastructure for the poor, which often includes immigrants and refugees. This situation can be explained by Toulouse’s unique history and illustrated by the medico-social doctors that work there today. This exceptional health care infrastructure for immigrants is essential in the wider context of French immigration, which has generally been quite hostile towards foreigners. As historian Gérard Noiriel writes, “simplification makes a caricature of the presentation of the immigrant, making him a foreign body to the nation, an individual who has the right to good republican sentiments because he comes to work chez nous and do the dirty work that the French would be obliged to execute themselves if he was not there...”\(^2\) Many xenophobic attitudes face those in France of different ethnic backgrounds, even if they were born in raised in France, and the health care sector is no different. Therefore, Toulouse’s particularly open-minded medico-social clinics, as well as the doctors and personnel that run them, play an important role of protesting the status quo of discrimination in French society.

Although numerous factors played into the creation of Toulouse as a warm community for immigrants, I will focus on one event in particular: the arrival of Spanish republican refugees after the installation of Franco’s dictatorship in Spain. These individuals came to Toulouse with leftist, anti-fascist ideology that they brought to every sector, including health care. They even founded a hospital intended specifically to serve immigrants during World War II.

Next, I will draw from the interviews I conducted with two Toulouse-based doctors whose holistic

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medical approach and militant advocacy for the poor are quite representative of the processes and ideologies that made Toulouse what it is today: Jean-Paul Charpiot of the CMSO and Jean-Claude Giraud of the CPPS (Comité de Coordination pour la Promotion et la Solidarité) and founder of many other medico-social organizations in Toulouse. These two have dedicated their lives to working with different marginalized groups, including legal and illegal immigrants, gypsies, the unemployed, the disabled, and the homeless. In examining their motivations in choosing this line of work, we will see how their mission and their approach to social medicine weave intricately into the fabric that is so fundamentally Toulousan.

II. Spanish Republican Refugees Leave a Legacy of Openness

Immigrants and refugees joined with radicals and socialists in the mid-nineteenth century to form the foundation of modern-day Toulouse municipal politics. In terms of health care, Spanish refugees played a very formative role almost a century later, during World War II and the period just preceding it. These immigrants, forming one of the most significant and influential migrant waves in Toulousan history, both strengthened the city’s left-leaning politics, inaugurated a tradition of health care for immigrants, and helped support the French Resistance against fascism, an enemy with which they were painfully familiar. Through protesting fascism by their involvement in the Spanish Civil War and World War II, they formed a foundation on which future protests against French xenophobia and discrimination would be based.

The Spanish Republican refugees came to France in a period known as La Retirada, a period of mass exile away from Spain immediately after the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. Francisco Franco’s fascist dictatorship had just taken power, and his views were directly pitted against those of the Spanish Republic. Republicans believed in a redistribution of wealth and anticlericalism, espousing views similar to communism, whereas Franco’s Nationalist party adhered to fascist ideas and the superiority of the Spanish nation and race. In a showdown that would set the stage for World War II, with Stalin’s Soviet Union supporting the Republicans while Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy supporting the Nationalists, the Republicans were outnumbered and lacked important resources. Sensing imminent defeat, many Spaniards, especially those who had fought against Franco, sought refuge abroad. According to the Catalan historians Vidal and Orellana, France was the destination for Republicans who could not afford to flee farther away to the Americas: “France would be the political exile of the less fortunate, the country where most of the communist, socialist, and anarchist groups would remain.”

Given the proximity of Toulouse and its sympathy to the Spanish Republican cause, it became a natural location for the capital of the Spanish exile in France.

However, this public compassion did not mean that the Spaniards were immediately well-received and appreciated. On their arrival in France in March 1939, most refugees were placed in “work camps,” which bore more resemblance to concentration camps. However, most did not remain in the camps for long, as their services were soon needed for the French army in World War II. Although many immigrant groups joined the cause of fighting in La Résistance, Spaniards played a particularly important role, Pike reports: As antifascists, they already had three years of battle experience in Spain, and they had more reason than the French to protect themselves from a summons by Vichy’s Service du travail obligatoire [mandatory work ser-

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vice], for they had more reason than the French to fear being selected as forced laborers for Nazi Germany.\(^5\) The Spanish Republicans rallied because they likely felt that although they had failed to keep fascism from taking their own country, perhaps they could keep it from taking another. If they did not, the consequences of resisting against losing to totalitarianism for a second time would be extremely dire. Although Spaniards participated in the resistance on various political and military levels, most relevant in this essay is their contribution to the conflict in terms of health care provision. Many active members of the Spanish resistance in Toulouse were doctors, medical students, and professors of medicine.\(^6\) Towards the end of the war, in 1944, these Spanish medical professionals in exile founded *L’Hôpital Varsovie* in the Spanish-dominated neighborhood of Saint-Cyprien. It started out as a military hospital; while Purpan Hospital – one of Toulouse’s largest public health care centers – largely treated native-born French soldiers, Varsovie sought specifically to serve wounded Spanish soldiers fighting for France.\(^7\) An international convention from a decade earlier, in 1933, made this operation possible. It established the Billoux law, which permitted foreign doctors to exclusively treat their compatriots within the context of officially recognized medical institutions in the host country.\(^8\) This allowed Spaniards to establish their own institution that would last beyond the war efforts and influence Toulouse’s health care providers for decades onward.

After World War II ended, the hospital continued to operate, turning its mission towards “social medicine” and initiating larger campaigns to fight tuberculosis, cancer, venereal disease, and child mortality.\(^9\) In its transition from military to civilian medicine, it oriented itself towards the vision of the “medico-social” approach that many Toulousan clinics employ today. However, the tolerance it enjoyed as an institution run by foreigners was short-lived. By the year 1950, a Cold War mindset had infected the French mindset, and people began suspecting the organization that founded the hospital of being “politically subversive.”\(^10\) In this xenophobic context, the Spanish Republicans in charge of Varsovie handed off ownership of the hospital to Professor Joseph Ducuing, a prominent figure in Toulouse who some described as an “aristocratic communist.”\(^11\) Considered the savior of this institution that almost went defunct, the hospital was later renamed in his honor.

The hospital did not cease to operate after its administrative turnover in 1950. On 20 July 1955, it was declared a nonprofit association of the “Friends of social medicine” (*Amis de la médecine sociale*). Twenty years later, on 3 November 1976, it was incorporated into Toulouse’s public hospital system. The hospital continues to operate today in the still immigrant-dominated neighborhood of Saint-Cyprien. Its website homepage declares that its vocation, as it was at its inception at 1945, is the “amelioration of individual and communalist [communautaire] health.”\(^12\)

In its use of the word “communalist,” a negatively-connoted word linked to the idea of immigrants resistant to integration to French society, is demonstrative of its lasting commitment to the principles of health care for foreigners to which its Spanish Republican founders cleaved.

Today, the second-and-third generation descendants of Spanish immigrants have melted into the fabric of Toulouse demography, and their adoptive home considers them an integral part of its history. This

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5 Ibid., 91.
6 Ibid., 90.
9 Ibid., 6.
10 “Les Guérilleros FFI Ont Créé L’hôpital de Varsovie.”
“immigrant success story” rings true not only in the context of municipal politics, but in that of health care. Whereas the entrenchment of socialist politics in Toulouse set the stage for working-class political power and the centrality of the “social question” in city politics, Spanish Republican refugees redefined the goals of “medico-social” health care to fit the needs of immigrant communities. In the same spirit in which Toulousan doctors have continued to operate to this day, the Varsovie/Joseph Ducuing Hospital played a key role in approaching health care “always in the same perspective of social medicine and the holistic account of the patient in his entirety.”13 Despite, or perhaps because of, being the victims of xenophobia themselves, they protested the status quo by firmly entrenching themselves in the city’s health infrastructure. They adapted to the French system while retaining their Spanish republican beliefs and, in turn, adapting Toulouse’s health clinics into more open, socially-oriented venues.

Toulouse’s significant commitment to immigrant rights was illustrated by its reaction to the tragic events of March 2012, when Islamic fundamentalist Mohammed Merah shot and killed seven Toulousans, some of whom were children attending a Jewish school. This event happened almost exactly one month before the presidential elections, in which Nicolas Sarkozy, François Hollande, and Marine Le Pen were candidates. Political commentators expected the event to work in Sarkozy’s favor, since he was considered “tough on crime” and strong in issues of national security. Le Pen, the far-right candidate of the National Front party, blamed the event on high levels of immigration, although Merah was born and raised in France, a native of Toulouse’s outlying neighborhood Trois Cocus.

Unfortunately for Sarkozy and Le Pen, most French citizens were focused on concerns about the economy – considered to be Hollande’s strong point – and the event did little to raise fears about national security or immigration. On the contrary, many French citizens pointed to the xenophobic, discriminatory attitude of French conservatives as the real cause of the Toulouse tragedy. The New York Times noted how quickly Hollande took this angle, by accusing Le Pen and Sarkozy of “promoting an atmosphere of intolerance towards immigrants and minorities.”14 This opinion was shared by many Toulousans, especially Muslims. Scott Sayare, the New York Times reporter who interviewed residents of Merah’s neighborhood shortly after the shootings, writes that “Despite Mr. Sarkozy’s recent appeals for tolerance, many Muslims say he has done much to stigmatize them, pointing often to a 2010 law banning the Islamic full veil or niqab, and to a debate on the ‘national identity.’”15 The national and local sentiment, therefore, held that the frustration of third-generation immigrants in France was a symptom, rather than a cause, of greater national problems. This reflected in the presidential election results, in which, as noted before, Toulouse voted for Hollande over Sarkozy by a twenty-point margin. The French public had not forgotten about security and immigration on the national agenda, but they worried about it much less than they worried about unemployment, purchasing power, and economic growth.16 Although Toulouse did see a brief period of fear towards Muslims after the shootings, the anxiety apparently did not affect their voting preferences.17 Even in the midst of horrible tragedy, which easily could have strengthened conservative leanings, Toulouse held true to its commitment to solidarity. The Merah affair showed that this tolerance towards immigration held true not just for Spaniards, but for other groups, such as North Africans, as well.

III. Two Key Doctors in the Medico-Social Present of Toulouse

Institutions play an extremely important role in the experience that immigrants play in the French health care system, especially on the national level. However, no representation of this schematic would be complete without an examination of the role that key individuals play in acting it out on a daily basis. This holds especially true in Toulouse, with its rich tradition of committed, politically-conscious doctors in the framework of medico-social health care.

First, I will present Dr. Jean-Paul Charpiot, my mentor at the CMSO. As a pied-noir who has lived in the Toulouse region since 1966, he has a long history of working with immigrants, the elderly, and with manual laborers in the context of occupational medicine. Second, Dr. Jean-Claude Giraud’s story will be told: one of growing up in the working-class neighborhood of Saint-Michel, founding several medico-social clinics and becoming somewhat of a local celebrity, and serving as a lifelong advocate for Toulouse’s gypsy community.

Toulouse’s strong medico-social support system could not operate without the commitment of individuals such as these two, among many others, who have done much of their work either for free or at a salary well below what their American counterparts receive. They have frequently worked as immigrants not because of their difference in nationality or ethnicity, but because their unique struggles situate within the wider socioeconomic problematic of the poor and the working class. In other words, they saw immigrants as part of the “social question” that they sought to address with their medical expertise. Today, they continue the traditions set in place by Spanish Republican refugees by protesting the status quo in French health care, forming their own health associations to meet the needs of all members of Toulouse.

A. Dr. Jean-Paul Charpiot

Jean-Paul Charpiot was born in Algeria in 1948. Descending from Spanish and French roots, he grew up a member of the pied-noir community, the name given to French-born citizens who settled in Algeria when it was still a French department. In 1962, the final year of the French-Algerian War, Charpiot and his family moved to France. After spending a few years in Lille, a French city near Belgium, his family settled in Toulouse in 1966.

After finishing his medical degree, Charpiot made plans to begin his career in earnest. His parents had an idea of what that would entail, but he had other plans:

When I got my medical degree, my parents told me, ‘We found you a house in a little village in Gascogne to open your medical office!’ But that didn’t interest me. Because two years before I got my degree, I had started working with Jean-Claude [Guiraud] in a hospital service that treated the homeless, gypsies, poor senior citizens, immigrants, and young delinquents…that experience really left its mark on me.

Other experiences also influenced his desire to work with marginalized groups of people. As a pied-noir, Charpiot shared the experience of being forced to leave the place he grew up. In working with North African immigrants in particular, he was able to rediscover pieces of his past: “When I was little in France, I spoke Arabic. Afterwards, I forgot it a bit.” However, working with immigrants also interested him because they constitute “one form of a social class.” He sees them as part of the “social question” that also includes the working-class, the poor, the homeless, etc.

He continued to work with Guiraud after completing his medical degree by volunteering at the Migrant Health Consultation that Guiraud had founded. Since the organization was small and only had money to pay the interpreters, all of the doctors, including Charpiot and Guiraud, worked as volunteers. In order to make a living – which Charpiot cites as being one of the most difficult aspects of being a doctor in

France – Charpiot worked as a geriatrician during the day. Charpiot volunteered with the Migrant Health Consultation for over a decade, describing its efforts not as a permanent resolution to problems in migrant health care, but rather a temporary response:

It was a moment, from 1970-1980, where we made a small, temporary, local effort to respond to a problem of public health. The ideal is that people will evolve, be able to access their rights, understand for whom they work, and later to get by in the country...the example, the proof, is that the [Migrant] Consultation diminished little by little in the amount of work it had. It no longer exists. And now you see families that have found systems and habits for getting by...It's to respond to urgency: the difficulty people have in taking care of themselves. The overarching goal, it's that things change. That's why I say it's political.

The Migrant Health Consultation operated for 25 years, from approximately 1974 to 1999. In 1991, Charpiot became a salaried employee at the CMSO at Hôpital Purpan. Although he has a smaller percentage of immigrant patients today than he did forty years ago, he still recognizes that recently-arrived immigrants require a different approach in diagnosis due to three main factors: low wages, lack of social benefits, and language barriers. This was especially true for the labor migrants who arrived in large waves during and immediately after the Glorious Thirty, a period of rapid economic growth and development in France after World War II. They came with knowledge that they would find work, but little else. However, the picture looks different today, especially with regard to this group: “Today, there are hardly any more [labor] immigrants. There are children of immigrants who are French. And grandchildren.”

An extremely valuable lesson that Charpiot transmits in his interview is the idea that medicine is never apolitical, especially not in migrant health care. He says that he has encountered discrimination from other doctors based on his choice of patients, some of whom refuse to treat immigrants: “Racism exists. I hear this mentality often.” Nevertheless, he stresses that medico-social consultations such as the Migrant Health Consultation and the CMSO, as well as government-sponsored medical funds such as AME (Aide Médical d’État) and CMU (Couverture Médicale Universelle), are nothing short of a moral political stance. “Political, moral, and maybe effectively not very economical, quite simply.”

As Charpiot approaches retirement, he does not fear for the future of medico-social consultations. He knows many young doctors who plan to carry on their tradition. In addition to responding to Toulouse’s “social question” through his medical expertise, he clearly enjoys his work: “I believe that when we work, and when we find our manner of working – through the people we meet and the conversations we have – we feel that we’re a little bit useful and, narcissistically speaking, that’s very good...there’s pleasure in it, too.”

B. Dr. Jean-Claude Guiraud

Born in 1941 and raised in the working-class Toulouse neighborhood of Saint-Michel, Dr. Guiraud could not be more representative of his city’s commitment to the “social question.” He calls himself the son of “interior migrants”: his parents came from the countryside to the city in order to find work during World War II. His father worked in a factory and his mother was a maid. He says that he benefitted very much from the French education system, and as he continued to excel academically, he decided to pursue medicine as a career in order to give back to the community of Toulouse.

Two experiences from his childhood had a great influence on his later decision to work so extensively with migrants and another marginalized group: gypsies. First, he had cousins who lived on a family farm with whom he spent every summer. One summer, his cousin Jeannette fell in love with an Italian immigrant who worked as farm labor. When she told her father she wanted to marry him, he told her, “You’ll never marry a macaroni.” Young Guiraud saw this as an injustice. Later, he became friends with a man in
his apartment building in Saint-Michel who had married a gypsy woman. The couple faced a tremendous amount of ostracism, exclusion, and insults. Again, Guiraud did not understand this unfairness, and afterwards he had a strong interest to learn about gypsy life and culture.

After finishing his medical degree, Guiraud soon founded several medico-social consultations in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He took this holistic approach after seeing that gypsy and migrant health problems were entirely linked to their education levels, lodging, social integration, and difficult jobs. He realized that he could not address their diagnoses without addressing the other factors in their lives.

First, he founded an organization for gypsy health in 1969. Next, he founded a consultation for children in the 1970s, wanting to decrease the high levels of infant mortality and morbidity among poor and marginalized children. In 1971, he founded the Comité de Coordination pour la Promotion et en Solidarité (CCPS) for migrants and gypsies. This organization joined together three previous groups that had worked with these groups individually. CCPS still exists today, although its medical services are now limited due to budgetary constraints. Lastly, in 1974, Guiraud founded the Migrant Health Consultation, where he worked with Charpiot. Due to limited finances of all these organizations, he volunteered at all of them; they were undertaken outside of his regular job as a rheumatologist and an occupational doctor. After becoming somewhat of a local celebrity for his extensive medico-social work, his mother told him one time, “I see you more on TV than I do at home!”

Guiraud has been heavily involved in the research of health indicators for gypsies and migrants. He found that gypsies live 15 years less, on average, than the rest of the French population, while migrants live about 8 years shorter on average. For the former, this disparity is linked to certain lifestyle habits, such as poor lodging, a tendency to avoid secondary education, and a culture of recuperating used materials that, while ecologically friendly, can sometimes lead to interaction with toxic products. As mentioned before, the health disparity for migrants can be linked to the difficult manual labor jobs that they often have no choice but to accept.

In terms of the politics of health care, Guiraud and Charpiot largely hold the same viewpoint. “On the left, there are politics of solidarity,” says Guiraud. “On the right, and especially on the far-right, there’s a neoliberal vision that solidarity is non-essential. Therefore, there’s a dichotomy between assistance and solidarity.” Although Guiraud is now retired, he still helps out regularly at CCPS. Interestingly, this organization is located in Les Izards, which borders the neighborhood in which Mohammed Merah, the Islamist gunman, grew up. In speaking of the shootings, he aligns himself with the anti-reactionary discourse heard from Hollande in the presidential elections: “The marginalized come from the same rough neighborhoods. The youth have no jobs and no futures.” While not condoning Merah’s action, he finds it irresponsible to ignore the fact that the health conditions of migrants and gypsies are “very revealing about the gaps and dysfunctions of our society.”

Guiraud has arguably been the most influential figure in Toulouse’s medico-social scene for the last forty years. As someone who both grew up surrounded by the social question, he serves as a natural progression in the city’s history of solidarity and social politics. Although not personally an immigrant or a gypsy, he describes himself as a “militant advocate” for these groups. He has made it his lifelong mission to protest the xenophobic rhetoric that often surrounds immigrants in health care, blaming them for any financial problems that the national health system encounters. He transmits the message to citizens of Toulouse and of France at large that “cultural appreciation must not be neglected” when addressing the medical needs of diverse groups.
IV. Conclusion

Dr. Charpiot and Dr. Guiraud are only two members of the long tradition of committed doctors, one that began long before the timeline of this essay. Since, as Charpiot expressed, a commitment to health care for the poor and working class is a “political and moral” decision, it is equally important to study Toulouse’s political history as its history of immigration and health care when it comes to understanding the intersection of these different elements.

Although it saw many migrant waves arrive throughout the twentieth century, including Belgian, Italian, Portuguese, and Moroccan, the Spanish republican refugees were the most important in terms of fusing the city’s social question with the immigrant question and establishing medical facilities specifically catered to foreign populations. Toulouse remained an open community for immigrants even when a tragedy with the potential to stir up xenophobic sentiments shocked the city and the entire country. As descendants of pied-noirs and Spanish republicans (Charpiot) and of Toulouse’s working class (Guiraud), the doctors interviewed in this chapter both exemplify and perpetuate Toulouse’s strong medico-social history. This southwestern city’s particular intersection of solidarity politics, openness to immigration, and implication of immigrants in the city’s medical framework have given it a unique approach to health that merits recognition from the rest of France and, indeed, the rest of the world. Although its protest has not taken the form of boycotts and picket signs, its adaption of the standard French health care model has been no less important and no less political. By providing a supplemental alternative to public hospitals to those who need it most, Toulouse’s medico-social clinics prove that immigrant solidarity and French republican values need not be mutually exclusive.
Toulouse: A Medico-Social Protest Against French Xenophobia

Bibliography


